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Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

Peremptory Challenges, Batson, and Arizona’s Abolition of Peremptories

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: How do peremptory challenges and Batson now operate in federal court, courts-martial, and Arizona, which abolished peremptories effective January 1, 2022?
  • What the research shows: Observational studies find racial disparities in strike rates by both prosecutors and defense attorneys, and experiments suggest race can influence strikes while people give race-neutral justifications; in one, a warning against using race removed the effect. Early Maricopa County data (2019 vs. 2022) reported increases in jurors of color on criminal juries (the article does not state the units) and essentially unchanged hung-jury rates.
  • What it does not show: The Arizona data cover about one year, mainly in one county, and cannot separate abolition from concurrent changes; no study links abolition to verdict accuracy or reports how cause challenges are decided. None of the research can show that a particular strike was discriminatory.
  • The law: Batson and its successors (Miller-El, Snyder, Foster, Flowers) bind every party (McCollum, J.E.B.). Courts-martial initially allow one peremptory per side under a stricter standard (Moore, Tulloch). Arizona now permits removal only for cause, by stipulation, or by statutory disqualification.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the issue where reasons for strikes are tested against recorded answers applied consistently and, in Arizona, where the voir dire record supports a challenge for cause; a sincere belief that a reason is neutral does not ensure it will be found so. Defense counsel are likely to encounter it in comparative analysis of strikes and, in Arizona, in questionnaires and oral voir dire; Batson binds the defense too.

A peremptory challenge allows a party to remove a prospective juror without stating a reason and without the court’s approval. For most of American history, peremptory challenges were regarded as an essential complement to challenges for cause: a way to remove jurors whom a party suspected of bias but could not prove to be biased. Since Batson v. Kentucky (1986), the peremptory challenge has also been the principal site of constitutional litigation over discrimination in jury selection, because a challenge that requires no reason can conceal an impermissible one.

In 2021, the Arizona Supreme Court became the first state high court to abolish peremptory challenges entirely, in both criminal and civil cases, effective January 1, 2022. Other states have kept peremptories but rewritten the Batson framework, most prominently Washington and California. Courts-martial retain a single peremptory challenge for each side and apply a modified Batson standard that is stricter than the civilian one. Practitioners therefore operate under three different regimes.

This paper traces the history of the peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court’s decisions from Swain v. Alabama through Flowers v. Mississippi, the research on how strikes are exercised and explained, reform models elsewhere, Arizona’s abolition and the early evidence on its effects, the arguments for and against abolition, and the governing federal, military, and Arizona law. Voir dire and challenges for cause, on which Arizona practice now depends, are addressed in the companion paper “Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias.”

Origins and Purposes of the Peremptory Challenge

Peremptory challenges came to American law from English common law, where both the accused and, for a time, the Crown could remove a number of jurors without cause. Congress and the states provided for them by statute, and the Supreme Court long described them as an important protection for the accused. The Court has nonetheless held that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required. They are a creature of statute or rule, and a state may withhold them altogether (Ross v. Oklahoma, 1988; United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 2000; Rivera v. Illinois, 2009).

Three purposes are usually given. The first is to remove jurors whose bias is suspected but cannot be established to the court’s satisfaction, which the companion paper shows is a real gap: prospective jurors do not always disclose relevant information, their assurances of impartiality are weak predictors of their decisions, and judges’ rulings may track those assurances. The second is to remove a juror antagonized by questioning or an unsuccessful challenge for cause. The third is to increase the parties’ confidence in, and acceptance of, the jury that decides the case. The costs are equally clear. Because no reason is required, a peremptory challenge can rest on intuition, stereotype, or a protected characteristic, and the reason is ordinarily invisible to the court.

From Swain to Batson

In Swain v. Alabama (1965), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges in a particular case was presumed proper and that a defendant could establish an equal protection violation only by showing a systematic pattern of exclusion across many cases. Batson v. Kentucky (1986) overruled that part of Swain and held that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination from the prosecutor’s strikes in the defendant’s own trial. Batson established a three-step procedure: the objecting party makes a prima facie showing that a strike was based on race; the striking party offers a race-neutral explanation; and the court decides whether the objecting party has proved purposeful discrimination. Justice Marshall, concurring, argued that only eliminating peremptory challenges would end discrimination in their use.

The Court later extended Batson to strikes of jurors of a race different from the defendant’s (Powers v. Ohio, 1991), to civil litigants (Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 1991), to criminal defendants (Georgia v. McCollum, 1992), and to strikes based on sex (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994). The prohibition thus binds every party.

The decisions that followed defined how demanding each step is. In Purkett v. Elem (1995), the Court held that the explanation at step two need not be persuasive or even plausible; it need only be facially neutral, with its persuasiveness evaluated at step three. Later decisions gave the third step more content. Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) found discrimination by comparing the prosecution’s treatment of struck Black jurors with similarly situated white jurors who were accepted, and by considering disparate questioning and the prosecution’s use of a procedure to reorder the venire. Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) held that a strike justified by the juror’s nervousness and a scheduling concern could not stand where the trial court made no finding on demeanor and the scheduling reason applied equally to accepted white jurors. Foster v. Chatman (2016) relied on prosecution file notes that marked the race of prospective jurors. Flowers v. Mississippi (2019) considered the prosecutor’s history of strikes across six trials of the same defendant, in which, in the trials for which records were available, the State struck 41 of the 42 Black prospective jurors it could have struck. The Court also relied on the State’s strikes of five of six Black prospective jurors at the sixth trial, its markedly more extensive questioning of the struck Black jurors than of the seated white jurors, and comparative analysis, and it held that the trial court clearly erred.

Research on How Peremptory Challenges Are Exercised

Observational studies of actual jury selection have examined who is struck and by whom. In a study of 173 capital trials of North Carolina death-row inmates conducted between 1990 and 2010, prosecutors struck 52.6% of eligible Black venire members and 25.7% of all other eligible venire members. In a fully controlled analysis of a random sample of 1,753 venire members, the odds of a state strike remained about 2.5 times higher for Black venire members after accounting for the race-neutral characteristics the researchers could measure (Grosso & O’Brien, 2012). A study of about 1,300 felony jury trials in North Carolina in 2011, covering more than 29,000 prospective jurors, found that prosecutors removed 20.6% of Black and 9.7% of white prospective jurors, while defense attorneys removed 9.9% of Black and 22.2% of white prospective jurors. Defense strikes partly offset prosecution strikes, and retention rates by the end of selection were 58% for white, 56% for Black, and 50% for other nonwhite prospective jurors (Wright et al., 2018). The authors noted that race was unknown for about one-fifth of jurors and that the data record outcomes, not the reasons for removals. In Maricopa County, Arizona, data presented to the Arizona Judicial Council for the year before abolition showed that non-white prospective jurors were removed between the venire and the seated jury at higher rates than white prospective jurors (McMurdie et al., 2024).

These studies describe the behavior of both prosecutors and defense attorneys, and they have limits. They are observational and cannot measure every legitimate reason for a strike, such as answers given in unrecorded exchanges or demeanor, and the North Carolina capital study concerns a single state and a category of trials with distinctive death-qualification procedures. The net effect of strikes on jury composition also depends on both sides. A study of jury selection in 277 civil trials found that peremptory challenges were systematically related to prospective jurors’ race and ethnicity, but that the opposing parties’ challenges offset each other and produced no overall effect on jury composition, whereas jury size had a substantial effect on minority representation (Diamond et al., 2009).

Whether peremptory challenges accomplish their intended purpose of removing biased jurors has been studied less. In a classic field experiment in a federal district court, the researchers compared the verdicts of the actual juries with those of shadow juries composed of jurors who had been struck and found that attorneys’ strikes had a modest and highly variable effect on verdicts, with some attorneys performing well and others no better than chance (Zeisel & Diamond, 1978). The study is small and nearly five decades old.

Race-Neutral Justifications

Experimental research has examined how people choose whom to strike and how they explain the choice. In an experimental study with three participant groups, college students, advanced law students, and practicing attorneys, participants exercised a peremptory challenge in a hypothetical case using written information about prospective jurors in which the juror’s race was varied. The race of the prospective juror influenced who was struck, but participants typically justified their choices in race-neutral terms that concealed that influence (Sommers & Norton, 2007). The authors concluded that the justifications people give may not reflect, and may not be known to reflect, the influence of race, which bears directly on Batson‘s reliance on the sincerity of the explanation offered at step two and on the court’s ability to detect pretext at step three (Sommers & Norton, 2008). A later online experiment replicated the pattern and tested a remedy. Participants acting as prosecutors in a case with a Black defendant were more likely to exclude a Black than a White prospective juror and gave race-neutral reasons, but the effect of race disappeared when participants were first warned against using race as a basis for exclusion (Abramowitz & Douglass, 2023). Participants were assigned the prosecutor role by the researchers, so the study cannot show how real prosecutors behave. In a companion study, participants who watched a simulated jury selection in which Black prospective jurors were disproportionately excluded rated the process as less fair, especially Black participants.

The experiments used brief written profiles and a hypothetical case, and participants faced no challenge, cross-examination, or professional consequence. They do not establish how often race influences actual strikes or show that any particular explanation is pretextual, but they suggest that a framework turning on purposeful discrimination may fail to detect an influence of which the person exercising the strike is unaware. The warning study suggests the influence can be reduced, at least in a simulation; it tested only the prosecutor’s role, and whether a warning would work in actual selection, or for defense strikes, has not been tested.

Reform Models: Washington and California

Washington General Rule 37, effective April 24, 2018, retains peremptory challenges but replaces Batson‘s purposeful-discrimination test. On objection, the court asks whether an objective observer, aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases have resulted in unfair exclusion, could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the strike; if so, the strike is denied. The rule lists reasons that are presumptively invalid because they have historically been associated with exclusion, including prior contact with law enforcement, distrust of law enforcement or a belief that it engages in racial profiling, close ties to people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted, living in a high-crime neighborhood, receiving public benefits, and not being a native English speaker. A party relying on demeanor, such as inattentiveness, poor eye contact, or confused answers, must give notice so that the conduct can be verified, and the absence of corroboration by the judge or opposing counsel invalidates the reason.

California’s Code of Civil Procedure § 231.7, enacted by Assembly Bill 3070 in 2020, takes a similar approach in jury trials in which selection began on or after January 1, 2022; under its current text it covers criminal cases and specified categories of civil cases (civil rights, civil commitment, and hate-crime damages cases). It requires no separate prima facie showing or finding of purposeful discrimination; the question is whether there is a substantial likelihood (more than a mere possibility) that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation as a factor in the strike. Listed reasons are presumptively invalid unless the striking party shows by clear and convincing evidence that they are unrelated to those characteristics and bear on the juror’s ability to be fair, and demeanor-based reasons stand only if the court confirms the conduct. Systematic outcome data on these reforms remain limited.

Arizona’s Abolition of Peremptory Challenges

In January 2021, two petitions to amend the Arizona rules were filed with the Arizona Supreme Court. One, filed by a Batson working group, proposed a new rule modeled on Washington’s General Rule 37 and extended to additional protected characteristics (No. R-21-0008); opponents argued that its standard would make peremptory challenges illusory. The other, filed by two judges of the Arizona Court of Appeals, proposed eliminating peremptory challenges in criminal and civil cases, arguing that Batson reform would not sufficiently reduce the role of race in jury selection (No. R-21-0020). On August 30, 2021, the court granted the second petition, effective January 1, 2022. The order stated no reasoning. The court had earlier created a Task Force on Jury Data Collection, Practices, and Procedures, which it directed to consider changes to cause challenges and voir dire, and in December 2021 it adopted, on an emergency basis, amendments encouraging written questionnaires and extended oral voir dire and discouraging leading rehabilitation questions (McMurdie et al., 2024; Recent Ordinance, 2022).

The amendments removed all provisions for peremptory challenges from Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 18.4 and 18.5 and Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 47, and added a provision allowing the parties to stipulate in good faith to the excusal of a juror. A challenge for cause requires the court to excuse a juror when there is a reasonable ground to believe the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, and the challenging party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the juror cannot do so, with the court considering the totality of the juror’s conduct and answers (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b), 18.5(h); Recent Ordinance, 2022). As amended in December 2021, the rules encourage case-specific written questionnaires when feasible and permit extended oral examination by the parties, and the Court of Appeals has held that written questionnaires may winnow a panel but do not replace the oral voir dire that Rule 18.5(d)-(f) requires, including the parties’ opportunity on request to question the panel (State v. Lucas, 2025, vacating convictions where the court used only a questionnaire and individual questioning).

The first published analysis of effects (McMurdie et al., 2024) compared Maricopa County Superior Court data from 2019 with data from 2022, the first full year after the change. These composition figures compare empaneled jurors in the two years, not the venire with the seated jury: among empaneled criminal juries, the share of persons of color rose by about 6% and the share of Hispanic jurors by about 15%; in civil juries, persons of color rose by about 15% while Hispanic jurors declined by about 4%. The article does not state whether these figures are percentage points or relative changes. Criminal hung juries were essentially unchanged (about 6.6% of trials in 2019 and 6.7% in 2022) and criminal mistrials declined; among more than 1,800 charges reaching verdict, the proportion of not-guilty verdicts rose from about 18% to about 21%; average jury selection time rose slightly, from 0.72 to 0.78 days; and the number of prospective jurors needed for each juror seated fell from an average of 4.3 to 3.1. A statewide survey in June 2022 found that 72% of trial judges reported no concerns about jury selection after the change (McMurdie et al., 2024). The authors cautioned that the data cover roughly one year, mainly in one county, that other changes during the period, including the COVID-19 pandemic, an increase in juror compensation, and pre-screening questionnaires, may have contributed to the results, that underrepresentation also arises before prospective jurors reach the courthouse, and that more data are needed. A study of qualitative interviews with Arizona public defenders and early appellate decisions concluded that elimination has been workable while identifying defense concerns about the loss of a protection against bias that falls short of cause (Gordon, 2024). No study has yet linked the change to the accuracy of verdicts, and no published data report how often challenges for cause are granted or denied under the new standard.

The rule change has also drawn legislative responses. A 2022 House bill would have restored peremptory challenges in criminal cases. In the 2025 session (Fifty-seventh Legislature, First Regular Session), House Bill 2228 and a strike-everything amendment to Senate Bill 1509 proposed restoring four peremptory challenges per party in civil actions in superior court. HB 2228 passed the House but did not pass the Senate, and SB 1509, as amended, passed the House 33-27 on April 23, 2025; neither was enacted. Bill numbers are reused each session, and the 2026 bills with the same numbers concern other subjects (the 2026 SB 1509 is a campaign-finance bill); no 2026 bill restoring peremptory challenges was located. Supporters argued that the number of peremptory challenges is a question of legislative policy, and the Arizona Supreme Court’s position has been that jury-trial procedure falls within the court’s rulemaking authority. As of November 2026, no bill restoring peremptory challenges had become law, and whether a statute could override the court’s rule has not been decided.

Arguments For and Against Abolition

The arguments for abolition rest on three propositions. First, Batson has proved difficult to enforce, because a facially neutral reason is easy to state and difficult to disprove, and experimental research suggests that people exercising strikes may be unaware of the influence of race on their choices. Second, observational studies in several jurisdictions show disparities in strike rates by race, by both prosecutors and defense attorneys, that persist after the controls researchers can apply. Third, abolition eliminates the need to adjudicate the motives of counsel, avoids accusations of discrimination against individual lawyers, and, on the early Arizona data, lengthened jury selection only slightly (0.72 to 0.78 days on average) and left hung-jury rates essentially unchanged.

The arguments against abolition rest on the purposes peremptories serve. The research reviewed in the companion paper shows that prospective jurors do not always disclose relevant information and that self-assessed impartiality is a weak predictor of decisions; peremptory challenges allowed parties to act on reasonable suspicion of bias that could not be proved for cause. Trial judges have broad discretion over voir dire and cause challenges, and critics argue that abolition should have been paired with mandatory, rather than encouraged, expansion of voir dire (Recent Ordinance, 2022). Peremptories also allowed defendants, including members of minority groups, to remove jurors they believed were biased against them, and their loss may affect parties’ confidence in the jury. Finally, the early data are limited, and modest changes in composition and outcomes over one year cannot establish long-term effects in either direction.

Both positions rest in part on empirical questions the evidence cannot yet resolve: how much sub-cause bias peremptories removed, how much discrimination Batson missed, and how cause challenges will operate when they bear the full weight of selection.

Limits of the Evidence

Studies of strike patterns are observational. They show associations between prospective jurors’ characteristics and the likelihood of being struck, but they cannot capture every legitimate reason for a strike, and their findings come from particular jurisdictions and periods. Experimental studies of strike decisions use brief written profiles and hypothetical cases. The evidence on Arizona’s abolition consists of one county’s data for roughly one year, a statewide judicial survey, and qualitative interviews; it does not include controlled comparisons and cannot isolate the effect of abolition from concurrent changes. Outcome data on the Washington and California reforms are limited. All of it describes groups and cannot show how a particular juror would have voted, whether a particular strike was discriminatory, or whether a particular verdict would have differed with a different jury.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the North Carolina capital data are cited to show that prosecutors struck 52.6% of eligible Black venire members and 25.7% of others (Grosso & O’Brien, 2012), ask what exactly was counted and who was studied: the data record strikes rather than reasons, come from one state’s capital trials, and control only for measured characteristics. When the 2011 felony data are cited to show that defense attorneys removed 22.2% of white prospective jurors (Wright et al., 2018), ask the same question about counting, since race was unknown for about one-fifth of jurors and the records do not show reasons. When the early Maricopa County results are offered to show that abolition increased jurors of color (McMurdie et al., 2024), ask how large the change is in absolute terms, because the article does not say whether the 6% and 15% figures are percentage points or relative changes, and whether a one-county comparison of 2019 and 2022 can separate abolition from concurrent changes. When Sommers and Norton (2007) is cited about a particular strike, ask whether brief written profiles apply to this case. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Peremptory Challenges and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) provides 20 peremptory challenges to each side in capital cases, 6 to the government and 10 to the defense in felony cases, and 3 to each side in misdemeanor cases. Batson and its successors govern their exercise, and J.E.B. extends the prohibition to sex.

In courts-martial, members serve the jury’s function. Article 41(b), UCMJ, and Rule for Courts-Martial 912(g) entitle the accused and the trial counsel initially to one peremptory challenge each, with one additional challenge for each side when new members are detailed to the court-martial. The Court of Military Appeals held that Batson‘s equal protection principle applies to courts-martial through the Fifth Amendment (United States v. Santiago-Davila, 1988) and adopted a per se rule under which a timely objection to the government’s peremptory challenge of a member of a cognizable racial group requires trial counsel to explain the challenge, without any further prima facie showing (United States v. Moore, 1989). In United States v. Tulloch (1997), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces declined to follow Purkett fully, reasoning that because members are selected by the convening authority as best qualified, trial counsel must give a race-neutral reason that is not unreasonable, implausible, or otherwise nonsensical. United States v. Witham (1997) held that sex, like race, is an impermissible basis for a peremptory challenge and that the prohibition binds the accused as well as the government. The court applied this modified framework in United States v. Hurn (2001) and, most recently, in United States v. Thomas (2025), which held that the military judge did not abuse his or her discretion in granting the government’s peremptory challenge, because the explanation, based on the member’s responses and demeanor, was facially race-neutral and plausible and pretext was not shown. Panel selection, including the random-selection reforms enacted in 2022, is addressed in the hub’s paper on court-martial panel selection.

Arizona

Before 2022, the Arizona rules provided a fixed number of peremptory challenges to each side (four per side in civil cases), and Batson governed their use. Since January 1, 2022, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 18.4 and 18.5 and Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 47 provide no peremptory challenges; prospective jurors may be removed only for cause, by stipulation, or for statutory disqualification under Arizona Revised Statutes § 21-211. State v. Hickman (2003) had held that a defendant who used a peremptory challenge to cure the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause was not entitled to automatic reversal absent a showing that the seated jury was not impartial. Because that cure is no longer available, an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause now leaves the challenged juror on the jury, and the record made under Rule 18.5 bears the full weight of any later review. Batson remains relevant in Arizona to the extent that a challenge for cause or a stipulation is alleged to have been based on a protected characteristic, but the rule change removed the setting in which nearly all Batson claims arose.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research bears on comparative, record-based reasoning when a strike or challenge is questioned, because the Supreme Court’s decisions from Miller-El through Flowers turn on whether stated reasons were applied consistently to similarly situated jurors. In federal court and courts-martial, reasons that rest on a juror’s recorded answers are more defensible than reasons based on general impressions, and Tulloch requires that a military trial counsel’s reason be reasonable and plausible, not merely neutral. In Arizona, the research on self-report bears on the voir dire record, built through questionnaires and open-ended questions, on which any challenge for cause rests.

The research also counsels caution. Experimental studies show that race can influence strike decisions without the decision-maker’s awareness, so a sincere belief that a reason is neutral does not ensure that it will be found so. Reasons such as a juror’s demeanor, residence, or prior contact with law enforcement have drawn particular scrutiny in Snyder and in reform rules elsewhere. Because there are no peremptories in Arizona, an erroneous ruling on any party’s challenge for cause leaves the juror seated or removes one who should have served.

Special Issues for Defense

The research bears on objections grounded in comparative analysis, patterns of questioning, and the record of strikes, as Miller-El, Foster, and Flowers illustrate, and in courts-martial the per se rule of Moore and the Tulloch standard place a meaningful burden on the government once a timely objection is made. In Arizona, the research on nondisclosure, self-assessed impartiality, and rehabilitation bears on requests for questionnaires, adequate time for oral voir dire, and individual questioning, which are now the principal means available to any party for identifying juror bias.

The research also counsels caution. McCollum, J.E.B., and Witham bind the defense equally, and observational studies show patterns in defense strikes as well as prosecution strikes. Demographic characteristics are generally weak and inconsistent predictors of how individual jurors vote, with small average differences by sex in sexual offense cases that were largely explained by attitudes and did not reliably persist through deliberation; these are group-level averages from mock-jury studies and do not apply to any individual juror, and the law forbids their use in selection regardless. The early Arizona data do not show that abolition has disadvantaged defendants, but they are too limited to show that it has not; claims in either direction should be stated with that limitation.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Abramowitz, K., & Douglass, A. B. (2023). Racial bias in jury selection hurts mock jurors, not just defendants: Testing one potential intervention. Law and Human Behavior, 47(1), 153–168. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000494

Diamond, S. S., Peery, D., Dolan, F. J., & Dolan, E. (2009). Achieving diversity on the jury: Jury size and the peremptory challenge. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 6(3), 425–449. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01149.x

Gordon, H. B. (2024). Evaluating the elimination of peremptory challenges in Arizona. University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 58(1), 229.

Grosso, C. M., & O’Brien, B. (2012). A stubborn legacy: The overwhelming importance of race in jury selection in 173 post-Batson North Carolina capital trials. Iowa Law Review, 97, 1531.

McMurdie, P. J., Carroll, L., Freed, R., & Wilkins, E. M. (2024). Arizona’s elimination of peremptory challenges: A first look. Arizona State Law Journal, 56, 1793.

Recent Ordinance: Order Amending Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 47(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, No. R-21-0020 (Ariz. 2021). (2022). Harvard Law Review, 135, 2245.

Sommers, S. R., & Norton, M. I. (2007). Race-based judgments, race-neutral justifications: Experimental examination of peremptory use and the Batson challenge procedure. Law and Human Behavior, 31(3), 261–273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9048-6

Sommers, S. R., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Race and jury selection: Psychological perspectives on the peremptory challenge debate. American Psychologist, 63(6), 527–539. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.6.527

Wright, R. F., Chavis, K., & Parks, G. S. (2018). The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury selection data as a political issue. University of Illinois Law Review, 2018(4), 1407.

Zeisel, H., & Diamond, S. S. (1978). The effect of peremptory challenges on jury and verdict: An experiment in a federal district court. Stanford Law Review, 30(3), 491. https://doi.org/10.2307/1228114

Legal Authorities

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).

Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019).

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016).

Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).

Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009).

Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).

State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 68 P.3d 418 (2003).

State v. Lucas, 260 Ariz. 567 (App. 2025) (No. 1 CA-CR 24-0199, Sept. 11, 2025, as amended Oct. 1, 2025) (vacated and remanded).

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).

United States v. Hurn, 55 M.J. 446 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000).

United States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366 (C.M.A. 1989).

United States v. Santiago-Davila, 26 M.J. 380 (C.M.A. 1988).

United States v. Thomas, 86 M.J. 15 (C.A.A.F. 2025).

United States v. Tulloch, 47 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

United States v. Witham, 47 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

U.S. Const. amend. V.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

10 U.S.C. § 841 (Article 41, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-211.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7.

Ariz. H.B. 2228, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2025) (passed House; not enacted).

Ariz. S.B. 1509, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2025) (House engrossed version) (passed House 33-27, Apr. 23, 2025; not enacted).

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2022).

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b).

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 912(g).

Wash. Gen. R. 37.

Related topic papers: Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias · Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges · Race and Juror Decision-Making · Jury Diversity, Representativeness, and Deliberation · Scientific Jury Selection, Trial Consultants, and AI Tools

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial