Snap Shot
- The question: When a child testifies by closed-circuit television or recording, behind a screen, with a support person or facility dog, or with help from an intermediary, how do those accommodations affect what jurors think of the child, the defendant, and the case?
- What the research shows: In staged mock trials, closed-circuit testimony reduced younger children’s suggestibility and pretrial anxiety and did not impair jurors’ ability to distinguish accurate from inaccurate testimony, but in one staged-trial series jurors viewed children who testified by closed-circuit television less favorably, and other studies found live testimony rated more positively or more convincing. Facility dogs did not affect verdicts in two experiments, and intermediaries did not change credibility ratings in one. Jurors’ impressions of a child’s emotion were linked to credibility and verdicts.
- What it does not show: The research has not consistently shown that accommodations make jurors more likely to convict, although one experiment found that a comfort item disadvantaged the defendant and, in one study that stopped the trial after the child testified, open-court testimony produced more convictions than shield or video; it also does not show that live testimony helps jurors detect false accounts. Jurors in most studies performed poorly at detecting deception, though one study found a pre-deliberation difference between true and false accounts that disappeared after deliberation. Most studies are older mock trials, and none examined Arizona juries.
- The law: Face-to-face confrontation may be dispensed with only on a case-specific finding of necessity (Coy; Craig). Arizona’s constitution guarantees the right to meet witnesses “face to face,” and remote or recorded testimony under A.R.S. § 13-4253 requires an individualized showing (Vincent). Arizona requires courts to allow a facility dog for a testifying minor victim, if one is available, with a jury instruction (A.R.S. § 13-4442); military judges must make three findings before remote child testimony (Mil. R. Evid. 611(d)).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can point to research showing that closed-circuit testimony reduced younger children’s suggestibility without biasing mock jurors against the defendant, while recognizing a possible credibility cost; defense counsel can insist on the required findings and instructions, without assuming that confrontation in open court exposes false testimony.
Children who testify in criminal cases, most often as complainants in sexual abuse prosecutions, may do so with accommodations meant to reduce fear and improve communication. A child may testify from another room over closed-circuit television, by a recording made before trial, from behind a screen that blocks the view of the defendant, accompanied by a support person or a trained facility dog, or with the help of a communication specialist. These measures respond to research showing that testifying can distress children and that fear can impair what they are able to say.
Accommodations also change what jurors see. The confrontation guarantee reflects a long-standing belief that testimony given face to face in open court is more reliable and that jurors can better judge credibility when they see the witness confront the accused. Defendants have argued that accommodations signal to jurors that the child is a victim and the defendant someone to be feared. Prosecutors have argued that a child who cannot speak in open court cannot give jurors the evidence at all. These positions rest on empirical assumptions that research has tested.
This paper summarizes research on how jurors perceive child witnesses who testify with accommodations, describes its limits, and reviews the federal, military, and Arizona law. Children’s memory and suggestibility, and juror beliefs about child abuse generally, are addressed in other papers in this hub and on this site. The research describes groups of jurors and children in simulated trials. It does not show whether a particular child was truthful or whether a particular accommodation affected a particular verdict.
Closed-Circuit and Recorded Testimony
The most rigorous research on accommodations comes from elaborately staged mock trials in which children testified about events they had actually experienced, so that the accuracy of their testimony was known. In one series, 5- to 6-year-old and 8- to 9-year-old children took part in a play session with an unfamiliar man and about two weeks later testified in a downtown courtroom, either live in open court or over closed-circuit television, before mock juries of community members who then deliberated (Goodman et al., 1998). Closed-circuit testimony reduced younger children’s suggestibility, and testifying in open court was associated with greater pretrial anxiety. Jurors who saw closed-circuit testimony were no worse at telling accurate from inaccurate testimony, and the procedure did not directly make them less favorable to the defendant. It did, however, lead jurors to view the child witnesses less favorably. Jurors based their impressions of credibility largely on how confident and consistent the child appeared.
A companion study asked whether open-court testimony helps jurors detect deception. Children aged 7 to 9 testified either truthfully or, in one condition, according to a false account they had been asked to give. Before deliberation, jurors were less likely to convict when the child gave the false account than when the child’s account was true, but the difference disappeared after deliberation, and the study found no evidence that jurors were more accurate when children testified in the courtroom rather than by closed-circuit television (Orcutt et al., 2001).
Recorded and indirect testimony shows a similar pattern. In a study with community-member jurors, children’s accounts were presented live, on videotape, or through a social worker who recounted the child’s statements. Children who testified live were seen as less likely to make false statements, and the format affected sympathy for the child, which in turn predicted confidence in guilt; jurors had difficulty distinguishing accurate from deceptive statements in every format (Goodman et al., 2006). The mock trials were conducted with jurors recruited in Sacramento County, California, and Maricopa County, Arizona. In a Swedish study, observers who watched 10- to 11-year-olds testify live perceived them more positively, found their statements more convincing, and remembered them better than observers who watched the same testimony on video, while veracity judgments were mediocre in both formats (Landström et al., 2007).
These findings cut in more than one direction. They support the conclusion that remote testimony can improve the quality of young children’s evidence without making jurors less accurate or more hostile to the defendant. They also indicate that remote or recorded testimony may reduce the credibility jurors attribute to the child, which may disadvantage the prosecution. And they indicate that the premise behind the confrontation guarantee, that seeing a witness live helps jurors detect falsehood, was not supported in these studies, a finding that does not alter the constitutional right.
Screens and Shields
The screen at issue in Coy v. Iowa (1988) has been studied less. In two mock-trial experiments, a 10-year-old witness testified in open court facing the defendant, in open court behind a protective shield, or from outside the courtroom by video (Ross et al., 1994). When participants heard the full trial, the mode of testimony had no effect on conviction rates. When the trial was stopped immediately after the child testified, open-court testimony produced more convictions than the shield or video conditions. The study suggests that any effect of the accommodation on verdicts was small relative to the rest of the evidence, and that when an effect appeared, the shield and video were associated with fewer, not more, convictions.
Support Persons, Facility Dogs, and Comfort Items
Courts increasingly permit a support person or a trained facility dog to accompany a child witness. Defendants have argued that a dog or a comfort item may generate sympathy or imply that the child has been harmed. In two mock-trial experiments with child witnesses, a facility dog did not affect verdicts, confidence, or sentencing, and accommodations did not affect perceptions of the child; a teddy bear disadvantaged the defendant in the first experiment but not the second (Burd & McQuiston, 2019). These are two studies with simulated trials, and research on support persons’ effects on jurors is sparse.
Intermediaries and Communication Aids
England and Wales use registered intermediaries, communication specialists who help the court question a child in ways the child can understand. In a study in which 217 adult mock jurors watched a recorded cross-examination of a child witness, neither the presence of an intermediary nor the intermediary’s interventions affected ratings of the child’s credibility or understanding; jurors’ judgments about whether the trial was moving toward a guilty verdict depended on the evidence (Krahenbuhl, 2019). American courts rely instead on the trial judge’s authority to control the mode of questioning, and no American study of jurors’ perceptions of comparable measures was found.
Demeanor, Emotion, and What Jurors Expect
One reason accommodations may affect credibility is that they change the cues jurors use. Many jurors expect a child who has been abused to appear distressed. In a study with undergraduate mock jurors, a girl described as teary while testifying produced more guilty verdicts and greater belief than one described as calm or crying hysterically (Golding et al., 2003). In a study with jury-eligible students and jurors released from jury duty, depicting the child as crying did not change verdicts, but participants who perceived the child as more emotional found the child more credible and were more likely to convict (Cooper et al., 2014). If an accommodation reduces a child’s visible distress, or places the child on a screen, jurors may see less of the emotion they expect, although no study has tested directly whether that explains the lower credibility ratings for remote testimony.
Research on lie detection indicates that observers’ use of demeanor to judge truthfulness is generally not accurate in children or adults, with accuracy only slightly above chance across 206 documents (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), and the research on expectations about how victims behave is reviewed in the hub’s paper on juror beliefs in sexual assault and child abuse trials and in the Counterintuitive Testimony resources on this site. Both parties have an interest in jurors not treating the presence or absence of tears as evidence of truth.
Juror Characteristics
Jurors’ reactions to child abuse allegations differ by gender at the group level. In a mock-trial study that varied the type of child abuse, female participants were more likely than male participants to find the defendant guilty and viewed the alleged victim more favorably (Pettalia et al., 2017). In a sample of 964 participants, men reported more fear of being falsely accused of child sexual abuse than women, and that difference partly explained why male mock jurors in a later trial were less likely to believe the child’s allegation (Jones et al., 2021). None of the accommodation studies summarized above reported whether men and women reacted differently to the accommodations themselves. These differences are modest group tendencies that cannot predict how an individual juror will decide, and jurors may not be selected or excluded because of sex (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994).
Limits of the Evidence
The staged mock trials with real child witnesses are unusually realistic, but they are few, are more than two decades old, and involved nonabusive events, children who were not traumatized, and mock jurors who knew no real defendant was at risk. Closed-circuit and video technology has changed considerably since the studies were conducted, and jurors now see much more video in daily life, which may change how they perceive testimony on a screen. The research on facility dogs, comfort items, and intermediaries consists of a handful of experiments with recorded or written materials. No study has examined actual Arizona juries or compared verdicts in real cases with and without accommodations, and in real cases accommodations are granted to children who show fear, so any comparison would be confounded with case characteristics.
Most studies did not analyze juror sex or gender in relation to the accommodation, and most used one child’s account in one type of case. Above all, the research cannot show whether a particular child was truthful, whether a particular accommodation affected a particular verdict, or whether a particular juror was influenced.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When closed-circuit testimony is said to make jurors doubt children (Goodman et al., 1998), ask whether the same study found that it also improved younger children’s accuracy and did not bias jurors against the defendant. When confrontation in open court is said to help jurors expose false testimony, ask whether that claim survived the direct test in Orcutt et al. (2001), in which jurors did not reach the truth better in open court. When a facility dog is said to create sympathy for the child, ask what the two experiments in Burd and McQuiston (2019) found and whether a written or recorded trial resembles the courtroom. When a child’s tears or calm are offered as evidence of credibility (Golding et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2014), ask whether the research measured jurors’ perceptions or the child’s accuracy. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Child Witness Accommodations and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. In Coy v. Iowa (1988), the Supreme Court held that placing a screen between the defendant and child complainants, under a statute that presumed trauma, violated the right to face-to-face confrontation absent individualized findings that the particular witnesses needed protection. In Maryland v. Craig (1990), the Court held that a child may testify by one-way closed-circuit television if the trial court finds, on evidence specific to the case, that the procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child, that the child would be traumatized by the presence of the defendant rather than by the courtroom generally, and that the distress would be more than de minimis. The Court relied in part on the procedure’s preservation of oath, cross-examination, and the jury’s observation of the witness’s demeanor.
Federal law permits a child under 18 to testify by two-way closed-circuit television or by videotaped deposition when the court finds that the child cannot testify in the defendant’s presence because of fear, a substantial likelihood of emotional trauma, mental infirmity, or conduct by the defendant or counsel, and permits an adult attendant to accompany the child (18 U.S.C. § 3509(b), (i)). Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) gives the court control over the mode of examining witnesses to protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. Courtroom practices that may convey a message to jurors are evaluated by asking whether they present an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play (Holbrook v. Flynn, 1986).
In courts-martial, members serve the jury’s function. Military Rule of Evidence 611(d) requires the military judge, in a case involving domestic violence or the abuse of a child, to allow a child under 16 to testify from outside the courtroom under R.C.M. 914A, but only after finding on the record that remote testimony is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child, that the child would be traumatized by the presence of the accused rather than the courtroom generally, and that the distress would be more than de minimis. Remote testimony is not used if the accused elects to be absent from the courtroom. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that the Craig framework remains valid after Crawford v. Washington (2004) (United States v. Pack, 2007).
Arizona
The Arizona Constitution guarantees the accused the right “to meet the witnesses against him face to face” (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24). Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4253, on the prosecution’s motion, the court may order that a minor’s testimony be taken in a separate room and shown by closed-circuit television, or recorded and later shown, with the defendant able to see and hear the testimony while the minor cannot see or hear the defendant; a minor who testifies this way is not required to testify in court at that proceeding. In State v. Vincent (1989), the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a conviction in which children’s testimony had been videotaped without a particularized finding of need, holding that the statute may be applied only after an individualized showing that testifying face to face would so traumatize the particular child that the child could not reasonably communicate; general assumptions about children of a given age were not enough.
Arizona requires a court to allow a victim under 18 to be accompanied by a facility dog while testifying, if one is available, and permits the court to allow one for adult victims and other witnesses. The party requesting the dog must give notice of its certification and insurance, and the court must instruct the jury on the dog’s role and that it is a trained animal (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4442; for juvenile proceedings, § 8-422). That instruction is consistent with the research finding no effect of facility dogs on verdicts, although no study has tested the instruction itself. Courts in other states have reviewed the use of facility dogs for abuse of discretion and have relied on limiting instructions (State v. Dye, 2013). Arizona Rule of Evidence 611(a) gives the court control over the mode of questioning, and the Victims’ Bill of Rights protects victims from intimidation and harassment (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the use of accommodations to improve the quality of young children’s testimony: closed-circuit testimony reduced younger children’s suggestibility and anxiety without making jurors less accurate or biasing them against the defendant, and facility dogs did not affect verdicts in two experiments. The research does not show that jurors judged truthfulness more accurately in open court than by closed-circuit television (Orcutt et al., 2001, one study of 7- to 9-year-old children), so an argument that open-court confrontation is needed for jurors to detect false testimony has limited empirical support, although the confrontation right is a legal protection, not an accuracy claim. A request for remote testimony must still rest on case-specific evidence of the particular child’s fear of the defendant, as Craig, Vincent, and Mil. R. Evid. 611(d) require.
The research also counsels caution. In Goodman et al. (1998), jurors viewed children who testified by closed-circuit television less favorably; other studies found that live testimony was rated more positively or more convincing (Goodman et al., 2006; Landström et al., 2007). An accommodation granted without the required case-specific showing may therefore carry a credibility cost as well as raise a confrontation issue. Argument that relies on a child’s tears, or that treats an accommodation as evidence of trauma, asks jurors to use demeanor as a guide to truthfulness, which the research does not support.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports insisting on the individualized findings that Coy, Craig, Vincent, and Mil. R. Evid. 611(d) require, on the jury instruction required for facility dogs in Arizona, and on cautionary instructions where other accommodations are used. It supports cross-examination and argument that address the consistency and specificity of the child’s account, the factors jurors relied on in the mock trials, rather than the child’s emotional presentation.
The research also counsels caution about what it can establish. The studies generally did not find that accommodations biased jurors against the defendant, and they did not support the belief that face-to-face confrontation helps jurors expose false testimony; the protection the confrontation right provides is legal, not a demonstrated accuracy advantage. A teddy bear produced an effect against the defendant in only one of two experiments, so objections to particular comfort items rest on limited evidence. Jurors’ difficulty detecting deception applies equally to true and false accounts, and it does not show that a particular child’s account is unreliable. Demeanor is a poor guide to truthfulness; the research does not show that jurors cannot or should not consider how a witness testifies.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214–234. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2
Burd, K. A., & McQuiston, D. E. (2019). Facility dogs in the courtroom: Comfort without prejudice? Criminal Justice Review, 44(4), 515–536. https://doi.org/10.1177/0734016819844298
Cooper, A., Quas, J. A., & Cleveland, K. C. (2014). The emotional child witness: Effects on juror decision-making. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 32(6), 813–828. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2153
Golding, J. M., Fryman, H. M., Marsil, D. F., & Yozwiak, J. A. (2003). Big girls don’t cry: The effect of child witness demeanor on juror decisions in a child sexual abuse trial. Child Abuse & Neglect, 27(11), 1311–1321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2003.03.001
Goodman, G. S., Myers, J. E. B., Qin, J., Quas, J. A., Castelli, P., Redlich, A. D., & Rogers, L. (2006). Hearsay versus children’s testimony: Effects of truthful and deceptive statements on jurors’ decisions. Law and Human Behavior, 30(3), 363–401. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9009-0
Goodman, G. S., Tobey, A. E., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., Orcutt, H., Thomas, S., Shapiro, C., & Sachsenmaier, T. (1998). Face-to-face confrontation: Effects of closed-circuit technology on children’s eyewitness testimony and jurors’ decisions. Law and Human Behavior, 22(2), 165–203. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025742119977
Jones, T. M., Bottoms, B. L., Sachdev, K., Aniciete, J., & Gorak, K. (2021). Jurors’ gender and their fear of false child sexual abuse accusations are related to their belief in child victims’ allegations. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 30(7), 828–846. https://doi.org/10.1080/10538712.2021.1931612
Krahenbuhl, S. (2019). Mock jurors’ perceptions of a child witness: The impact of the presence and/or intervention of a registered intermediary during cross-examination. Psychology, Crime & Law, 25(7), 713–728. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2018.1543421
Landström, S., Granhag, P. A., & Hartwig, M. (2007). Children’s live and videotaped testimonies: How presentation mode affects observers’ perception, assessment and memory. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 12(2), 333–348. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532506X133607
Orcutt, H. K., Goodman, G. S., Tobey, A. E., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., & Thomas, S. (2001). Detecting deception in children’s testimony: Factfinders’ abilities to reach the truth in open court and closed-circuit trials. Law and Human Behavior, 25(4), 339–372. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010603618330
Pettalia, J., Pozzulo, J. D., & Reed, J. (2017). The influence of sex on mock jurors’ verdicts across type of child abuse cases. Child Abuse & Neglect, 69, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2017.03.025
Ross, D. F., Hopkins, S., Hanson, E., Lindsay, R. C. L., Hazen, K., & Eslinger, T. (1994). The impact of protective shields and videotape testimony on conviction rates in a simulated trial of child sexual abuse. Law and Human Behavior, 18(5), 553–566. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499174
Legal Authorities
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
State v. Dye, 178 Wash. 2d 541, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013).
State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 768 P.2d 150 (1989).
United States v. Pack, 65 M.J. 381 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.
18 U.S.C. § 3509.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-422.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4253.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4442.
Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).
Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a).
Mil. R. Evid. 611(d).
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 914A (2024 ed.).
Related topic papers: Juror Beliefs in Sexual Assault and Child Abuse Trials · Remote and Video Testimony · Juror Beliefs About Memory, Eyewitnesses, and Confessions · Limiting Instructions, Inadmissible Evidence, and Instructions to Disregard · Juror Stress and Graphic or CSAM Evidence
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Child Abuse Allegations · Memory in the Courtroom · Counterintuitive Testimony