Snap Shot
- The question: Since Ring v. Arizona (2002) moved death-penalty decisions from judges to juries, what does research show about how capital jurors are selected, how they understand penalty-phase instructions, and how they use aggravating, mitigating, and victim impact evidence?
- What the research shows: In several studies from other jurisdictions (for example, 212 Florida venirepersons and two surveys in one California county), death-qualified participants were, as a group, more receptive to aggravating factors and less receptive to mitigating factors than excluded participants, and exclusion fell unevenly across racial, religious, and gender groups; no Arizona study was found, and the findings do not apply to any individual juror. Comprehension of other states’ penalty-phase instructions has been poor in many studies, especially about mitigation, and simplified instructions helped. Emotion matters: anger, but not sadness, increased death verdicts in one experiment on victim impact statements.
- What it does not show: The research does not show that any capital jury or juror is biased, that death-qualified jurors convict the innocent, or that a particular sentence was arbitrary. Most studies are mock-jury simulations, many are decades old, and no study has measured Arizona capital jurors directly.
- The law: Ring requires a jury to find any fact that makes a defendant eligible for death. Arizona juries now decide aggravation unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt, each juror decides mitigation individually by a preponderance, and a death verdict must be unanimous; a hung penalty jury is replaced once, then life is imposed. Death qualification remains constitutional (Witt; Lockhart; Morgan).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter research in which mock jurors distinguished more serious crimes and, in one experiment, sad victim impact statements did not increase death verdicts, although in the narrowing study the two kinds of evidence did not combine as the law assumes (Holleran & Vaughan, 2020), while keeping evidence and argument within Arizona’s limits; defense counsel can point to the research on comprehension and mitigation, without overstating what mock-jury findings show about a particular jury.
In 2002, the Supreme Court held in Ring v. Arizona that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find the aggravating facts that make a defendant eligible for a death sentence. Until then, Arizona juries decided guilt and judges alone decided whether aggravating circumstances existed and whether death should be imposed. After Ring, the Arizona Legislature rewrote the capital statutes so that the jury decides both eligibility and sentence, under a multi-phase procedure and instructions unlike those in an ordinary trial.
These questions reach court in death qualification, in disputes over penalty-phase instructions, in rulings on victim impact evidence, and on appeal and postconviction review. This paper summarizes research on death qualification, instruction comprehension, mitigation, victim impact evidence, and race and demeanor; describes its limits; and reviews the governing federal, military, and Arizona law. The research describes tendencies of groups of jurors, much of it from other states or with mock jurors. It does not show that any juror is unfit to serve or that any sentence was wrongly imposed, and its findings bear on arguments available to both the State and the defense.
How the Arizona Capital Jury Decides
Under the statutes as revised after Ring, an Arizona capital trial has up to three phases before the same jury. In the guilt phase, the jury decides whether the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder. In the aggravation (eligibility) phase, the jury decides whether the State has proved one or more statutory aggravating circumstances; each must be found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. If at least one is found, the case moves to the penalty phase, in which each juror individually decides whether any mitigating circumstance has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence and whether the mitigation is “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-751, 13-752). The Arizona pattern instructions tell jurors that the law does not presume either sentence, that a juror who finds aggravation and mitigation of equal quality may still vote for life, that the decision is a qualitative moral judgment rather than a mathematical one, and that the verdict is binding rather than a recommendation (State Bar of Arizona, 2022).
The penalty phase thus asks for an individual moral judgment in which jurors need not agree on mitigation. Much of the research below concerns whether jurors understand and perform that task as the law describes it.
Death Qualification and Who Sits
Because the same jury decides guilt and sentence, prospective jurors are questioned about their views on capital punishment before trial. A juror whose views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties may be excused for cause, whether the juror opposes the death penalty or would impose it automatically. This process is called death qualification.
Early survey research found that people who would be excluded because of opposition to the death penalty differed as a group from those who remained: in a California survey, death-qualified respondents were more favorable to the prosecution and to crime-control values, and excluded respondents were disproportionately women and Black (Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984). A companion experiment examined whether the questioning process itself, in which prospective jurors discuss the penalty before hearing any evidence, shifts participants’ expectations toward conviction and a death sentence (Haney, 1984). A meta-analysis of studies relating death penalty attitudes to verdicts found that support for capital punishment was associated with a greater tendency to convict (Allen et al., 1998).
Later studies examined sentencing judgments directly. Among 212 Florida venirepersons, death-qualified participants endorsed aggravating factors more strongly and mitigating factors less strongly than excluded participants, and also scored higher on legal authoritarianism and belief in a just world (Butler & Moran, 2007). Religious affiliation and beliefs, a belief that murderers deserve to die, gender, and race all predicted death-qualification status in another sample (Summers et al., 2010). Because attitudes toward capital punishment differ across racial groups, two countywide surveys in a California county with a large Black population found that death qualification continued to exclude death penalty opponents disproportionately and to reduce the representation of Black residents, leaving a pool more receptive to aggravation and less receptive to mitigation (Lynch & Haney, 2018).
The research is not uniform. In two experiments, watching death-qualification questioning raised participants’ pretrial estimates of guilt, but the effect did not survive the evidence; exposed participants were not more likely to convict and said they would require more evidence (Vitriol & Kovera, 2018). The older findings also predate substantial changes in public support for capital punishment, and the composition of an excluded group depends on the population surveyed. The research shows that death qualification changes who sits on a capital jury; how much that changes verdicts in actual trials has not been measured.
Understanding Penalty-Phase Instructions
Capital sentencing instructions use terms such as “aggravating circumstance” and “mitigating circumstance” that do not match ordinary usage, and researchers have tested comprehension of states’ approved capital instructions since the 1990s (Wiener et al., 1995). In an experiment in which jury-eligible participants watched a simulated penalty trial, comprehension was poor overall, and Black defendants were treated only slightly more punitively than White defendants in general, but racial disparities were concentrated among participants whose comprehension was poorest (Lynch & Haney, 2000). When participants then deliberated in small groups, deliberation did not improve comprehension or reduce the misuse of mitigating evidence, and it produced a shift toward death rather than leniency (Lynch & Haney, 2009).
Instructions can be improved. In an experiment in which defendant race and instruction type were varied, simplified penalty-phase instructions improved comprehension and reduced the disadvantage of the Black defendant, as did racially diverse participant groups (Shaked-Schroer et al., 2008). The Arizona pattern instructions frame the penalty decision as a qualitative judgment rather than a balancing or weighing (State Bar of Arizona, 2022), but their comprehension has not been tested.
In two vignette experiments testing whether jurors select among death-eligible offenders as the law assumes, mock jurors identified more serious crimes and offenders with diminished culpability, but the two kinds of evidence did not combine as the law assumes, and mitigation affected sentences inconsistently from one sample to the next (Holleran & Vaughan, 2020).
How Jurors Use Mitigating Evidence
Mitigation is the part of capital sentencing jurors appear to find most difficult. Interviews with actual capital jurors from the Capital Jury Project, a multistate interview study of jurors who served in capital trials, found that jurors expected evidence of mental illness to favor life, but jurors who had heard such evidence often described it as outweighed by the brutality of the crime, as a sign of future dangerousness, as confusing when presented by experts, or as an attempt at manipulation (Sandys et al., 2018). In a mock-juror study, death-qualified participants chose death less often when the case included mitigation such as untreated schizophrenia, intoxication, borderline intellectual functioning, or severe childhood abuse than when it included none (Barnett et al., 2004). Federal capital verdict forms, which allow jurors to write in mitigating factors of their own, provide a rare look at actual juries: in 205 forms from 171 juries, about four in ten juries given the opportunity added mitigators, most raising topics not listed on the form, and juries were less likely to write in mitigators when the defendant was White (Rose & Rountree, 2022).
These findings indicate both that jurors take mitigation seriously, sometimes beyond what the parties presented, and that the same evidence can be heard as favoring either sentence.
Victim Impact Evidence and Emotion
Since Payne v. Tennessee (1991), victim impact evidence has been admissible at capital sentencing. A review of early mock-jury research argued, as its title indicates, that victim impact statements are prejudicial (Myers & Greene, 2004). In a randomized experiment using the videotape of an actual penalty trial, victim impact testimony increased participants’ sympathy for the victim and family, and that sympathy was associated with a higher likelihood of choosing death (Paternoster & Deise, 2011).
The effect may depend on the emotion conveyed. Among 581 death-qualified participants who watched a penalty-phase trial, an angry victim impact statement increased death sentences and reduced the weight given to mitigation, while a sad statement did not increase death sentences; participants who reported becoming angry during the trial were more likely to choose death (Nuñez et al., 2017). The authors concluded that victim impact statements are not inherently biasing and that not all emotions affect sentencing equally. In Arizona, jurors are instructed that victim impact information may be considered only to rebut mitigation and not as a new aggravating circumstance, and that family members may not recommend a sentence (State Bar of Arizona, 2022). No study has tested whether that limiting instruction changes how jurors use the information.
Race, Demeanor, and Deliberation
Racial disparities in capital sentencing have been studied in both field data and experiments. In one jurisdiction’s death-eligible cases involving White victims, Black defendants rated as having a more stereotypically Black appearance were more likely to have been sentenced to death, controlling for other case factors (Eberhardt et al., 2006). In a mock penalty-phase study with deliberating groups, White male participants were significantly more likely than women and participants of color to sentence a Black defendant to death (Lynch & Haney, 2011). These findings concern group tendencies under particular conditions; they do not show that any individual juror of any group is biased, and race and sex may not be the basis for selecting or striking jurors (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994).
Jurors also attend to how the defendant appears at trial. In Capital Jury Project data, jurors who saw the defendant as sorry and sincere tended to favor life, while those who saw the defendant as bored or emotionally uninvolved tended to favor death (Antonio, 2006). A defendant’s courtroom demeanor can reflect medication, culture, or counsel’s advice, as discussed in the hub’s paper on the defendant’s courtroom presentation.
Limits of the Evidence
Most capital jury research uses mock jurors who read or watch abbreviated trials and know no life depends on their decision. Many foundational studies are decades old, predate current instructions, and come from California, Florida, and other states rather than Arizona. The Capital Jury Project interviewed real jurors, but its interviews were retrospective and its jurors served in trials from earlier decades. Field studies of actual sentences can show associations but cannot fully separate juror decisions from charging decisions and case strength. The searches for this paper found no published study of Arizona capital jurors since Ring and no test of comprehension of the Arizona pattern instructions.
Most studies did not analyze juror gender. Where it was examined, gender predicted death-qualification status (Summers et al., 2010), and in one mock-jury study, White male mock jurors sentenced a Black defendant to death more often than women and participants of color (Lynch & Haney, 2011). These are group-level findings from limited samples and cannot be applied to any juror. Above all, the research cannot show that a particular jury misunderstood its instructions, that a particular juror was biased, or that a particular sentence was or was not warranted.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When death qualification is said to produce juries biased toward conviction (Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984; Allen et al., 1998), ask how old the data are and whether later experiments, such as Vitriol and Kovera (2018), found that the effect survived the trial evidence. When poor comprehension of penalty-phase instructions is cited (Wiener et al., 1995; Lynch & Haney, 2000), ask which instructions were tested and whether they resemble the Arizona pattern instructions now in use. When an angry victim impact statement is said to increase death verdicts (Nuñez et al., 2017), ask whether the statement at issue resembles the one studied and whether the same study found no such effect for sadness. When the Capital Jury Project is cited for how real jurors treat mental illness or remorse (Sandys et al., 2018; Antonio, 2006), ask when and where the jurors served and how their recollections were gathered. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Capital Jury Sentencing and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Ring v. Arizona (2002), applying Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), held that because Arizona’s aggravating circumstances operated as the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find them; it overruled Walton v. Arizona (1990) to the extent that case allowed a judge to do so. Schriro v. Summerlin (2004) held that Ring does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review, and Hurst v. Florida (2016) applied Ring to Florida’s advisory-jury scheme. In McKinney v. Arizona (2020), the Court held that a state appellate court may itself reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including on collateral review of a case already final, without a jury.
Death qualification is governed by Wainwright v. Witt (1985), which permits exclusion for cause of a juror whose views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties, and by Morgan v. Illinois (1992), which requires excusal of a juror who would automatically impose death. In Lockhart v. McCree (1986), the Court held that death qualification does not violate the fair-cross-section requirement or the right to an impartial jury, and, while noting limits of the studies offered to show that death-qualified juries are more prone to convict, it assumed for purposes of its opinion that the studies were valid.
The sentencer must be allowed to consider any aspect of the defendant’s character, record, or offense offered as a basis for a sentence less than death (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 1982; Tennard v. Dretke, 2004). Payne v. Tennessee (1991) permits evidence of the victim’s characteristics and the impact of the crime, but family members’ characterizations of the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence remain barred (Bosse v. Oklahoma, 2016). When future dangerousness is at issue and the only alternative to death is life without parole, the defendant may inform the jury of parole ineligibility (Simmons v. South Carolina, 1994).
Under the Federal Death Penalty Act, a jury must find at least one aggravating factor unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt; mitigating factors are proved by a preponderance and may be found by any one juror; and a death recommendation must be unanimous (18 U.S.C. § 3593). In courts-martial, members serve the jury’s function. A capital case requires twelve members (Article 25a, UCMJ), and death may be adjudged only if the members unanimously find at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that extenuating and mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by aggravating circumstances, and unanimously vote for death (R.C.M. 1004(a)); if the members do not vote unanimously for death, they vote on life without eligibility for parole, which requires three-fourths, and otherwise the military judge imposes a lesser sentence (Article 53, UCMJ; R.C.M. 1004).
Arizona
After Ring, the Arizona Legislature amended the capital statutes in 2002 to provide for jury sentencing. Under the current statutes, the jury that decided guilt decides whether aggravating circumstances listed in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751(F) have been proved unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant must prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, and jurors need not agree on them; and a death verdict must be unanimous (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-751, 13-752). If the jury cannot reach a penalty verdict, the court dismisses it and impanels a new jury, which does not retry guilt or the aggravating circumstances already found; if the new jury also cannot agree, the court imposes a sentence of life or natural life (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-752(K); State Bar of Arizona, 2022).
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that the statute creates no presumption of death, that a juror who finds aggravation and mitigation equally balanced is not required to vote for death, and that a jury may return a life verdict even when no mitigation is presented (State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville, 2005). It has also cautioned that terms such as “balance,” “outweigh,” and “compare” may mislead penalty-phase jurors (State v. Carlson, 2015). Victim impact information may be considered only to rebut mitigation and is not an aggravating circumstance (State v. Tucker, 2007). In Lynch v. Arizona (2016), the Supreme Court held that Simmons applies in Arizona because parole is unavailable for offenses committed after 1993, and in Cruz v. Arizona (2023), it held that the Arizona Supreme Court’s refusal to treat Lynch as a significant change in the law for postconviction purposes was not an adequate state ground. The current pattern instructions explain the release consequences of each life sentence (State Bar of Arizona, 2022).
Because Arizona abolished peremptory challenges effective January 1, 2022, death qualification proceeds entirely through challenges for cause under the Witt standard and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
In the studies reviewed, mock jurors identified more serious crimes and offenders with diminished culpability, although the two kinds of evidence did not combine as the law assumes (Holleran & Vaughan, 2020); the authors of one experiment with 581 death-qualified participants concluded that victim impact statements are not inherently biasing (Nuñez et al., 2017), while another randomized experiment found that victim sympathy was associated with choosing death (Paternoster & Deise, 2011); and exposure to death-qualification questioning did not increase convictions in two recent experiments. These findings bear on claims that capital jury procedures are inherently unreliable. The comprehension research also supports plain-language instructions and argument that track the Arizona instructions’ description of the penalty decision as an individual qualitative judgment.
The research also counsels caution. Angry victim impact statements, more than sad ones, were associated with more death verdicts and less weight to mitigation, so victim impact evidence that stays within the rebuttal purpose Arizona law permits is less likely to raise concerns about unfair prejudice. Argument that describes the penalty decision as arithmetic, or suggests that mitigation must be connected to the crime or outweigh aggravation, is in tension with the Arizona pattern instructions and with State v. Carlson (2015), and with research suggesting that jurors already struggle with these concepts; this sentence concerns Arizona proceedings only. Questioning during death qualification that tracks protected characteristics rather than expressed views raises the constitutional problems addressed in the hub’s paper on Batson.
Special Issues for Defense
The research is relevant to requests for clear penalty-phase instructions, for careful explanation that mitigation need not be unanimous or connected to the crime, and for the Simmons and Lynch instruction where it applies. It is also relevant to individualized death-qualification questioning that distinguishes general opposition or support from views that would substantially impair a juror’s duties, and to how mitigation evidence, particularly mental illness and childhood abuse, may be heard as evidence of dangerousness.
The research also counsels caution about what it can establish. Studies showing that death-qualified jurors as a group favor aggravation do not show that any seated juror is biased, and under Lockhart death qualification does not violate the federal fair-cross-section or impartial-jury guarantees. Findings on comprehension come largely from instructions other than Arizona’s, and a recent experiment did not find that the effect of death-qualification questioning on pretrial guilt estimates survived the trial evidence. Actual capital jurors sometimes described mitigation as manipulative, confusing, or a sign of dangerousness, so the research does not show that more mitigation evidence is always favorable to the defendant.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Allen, M., Mabry, E., & McKelton, D.-M. (1998). Impact of juror attitudes about the death penalty on juror evaluations of guilt and punishment: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 22(6), 715–731. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025763008533
Antonio, M. E. (2006). Arbitrariness and the death penalty: How the defendant’s appearance during trial influences capital jurors’ punishment decision. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 24(2), 215–234. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.673
Barnett, M. E., Brodsky, S. L., & Davis, C. M. (2004). When mitigation evidence makes a difference: Effects of psychological mitigating evidence on sentencing decisions in capital trials. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 22(6), 751–770. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.591
Butler, B., & Moran, G. (2007). The impact of death qualification, belief in a just world, legal authoritarianism, and locus of control on venirepersons’ evaluations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 25(1), 57–68. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.734
Eberhardt, J. L., Davies, P. G., Purdie-Vaughns, V. J., & Johnson, S. L. (2006). Looking deathworthy: Perceived stereotypicality of Black defendants predicts capital-sentencing outcomes. Psychological Science, 17(5), 383–386. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01716.x
Fitzgerald, R., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1984). Due process vs. crime control: Death qualification and jury attitudes. Law and Human Behavior, 8(1–2), 31–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044350
Haney, C. (1984). Examining death qualification: Further analysis of the process effect. Law and Human Behavior, 8(1–2), 133–151. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044356
Holleran, L. B., & Vaughan, T. J. (2020). Examining jurors’ ability to meet the constitutional requirement of narrowing in capital sentencing. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 38(4), 317–336. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2464
Lynch, M., & Haney, C. (2000). Discrimination and instructional comprehension: Guided discretion, racial bias, and the death penalty. Law and Human Behavior, 24(3), 337–358. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005588221761
Lynch, M., & Haney, C. (2009). Capital jury deliberation: Effects on death sentencing, comprehension, and discrimination. Law and Human Behavior, 33(6), 481–496. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-008-9168-2
Lynch, M., & Haney, C. (2011). Mapping the racial bias of the White male capital juror: Jury composition and the “empathic divide.” Law & Society Review, 45(1), 69–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2011.00428.x
Lynch, M., & Haney, C. (2018). Death qualification in Black and White: Racialized decision making and death-qualified juries. Law & Policy, 40(2), 148–171. https://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12099
Myers, B., & Greene, E. (2004). The prejudicial nature of victim impact statements: Implications for capital sentencing policy. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 10(4), 492–515. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.10.4.492
Nuñez, N., Myers, B., Wilkowski, B. M., & Schweitzer, K. (2017). The impact of angry versus sad victim impact statements on mock jurors’ sentencing decisions in a capital trial. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 44(6), 862–886. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854816689809
Paternoster, R., & Deise, J. (2011). A heavy thumb on the scale: The effect of victim impact evidence on capital decision making. Criminology, 49(1), 129–161. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2010.00220.x
Rose, M. R., & Rountree, M. M. (2022). The focal concerns of jurors evaluating mitigation: Evidence from federal capital jury forms. Law & Society Review, 56(2), 213–236. https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12602
Sandys, M., Pruss, H., & Walsh, S. M. (2018). Capital jurors, mental illness, and the unreliability principle: Can capital jurors comprehend and account for evidence of mental illness? Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 36(4), 470–489. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2355
Shaked-Schroer, N., Costanzo, M., & Marcus-Newhall, A. (2008). Reducing racial bias in the penalty phase of capital trials. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 26(5), 603–617. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.829
State Bar of Arizona. (2022). Revised Arizona jury instructions (criminal) (6th ed.), Capital Case Instructions. State Bar of Arizona.
Summers, A., Hayward, R. D., & Miller, M. K. (2010). Death qualification as systematic exclusion of jurors with certain religious and other characteristics. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40(12), 3218–3234. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00698.x
Vitriol, J. A., & Kovera, M. B. (2018). Exposure to capital voir dire may not increase convictions despite increasing pretrial presumption of guilt. Law and Human Behavior, 42(5), 472–483. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000304
Wiener, R. L., Pritchard, C. C., & Weston, M. (1995). Comprehensibility of approved jury instructions in capital murder cases. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80(4), 455–467. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.80.4.455
Legal Authorities
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S. 1 (2016).
Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U.S. 17 (2023).
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613 (2016).
McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U.S. 139 (2020).
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville (Baldwin), 211 Ariz. 468 (2005).
State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381 (2015).
State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298 (2007).
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004).
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
18 U.S.C. § 3593.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-751.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-752.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 25a, 10 U.S.C. § 825a.
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 53, 10 U.S.C. § 853.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 1004 (2024 ed.).
Related topic papers: Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias · Jury Instructions: Comprehension and Effectiveness · Race and Juror Decision-Making · Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts · Closing Argument and Emotion · The Defendant’s Courtroom Presentation
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial