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Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

Remote and Video Testimony

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Snap Shot

  • The question: Does testimony or a court appearance by video change how jurors and court-martial members perceive witnesses and defendants, and does it change verdicts?
  • What the research shows: In mock-trial studies, children who testified by closed-circuit television were viewed somewhat less favorably than children who testified live, but jurors were no worse at distinguishing accurate from inaccurate testimony, and the format did not directly disadvantage the defendant in those studies. An English study of adult rape complainants found no clear or consistent effect of live links, recorded evidence, or screens on deliberations. Video appearance did not change mock verdicts in an Australian study, and in one large county bail amounts rose after bail hearings moved to video, in an observational study that could not rule out other explanations.
  • What it does not show: The research does not show that video testimony is more or less truthful, or that jurors read credibility accurately in either format. Most studies are mock trials with older technology, and few test adult witnesses in American criminal trials.
  • The law: Coy and Craig allow a child to testify outside the defendant’s presence only on a case-specific finding of necessity; federal circuits have divided on remote testimony by adults (Gigante; Yates). Courts-martial permit remote merits testimony only with the consent of both sides (R.C.M. 703). Arizona generally bars video trials absent extraordinary circumstances and consent (Rule 1.5).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the mock-trial evidence that remote testimony did not clearly bias jurors against defendants, along with the findings that it may reduce a witness’s impact and that accommodations require case-specific findings; defense counsel are likely to encounter confrontation law and the evidence that the medium changes impressions, along with the finding that the verdict research has generally found small or no effects.

Testimony by video was once an exception reserved mainly for child witnesses. It is now common. Courts use closed-circuit television and video links for children and other vulnerable witnesses, for witnesses who are ill, distant, or deployed, for expert witnesses, and for defendants appearing from custody at initial appearances, arraignments, and bail hearings. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many courts conducted hearings and some trials entirely by video, and some jurisdictions retained remote procedures afterward. Court-martial practice, with witnesses and parties often stationed far apart, has long relied on remote means for certain purposes.

The legal question is whether remote testimony satisfies the right to confront witnesses and the defendant’s right to be present. The psychological question is whether the medium changes how fact-finders perceive the person on the screen and decide the case. This paper summarizes research on presentation mode and witness credibility, child and adult complainants testifying remotely, the reading of deception through a screen, defendants appearing by video, the technical framing of video images, and virtual juries, followed by the governing federal, military, and Arizona law. Courtroom accommodations for child witnesses are addressed in more detail in the companion paper “Child Witnesses and Courtroom Accommodations as Jurors See Them.”

The research shows that the medium can change impressions of a witness, but it has generally not shown that remote testimony changes verdicts or impairs jurors’ ability to separate accurate from inaccurate accounts. Those findings cut in different directions for each party, and the studies are fewer and older than the current use of the technology.

Presentation Mode and Impressions of the Witness

The central concern about remote testimony is that a witness on a screen may seem less vivid, less engaged, or less credible than a witness in the room. Experimental studies of children support part of that concern. In a Swedish study, 10- and 11-year-old children who had either experienced an event or heard about it testified as though they had experienced it, and mock jurors watched the testimony either live (68 observers) or on video (68 observers). Live observers rated the children more positively and found their statements more convincing, and they remembered the statements better; both groups were only modestly accurate in distinguishing truthful from deceptive children (Landström et al., 2007). The study was small, used 14 child witnesses, and measured impressions rather than verdicts.

The most elaborate American study staged mock trials in a downtown courtroom. Children aged 5 to 6 and 8 to 9 took part in a play session with an unfamiliar man and testified about two weeks later, either live in open court or by closed-circuit television, before mock juries recruited from the community who then deliberated. Younger children who testified by closed circuit were less suggestible, and children facing open court reported more anxiety beforehand. Jurors who watched closed-circuit testimony were as able as other jurors to tell accurate from inaccurate accounts, and the format did not directly disadvantage the defendant; it did, however, lead jurors to view the children less favorably (Goodman et al., 1998). A companion study in which some children were coached to give a false account found that jurors were less likely to convict before deliberation when the child’s account was false, that this difference disappeared after deliberation, and that jurors did not reach the truth better when children testified in open court than by closed-circuit television (Orcutt et al., 2001).

Taken together, these studies suggest that remote testimony may reduce the favorability of a child witness’s impression without making jurors either more or less accurate and without directly disadvantaging the defendant. They do not show that one format produces more truthful testimony; the reduction in younger children’s suggestibility is a finding about the accuracy of testimony, not about jurors’ perceptions of it.

Adult Complainants and Special Measures

Research on adult witnesses is thinner. In England and Wales, adult complainants in sexual offence cases may testify by live link, with a recorded interview as evidence-in-chief, or from behind a screen. In a study in which 160 members of the public watched one of four short reconstructions of a rape trial and deliberated in groups, the researchers analyzed the deliberations and found no clear or consistent impact of live links, recorded evidence-in-chief with live-link cross-examination, or screens, compared with testimony in the courtroom (Ellison & Munro, 2014). The authors concluded that concerns about the effect of these measures on jurors may be overstated. The study used actors, short trials, and a complainant who was a woman, so it does not address male complainants, and it relied on qualitative analysis of deliberations rather than a statistical comparison of verdicts.

The research on how jurors evaluate sexual assault complainants more generally, including beliefs about demeanor and emotional display, is reviewed in “Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows” in the Counterintuitive Testimony hub and in the hub’s paper on juror beliefs in sexual assault and child abuse trials, and is not repeated here.

Reading Deception Through a Screen

A common argument for in-person testimony is that jurors need to see a witness’s demeanor to assess credibility. The research on deception detection complicates that argument in both directions. A meta-analysis of more than 200 studies found that people distinguish lies from truths with an average accuracy of about 54%, only slightly better than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). On that evidence, two deception researchers argued during the pandemic that because reliable nonverbal signs of deception are largely absent, virtual proceedings and face masks should not impair jurors’ ability to detect lies, and that attention to the content of speech may even help (Vrij & Hartwig, 2021). Other researchers, drawing on the broader literature on nonverbal communication, cautioned lawyers and judges against permanently replacing in-person trials, arguing that video alters eye contact, timing, and other cues that shape impressions and rapport, whatever their value for detecting deception (Denault & Patterson, 2021). Both are commentaries applying existing research rather than new experiments. On the deception research, demeanor, whether viewed in person or on a screen, is a poor guide to truthfulness (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij & Hartwig, 2021); the research does not show that jurors cannot or should not consider how a witness testifies, and the commentators differ on whether video changes other impressions.

Defendants Appearing by Video

Defendants may appear by video from jail for early proceedings in many courts. The largest real-world study examined 645,117 felony bail decisions in Cook County, Illinois, from 1991 through 2007, spanning the 1999 move to closed-circuit television for most felony bail hearings. For offenses moved to televised hearings, average bail rose by about 51% relative to bail before the move, a statistically significant increase; for the most serious offenses, which continued to be heard in person, bail rose by about 13%, a change that was not statistically significant (Diamond et al., 2010). The study could not control for defendant characteristics such as criminal history, so part of the increase may reflect factors other than the video format.

At trial, the evidence is different. In an Australian mock-jury study comparing courtroom configurations, a defendant who appeared by video was not more likely to be found guilty than one who appeared in person; the arrangement that appeared most prejudicial was a defendant sitting alone in a dock (Rossner & Tait, 2023). In earlier work the same group found that a defendant seated in a dock was more likely to be convicted than one seated beside counsel (Rossner et al., 2017). These findings concern judgments of guilt in a simulated trial, not bail or sentencing decisions by judges, and they suggest that the effect of a video appearance may depend on what the format conveys about custody and isolation rather than on the screen itself. Courtroom seating and other aspects of the defendant’s presentation are addressed in the companion paper “The Defendant’s Courtroom Presentation.”

Camera Perspective and the Technical Frame

Video is not a neutral window. What the camera shows, and from what angle, can affect judgment. In research on videotaped confessions, a camera focused on the suspect rather than on the interrogator or on both led mock jurors to judge confessions as more voluntary; the effect persisted in a fuller videotaped trial and after a cautionary instruction from the judge, and it carried through to verdicts (Lassiter et al., 2002). The authors proposed that framing the interrogator may make coercion easier for fact-finders to see. The research concerns recorded interrogations, not live remote testimony, but it shows that framing, image size, and what is left out of view can shape impressions. Remote testimony also raises practical questions the research has barely addressed, such as who else is present in the witness’s room, whether the witness can see documents or receive prompts, and how audio delay or poor connections affect the flow of cross-examination.

Virtual Juries

Some courts have also seated juries remotely. In the first experimental comparison of in-person and virtual deliberations, 317 community members watched a videotaped civil trial involving an automobile accident and deliberated in 54 mock juries, 24 in person and 30 by video. The two formats did not differ on most outcomes. Virtual jurors reported expending more cognitive effort; in-person juries interrupted each other more often and discussed more topics. Even with identical recruitment, the people who took part virtually were on average younger, more affluent, and better educated (Reed et al., 2026). The sample was 61% women and 86% White, the case was civil, and the study did not report differences by juror gender. The finding about who participated virtually bears on representativeness as well as on deliberation quality.

Limits of the Evidence

The research on remote testimony is small relative to its use. Most studies are mock trials with students or community volunteers who know no real case depends on their decision, and the leading studies of child witnesses are more than 20 years old and used closed-circuit technology that differs from modern high-definition video. Few studies examine adult witnesses in American criminal trials, and none of the studies reviewed here examined courts-martial. The English study of adult complainants used a single female complainant, so it does not show whether the findings apply to male complainants; most of the other studies did not analyze witness or juror gender. The bail study is observational and could not rule out other explanations for the change. Several of the most-cited sources are commentaries rather than experiments.

Above all, the research describes average differences in impressions and verdicts. It cannot show whether a particular witness was believed more or less because of the format, and it does not show that either format reveals truthfulness.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the finding that closed-circuit testimony biased jurors against child witnesses (Goodman et al., 1998) is cited to oppose or to justify remote testimony, ask whether it applies to this case, since the study used staged events with young children and older closed-circuit technology, and ask what else the study found, including that jurors were no less accurate and the defendant was not directly disadvantaged. When the 51% increase in bail amounts (Diamond et al., 2010) is cited, ask what exactly was counted and whether the design supports a causal conclusion, since the study could not control for defendant characteristics. When Ellison and Munro (2014) are cited to show that special measures do not affect jurors, ask how much evidence the conclusion rests on, since it came from qualitative analysis of 160 participants watching short reconstructions with a single female complainant. When the finding that virtual and in-person juries did not differ on most outcomes (Reed et al., 2026) is cited, ask who was studied, since the case was civil and virtual participants differed demographically. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Remote Testimony and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her. In Coy v. Iowa (1988), the Supreme Court held that placing a screen between child complainants and the defendant, under a statute that presumed trauma without individualized findings, violated the Confrontation Clause. In Maryland v. Craig (1990), the Court held that a child may testify by one-way closed-circuit television when the trial court finds, on evidence specific to the case, that the procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child, that the child would be traumatized by the presence of the defendant rather than by the courtroom generally, and that the distress would be more than minimal. Federal law provides procedures for closed-circuit and videotaped testimony of child victims and witnesses (18 U.S.C. § 3509). Crawford v. Washington (2004) refocused confrontation analysis on testimonial hearsay but did not address remote live testimony, and the continued scope of Craig has been debated.

For adult witnesses, the federal courts of appeals have divided. In United States v. Gigante (1999), the Second Circuit upheld two-way closed-circuit testimony by a seriously ill witness in the witness protection program, applying a standard drawn from the rule on depositions. In United States v. Yates (2006), the en banc Eleventh Circuit held that two-way video testimony from witnesses in Australia violated the Confrontation Clause because, under Craig, the prosecution’s need for the testimony to make and expeditiously resolve its case was not an important enough public policy to justify denying face-to-face confrontation, particularly where a deposition under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 was available. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 requires that testimony be taken in open court unless otherwise provided by statute or rule; in 2002 the Supreme Court declined to transmit to Congress a proposed amendment that would have permitted remote testimony in limited circumstances. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), by contrast, permits contemporaneous transmission of testimony in civil cases for good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 requires the defendant’s presence at trial, and Rules 5 and 10 permit video teleconferencing for initial appearances and arraignments with the defendant’s consent.

In courts-martial, members serve the jury’s function. Rule for Courts-Martial 703(b)(1) permits any witness to testify on the merits by remote means only with the consent of both the accused and the government; over objection, remote testimony may be received on interlocutory questions but is not admissible on the ultimate issue of guilt over the accused’s objection. Rule 914B prescribes minimum procedures, including that all parties be able to hear each other, that persons at the remote site be identified, and that the accused be able to communicate privately with counsel. Military Rule of Evidence 611(d) and R.C.M. 914A govern remote live testimony of a child under 16 in cases involving child abuse or domestic violence, and require findings that track Craig: that the procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child, that the child would be traumatized by the presence of the accused rather than by the courtroom generally, and that the distress would be more than de minimis. R.C.M. 804(a)(3) permits the accused to be present remotely for Article 39(a) sessions under specified conditions, and for a plea inquiry or judge-alone presentencing only in exceptional circumstances with the accused’s consent and defense counsel physically present. In presentencing, R.C.M. 1001(f)(2) treats testimony by remote means as one alternative to producing a witness in person.

Arizona

The Arizona Constitution guarantees the accused the right to meet the witnesses against him or her face to face (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.5 governs appearances by interactive audiovisual systems. It permits video appearances at the court’s discretion for specified early and uncontested proceedings, requires that the court and parties be able to see and speak with each other, that a record be kept, that the defendant be able to confer confidentially with counsel, and that the public and victims be able to observe. For trials, contested probation violation hearings, felony sentencings, and felony probation dispositions, video appearance is generally not permitted unless the court finds extraordinary circumstances and the parties consent. Arizona law also provides procedures for the testimony of minors by closed-circuit television or recording (A.R.S. § 13-4253), subject to the confrontation requirements described above and addressed in the companion paper on child witnesses.

The research bears on these rules in a limited way. The findings that remote testimony reduced favorable impressions of child witnesses without impairing jurors’ accuracy, and that video appearance did not change mock verdicts, are relevant to how courts weigh necessity findings and consent. The bail findings are relevant to proceedings, such as release decisions, in which a defendant’s video appearance is routine.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research is relevant to the position that remote testimony by children and vulnerable adult witnesses has not been shown to bias jurors against defendants or to impair jurors’ ability to distinguish accurate from inaccurate accounts in the studies reviewed, and that closed-circuit testimony reduced suggestibility in younger children in one mock-trial study (Goodman et al., 1998), a finding about the accuracy of the testimony, not about jurors’ perceptions of it. Those findings bear on requests for accommodations, which must still rest on the case-specific findings that Craig, Military Rule of Evidence 611(d), and Arizona law require.

The research also counsels caution. Remote testimony may make a child witness seem less credible or less convincing to jurors, which is a cost to the party offering the witness, and there is little research on adult witnesses in American trials. Technical quality, camera framing, and the presence of others in the witness’s room can affect impressions and invite challenge, so the record should document how the testimony was taken. In courts-martial, remote merits testimony requires the accused’s consent.

Special Issues for Defense

The research is relevant to arguments that the medium can change impressions of a person on screen, that camera framing in recorded interrogations affected judgments of voluntariness, and that video appearance at bail hearings was followed by higher bail in the largest real-world study, an observational finding. Confrontation law requires case-specific necessity findings before a child may testify outside the defendant’s presence, and in courts-martial the accused’s consent is required for remote merits testimony.

The research also counsels caution about predicting harm to the defendant. The mock-trial studies have generally found that remote testimony did not directly disadvantage the defendant and that video appearance did not change verdicts, and the Cook County bail study could not rule out other explanations. Arguments that jurors need to see a witness in person to judge truthfulness should be weighed against the evidence that demeanor is a poor guide to truthfulness in any format; that evidence does not show that jurors cannot or should not consider how a witness testifies.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214–234. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2

Denault, V., & Patterson, M. L. (2021). Justice and nonverbal communication in a post-pandemic world: An evidence-based commentary and cautionary statement for lawyers and judges. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 45(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10919-020-00339-x

Diamond, S. S., Bowman, L. E., Wong, M., & Patton, M. M. (2010). Efficiency and cost: The impact of videoconferenced hearings on bail decisions. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 100(3), 869–902.

Ellison, L., & Munro, V. E. (2014). A ‘special’ delivery? Exploring the impact of screens, live-links and video-recorded evidence on mock juror deliberation in rape trials. Social & Legal Studies, 23(1), 3–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663913496676

Goodman, G. S., Tobey, A. E., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., Orcutt, H., Thomas, S., Shapiro, C., & Sachsenmaier, T. (1998). Face-to-face confrontation: Effects of closed-circuit technology on children’s eyewitness testimony and jurors’ decisions. Law and Human Behavior, 22(2), 165–203. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025742119977

Landström, S., Granhag, P. A., & Hartwig, M. (2007). Children’s live and videotaped testimonies: How presentation mode affects observers’ perception, assessment and memory. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 12(2), 333–348. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532506X133607

Lassiter, G. D., Geers, A. L., Handley, I. M., Weiland, P. E., & Munhall, P. J. (2002). Videotaped interrogations and confessions: A simple change in camera perspective alters verdicts in simulated trials. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(5), 867–874. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.5.867

Orcutt, H. K., Goodman, G. S., Tobey, A. E., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., & Thomas, S. (2001). Detecting deception in children’s testimony: Factfinders’ abilities to reach the truth in open court and closed-circuit trials. Law and Human Behavior, 25(4), 339–372. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010603618330

Reed, K., Hans, V. P., Rotenstein, V. N., McKendall, P., Rodriguez, A., Helm, R. K., & Reyna, V. F. (2026). Virtually the same? A comparison between in-person and virtual mock jury deliberations. Law and Human Behavior, 50(3), 225–239. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000643

Rossner, M., & Tait, D. (2023). Presence and participation in a virtual court. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 23(1), 135–157. https://doi.org/10.1177/17488958211017372

Rossner, M., Tait, D., McKimmie, B., & Sarre, R. (2017). The dock on trial: Courtroom design and the presumption of innocence. Journal of Law and Society, 44(3), 317–344. https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12033

Vrij, A., & Hartwig, M. (2021). Deception and lie detection in the courtroom: The effect of defendants wearing medical face masks. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 10(3), 392–399. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2021.06.002

Legal Authorities

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).

United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999).

United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.

18 U.S.C. § 3509.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4253.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a).

Fed. R. Crim. P. 5, 10, 26, and 43.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.5.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 703(b)(1).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 804(a)(3).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 914A and 914B.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 1001(f)(2).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 611(d).

Related topic papers: Child Witnesses and Courtroom Accommodations as Jurors See Them · The Defendant’s Courtroom Presentation · Juror Beliefs in Sexual Assault and Child Abuse Trials · How Jurors Evaluate Expert Testimony · Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Child Abuse Allegations · Counterintuitive Testimony · Courts-Martial