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Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

The Defendant’s Courtroom Presentation

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  • The question: Do a defendant’s appearance, demeanor, restraints, seating, and decision whether to testify affect how jurors and court-martial members judge the case?
  • What the research shows: A meta-analysis of mock-juror studies found modest advantages for defendants who were physically attractive, female, or of higher socioeconomic status, though for some crimes the advantage disappeared. Mock jurors convicted more often when the defendant sat in a dock rather than beside counsel, and real Arizona civil jurors noticed courtroom behavior but gave it a minor role in deliberation. In a meta-analysis of lie-detection studies, people distinguished lies from truths about 54% of the time, only slightly better than chance, and displays of remorse do not have a single, predictable effect.
  • What it does not show: The research does not show that any defendant’s demeanor reveals guilt, innocence, or sincerity, or that a particular jury was swayed by appearance. Most studies are mock-jury experiments with written or video materials, and the findings on facial appearance are contested.
  • The law: Compelled prison clothing (Estelle) and visible restraints without case-specific findings (Deck) are constitutionally restricted, and the jury may not draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence (Griffin; Carter). Courts-martial require proper uniform and bar restraint unless the military judge prescribes it (R.C.M. 804). Arizona vacated a death sentence for shackling based on a general jail policy (Gomez).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the issue in argument about demeanor and in security measures, which require case-specific findings; defense counsel are likely to encounter it in questions about restraints, clothing, seating, and demeanor; for both, the effects are modest and remorse displays can cut both ways.

The defendant is present throughout a criminal trial, but usually as a silent participant. Jurors watch the defendant during jury selection, testimony, and argument, and they may form impressions from how the defendant looks, dresses, sits, reacts, and whether he or she testifies. The law treats most of these impressions as outside the evidence. Jurors are told to decide the case only on the evidence and not to be influenced by sympathy or prejudice, and they are told that a defendant’s decision not to testify may not be held against him or her. The question this paper addresses is how well that legal ideal matches what research shows about human judgment.

The issue reaches court in several ways: in motions about restraints, jail clothing, and security personnel; in decisions about where the defendant sits; in objections to prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s demeanor; in disputes over medication that may affect how a defendant appears; and in the defendant’s decision whether to testify. It also arises when a defendant has a condition, such as autism, that produces unusual courtroom behavior. This paper summarizes research on physical appearance, demeanor and the reading of deception, remorse, conditions that affect presentation, restraints and seating, and the decision to testify, followed by the governing federal, military, and Arizona law.

Two points frame the research. First, most of it is experimental work with mock jurors, which isolates a single variable but cannot show how large the effect is in a real trial with substantial evidence. Second, the research addresses what jurors infer from presentation, not whether those inferences are accurate. A finding that jurors react to a defendant’s demeanor is not a finding that demeanor is informative, and a finding that a factor affects verdicts on average does not show that it affected a particular verdict.

Physical Appearance

Research on physical appearance began with experiments showing that attractive defendants are often treated more leniently. In a frequently cited early study, participants recommended shorter sentences for an attractive defendant charged with burglary, but longer sentences for an attractive defendant charged with a swindle in which her appearance was used to commit the offense (Sigall & Ostrove, 1975). The study was small, used students and written materials, and is now five decades old, but it illustrated that the effect depends on the crime.

A meta-analysis of experimental mock-juror research combined these studies. It found that, in general, defendants who were physically attractive, female, or of higher socioeconomic status were judged somewhat more favorably, although for some crimes the advantages disappeared; the analysis found no overall effect of defendant race, although the effect of race on punishment depended strongly on the type of crime, and defendants were at a disadvantage when the victim was female (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). The effects were modest, the studies largely used written vignettes or photographs, and the meta-analysis predates most modern research methods. The finding that female defendants were judged somewhat more favorably on average is a group-level result from mock-juror studies; it varied with the offense and says nothing about how a particular juror will view a particular defendant.

Facial appearance has also been studied with real sentencing data. In one study, participants rated photographs of men convicted of murder in Florida, and those rated as less trustworthy in appearance were more likely to have received death rather than life sentences (Wilson & Rule, 2015). Later replication attempts using the original images, additional images of the same people, and a larger set of cases found little support for the association, and found that ratings depended heavily on which photograph of a person was used (Kramer & Gardner, 2020). The original finding is therefore contested. A separate study of death-eligible cases in one large jurisdiction found that, controlling for a wide range of other factors, among cases with White victims, Black defendants rated as more stereotypically Black in appearance were more likely to have been sentenced to death (Eberhardt et al., 2006). Research on race and juror judgment is reviewed in the hub’s paper on race and juror decision-making and is not repeated here.

Demeanor and the Reading of Deception

Jurors are often told that they may consider a witness’s manner while testifying, and many people believe that lying shows in the face and body. The research does not support a strong version of that belief. A meta-analysis of more than 200 studies found that people distinguished lies from truths with an average accuracy of about 54%, only slightly better than chance, and that accuracy was somewhat higher for truths than for lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Those meta-analytic results concern lie detection, not the demeanor of a defendant who does not testify, but they give little reason to expect that observers can read guilt from a nonverbal defendant’s nervousness, gaze, or affect, which can reflect many states other than guilt.

Real jurors do notice what happens off the witness stand. In a study of 50 videotaped deliberations in Arizona civil trials, the jurors discussed what they had observed of the parties and others in the courtroom outside of formal testimony, but those observations played a minor role in the deliberations as a whole (Rose et al., 2010). The study involved civil cases, and the parties were not criminal defendants, but it is the only direct observation of real jurors on this question that I identified.

Remorse and Emotional Display

The law treats remorse as relevant to sentencing and, in capital cases, to mitigation, and jurors may also react to a defendant’s emotional display during the guilt phase. The research shows that remorse is perceived, but not in a simple or uniform way. In one experiment, mock jurors who watched a video of a capital defendant relied more on nonverbal than verbal behavior in judging whether he was remorseful, and sentencing was associated both with the defendant’s behavior and with the jurors’ own willingness to engage with emotional situations (Corwin et al., 2012). In another, a defendant who displayed remorse was found guilty more often than a remorseless defendant when he offered no explanation for the conduct, a pattern explained as the display being read as an acknowledgment of wrongdoing (Jehle et al., 2009). This is a single mock-juror finding, and it measures what jurors infer, not what is true. Remorse displays may therefore carry different consequences for punishment and for conviction.

Legal scholarship has also noted that, although a lack of remorse weighs heavily in sentencing, there is no evidence that remorse can be accurately evaluated in a courtroom, and race and other impermissible factors may affect how it is perceived (Bandes, 2016). A defendant who appears unmoved may be depressed, medicated, anxious, following counsel’s advice, or from a background in which public displays of emotion are discouraged; no study cited here tests these explanations. A defendant who weeps may be remorseful, frightened, or distressed about the consequences.

Conditions That Affect Presentation

Some defendants have conditions that produce behavior jurors may misread, such as reduced eye contact, flat or unusual affect, literal answers, or difficulty following questions. In an experiment with 160 jury-eligible adults in the United Kingdom, participants read about a man whose behavior toward police and in court was atypical. Those who were told he had autism and given background information about it rated him as more honest and likeable and less blameworthy, returned fewer guilty verdicts, and recommended more lenient sentences; those who were not told described him as deceitful, unremorseful, and rude (Maras et al., 2019). A related study of a defendant with developmental language disorder found that the diagnostic information changed ratings of credibility and blameworthiness but not verdicts or sentences (Hobson et al., 2023). Both studies used written vignettes without deliberation, and neither tested how jurors would respond to the information when the prosecution contested it.

Medication raises a parallel issue. Antipsychotic and other psychiatric medications can flatten affect or produce visible side effects, and the Supreme Court has recognized that involuntary medication may affect a defendant’s demeanor and ability to participate at trial (Riggins v. Nevada, 1992). The research on how jurors perceive medication effects is limited.

Restraints, Clothing, and Where the Defendant Sits

Courts have long assumed that jurors who see a defendant in jail clothing or restraints will infer that he or she is dangerous or guilty. Direct experimental evidence on visible restraints in American trials is sparse. The closest evidence comes from research on the dock, an enclosure for the defendant used in Australia, England, and other countries. In an Australian mock-jury experiment, participants were more likely to convict when the defendant sat in a traditional dock or a glass-enclosed secure dock than when he sat beside counsel at the bar table (Rossner et al., 2017). In a later study by the same research group, a defendant who appeared by video was not more likely to be convicted than one who appeared in person, but a defendant appearing alone in a dock again appeared to be the most prejudicial arrangement (Rossner & Tait, 2023). These studies did not test handcuffs, leg restraints, or jail clothing, and their participants knew no real case depended on their decision. They are consistent with the legal assumption that markers of custody can affect judgment, but they do not establish the size of that effect in an American courtroom.

The Decision to Testify

A defendant’s most consequential decision about presentation is whether to testify. Jurors are instructed not to draw an inference from silence, but some research suggests that some do. An early experiment found that mock jurors judged a defendant more harshly when he invoked the privilege against self-incrimination (Shaffer & Case, 1982). A later review of mock-jury experiments, together with a new 400-person simulation and data from real trials, concluded that the penalty for not testifying is substantial and comparable to the penalty from the jury’s learning of a prior criminal record (Bellin, 2018). Analysis of real felony trials found that defendants with prior records were less likely to testify, that juries usually learned of a prior record when the defendant testified, and that such knowledge was associated with a higher probability of conviction, particularly when the other evidence was weaker (Eisenberg & Hans, 2009).

These findings describe a real dilemma rather than a recommendation. A defendant who testifies is exposed to cross-examination and, in many cases, impeachment with prior convictions; a defendant who does not testify relies on jurors to follow an instruction that some may not follow. The research does not tell any defendant which choice is better in a particular case, and it does not show that jurors who see a defendant testify are able to judge his or her credibility from demeanor any better than they judge other witnesses.

Limits of the Evidence

Most of this research uses mock jurors reading vignettes, viewing photographs, or watching short videos, often without deliberation. Real trials contain substantially more evidence, and the effect of a defendant’s appearance or demeanor is likely smaller when the evidence strongly favors one side. Several foundational studies are decades old. The facial-appearance research is contested, and the experimental work on restraints and seating comes largely from other countries with different courtroom designs. Few studies examine courts-martial, in which the accused appears in uniform with insignia of grade and decorations, and none of the studies reviewed here tested whether members respond differently from civilian jurors. Most studies used a single male defendant, so differences by defendant sex rest largely on the older meta-analysis.

Above all, the research addresses what observers infer, not what is true. It does not show that any defendant’s demeanor reveals guilt or innocence, sincerity or insincerity, and it cannot show that a particular verdict was affected by a defendant’s appearance.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the finding that untrustworthy-looking men were more likely to have received death sentences (Wilson & Rule, 2015) is cited to show that appearance drives outcomes, ask whether it has held up, since replication attempts found little support and found that the photograph chosen mattered (Kramer & Gardner, 2020). When the Australian dock studies (Rossner et al., 2017; Rossner & Tait, 2023) are cited in a motion about restraints, ask who was studied and whether a glass dock in an Australian mock trial is the same as the restraint at issue. When a defendant’s lack of visible emotion is offered as evidence of guilt or lack of remorse, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design of studies showing that people detect deception at about 54% accuracy (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) and that a remorse display increased convictions in one condition (Jehle et al., 2009). When the autism-label findings (Maras et al., 2019) are offered, ask whether a vignette study without deliberation or opposing evidence applies to this defendant. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

The Defendant’s Presentation and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The Due Process Clause and the presumption of innocence limit what the State may do to a defendant’s appearance before the jury. In Estelle v. Williams (1976), the Supreme Court held that the State may not compel a defendant to stand trial before a jury in identifiable prison clothing, although a defendant who does not object may be found to have waived the claim. In Deck v. Missouri (2005), the Court held that the Constitution forbids visible shackles during the guilt phase, and during the penalty phase of a capital trial, unless the trial court finds them justified by an essential state interest, such as courtroom security, specific to the particular defendant. Illinois v. Allen (1970) permits a trial judge to deal with a persistently disruptive defendant by contempt, by removal, or, as a last resort, by binding and gagging. Other courtroom arrangements are judged by whether they are inherently prejudicial: Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) upheld the presence of uniformed troopers seated behind the defendant, and Carey v. Musladin (2006) held that no clearly established federal law addressed spectators’ conduct, there buttons bearing the victim’s photograph, for purposes of federal habeas review.

The Fifth Amendment forbids comment by the prosecution or the court suggesting that a defendant’s silence is evidence of guilt (Griffin v. California, 1965), and on request the court must instruct the jury not to draw an adverse inference (Carter v. Kentucky, 1981). A defendant also has a constitutional right to testify (Rock v. Arkansas, 1987). In Riggins v. Nevada (1992), the Court reversed a conviction in which the defendant had been involuntarily medicated with an antipsychotic during trial without adequate findings, and the concurring opinion emphasized the possible effects of medication on the defendant’s demeanor and ability to assist counsel. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, a testifying defendant may be impeached with certain prior convictions, and Luce v. United States (1984) held that a defendant must testify to raise and preserve for review a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction under Rule 609(a); a concurring opinion read the holding as limited to in limine Rule 609(a) rulings.

In courts-martial, members serve the jury’s function. Rule for Courts-Martial 804(a)(1)(A) requires the accused to be properly attired in the uniform or dress prescribed by the military judge, with insignia of grade, and permits the accused to wear decorations to which he or she is entitled; the Discussion describes a good military appearance as both a right and an obligation. Rule 804(a)(1)(C) provides that physical restraint may not be imposed during open sessions unless prescribed by the military judge. Under Military Rule of Evidence 301(f)(3), when the accused does not testify, defense counsel may request that members be instructed not to draw an adverse inference, or may request that no such instruction be given; the election binds the military judge unless the instruction is necessary in the interests of justice. For non-capital offenses committed after December 27, 2023, the military judge rather than the members determines the sentence (R.C.M. 925(c)), so members’ perceptions of remorse now bear chiefly on findings, capital cases, and cases involving earlier offenses.

Arizona

The Arizona Constitution guarantees the accused the right to appear and defend in person (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24). The Arizona Supreme Court applied Deck in State v. Gomez (2005), holding that shackling the defendant during the penalty phase on the basis of a general jail policy, without case-specific findings, was unconstitutional and vacating the death sentence. Arizona’s pattern instructions tell jurors that they must not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice (RAJI Standard Criminal 1), that the defendant is not required to testify and that the jury must not let that choice affect deliberations (Standard Criminal 18(a)), and that a defendant who does testify is to be evaluated the same as any other witness (Standard Criminal 18(b)). Impeachment of a testifying defendant with prior convictions is governed by Arizona Rule of Evidence 609.

The research bears on these rules in two ways. It is consistent with the legal assumption that visible markers of custody can affect jurors, and it suggests that the no-adverse-inference instruction, while required, may not fully prevent jurors from drawing inferences from silence. Whether that instruction reduces the effect in real trials has not been tested.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research is consistent with jurors deciding principally on the evidence in the civil deliberations studied (real Arizona civil jurors noticed courtroom behavior but gave it a minor role), although that study did not involve criminal defendants and cannot show what any particular jury did; the effects of appearance in experiments are modest and inconsistent across crimes. The research on demeanor gives no basis for treating a defendant’s displayed remorse, distress, or lack of it as a reliable indicator of either guilt or innocence. Security measures are reviewed for the case-specific findings that Deck and Gomez require.

The research counsels caution about argument that invites jurors to read guilt or a lack of remorse from a defendant’s demeanor, because people detect deception from demeanor only slightly better than chance and emotional expression can vary with a person’s condition, medication, and background, although no study cited here tests this. Comment that touches on a defendant’s silence carries constitutional risk under Griffin. Where a defendant has a condition that affects presentation, the research suggests that unexplained atypical behavior may be misread by jurors.

Special Issues for Defense

The research bears on jail clothing, visible restraints, and seating that marks the defendant as in custody, and on whether jurors are given accurate information when a defendant’s condition affects demeanor, as in the autism research. It also bears on the no-adverse-inference instruction and, in courts-martial, on the election under Military Rule of Evidence 301(f)(3), recognizing that some jurors may still weigh silence.

The research also counsels caution. The effects of appearance and seating are modest in experiments and largely untested in real American trials, so they speak to the risk of prejudice rather than showing that a verdict was affected. The facial-appearance findings are contested. Remorse displays can lower punishment but may also be read as acknowledgment of guilt, and the research on the silence penalty identifies a real cost without showing that testifying is the better choice in any particular case.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bandes, S. A. (2016). Remorse and criminal justice. Emotion Review, 8(1), 14–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073915601222

Bellin, J. (2018). The silence penalty. Iowa Law Review, 103(2), 395–434.

Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214–234. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2

Corwin, E. P., Cramer, R. J., Griffin, D. A., & Brodsky, S. L. (2012). Defendant remorse, need for affect, and juror sentencing decisions. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 40(1), 41–49.

Eberhardt, J. L., Davies, P. G., Purdie-Vaughns, V. J., & Johnson, S. L. (2006). Looking deathworthy: Perceived stereotypicality of Black defendants predicts capital-sentencing outcomes. Psychological Science, 17(5), 383–386. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01716.x

Eisenberg, T., & Hans, V. P. (2009). Taking a stand on taking the stand: The effect of a prior criminal record on the decision to testify and on trial outcomes. Cornell Law Review, 94(6), 1353–1390.

Hobson, H. M., Woodley, J., Gamblen, S., Brackely, J., O’Neill, F., Miles, D., & Westwood, C. (2023). The impact of developmental language disorder in a defendant’s description on mock jurors’ perceptions and judgements. International Journal of Language & Communication Disorders, 58(1), 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/1460-6984.12779

Jehle, A., Miller, M. K., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2009). The influence of accounts and remorse on mock jurors’ judgments of offenders. Law and Human Behavior, 33(5), 393–404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-008-9164-6

Kramer, R. S. S., & Gardner, E. M. (2020). Facial trustworthiness and criminal sentencing: A comment on Wilson and Rule (2015). Psychological Reports, 123(5), 1854–1868. https://doi.org/10.1177/0033294119889582

Maras, K., Marshall, I., & Sands, C. (2019). Mock juror perceptions of credibility and culpability in an autistic defendant. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 49(3), 996–1010. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-018-3803-7

Mazzella, R., & Feingold, A. (1994). The effects of physical attractiveness, race, socioeconomic status, and gender of defendants and victims on judgments of mock jurors: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24(15), 1315–1338. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1994.tb01552.x

Rose, M. R., Diamond, S. S., & Baker, K. M. (2010). Goffman on the jury: Real jurors’ attention to the “offstage” of trials. Law and Human Behavior, 34(4), 310–323. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-009-9195-7

Rossner, M., & Tait, D. (2023). Presence and participation in a virtual court. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 23(1), 135–157. https://doi.org/10.1177/17488958211017372

Rossner, M., Tait, D., McKimmie, B., & Sarre, R. (2017). The dock on trial: Courtroom design and the presumption of innocence. Journal of Law and Society, 44(3), 317–344. https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12033

Shaffer, D. R., & Case, T. (1982). On the decision to testify in one’s own behalf: Effects of withheld evidence, defendant’s sexual preferences, and juror dogmatism on juridic decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42(2), 335–346. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.42.2.335

Sigall, H., & Ostrove, N. (1975). Beautiful but dangerous: Effects of offender attractiveness and nature of the crime on juridic judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(3), 410–414. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076472

Wilson, J. P., & Rule, N. O. (2015). Facial trustworthiness predicts extreme criminal-sentencing outcomes. Psychological Science, 26(8), 1325–1331. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615590992

Legal Authorities

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006).

Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981).

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005).

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).

Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984).

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).

State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 123 P.3d 1131 (2005).

U.S. Const. amend. V.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.

Fed. R. Evid. 609.

Ariz. R. Evid. 609.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 804(a)(1).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 925(c).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 301(f)(3).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 1, 18(a), and 18(b) (6th ed. 2022).

Related topic papers: Race and Juror Decision-Making · Limiting Instructions, Inadmissible Evidence, and Instructions to Disregard · Remote and Video Testimony · Explicit and Implicit Bias in Jurors · Closing Argument and Emotion

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial