Snap Shot
- The question: Does race influence how jurors decide cases, and what can the research say about any particular juror or verdict?
- What the research shows: A meta-analysis of mock-juror studies found a small but significant out-group effect (about d = 0.09 for verdicts). Bias by White mock jurors appeared more often when evidence was ambiguous and race was an unspoken background factor. In 712 felony trials in two Florida counties, a conviction gap between Black and White defendants (81% versus 66%) was not seen when the jury pool included at least one Black member (71% versus 73%). Several larger experiments since 2022 found no anti-Black effect or harsher judgments of White defendants, which the authors of some of these studies suggested may reflect participants’ concern about appearing prejudiced. A few attitudes predicted verdicts somewhat better than demographics, though still modestly.
- What it does not show: These are group-level averages, consistent with most jurors showing no effect. Similarity-leniency is conditional and can reverse, little is known about Hispanic, Asian, or Native American jurors or court-martial members, and no study can show how a particular juror will vote.
- The law: Batson bars race-based strikes by every party (McCollum, Flowers); voir dire on race is required in some cases (Ham, Turner). Peña-Rodriguez reaches clear statements of racial animus, and McCleskey holds statistics alone do not prove discrimination in a case. Military law bars race in panel selection (Jeter).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the issue in selection records and in overstatement of the research, where the absence of explicit bias is not the absence of risk; defense counsel are likely to encounter it in voir dire on racial attitudes where warranted; neither side may premise argument or selection on jurors’ race.
Questions about race arise at nearly every stage of a jury trial: when a venire’s composition is compared with the community; when counsel ask whether prospective jurors can fairly judge a defendant, complainant, or witness of a different race; when a strike is challenged under Batson v. Kentucky; after a verdict, when a juror reports that another juror relied on racial stereotypes; and in capital cases, where the race of the victim has been studied as a factor in who is sentenced to death. The research is often summarized loosely in both directions, as proof that juries are generally biased or that race does not matter. Neither summary is accurate. The best evidence shows effects that are real but generally small at the level of groups, that depend heavily on the case and the trial context, and that cannot predict how any particular juror will decide. The law, for its part, forbids using race in selecting jurors regardless of what any study shows.
This paper reviews the evidence on defendant race, similarity-leniency, race salience, real jury pools, victim race in capital sentencing, and death qualification, then the limits of that evidence and the governing federal, military, and Arizona law. “Juror” refers to civilian juries; court-martial members, who serve the jury’s function in the military, are called “members” or “panel members.”
Defendant Race: What the Meta-Analyses Show
Most experimental research asks whether mock jurors judge a defendant differently when only the defendant’s race changes. Individual studies conflict, and earlier reviews disagreed about whether any overall bias existed (Sommers, 2007), so meta-analyses are the better guide.
The most widely cited meta-analysis of defendant treatment combined experimental studies involving more than 7,000 participants for verdicts and more than 3,000 for sentences (Mitchell et al., 2005; Sommers, 2007). It defined racial bias as disparate treatment of a racial out-group, that is, a defendant of a different race from the mock juror, rather than as harsher treatment of minority defendants only. The authors reported a small but statistically significant overall effect that became more pronounced under certain moderating conditions; reviewers report the effect as about d = 0.09 for verdicts and d = 0.18 for sentencing judgments (Hunt, 2015; these figures come from that secondary source and were not recomputed from the 2005 article). An effect of 0.09 standard deviations is very small; the distributions of judgments overlap almost entirely. The effect was reported to be stronger among Black participants than among White participants (Hunt, 2015). A 2017 correction revised sign and value errors in the article’s study-level appendices. Sentencing findings apply less directly because jurors in most jurisdictions do not sentence outside capital cases (Hunt, 2015).
Reviews of the experimental literature identify conditions under which White mock jurors’ judgments of Black defendants tend to be harsher: when the evidence is ambiguous, when jurors have been exposed to inadmissible incriminating evidence or inflammatory pretrial publicity, when the trial contains no racially charged issues, when jurors receive no instruction about avoiding sympathy or prejudice, and in blue-collar rather than white-collar offenses (Sommers, 2007). Each condition rests on few studies, and these reviews predate the experiments described next.
Several larger experiments since 2022 have not found the expected bias against Black defendants, and some found the reverse. In two experiments with White mock jurors (N = 1,018 and 1,253), most participants judging a Black defendant guessed that the study was about racial bias, and they convicted Black defendants less often than those who guessed otherwise (Salerno et al., 2023). In 70 deliberating mock juries, mostly of students, individual jurors were more likely before deliberation to convict a White defendant than a Black or Indigenous one, and no all-White jury convicted a racialized defendant (Maeder et al., 2026). Two sexual assault experiments by one team found more guilty verdicts for White than for Black (N = 752) or Indigenous defendants (Fraser et al., 2023, 2025). Salerno and colleagues suggested the pattern may reflect participants’ concern about appearing prejudiced, and Maeder and colleagues said their effects do not match real-world disparities.
A broader meta-analysis examined whether individual characteristics of mock jurors, including demographic characteristics, predict guilt judgments (Devine & Caughlin, 2014). Demographic characteristics were weak predictors, and a few attitudinal characteristics, such as legal authoritarianism and trust in the legal system, were somewhat stronger, though still modest. Recent mock-trial research in sexual offense cases likewise found case-relevant attitudes to be more consistent predictors of verdicts than demographic characteristics (Willmott et al., 2026). That pattern is the principal scientific reason that questioning prospective jurors about their attitudes and experiences is more informative than inferring attitudes from race.
The Similarity-Leniency Hypothesis
A recurrent finding is that jurors are, under some conditions, more lenient toward defendants who resemble them. Kerr and colleagues (1995) tested this “similarity-leniency” hypothesis in two experiments, one varying religious similarity between defendant and mock jurors and one varying racial similarity, predicting leniency when evidence was weak but the reverse when it was strong. Religious similarity was associated with more favorable evaluations and more lenient judgments regardless of evidence strength. In the race study, when the evidence was strong, racial similarity increased the likelihood of conviction, but only among mock jurors who expected to be in the racial minority on their jury (Kerr et al., 1995). The effect is therefore conditional rather than general, and it can reverse. In a manslaughter case against a police officer (416 jury-eligible community members reading a transcript), White mock jurors’ verdicts did not differ by the officer’s race, while Black, Indigenous, and other mock jurors of color were more likely to convict a White than a Black officer (Ewanation & Maeder, 2023).
An online experiment published in 2025 illustrates both the presence and the limits of similarity-leniency (Huang, 2025). It presented 1,462 jury-eligible U.S. adults, recruited to match census proportions on age, sex, and ethnicity, with a patent-infringement case in which only the defendant company’s country of origin, accompanied by a photograph of its president, varied (the United States, Japan, France, or China). Overall, liability findings did not differ significantly across the four countries (40% to 46%), although among participants who found liability, damages against the Chinese company were higher than against the U.S. company. The similarity-leniency pattern appeared in the interaction between juror and company: Asian participants found an Asian company liable 31% of the time and a non-Asian company 63% of the time, while White participants found an Asian company liable 46% of the time and a non-Asian company 39% of the time. Both interactions were significant, and stronger among the roughly 96 Asian participants. The study involved no deliberation, used a single civil case with a bounded damages scale, and drew a sample more educated and more politically liberal than the population (Huang, 2025). These are group-level averages from mock-jury studies and do not apply to any individual juror.
Similarity-leniency is sometimes cited as a reason to seek or avoid jurors of a particular race. The research does not support that use, and the law forbids it: the effect is conditional, varies across studies, and describes average group differences, and within any group many jurors show no such tendency.
Race Salience: When Bias Shrinks
Some of the most consistent findings concern when, rather than whether, racial bias appears. In one study with non-student participants, an interracial assault case was presented in a version with racially charged content and a version without it. In the racially charged version, White mock jurors judged Black and White defendants similarly; in the race-neutral version, they rated the Black defendant more guilty, aggressive, and violent than an otherwise identical White defendant. Black mock jurors showed same-race leniency in both versions (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). A second article reported the same pattern for White mock jurors (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001).
The leading explanation, drawn from research on “aversive racism,” is that people who value fairness monitor their judgments when the risk of racial bias is obvious but are less likely to do so when race is an unnoticed background factor, particularly when a race-neutral justification for a harsher judgment is available (Sommers, 2007). The authors later cautioned that the literature on “race salience” is narrower than often assumed, because later studies manipulated salience in the same way, through racially charged facts in the incident itself, rather than through other trial features (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009). The findings therefore do not show that merely mentioning race reduces bias, and racial bias can still occur in racially charged cases. Some experiments found that making race salient through racially charged facts, or through voir dire questions about racism (Sommers, 2006), was associated with less harsh judgment of Black defendants by White mock jurors; the evidence rests on few studies, and whether voir dire or instructions have this effect in real trials has not been shown.
A related experiment tested six-person mock juries composed either entirely of White members or of four White and two Black members, all deciding a sexual assault case against a Black defendant (Sommers, 2006). Diverse juries deliberated longer, discussed more trial evidence, and made fewer factually inaccurate statements, and the difference was not wholly attributable to Black members: White members of diverse juries cited more case facts and made fewer errors than White members of all-White juries. Before deliberation, White members of diverse juries were also more lenient toward the Black defendant. Half the groups received pretrial jury selection questions about racism, which also increased leniency toward the Black defendant (Sommers, 2006). A later civil experiment with 30 mock juries did not replicate the longer deliberation or broader discussion of facts, although juries with two Black members found for the plaintiff in a retail discrimination case more often and awarded more (Hakstian et al., 2022). The deliberation findings are therefore only partly replicated.
Evidence From Real Juries
Archival studies trade experimental control for realism. The most rigorous archival study examined 712 felony jury trials in two Florida counties, using the fact that the racial composition of each jury pool was close to random (Anwar et al., 2012). When the pool contained no Black members, Black defendants were convicted 81% of the time and White defendants 66% of the time, a gap of about 16 percentage points. When the pool contained at least one Black member, conviction rates were 71% for Black defendants and 73% for White defendants, and the gap was not seen (Anwar et al., 2012).
The authors described several limits. Black residents made up about 3.9% of jury pools, so the analysis compared pools with no Black members to pools with one or two, and the results may not apply where the Black population is larger. Strength of evidence was not observed, so the study could not say which conviction rate was accurate. The estimate concerns the pool rather than the seated jury; only about 40% of pools with a Black member produced a jury with a Black juror, suggesting that selection itself may affect outcomes (Anwar et al., 2012). The study shows that jury composition can matter in real trials; it does not show that any individual juror decided a case on the basis of race.
Victim Race and Capital Sentencing
The Baldus study at issue in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) examined more than 2,000 Georgia murder cases from the 1970s and found that, even after accounting for dozens of nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing White victims were about 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing Black victims. A 1990 synthesis by the U.S. General Accounting Office reviewed 28 studies and found that 82% reported that the race of the victim influenced the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving a death sentence, a finding it described as remarkably consistent across data sets; the evidence on defendant race was, in its word, equivocal (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990).
These studies measure the entire capital process, including charging decisions, and the GAO found the victim-race influence strongest at earlier stages, so they do not isolate jurors’ decisions; the data are also old. Juror-level research is more limited. An analysis of 340 capital trials, based on interviews with jurors, found that Black defendants were more likely to be sentenced to death as the proportion of White jurors increased, particularly when the jury included five or more White men and when the victim was White (Bowers et al., 2001; Sommers, 2007; Hunt, 2015), and a mock-jury study found that participants with poorer comprehension of capital sentencing instructions showed more racial disparity in sentencing (Lynch & Haney, 2000). Both have recognized limits: retrospective interviews in one and simulated sentencing in the other. In a more recent experiment with 1,261 White participants, postmortem photographs of a female murder victim increased convictions through anger and disgust when the victim was White or Latina but not when she was Black (Phalen et al., 2023), a verdict study using one video trial.
Death Qualification and Race
In capital cases, prospective jurors whose views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their performance are excluded for cause under Wainwright v. Witt (1985). Because opposition to the death penalty differs across demographic groups, that process can change the composition of the jury that decides guilt. A survey of 811 jury-eligible adults in Alameda County, California, found that death qualification excluded a significantly larger share of Black than White respondents, and of women than men, and that death-qualified respondents held attitudes more favorable to the prosecution on most measures (Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984). Later research reports disproportionate exclusion by religious and other characteristics (Summers et al., 2010).
The Supreme Court considered similar research in Lockhart v. McCree (1986) and held that death qualification does not violate the fair-cross-section requirement, because people excluded for their death penalty views are not a distinctive group for constitutional purposes.
Limits of the Evidence
Most experimental research uses student or online mock jurors who review abbreviated trials, know their decisions have no consequences, and often do not deliberate. Most studies examine White and Black participants and defendants; far less is known about Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and multiracial jurors and parties, a significant gap for Arizona, and almost nothing about court-martial members. The few recent studies with Indigenous or Native American defendants found no verdict difference or harsher judgments of White defendants (Maeder & McManus, 2022; Fraser et al., 2025; Maeder et al., 2026), and some of it was set in Canada, whose history differs. Publication bias may inflate reported effects, while participants’ wish to appear unprejudiced may suppress them (Salerno et al., 2023), so laboratory findings can understate real-world bias as well as overstate it. Archival studies show real disparities but cannot measure evidence strength or establish which outcome was correct, and much of the capital-sentencing evidence is decades old.
Above all, the effects described here are group-level averages. A small average effect in a meta-analysis is consistent with most jurors showing no effect at all. No study, scale, or demographic profile can show how a particular juror will vote, whether a particular verdict was influenced by race, or whether a particular defendant is guilty. Research on attitudes, which can be explored through questioning, is a better guide to individual jurors than race, and the law forbids the use of race in selection in any event.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the meta-analytic effect of about d = 0.09 for verdicts (Mitchell et al., 2005; Hunt, 2015) is cited to show that race does not matter, or that juries are generally biased, ask how large the effect is in absolute terms, since a small average is consistent with most jurors showing no effect and with stronger effects under the conditions Sommers (2007) identifies. When the Florida finding that a 16-point conviction gap was not seen when the pool included a Black member (Anwar et al., 2012) is offered, ask who was studied and what was counted: pools about 3.9% Black, composition measured at the pool rather than the seated jury, and no measure of evidence strength. When the Baldus figure of 4.3 times or the finding that 82% of 28 studies reported a victim-race influence (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990) is cited about jurors, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since those studies measure the whole capital process, including charging. When recent experiments finding harsher judgments of White defendants (Salerno et al., 2023; Maeder et al., 2026) are cited to show that bias against Black defendants does not operate at trial, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design. When similarity-leniency (Kerr et al., 1995) is raised about a juror, ask whether a conditional group finding applies to this person. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Race and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Equal Protection Clause has barred racial exclusion from juries since Strauder v. West Virginia (1880). Batson v. Kentucky (1986) extended the prohibition to peremptory strikes and established the three-step framework: a prima facie showing that a strike was based on race, a race-neutral explanation, and a judicial determination of purposeful discrimination. Later cases allowed objection regardless of the defendant’s race (Powers v. Ohio, 1991), reached defense strikes (Georgia v. McCollum, 1992), and extended the rule to sex (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994). Foster v. Chatman (2016) and Flowers v. Mississippi (2019) found purposeful discrimination on records that included, respectively, prosecution files marking Black prospective jurors and a prosecutor’s strikes of 41 of 42 Black prospective jurors across six trials of one defendant. The fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment governs the composition of the venire (Duren v. Missouri, 1979), and the Jury Selection and Service Act prohibits exclusion from federal jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status (28 U.S.C. § 1862).
Voir dire on racial prejudice is required in some cases and discretionary in others. In Ham v. South Carolina (1973), due process required inquiry into racial prejudice where a Black civil rights worker claimed he had been framed. Ristaino v. Ross (1976) held that a difference in race between defendant and victim does not alone require it. Exercising its supervisory authority over federal courts, a plurality in Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981) held that federal trial courts should ask about racial or ethnic prejudice when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime against a victim of a different racial or ethnic group. Turner v. Murray (1986) held that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled, on request, to have prospective jurors informed of the victim’s race and questioned about racial bias, with the remedy limited to the death sentence.
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) held that when a juror makes a clear statement indicating reliance on racial stereotypes or animus to convict, tending to show that animus was a significant motivating factor in the vote, the Sixth Amendment requires the no-impeachment rule to give way. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) otherwise bars juror testimony about deliberations except for extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence, or a mistake on the verdict form. In McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), the Court assumed the Baldus study’s validity but held that system-wide statistical disparity does not establish that the decisionmakers in a particular case acted with discriminatory purpose, rejecting equal protection and Eighth Amendment challenges.
In courts-martial, the convening authority details members under Article 25, UCMJ; for courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024, Article 25(e)(4), added by the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, and the implementing amendments to the Rules for Courts-Martial (Exec. Order No. 14130) require that the members who sit be chosen, to the maximum extent practicable, by randomized selection from the pool the convening authority details. Batson applies to peremptory challenges in courts-martial (United States v. Santiago-Davila, 1988), and military law goes further: on objection, trial counsel must give a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge against a member of a cognizable racial group without any prima facie showing (United States v. Moore, 1989). Equal protection also governs the convening authority’s selection of members. In United States v. Bess (2020), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a panel without minority members does not by itself violate equal protection or Article 37 absent intentional discrimination or an improper criterion, and that the absence of minority members from a convening authority’s panels over a year did not establish systematic exclusion. In United States v. Jeter (2023), the court held that race is not among the Article 25 selection criteria and may not be used even to add a member of the accused’s race, that the older allowance for race-conscious inclusion recognized in United States v. Crawford (1964) did not survive Batson, and that a prima facie showing that race played a role in selection raises a presumption of improper constitution that the government must rebut. Military Rule of Evidence 606(b) restricts testimony about deliberations, with exceptions for extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence including unlawful command influence, and a mistake on the findings worksheet. Whether Peña-Rodriguez, a Sixth Amendment decision, applies of its own force in courts-martial, where the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right does not apply in the same way, is a question to research under current military law.
Arizona
Arizona eliminated peremptory challenges in criminal and civil trials effective January 1, 2022 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020, amending Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4 and 18.5 and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(e)), in part in response to concerns that the Batson framework had not prevented discriminatory strikes. Bills to restore peremptory challenges in civil cases were introduced in the 2025 session (Fifty-seventh Legislature, First Regular Session): House Bill 2228 and a strike-everything amendment to Senate Bill 1509. Neither was enacted (bill numbers are reused each session, and the 2026 bills with those numbers concern other subjects), and no 2026 bill restoring peremptory challenges was located; civil practitioners should confirm the current rule. Rule 18.4(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the court to excuse a prospective juror when there is reasonable ground to believe the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, and A.R.S. § 21-211 lists grounds for disqualification, including bias or prejudice in favor of or against either party. Race is never a ground for cause; questioning under Rule 18.5 about attitudes, experiences, and the ability to judge a person of another race or ethnicity fairly is the lawful means of addressing racial bias. Batson remains relevant to review of trials conducted before 2022, and State v. Hickman (2003) held that an erroneous denial of a cause challenge is not automatically reversible when the defendant removed the juror with a peremptory challenge; the defendant must show prejudice, and reversal was unwarranted where the jury that decided the case was fair and impartial.
Arizona Rule of Evidence 606(b) tracks the federal rule, and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1(d) permits evidence about the conduct of a juror, court official, or third person when the validity of a verdict is challenged, while barring evidence about a juror’s subjective motives or mental processes. Peña-Rodriguez is a Sixth Amendment holding binding on Arizona courts; a juror’s clear statement of reliance on racial animus must be considered notwithstanding either rule. Witt, Turner, and Lockhart govern Arizona capital cases.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the view that racial bias, where it occurs, is most likely when evidence is ambiguous and race is an unspoken background factor, and that some experiments found less harsh judgments of Black defendants by White mock jurors when race was made salient, although whether voir dire or instructions have this effect in real trials has not been shown. Selection records bear on review under Batson, Flowers, Peña-Rodriguez, and the military’s per se explanation rule; in courts-martial, Jeter means that panel selection is judged by Article 25 criteria, and race-conscious adjustments, even for inclusion, are impermissible. The research also indicates that the effects are small, conditional, and group-level, and they do not show that a particular jury or verdict was affected by race.
The research counsels caution, however, about treating the absence of explicit bias as the absence of risk. Recent experiments finding no anti-Black effect do not show that bias is absent at trial. Real-world data associate jury pool composition with conviction gaps, and victim-race disparities in capital cases were documented across many data sets, strongest at stages where prosecutors exercise discretion. In Arizona, where peremptory challenges no longer exist, cause challenges that fall disproportionately on prospective jurors of one race could affect the representativeness of the jury, although no published data report how challenges for cause are decided. Reasons for any challenge are judged on a prospective juror’s stated attitudes and answers, not on assumptions about how members of a group will vote.
Special Issues for Defense
The research bears on voir dire about racial attitudes, particularly where the case involves an interracial crime, racially charged facts, or ambiguous evidence, and Ham, Rosales-Lopez, and Turner provide the legal basis in the circumstances they describe. The jury pool evidence, the death qualification research, and Peña-Rodriguez bear on venire composition, capital-qualification procedures, and post-verdict reports of racial statements. In courts-martial, the defense may object to trial counsel’s peremptory challenge of a member of a cognizable racial group and require an explanation without a prima facie showing, and under Jeter a prima facie showing that race played a role in the convening authority’s selection shifts the burden to the government.
The research counsels caution about overstatement in the other direction. Similarity-leniency is conditional and sometimes reverses when evidence is strong, the average defendant-race effect is small, several recent experiments found harsher judgments of White defendants, and no study shows that a juror of any race will favor or disfavor a particular defendant. Defense strikes are subject to Batson under McCollum, and an argument or selection strategy premised on jurors’ race is unlawful as well as unsupported. Under McCleskey, statistical disparities alone do not establish discrimination in a particular case.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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U.S. General Accounting Office. (1990). Death penalty sentencing: Research indicates pattern of racial disparities (GAO/GGD-90-57). https://www.gao.gov/products/ggd-90-57
Willmott, D., Boduszek, D., & Booth, N. (2026). Profiling jury bias in rape trials: Examining the link between juror characteristics and trial decisions. In E. Dowds, S. Weare, & S. Leahy (Eds.), Researching rape trials: Methods, ethics and empirical perspectives (pp. 127–144). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003613015-10
Legal Authorities
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019).
Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016).
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206 (2017).
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 68 P.3d 418 (2003).
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
United States v. Bess, 80 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
United States v. Crawford, 15 C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964), abrogated in part by United States v. Jeter, 84 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
United States v. Jeter, 84 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
United States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366 (C.M.A. 1989).
United States v. Santiago-Davila, 26 M.J. 380 (C.M.A. 1988).
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
28 U.S.C. § 1862.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-211.
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
Mil. R. Evid. 606(b).
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024) (amending R.C.M. 503(a)(1), effective Dec. 23, 2024).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(d).
Ariz. R. Evid. 606(b).
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(e).
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (amending Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4 and 18.5 and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(e), effective Jan. 1, 2022).
Related topic papers: Explicit and Implicit Bias in Jurors · Peremptory Challenges, Batson, and Arizona’s Abolition of Peremptories · Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges · Juror Demographics and Verdicts: What Predicts Guilt Judgments · Jury Diversity, Representativeness, and Deliberation
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial