Snap Shot
- The question: How do closing arguments and the emotions they evoke affect jurors’ and members’ decisions, and where does the law draw the line between legitimate persuasion and improper appeals?
- What the research shows: Jurors organize evidence into stories, and the way arguments are structured can affect verdicts. Anger in particular is associated with simpler reasoning and greater blame: gruesome photographs increased anger and convictions in one experiment, color photographs increased disgust and convictions compared with black-and-white versions, and angry but not sad victim impact statements increased death sentences. Improper statements from an actual prosecutor’s closing argument increased death recommendations in a mock penalty phase. In three experiments (the first using undergraduates), the same angry closing argument was rated more effective for a male attorney and less effective for a female attorney; the studies describe listener reactions, not advocates’ skill.
- What it does not show: It does not show that emotion is inherently prejudicial, that emotional evidence of real harm is unfair, or that any particular argument changed any particular verdict. Most studies used mock jurors, brief materials, and individual judgments without deliberation, and several involved capital sentencing rather than findings of guilt.
- The law: Counsel may argue the evidence and reasonable inferences with force but may not inflame passion or prejudice, vouch, comment on silence, or argue facts not in evidence (Berger, Darden, Young; R.C.M. 919). Golden rule arguments are improper in courts-martial, though members may be asked to consider a victim’s fear (Baer). Arizona reviews prosecutorial error individually and cumulatively (Hughes, In re Martinez) and instructs jurors not to be influenced by sympathy or prejudice.
- Issues for each side: Both sides may ground emotion in the evidence; appeals that ask jurors to decide on anger, sympathy, or identity rather than proof are the ones courts most often review, and objections and curative instructions are the usual responses, with recognized limits.
Closing argument is the last time the parties address the jury or court-martial members directly, and it is where counsel explain what the evidence means. Argument is not evidence, but it shapes how jurors organize and remember the evidence, which facts they treat as important, and how they feel about the people involved. Emotions are part of every trial that involves harm. Jurors may feel sympathy for a complainant, anger at what was done, sympathy for a defendant or the defendant’s family, or distress at graphic evidence, and the law does not expect them to feel nothing. The legal question is whether a verdict rests on the evidence and the law or on feeling detached from them.
This paper reviews research on how jurors use argument, how emotions such as anger, disgust, and sadness affect legal judgments, how emotionally powerful evidence and victim impact statements affect decisions, how jurors react to emotion expressed by attorneys, and what is known about improper argument and curative instructions. It then summarizes the federal, military, and Arizona law of closing argument. In courts-martial, members serve the jury’s function, and the research applies to them by inference.
The research does not show that emotion is the enemy of accurate verdicts. Some emotional responses track the seriousness of the evidence, and the same research that raises concerns about anger also shows that reasoning, accountability, and instructions can moderate it. The research identifies conditions under which emotion is more likely to displace evidence, and those conditions apply to arguments by either side.
How Jurors Use Closing Arguments
The most influential account of juror reasoning, the story model, holds that jurors construct a narrative explaining the evidence and then match it to the verdict options. In experiments, mock jurors were more likely to reach the verdict favored by a side whose evidence was presented in story order, following the sequence of events, than when the same evidence was presented in the order of witnesses, and the coherence of the story jurors constructed predicted their confidence (Pennington & Hastie, 1988, 1992). Closing argument is often counsel’s best opportunity to supply a coherent story that accounts for the evidence, including evidence that does not fit the other side’s account.
Structure matters, though narrative is not always best. In a simulated civil trial, a plaintiff who used a narrative opening statement and a closing organized around the legal elements did better than one who used narrative throughout, and the defense did better with a mixed or element-based structure than with a purely narrative one (Spiecker & Worthington, 2003). Research on the order of evidence has also found recency effects, in which information presented later carried more weight in mock jurors’ judgments (Costabile & Klein, 2005). These studies used students or community participants deciding abbreviated cases, mostly civil, and did not include deliberation.
Emotion and Legal Judgment
Reviews of the experimental literature conclude that emotions influence judgments of responsibility and blame, and that specific emotions matter differently (Feigenson & Park, 2006). Anger has received the most attention. In one experiment, participants who first watched an anger-inducing video used fewer cues in later, unrelated legal judgments and assigned more blame and punishment, but when participants expected to justify their decisions, their judgments were more complex and the carryover of anger was reduced (Lerner et al., 1998). In a mock capital sentencing study, increases in anger during the trial, but not increases in sadness or fear, predicted death sentences, and the effect operated through the importance jurors gave to the prosecution’s aggravating evidence and argument (Nuñez et al., 2015).
Anger and disgust appear to combine. In two studies, anger toward a moral transgression predicted moral outrage only when accompanied by at least moderate disgust; in a mock trial with disturbing photographs of a murder victim, outrage linked both emotions to greater confidence in a guilty verdict (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). These studies measured emotion rather than manipulating it in most conditions, so they show associations more firmly than causes.
Emotionally Powerful Evidence
Graphic evidence is often the subject of argument and of objections. In a Canadian study of 120 mock jurors, the proportion of guilty verdicts was about double among those who saw color or black-and-white photographs of a murder victim compared with those who saw none, and participants did not perceive that the photographs had influenced them (Douglas et al., 1997). In an Australian experiment varying photographic and verbal evidence, gruesome verbal descriptions did not change emotions or convictions, but mock jurors who saw photographs, gruesome or neutral, convicted more often than those who saw none; those who saw gruesome photographs reported more anger at the defendant, and that anger accounted for the greater weight they gave to the prosecution’s evidence (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). In later experiments, by contrast, gruesome photographs shown in color increased disgust and convictions compared with the same photographs in black and white (Salerno, 2017). These are mock-juror studies with individual verdicts, and they do not show that such evidence produced an inaccurate verdict, since the photographs in some conditions also carried probative information.
Graphic evidence also affects jurors’ well-being, a subject addressed in the hub’s paper on juror stress and graphic or CSAM evidence.
Victim Impact and Sympathy
Victim impact evidence describes the harm a crime caused to the victim and others, and in most jurisdictions it reaches a jury only in capital sentencing. A review of the early research concluded that victim impact statements can increase punitive judgments, through emotional responses to the victim and the victim’s family (Myers & Greene, 2004). In a mock capital penalty phase, participants exposed to victim impact evidence were more likely to choose death (Paternoster & Deise, 2011). The emotion conveyed appears to matter: in a study of 581 death-qualified participants, an angry victim impact statement increased death sentences while a sad one did not, and participants who became angry, but not those who became sad, were more likely to choose death (Nuñez et al., 2017). The authors concluded that the effect depends on which emotion a statement evokes, not on victim impact evidence as such. The law of victim impact in capital cases is addressed in the hub’s paper on Arizona capital jury sentencing.
Research on sympathy for defendants is thinner. Studies of defendants’ demeanor and expressions of remorse are reviewed in the hub’s paper on the defendant’s courtroom presentation, and arguments asking jurors to acquit despite the evidence are discussed in the paper on nullification and compromise verdicts.
The Advocate’s Own Emotion
Attorneys are sometimes advised that expressing conviction through anger builds credibility, and research suggests the effect depends on the attorney’s gender. In three experiments with 120 undergraduates, 294 community participants, and 273 further participants, the same closing argument delivered in an angry rather than a neutral tone made male attorneys appear more effective and female attorneys less effective; participants described the angry male attorney in terms of conviction and power and the angry female attorney in negative terms (Salerno et al., 2018). In a simulated deliberation, a male holdout juror who expressed anger reduced other participants’ confidence in their verdicts, while a female holdout who expressed the identical opinion and anger increased it (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2015). These findings describe listeners’ reactions at the group level; they apply to attorneys and jurors of either gender on either side, and they say nothing about the quality of a particular argument.
Improper Argument and Curative Instructions
Courts often assume that a single improper remark in argument does not change a verdict. One study tested that assumption directly in a single capital sentencing simulation. About 320 jury-eligible participants watched a videotaped penalty phase from an actual capital trial, with or without a series of statements from the prosecutor’s closing argument that had been challenged on appeal as improper; those who heard the statements recommended death significantly more often (Platania & Moran, 1999). The study concerned sentencing, used one case, and did not include deliberation.
Curative instructions are the usual remedy. Research on the closely related problem of instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence found that such instructions did not eliminate the evidence’s influence on verdicts on average, although compliance improved in some studies when the judge explained the reason for the ruling (Steblay et al., 2006). Whether an instruction that argument is not evidence corrects an improper appeal has not been tested directly. The evidence on instructions is reviewed in the hub’s paper on limiting instructions.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of this research uses students or online and community participants who read, hear, or watch brief trial materials and decide individually, without deliberation or real consequences. Several key studies concern capital sentencing, in which emotion and moral judgment play a recognized role, rather than findings of guilt. Emotion is often measured by self-report rather than manipulated, so associations between emotion and verdicts do not establish causation. Studies of graphic evidence vary in whether the photographs were probative, which makes it hard to separate prejudice from proof. Apart from the studies of attorney and juror anger, most of the studies cited did not report analyses by participant gender, and none involved court-martial members.
The research describes tendencies in groups. It cannot show that a particular argument, photograph, or display of emotion affected a particular verdict, or that a particular juror decided on feeling rather than evidence.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the finding that gruesome photographs increased convictions (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006) is cited to exclude photographs, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since neutral photographs also increased convictions and the effect may reflect the added evidence as well as emotion. When the finding that improper statements increased death recommendations (Platania & Moran, 1999) is cited in a non-capital case, ask whether it applies, since it concerned one capital penalty phase. When the angry victim impact findings (Nuñez et al., 2017) are offered to show that emotional testimony is prejudicial, ask how large the effect is and whether the same study found sad statements had no effect. When the attorney anger studies (Salerno et al., 2018) are cited, ask who was studied, since the first experiment used undergraduates rating whether they would hire the attorney. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Closing Argument and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Closing argument is part of the right to the assistance of counsel, and a court may not deny it in a criminal trial (Herring v. New York, 1975). A prosecutor may “strike hard blows” but not “foul ones” (Berger v. United States, 1935). Improper argument violates due process when it so infects the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process, judged in the context of the whole trial (Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 1974; Darden v. Wainwright, 1986). In Darden, the Court found that a prosecutor’s inflammatory remarks, including calling the defendant an animal, were improper but did not deny a fair trial, given the instructions, the defense’s opportunity to respond, and the weight of the evidence. An improper prosecution argument is not excused because it responded to an improper defense argument, though the invitation is relevant to prejudice (United States v. Young, 1985). The prosecution may not comment on a defendant’s decision not to testify (Griffin v. California, 1965). In capital sentencing, victim impact evidence is permitted (Payne v. Tennessee, 1991), but a victim’s family members’ characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence remain barred (Bosse v. Oklahoma, 2016). Graphic evidence is subject to exclusion when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (Fed. R. Evid. 403).
In courts-martial, argument may include reasonable comment on the evidence and inferences from it (R.C.M. 919(b)). The rule’s discussion states that counsel should not express personal belief in the truth of testimony or in guilt or innocence, should not make arguments calculated to inflame passions or prejudices, and may not cite the facts of other cases, and that trial counsel may not comment on the probable effect of the findings on relations between the military and civilian communities. Failure to object before the military judge begins instructing on findings forfeits the objection (R.C.M. 919(c)). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that golden rule arguments, which ask members to put themselves in the victim’s place, are improper, while an argument asking members to imagine the victim’s fear and pain may be permissible (United States v. Baer, 2000). Repeated vouching and personal characterization of the evidence was error, assessed for prejudice by the severity of the misconduct, the measures taken to cure it, and the weight of the evidence (United States v. Fletcher, 2005); trial counsel’s repeated use of “we” to align with the members was improper (United States v. Sewell, 2017); repeated assurances that a child complainant was telling the truth were improper though not prejudicial on findings (United States v. Norwood, 2021); and argument about the accused’s ethnicity and guilt by association was plain error (United States v. Diffoot, 2000). In sentencing argument, trial counsel may not purport to speak for the convening authority or refer to policy directives (R.C.M. 1001(h)).
Arizona
Arizona gives counsel wide latitude in closing argument to comment on the evidence and argue reasonable inferences, and reviews claims of prosecutorial error by asking whether error occurred and whether there is a reasonable likelihood it could have affected the verdict, considering each instance and then their cumulative effect (In re Martinez, 2020). In re Martinez also distinguished “error,” which does not necessarily imply an ethical violation, from “misconduct,” which may. In State v. Hughes (1998), the Arizona Supreme Court reversed because the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s improper conduct, including in closing argument, denied a fair trial, and in State v. Vargas (2020) it explained how unobjected-to instances may be raised together as a single claim of cumulative fundamental error. Under Pool v. Superior Court (1984), the Arizona Constitution’s double jeopardy clause (art. 2, § 10) bars retrial after a mistrial only if the mistrial was caused by prosecutorial misconduct that was intentional, known to be improper and prejudicial, and pursued for an improper purpose with indifference to a significant danger of mistrial or reversal, and the prejudice could not be cured short of a mistrial. Pool involved improper questioning of witnesses rather than closing argument, and its intent analysis addresses retrial, not whether error occurred.
Arizona’s pattern instructions tell jurors that they must not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice (Standard Criminal 1), that what the lawyers say in opening statements and closing arguments is not evidence (Standard Criminal 10), and, at the start of trial, that they are not to be swayed by sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling (Preliminary Criminal 2). Arizona Rule of Evidence 403 governs graphic evidence. The Victims’ Bill of Rights guarantees victims the right to be present and to be heard at specified proceedings, including sentencing (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1; the right to be heard at sentencing is § 2.1(A)(4)); victim impact before a capital jury is addressed in the hub’s paper on capital sentencing.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the legitimacy of closing arguments that give jurors a coherent account tying each element to the evidence, and of evidence and argument describing real harm. Baer permits asking members to consider a victim’s fear and pain, and in one large capital study a sad victim impact statement did not increase death sentences while an angry one did. Prosecutors are likely to encounter the emotion issue where argument ties emotion to specific testimony and exhibits, and where the forms of argument most often found to be error arise: personal assurances of credibility, alignment with the jury, references to facts outside the record or to command policy, and appeals to ethnicity or identity.
The research also counsels caution. Anger-inducing appeals and improper statements increased punitive decisions in experiments, curative instructions did not reliably undo the effect of inadmissible information, and Arizona and military courts assess cumulative error, so several modest improprieties can together be found to have denied a fair trial. Color photographs added disgust and convictions in one line of research, which bears on Rule 403 arguments about format as well as content. The finding that expressed anger was received differently depending on the attorney’s gender describes listeners’ reactions, not the skill of the advocate, and applies to counsel on both sides.
Special Issues for Defense
The research bears on the number, format, and necessity of graphic exhibits, on curative instructions and the instructions on sympathy and prejudice, and on inflammatory or golden rule arguments, which in courts-martial are forfeited if not raised before findings instructions. The finding that a mock penalty phase produced more death recommendations when improper statements were included is consistent with courts assessing each improper statement in the context of the whole trial. Defense counsel are likely to encounter the emotion issue where they offer jurors an alternative account that explains all of the evidence, including the parts that support the prosecution.
The research also counsels caution. Emotion grounded in evidence is not improper, and the research does not show that gruesome or emotional evidence makes verdicts inaccurate; the instruction against sympathy and prejudice applies equally to appeals for sympathy toward the defendant, and arguments inviting acquittal despite the evidence raise the issues discussed in the paper on nullification. Courts require a showing of prejudice in context (Darden, Fletcher, In re Martinez), and research on mock jurors cannot establish that a particular remark changed a verdict. The research on attorney anger applies to defense counsel as well, and an argument’s effect may depend on how listeners perceive the advocate as much as on its content.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Bright, D. A., & Goodman-Delahunty, J. (2006). Gruesome evidence and emotion: Anger, blame, and jury decision-making. Law and Human Behavior, 30(2), 183–202. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9027-y
Costabile, K. A., & Klein, S. B. (2005). Finishing strong: Recency effects in juror judgments. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27(1), 47–58. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp2701_5
Douglas, K. S., Lyon, D. R., & Ogloff, J. R. P. (1997). The impact of graphic photographic evidence on mock jurors’ decisions in a murder trial: Probative or prejudicial? Law and Human Behavior, 21(5), 485–501. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024823706560
Feigenson, N., & Park, J. (2006). Emotions and attributions of legal responsibility and blame: A research review. Law and Human Behavior, 30(2), 143–161. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9026-z
Lerner, J. S., Goldberg, J. H., & Tetlock, P. E. (1998). Sober second thought: The effects of accountability, anger, and authoritarianism on attributions of responsibility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(6), 563–574. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167298246001
Myers, B., & Greene, E. (2004). The prejudicial nature of victim impact statements: Implications for capital sentencing policy. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 10(4), 492–515. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.10.4.492
Nuñez, N., Myers, B., Wilkowski, B. M., & Schweitzer, K. (2017). The impact of angry versus sad victim impact statements on mock jurors’ sentencing decisions in a capital trial. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 44(6), 862–886. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854816689809
Nuñez, N., Schweitzer, K., Chai, C. A., & Myers, B. (2015). Negative emotions felt during trial: The effect of fear, anger, and sadness on juror decision making. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 29(2), 200–209. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3094
Paternoster, R., & Deise, J. (2011). A heavy thumb on the scale: The effect of victim impact evidence on capital decision making. Criminology, 49(1), 129–161. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2010.00220.x
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1988). Explanation-based decision making: Effects of memory structure on judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14(3), 521–533. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.14.3.521
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992). Explaining the evidence: Tests of the story model for juror decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(2), 189–206. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189
Platania, J., & Moran, G. (1999). Due process and the death penalty: The role of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument in capital trials. Law and Human Behavior, 23(4), 471–486. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022364132399
Salerno, J. M. (2017). Seeing red: Disgust reactions to gruesome photographs in color (but not in black and white) increase convictions. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 23(3), 336–350. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000122
Salerno, J. M., & Peter-Hagene, L. C. (2013). The interactive effect of anger and disgust on moral outrage and judgments. Psychological Science, 24(10), 2069–2078. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613486988
Salerno, J. M., & Peter-Hagene, L. C. (2015). One angry woman: Anger expression increases influence for men, but decreases influence for women, during group deliberation. Law and Human Behavior, 39(6), 581–592. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000147
Salerno, J. M., Phalen, H. J., Reyes, R. N., & Schweitzer, N. J. (2018). Closing with emotion: The differential impact of male versus female attorneys expressing anger in court. Law and Human Behavior, 42(4), 385–401. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000292
Spiecker, S. C., & Worthington, D. L. (2003). The influence of opening statement/closing argument organizational strategy on juror verdict and damage awards. Law and Human Behavior, 27(4), 437–456. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024041201605
Steblay, N., Hosch, H. M., Culhane, S. E., & McWethy, A. (2006). The impact on juror verdicts of judicial instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 30(4), 469–492. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9039-7
Legal Authorities
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S. 1 (2016).
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 (2020).
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261 (1984).
State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 969 P.2d 1184 (1998).
State v. Vargas, 249 Ariz. 186 (2020).
United States v. Baer, 53 M.J. 235 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
United States v. Diffoot, 54 M.J. 149 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
United States v. Norwood, 81 M.J. 12 (C.A.A.F. 2021).
United States v. Sewell, 76 M.J. 14 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, §§ 2.1, 10.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 919, 1001(h).
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Preliminary Criminal 2; Standard Criminal 1, 10 (6th ed. 2022).
Related topic papers: Introduction to Juror Decision-Making · Limiting Instructions, Inadmissible Evidence, and Instructions to Disregard · Juror Stress and Graphic or CSAM Evidence · Nullification and Compromise Verdicts · Arizona Capital Jury Sentencing After Ring · The Defendant’s Courtroom Presentation
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial