Snap Shot
- The question: Does a defendant’s political identity, or a politically divisive issue, affect how jurors judge guilt, and can voir dire and instructions address it?
- What the research shows: In two online survey experiments by one team using one written self-defense scenario, respondents in both parties convicted an opposing-party defendant more often than a co-partisan (gaps of 21.4 and 24.9 points in the first study), concentrated among the most polarized. In the second study, standard instructions did not measurably reduce the gap; the confidence intervals overlapped in every comparison, so the study does not show whether the instructions had any effect. Other studies show cultural values can shape perception of the same event, in both directions.
- What it does not show: The studies had no witnesses, cross-examination, or deliberation, and the partisan cues were unusually conspicuous. Many respondents decided consistently with the evidence. The research does not show that either party’s members are more biased, or that a juror’s party predicts that juror’s vote.
- The law: Impartiality does not require jurors to be free of opinions (Irvin), and voir dire rests in the court’s discretion (Skilling, Rosales-Lopez). No Supreme Court decision treats political affiliation as a Batson classification, it is not by itself a ground for cause, and post-verdict remedies are narrow (Warger). Courts-martial apply a liberal grant mandate for defense challenges (Clay, Urieta).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors and defense counsel are each likely to encounter questions about voir dire on political attitudes, where questioning focuses on attitudes rather than party labels, a party label is not by itself disqualifying, and the direct evidence is two survey experiments.
Political identity has become one of the strongest social identities in American life. Survey and experimental research over the past two decades shows that many Americans feel warmth toward members of their own party and hostility toward members of the other, and that those feelings influence judgments having nothing to do with politics. Courts have long assumed that jurors can set aside their political views and decide a case on the evidence. When a defendant’s, complainant’s, or party’s political identity is known, or when a case involves an issue that divides the parties, the question is whether that assumption holds and what voir dire, instructions, and challenges for cause can do about it.
This paper reviews research on affective polarization and partisan discrimination, the debate over whether partisan bias is symmetric across the political spectrum, research on how political and cultural identity shapes perceptions of contested events such as protests, direct experimental evidence on partisan bias in mock-juror verdicts and on whether standard instructions reduce it, and related evidence from other settings. It then describes the limits of that evidence and the law governing impartiality, voir dire on political views, and challenges for cause in federal, military, and Arizona courts. “Juror” refers to civilian juries; court-martial members, who serve the jury’s function in the military, are called “members” or “panel members.” Throughout, the research describes partisan bias as a general human tendency; the symmetry question is contested, and the studies here do not show that supporters of either party are more or less fair-minded as jurors.
Affective Polarization and Partisan Discrimination
Political scientists distinguish ideological polarization, a widening gap in policy views, from affective polarization, the tendency to like one’s own party and dislike the other. Research reviewing several decades of survey data concludes that affective polarization in the United States has grown substantially, that Democrats and Republicans alike describe members of the other party as hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and that partisan feeling now influences attitudes and behavior well outside politics (Iyengar et al., 2019).
The most frequently cited experimental evidence comes from Iyengar and Westwood (2015), who measured partisan affect with implicit, explicit, and behavioral measures. They reported that negative feelings toward the opposing party operate automatically, that affective polarization based on party is as strong as polarization based on race, and that partisans discriminated against opposing partisans in nonpolitical decisions, such as choosing among candidates for a scholarship, at rates exceeding discrimination by race in those experiments; the findings are from vignette and behavioral tasks outside legal settings. The authors attributed the willingness to express partisan animus openly in part to the absence of social norms discouraging it, in contrast to the strong norms against expressing racial prejudice (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015).
That last point has a direct implication for jury selection. Because social norms discourage expressing racial prejudice more than partisan feeling (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), prospective jurors may be more willing to acknowledge partisan feelings, though no study has tested this in voir dire; that may make partisan attitudes easier to explore in questioning. The same absence of norms, however, means that jurors may not regard partisan reactions as a form of bias they are obliged to set aside.
Is Partisan Bias Symmetric?
Whether supporters of one party or ideology are more biased than supporters of the other is a contested question in psychology, and both positions are represented in the peer-reviewed literature. A meta-analysis of 51 experiments with more than 18,000 participants examined one form of partisan bias: evaluating otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports one’s political views or allegiances (Ditto et al., 2019). Overall bias was robust, with a mean correlation of about .25, and liberals (r = .235) and conservatives (r = .255) did not differ; the authors reported that the pattern was consistent across methods and political topics.
In a commentary published in the same issue, Baron and Jost (2019) disputed that conclusion. They argued that the studies reviewed had not been designed to test ideological differences, that the materials may have been selected in ways that would avoid finding them, and that some of what was measured as bias may not be irrational. They also contended that other research on motivated reasoning points to differences between liberals and conservatives. The debate concerns the general psychology of political reasoning rather than juror behavior specifically, and neither side’s evidence was drawn from juries. For practitioners, the point on which the two sides appear to agree is that people across the political spectrum may evaluate evidence differently depending on whether it favors their side, although they disagree about how much of that is bias.
Political Identity and Perception of Contested Events
Juries decide what happened, and research shows that political and cultural identity can shape perception of the same event. In one experiment, adults watched a video of police dispersing a political demonstration. Some were told the demonstrators were protesting outside an abortion clinic; others were told the demonstrators were protesting the military’s then-existing policy on gay service members outside a military recruiting office on a college campus. Whether viewers saw the demonstrators as obstructing or threatening pedestrians, rather than engaging in protected speech, depended on whether the protest’s message matched or opposed the viewers’ cultural values, and viewers with opposing values reversed their perceptions when the cause changed (Kahan et al., 2012). In an earlier study, 1,350 Americans watched the police-chase video at issue in Scott v. Harris (2007); most agreed with the Supreme Court’s view that the driver posed a serious danger, but disagreement was concentrated among identifiable cultural, ideological, and demographic groups (Kahan et al., 2009).
These studies did not measure verdicts, and they used cultural worldviews rather than party registration. They are relevant to politically salient trials because they show that the bias operates on perception of the facts, not merely on the willingness to apply the law, and that it runs in both directions depending on whose cause is at stake. Prosecutions arising from protests, firearms cases, immigration-related cases, and election-related cases can engage strong attitudes about the underlying issue whatever the parties’ own politics. In such cases, a juror’s views on the issue, rather than party affiliation as such, may be the attitude most relevant to impartiality.
Partisanship and Mock-Juror Verdicts
Direct experimental evidence on whether a defendant’s partisan identity affects mock-juror verdicts comes from two studies reported in 2025 (Rhodes et al., 2025). Both were included as modules in the Cooperative Election Study, a large national survey administered online by YouGov. Respondents read a case in which an 18-year-old basketball player injured a teammate during a fight in a weight room and claimed self-defense. The authors kept the facts ambiguous so that, in their view, acquittal was the appropriate verdict under the reasonable-doubt standard. Only cues to the defendant’s politics changed. The defendant’s party was never named; instead, the scenario described his political beliefs as liberal or conservative, the cable news program he was watching (MSNBC or Fox News), and the political insult the other player used against him. Respondents were grouped by their own party identification.
In the first study (2022; 821 responses analyzed), 47.6% of respondents voted to convict. Republican respondents convicted the Republican defendant 33.6% of the time and the Democratic defendant 55.0% of the time, a gap of 21.4 percentage points. Democratic respondents convicted the Democratic defendant 39.5% of the time and the Republican defendant 64.4% of the time, a gap of 24.9 points. The effect therefore appeared among members of both parties, and the authors described the two parties’ patterns as very similar. It was concentrated among the most affectively polarized respondents: among them (a subset of respondents whose size is not reported here), the model-predicted probability of conviction was about .74 for an opposing-party defendant in both parties, compared with .32 for a co-partisan among Democrats and .26 among Republicans. Recommended sentences did not differ significantly by the defendant’s party, which the authors interpreted as showing that partisanship affected judgments of guilt rather than punitiveness (Rhodes et al., 2025).
The researchers also analyzed respondents’ written explanations, using a large language model to identify themes. Respondents in both parties relied on the same legal themes, such as accident, self-defense, and insufficient evidence, but applied them selectively depending on the defendant’s party (Rhodes et al., 2025).
The second study (2024; about 1,000 respondents, half randomly assigned to receive instructions) added a test of standard jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, the right of self-defense, and the duty to avoid sympathy or prejudice. In the second study, standard instructions did not measurably reduce the gap; the confidence intervals overlapped in every comparison, so the study does not show whether the instructions had any effect. Without instructions, Democratic respondents convicted a co-partisan 52.9% of the time and an opposing-party defendant 61.9% of the time; with instructions, 46.4% and 67.2%. Without instructions, Republican respondents convicted a co-partisan 39.7% of the time and an opposing-party defendant 64.0% of the time; with instructions, 32.5% and 62.9%. The authors noted that instructions “may” have widened the gap, but a widening was not statistically established (Rhodes et al., 2025). The size of the gap varied between the two studies and between conditions, and the article did not report a formal test of whether it differed between the parties. The two studies therefore support the conclusion that the effect appeared on both sides, not a conclusion that either party’s members are more or less affected.
The authors identified important limits: respondents read a short, ambiguous written scenario, with no witnesses, cross-examination, or deliberation; the partisan cues were conspicuous and the defendant’s politics highly salient, which is uncommon at trial; only two news networks were used as cues; and the mix of views on a real jury might offset individual bias. In addition, independents who did not lean toward either party were excluded, survey weights were not applied, and sentencing was not analyzed in the second study (Rhodes et al., 2025).
Ideology and Litigant Identity in Other Settings
Other studies show political orientation interacting with the identity of a litigant. In an online experiment published in 2025 (data collected in 2021) involving a civil patent case, the defendant company’s country of origin was varied; overall, liability did not differ significantly by country (Huang, 2025). Among participants who identified as conservative, the domestic company was found liable less often than foreign companies (27.8% vs. 51.5%), a significant interaction, while non-conservative participants awarded higher damages against the Chinese company. This was a single civil experiment without deliberation; it does not show that any group is more biased. The study (N = 1,462) involved no deliberation, and its sample was more liberal and more educated than the population; the ideology and ethnicity subgroup differences were small-sample findings (the Asian subgroup numbered about 96 people; see the Juror Demographics paper) (Huang, 2025).
In two experiments with White mock jurors (N = 1,018 and 1,253), political orientation shaped responses to defendant race in different ways (Salerno et al., 2023). In subsequent analyses, conservative participants who had first acquitted a Black defendant in an earlier case were more likely than conservatives without that earlier case to convict a Black defendant in a later ambiguous case. Liberal participants who had done so continued to convict Black defendants at low rates and instead convicted White defendants more often than liberals without the earlier case did. The authors attributed both patterns to concern about appearing prejudiced. The study shows ideology interacting with defendant race in opposite directions; it does not show that either group was more biased. These are group-level averages from mock-jury studies and do not apply to any individual juror.
One study examined ideology during deliberation. In mock juries of up to 12 that discussed an actual coerced false confession (N = 253), politically conservative participants and supporters of the death penalty made more pro-prosecution statements, and women made more pro-defense statements; these statements in turn predicted verdicts (Stevenson et al., 2023). This is a group-level association from one case and one study. It concerns how jurors discussed a confession, not partisan cues about the defendant, and it cannot predict how a particular juror will reason.
Real-world evidence comes from Sweden, where lay judges nominated by political parties sit with professional judges and their assignment to cases is close to random (Anwar et al., 2019). In an analysis of more than 950 person-crime cases in one Swedish district court, panels that included a member of a particular party were more likely to convict in certain case types (defendants with Arabic-sounding names and young defendants for the Sweden Democrats; cases with female victims for the Left Party, at the other end of the Swedish political spectrum), patterns the authors described as consistent with party platforms. The authors noted that defendants’ ethnicity was inferred from names, that evidence strength was not measured, so the correct outcome is unknown, that some estimates were imprecise, and that the Swedish system differs from American jury trials (Anwar et al., 2019). The study shows that political affiliation can be associated with case outcomes on both ends of a political spectrum; it does not establish that American jurors behave the same way.
Limits of the Evidence
The direct evidence on partisan bias in juror verdicts consists of two online survey experiments by one research team using one scenario. Neither included deliberation, witnesses, cross-examination, or the extended exposure to evidence that a trial provides, and real trials seldom announce a defendant’s party as plainly as the scenario did. The broader polarization research measures nonlegal decisions, and the protest and video studies measure perception rather than verdicts and use cultural rather than partisan categories. The symmetry debate remains unresolved. Real-world evidence comes from a different legal system.
These are group-level findings. Many respondents in every condition voted consistently with the evidence regardless of the defendant’s party, and the effect was concentrated among the most polarized. Party registration or political affiliation cannot show how a particular juror will vote, and no study shows that questioning about political views reliably identifies jurors who cannot be impartial. Strong partisan or issue-related attitudes are a legitimate subject of inquiry when politics is salient in a case, and, on the one direct test available, a generic impartiality instruction did not measurably reduce the partisan gap, so its effectiveness should not be assumed where politics is salient; the courts presume that jurors follow instructions, and that presumption remains the law.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the conviction gaps of 21.4 and 24.9 percentage points (Rhodes et al., 2025) are cited to support expanded voir dire on politics, ask who was studied and how much evidence the finding rests on: two online survey experiments by one team, using one written scenario with conspicuous partisan cues and no deliberation. When the second study is cited to show that standard instructions widened the gap, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since the confidence intervals overlapped in every comparison. When the response is that the effect is confined to a polarized few, ask how large the effect is in absolute terms: among the most polarized respondents, the predicted probability of conviction was about .74 for an opposing-party defendant, compared with .32 and .26 for a co-partisan. When the Swedish lay-judge findings (Anwar et al., 2019) are offered to show that one side is more biased, ask whether the finding applies to this juror and this system, given unmeasured evidence strength. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Political Identity and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury, and the Due Process Clause protects the same interest. Impartiality does not require jurors to be free of opinions. Irvin v. Dowd (1961) held that it is sufficient if a juror can lay aside an impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence, while recognizing that a juror’s assurance of fairness is not dispositive when the circumstances show otherwise. Skilling v. United States (2010) reaffirmed the broad discretion of trial judges in conducting voir dire and assessing juror impartiality, and Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991), decided 5-4, held that due process did not require questioning about the content of what jurors have learned about a case where the court asked about exposure and impartiality; it does not bar such questions. Under Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981) (plurality opinion), the scope of voir dire in federal court rests largely in the trial court’s discretion, subject to constitutional and supervisory requirements in particular circumstances. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) permits the court to examine prospective jurors itself and to allow the parties to supplement the examination. Morgan v. Illinois (1992), although a capital case, illustrates the principle that a juror whose views would prevent the juror from following the law is not impartial, and that the parties are entitled to voir dire adequate to identify such views.
No decision of the Supreme Court treats political affiliation as a classification protected by Batson v. Kentucky (1986); the Court has applied Batson to race and ethnicity and, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994), to sex. The Jury Selection and Service Act prohibits exclusion from federal jury service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status (28 U.S.C. § 1862), a list that does not include political affiliation. Some states have adopted rules that go beyond Batson; California’s statute, for example, covers race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, and religious affiliation (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7), but does not list political affiliation. Nor is political affiliation by itself a ground for a challenge for cause; the question for cause is whether a particular juror can decide the case on the evidence and the law. Whether, and how far, prospective jurors may be questioned about political views is a matter for the trial court’s discretion over voir dire.
Post-verdict remedies for undisclosed partisan bias are narrow. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars juror testimony about deliberations except for extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence, or a mistake on the verdict form, and Warger v. Shauers (2014) held that the rule bars using a juror’s account of deliberations to show that another juror lied during voir dire. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) created an exception for a juror’s clear statement of racial animus only and did not decide whether it extends to other biases. A new trial may be available under McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) where a juror failed to answer honestly a material voir dire question and a correct answer would have supported a challenge for cause, but evidence of the failure must ordinarily come from outside the deliberations. Thorough voir dire is therefore the principal protection.
In courts-martial, members may be challenged for cause under Rule for Courts-Martial 912(f)(1)(N) when serving would raise substantial doubt about the legality, fairness, and impartiality of the proceedings, a standard that includes both actual and implied bias, and military judges must liberally grant defense challenges in close cases (United States v. Clay, 2007; United States v. Urieta, 2025). Implied bias is judged objectively, from the perspective of public confidence in the fairness of the proceeding. Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 permits service members to vote and to express personal opinions on candidates and issues, but not as representatives of the armed forces, and restricts partisan political activity. The directive regulates conduct, not belief; members hold political views like other citizens, and nothing in it suggests that members’ political attitudes are less relevant to impartiality than those of civilian jurors. Questioning on such attitudes is subject to the military judge’s control of voir dire under R.C.M. 912(d).
Arizona
The Arizona Constitution guarantees an impartial jury (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24). Because Arizona eliminated peremptory challenges effective January 1, 2022 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020), challenges for cause are the only means of removing a prospective juror, and voir dire under Rule 18.5 is the means of developing them. Rule 18.4(b) requires the court to excuse a prospective juror when there is reasonable ground to believe the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, and A.R.S. § 21-211 disqualifies a person who is interested in the matter or biased or prejudiced in favor of or against either party. Under these standards, political affiliation or a strong view about a contested issue is not itself a ground for excusal; a prospective juror’s expressed inability to judge fairly a party or witness of a particular political identity, or to decide an issue on the evidence, may be. State v. Hickman (2003) held that an erroneous denial of a cause challenge is not automatically reversible when the defendant removed the juror with a peremptory challenge; the defendant must show prejudice, and reversal was unwarranted where the jury that decided the case was impartial. Arizona Rule of Evidence 606(b) and Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1(d) limit post-verdict inquiry into jurors’ mental processes, so the record made in voir dire is again the principal protection.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research is relevant to focused voir dire on political and issue-related attitudes when a case involves a politically salient defendant, complainant, witness, or subject, because bias against the prosecution’s position can arise from either side of the political spectrum depending on the facts. In cases arising from protests, elections, firearms, or immigration enforcement, the protest-perception research suggests that attitudes toward the underlying cause can shape how jurors see the conduct itself. Questioning of this kind is most useful when it is even-handed, addresses attitudes rather than party labels, and builds a record of the impartiality of the jury that is seated.
The research counsels caution about relying on any single safeguard where politics is salient, since the one direct test this review identified did not show that standard instructions reduced the gap, with confidence intervals that overlapped in every comparison, so the study cannot show that instructions had no effect. It also counsels against assumptions that a particular juror of one party or ideology will favor or disfavor the prosecution: the experimental effects appeared in both parties, depended on the match between juror and defendant, and were concentrated among the most polarized, and the one deliberation study linking conservatism to pro-prosecution statements describes a group-level tendency in a single coerced-confession case. A challenge for cause should rest on what a particular juror says, not on affiliation.
Special Issues for Defense
The research is relevant to requests for voir dire on partisan and issue-related attitudes, and for questioning that goes beyond asking whether a juror can be fair, when a defendant’s political identity or the subject of the case is likely to be known to jurors. Irvin v. Dowd and Morgan v. Illinois support inquiry adequate to identify views that would prevent a juror from deciding on the evidence, and in courts-martial the implied-bias doctrine and the liberal grant mandate give weight to circumstances that would cause the public to doubt a member’s impartiality. Because partisan bias in the experiments affected judgments of guilt, a record developed before trial matters more than post-verdict remedies, which Warger and Rule 606(b) restrict.
The research counsels caution, too, about overstating what it shows. The direct evidence comes from two survey experiments using one written scenario without deliberation, the effects were concentrated among a subset of highly polarized respondents, and many respondents decided consistently with the evidence regardless of the defendant’s party. Political affiliation is not a ground for cause, and the research does not show that a juror’s party predicts that juror’s vote. Questioning that treats a party label as disqualifying, rather than exploring a juror’s ability to set views aside, is unlikely to support a challenge and is not supported by the science.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Anwar, S., Bayer, P., & Hjalmarsson, R. (2019). Politics in the courtroom: Political ideology and jury decision making. Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(3), 834–875. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvy013
Baron, J., & Jost, J. T. (2019). False equivalence: Are liberals and conservatives in the United States equally biased? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(2), 292–303. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691618788876
Ditto, P. H., Liu, B. S., Clark, C. J., Wojcik, S. P., Chen, E. E., Grady, R. H., Celniker, J. B., & Zinger, J. F. (2019). At least bias is bipartisan: A meta-analytic comparison of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(2), 273–291. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617746796
Huang, L. (2025). Xenophobia in juror decision-making. Law & Social Inquiry, 50(1), 170–194. https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2024.36
Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 129–146. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034
Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 690–707. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152
Kahan, D. M., Hoffman, D. A., & Braman, D. (2009). Whose eyes are you going to believe? Scott v. Harris and the perils of cognitive illiberalism. Harvard Law Review, 122(3), 837–906.
Kahan, D. M., Hoffman, D. A., Braman, D., Evans, D., & Rachlinski, J. J. (2012). “They saw a protest”: Cognitive illiberalism and the speech-conduct distinction. Stanford Law Review, 64(4), 851–906.
Rhodes, J., Nteta, T., & Rice, D. (2025). Partisan bias in juror decision-making. Journal of Law and Empirical Analysis, 2(2), 308–323. https://doi.org/10.1177/2755323X251366728
Salerno, J. M., Kulak, K., Smalarz, L., Eerdmans, R. E., Lawrence, M. L., & Dao, T. (2023). The role of social desirability and establishing nonracist credentials on mock juror decisions about Black defendants. Law and Human Behavior, 47(1), 100–118. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000496
Stevenson, M. C., McCracken, E., Watson, A., Petty, T., & Plogher, T. (2023). An attribution theory-based content analysis of mock jurors’ deliberations regarding coerced confessions. Law and Human Behavior, 47(2), 348–366. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000529
Legal Authorities
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (5-4 decision).
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206 (2017).
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion).
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 68 P.3d 418 (2003).
United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Urieta, 85 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40 (2014).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.
28 U.S.C. § 1862.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-211.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a).
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
R.C.M. 912(d), (f)(1)(N).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(d).
Ariz. R. Evid. 606(b).
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (amending Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4 and 18.5, effective Jan. 1, 2022).
Dep’t of Defense Directive 1344.10, Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces (Feb. 19, 2008).
Related topic papers: Explicit and Implicit Bias in Jurors · Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias · Pretrial Publicity, Social Media, and Juror Misconduct · Jury Instructions: Comprehension and Effectiveness · Race and Juror Decision-Making
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial