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Adults Reporting Childhood Sexual Abuse After Long Delay

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What does research say about an adult’s report, often decades later, of childhood sexual abuse, including memories said to have been recovered?
  • What the research shows: First disclosure in adulthood is common; survivors in the Australian Royal Commission’s private sessions (self-selected, institutional abuse) took on average 23.9 years to tell someone. Most adults reporting historical abuse say they always remembered it. In one study, corroboration was found for 45% of continuous memories, 37% of memories recovered outside therapy, and none of 16 recovered in therapy.
  • What it does not show: No validated method distinguishes a true historical memory from a false one in an individual case. Delay, therapy, and uncertain dates do not show an account is false, absence of corroboration is not evidence a memory is false, and implantation studies do not establish how often recovered memories of abuse are false.
  • The law: Many child sex offenses may be charged at any time or within extended periods, but Stogner bars reviving expired prosecutions. Recovered memories may face a reliability hearing (Rule 702; Hungerford; Borawick); Arizona’s Collins rule excludes hypnotically induced recall (its status after Daubert should be confirmed); vouching is barred (Brooks, Lindsey).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should state figures with their sampling limits and document what was remembered before any therapy; defense counsel should examine how the account originated and what intervened, without suggesting a particular memory was implanted.

Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common, and many people who were abused first tell someone as adults, often decades later. Because many jurisdictions have extended or abolished limitation periods for these offenses, an adult’s report of long-ago abuse may reach a criminal court, a court-martial, or a civil court. Delay is common among people who were abused, so the fact of delay does not, by itself, suggest that an account is untrue; delay also does not show that abuse occurred.

Historical allegations raise questions that reports by children do not. The complainant is an adult recalling childhood events after years of intervening experience, conversation, and sometimes psychotherapy. Most adults who report historical abuse say they always remembered it; a smaller number describe a period in which they did not think about it, or believe they had no memory of it until it returned. Whether memories recovered after complete amnesia are accurate is among the most contested questions in psychology, corroboration is often limited, and no validated test distinguishes an accurate historical memory from an inaccurate one.

This paper consolidates material addressed in part in several companion papers. It covers adult first disclosure, continuous and recovered memories, therapy history, memory for long-ago events, and corroboration, then the limits of the evidence, the governing law, and the recurring issues for each side.

How Often Abuse Is First Disclosed in Adulthood

In a nationally representative survey of American women, 288 reported having been raped before age 18; 28% had never told anyone before the research interview, and 47% had waited more than five years (Smith et al., 2000). Reviews conclude that many people delay disclosure, that a substantial share do not disclose during childhood at all, and that first disclosure often occurs in adulthood (London et al., 2005; McElvaney, 2015).

The largest body of data on long delays comes from the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. Survivors who spoke with the Commission in private sessions took, on average, 23.9 years to tell someone about the abuse; the average was 20.6 years for women and 25.6 years for men (Royal Commission, 2017). The figures describe self-selected survivors of institutional abuse whose accounts were not independently tested, not all survivors, but they show that delays of twenty years or more are not unusual.

Men appear to disclose later than women. Among 487 adult male survivors recruited through survivor organizations, more years until disclosure and greater conformity to masculine norms were each associated with more mental-health symptoms (Easton, 2014), and interview studies describe shame, fear of being labeled, and limited acceptance of male victimization as barriers that persisted into adulthood (Easton et al., 2014). Adult disclosures include accounts withheld for years and accounts prompted by memories that returned (Alaggia, 2004), and adults’ reasons for waiting largely mirror children’s (Alaggia et al., 2019). Publicity, an inquiry, or learning that someone else has reported can also prompt a first disclosure, which helps explain why historical reports against one person often emerge together and raises the issues addressed in the companion paper on co-witness contamination.

Continuous, Forgotten-and-Remembered, and Recovered Memories

Three situations are often described with the same words: the person always remembered the abuse but did not tell, which by most accounts is the most common; the person did not think about it for a long period and was later reminded; or the person describes having had no memory at all until it returned, sometimes gradually during psychotherapy. Only the third raises the scientific dispute described below. Delay in telling is not a lapse in memory.

One study, of 128 adults recruited through newspaper advertisements, sought corroboration for accounts in each group; raters who did not know the group assignment interviewed other people for evidence that someone had learned of the abuse within a week after it occurred, that another person reported abuse by the same perpetrator, or that the perpetrator admitted it. Corroboration was found for 45% of 71 continuous memories, 37% of 41 memories recovered outside therapy, and none of 16 memories recovered in therapy (Geraerts et al., 2007, p. 565). The authors noted that this level of corroboration does not meet the criminal standard, that a false memory could in principle be corroborated under these criteria, and that results might differ in clinical samples (pp. 566–567).

McNally and Geraerts (2009) proposed that many people who recovered memories outside therapy did not experience the abuse as terrifying at the time, often because they were too young to understand it, did not think about it for years, and recalled it when they encountered reminders, recognizing it as abuse only as adults. On that account, later recall does not require a special blocking mechanism. The samples were modest and recruited by advertisement, and the absence of corroboration is not evidence that a memory is false.

A systematic review of 42 studies published since 2000 found that reported rates of recovered memory depend heavily on who is studied: 1% to 3% in legally documented CSA cases, 22% to 39% in self-reported survivor samples, 6% to 19% among people attending therapy, and 3% to 13% in general population samples. The authors attributed the variation largely to differing definitions (complete amnesia versus partial forgetting), sample types, and recovery contexts, and found no cognitive mechanism unique to recovered memories; the experiences studied often reflected deliberate suppression, failure to notice that one had remembered, or encounters with reminders (Carey et al., 2026). The review did not assess how often recovered memories are accurate.

Prospective research is consistent with these findings. In follow-up studies of abuse documented at the time, most participants remembered and reported it years later, and greater traumatic impact was associated with more accurate memory in those samples; some did not report documented abuse when asked, for reasons that include having been very young, ordinary forgetting, and reluctance to disclose (Alexander et al., 2005; Goodman et al., 2003; Williams, 1994). A 20-year follow-up of 99 people first seen at ages 3 to 16 at a forensic unit found that some who had denied abuse as children disclosed it as adults, which was associated with more adult trauma symptoms, and some who had disclosed as children recanted as adults; corroboration and greater severity predicted adult recantation (Hartman et al., 2023). The sample was small. The finding indicates that an adult’s recantation does not establish that childhood abuse did not occur, and an adult disclosure after a childhood denial is not, by itself, corroboration. These studies are reviewed in the companion paper on stress, trauma, and memory.

The Recovered-Memory Debate

The dispute concerns mechanism and frequency more than possibility. One group of researchers has argued that evidence for repression or dissociative amnesia as a mechanism that blocks traumatic memories entirely is weak, that belief in such a mechanism remains widespread, and that memory-recovery techniques risk producing false memories (Otgaar et al., 2019, 2022). Surveys show that belief in repressed memory has declined among clinicians since the 1990s but remains more common among practitioners than researchers (Patihis et al., 2014), and more recent surveys find such beliefs widely held among legal professionals as well. Across three U.K. samples (N = 717) that included judges and barristers, more than 78% of lay, legal, and clinical participants endorsed repression and more than 87% endorsed dissociative amnesia (Radcliffe & Patihis, 2024), and most Danish professionals in six groups relevant to the legal system, most strongly police and social workers, rated an inability to remember CSA as plausible (Sonne et al., 2025). These surveys measure beliefs, not how often memories become inaccessible, and whether the beliefs are mistaken is part of the dispute described here. In response, Brewin (2021) argued that the critique overlooks broad agreement that recovered memories may be accurate, false, or a mixture; that no major publication endorses the theory of unconscious repression being criticized; that recovered memories also arise in therapies that use no suggestive techniques; and that the field has long agreed that suggestive memory-recovery practices are hazardous. The original authors replied that belief in unconscious repressed memory persists (Otgaar et al., 2021). A parallel exchange on trauma and dissociation (Dalenberg et al., 2012; Lynn et al., 2014) is addressed in the companion paper on dissociation.

Research on implanted memories frames the other side of the question. A systematic review of studies giving adults false suggestions about childhood events found that memory-implantation procedures induced some recollective experience in an average of 47% of participants but full false memories in only about 15% (Brewin & Andrews, 2017). Critics responded that the review was selective and that implanted memories can be held with high confidence (Otgaar et al., 2017). A mega-analysis of 423 participants in eight implantation studies classified 30.4% of cases as false memories and a further 23% as partial acceptance (Scoboria et al., 2017). The suggested events were generally less traumatic and stigmatizing than sexual abuse, which limits generalization in either direction.

Researchers on both sides would generally accept several propositions: people can stop thinking about abuse and later remember it; memories that return after a long interval can be accurate, inaccurate, or partly accurate; suggestion, expectation, and repeated imagining can produce false or distorted memories in some people; and suggestive memory-recovery techniques increase that risk. How memories become inaccessible, and how often complete amnesia occurs, remain disputed.

Therapy History and the Origins of a Report

Many adults who were abused seek psychotherapy because of the harm the abuse caused, and therapy is a common and appropriate setting for a first disclosure. A history of therapy is therefore not, by itself, a marker of an inaccurate report. Its significance lies in sequence and content: whether the person remembered and described the abuse before therapy; whether therapy was simply the first occasion to speak of a continuous memory; and, if the memory returned during treatment, what the therapist believed and suggested and what techniques were used. Hypnosis, guided imagery, interpreting dreams or symptoms as signs of hidden abuse, and repeated imagining are most often identified as risky (Brewin, 2021; Otgaar et al., 2019). In a survey of 61 members of a German support organization for people who say they were falsely accused, 89% had been accused of sexual abuse, 71% were a parent of the accuser, and 72% said the allegation arose while the accuser was in psychotherapy (Houben et al., 2024). The respondents were self-selected and the allegations were not shown to be false. Treatment records can show when an account first appeared and in what form; access to them is addressed in the companion papers on access to the complainant’s records and on therapy and the forensic process.

What Remains Reliable in Memory for Long-Ago Events

A review of studies comparing adults’ recollections of childhood adversity with other sources concluded that false-positive reports of major adversities are probably rare, that false negatives and measurement error are substantial, and that little weight can be placed on retrospective reports of details (Hardt & Rutter, 2004). A meta-analysis of 16 studies found poor agreement between prospective and retrospective measures of childhood maltreatment, which identify largely different groups of people (Baldwin et al., 2019). That finding cuts both ways: many people with documented maltreatment do not report it as adults, and many who report maltreatment had none documented, which may reflect undetected abuse, inaccurate recollection, or both.

Memory retains the gist of an experience more durably than its details, and suggestions consistent with that gist can be accepted as memories (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Central features of a significant event, such as who was involved and what basically occurred, are more likely to be retained than peripheral details such as clothing, exact words, or sequence, although emotion does not protect even central details from later misinformation (Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008). Repeated events tend to merge into a general account, and memories attributed to the first two or three years of life warrant particular scrutiny, as discussed in the companion papers on script memory and on childhood amnesia.

Dating is a specific weakness. Memory does not store a reliable time code; people reconstruct when something happened from contextual landmarks such as a school grade, a residence, or a season (Friedman, 1993). Dating errors of a year or more are expected in accurate accounts. Decades of conversation and media exposure also create opportunities to incorporate post-event information, which makes the earliest documented account especially informative.

Corroboration in Historical Cases

Corroboration matters more, and is harder to obtain, when events are old. Records may be gone, witnesses may have died or forgotten, and the accused may be unable to reconstruct his or her whereabouts on uncertain dates. The sources that tend to matter most are contemporaneous documents; earlier disclosures, especially those made before any therapy, publicity, or contact with other complainants; admissions; evidence about access and living arrangements; and other-act evidence where the law permits it. Earlier disclosures show that an account existed at a certain time, not that it is accurate, and accounts from several complainants carry weight when they are independent and can mislead when the complainants have shared information. The absence of corroboration is common in true historical cases, and an uncorroborated report cannot be equated with an unfounded or fabricated one.

Limits of the Evidence

The research rests mostly on retrospective self-report that cannot be independently verified, and disclosure figures depend on who chose to participate. Studies comparing continuous and recovered memories use modest samples, recovered-memory rates vary several-fold with definitions and sampling, and corroboration measures capture only evidence that happened to exist and could be found. Prospective studies concern abuse documented in childhood, which may differ from abuse that was not. Implantation studies use plausible, generally benign events, and their rates cannot be transferred to forensic settings in either direction.

No validated method distinguishes a true historical memory from a false one in an individual case. Confidence, vividness, emotion, and detail occur in both; group differences in behavioral and neuroimaging studies have not been shown to classify individual memories; and without independent corroboration a particular memory’s accuracy has not been shown to be determinable (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). Content-based credibility methods have not been validated for this purpose (see the companion paper on CBCA and SVA). An expert can explain what research shows about delay, forgetting, recovery, suggestion, and the reliability of different kinds of detail. An expert cannot tell a court whether a particular memory is accurate, whether a particular recovered memory is true or false, or whether the accused committed the offense.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the average delay of 23.9 years (Royal Commission, 2017) is offered to show that a long delay is typical, ask who was studied: self-selected survivors of institutional abuse whose accounts were not independently tested. When the finding that none of the 16 memories recovered in therapy were corroborated (Geraerts et al., 2007) is offered against a complainant, ask how much evidence it rests on, given modest samples, and what exactly was counted, since corroboration measures capture only evidence that happened to exist and could be found, and its absence is not evidence that a memory is false. When implantation rates such as about 15% full false memories (Brewin & Andrews, 2017) or 30.4% of 423 participants (Scoboria et al., 2017) are cited by either side, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, because the suggested events were generally less traumatic than sexual abuse and the rates cannot be transferred to forensic settings. Finally, ask whether any figure applies to this person, since no validated method distinguishes a true historical memory from a false one in an individual case. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Historical Allegations and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

An indictment may be found at any time for any felony under chapter 109A, 110 (other than §§ 2257 and 2257A), or 117 of Title 18, under § 1591, or for kidnapping a minor (18 U.S.C. § 3299); other offenses involving the sexual or physical abuse of a child under 18 may be prosecuted during the life of the child or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer (18 U.S.C. § 3283). An extension may apply to an offense whose prior period had not yet run, but a law enacted after a limitation period has expired may not revive a time-barred prosecution (Stogner v. California, 2003), so the version in force at the time of the offense and each later amendment can matter. Civil actions under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 have had no time limit since a 2022 amendment, which does not revive claims already barred.

Under Article 43, UCMJ, rape or sexual assault, including of a child, may be tried at any time (10 U.S.C. § 843(a)); other child abuse offenses, including offenses under Articles 120 through 120c involving a person under 16, may be tried if sworn charges are received during the life of the child or within ten years after the offense, whichever is longer (10 U.S.C. § 843(b)(2)); earlier versions govern some older offenses. In United States v. Briggs (2020), the Supreme Court held that rape committed between 1986 and 2006 could be tried at any time. For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including Article 120b offenses, prosecution decisions rest with the Offices of Special Trial Counsel (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022); because that authority turns on the offense date, a long-delayed allegation of earlier conduct may fall outside it.

Expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and by Military Rule of Evidence 702, into which the December 1, 2023 federal amendment was incorporated (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the military factors. The proponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that each requirement is met and that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts. An opinion that a particular memory was accurately recovered, or is false, would require a reliable method that the research does not supply. Testimony that vouches for a complainant, including by quantifying how rarely such allegations are false, is barred (United States v. Brooks, 2007).

Rock v. Arkansas (1987) held that a per se rule excluding a criminal defendant’s own hypnotically refreshed testimony violated the right to testify; it does not address other witnesses. In Borawick v. Shay (1995), a civil action based on memories of childhood abuse that emerged after hypnosis, the Second Circuit rejected per se rules in favor of a case-by-case inquiry into such factors as the purpose of the hypnosis, suggestion, the existence of a permanent record, the hypnotist’s qualifications, and corroboration, and affirmed exclusion. Therapy records in courts-martial are governed by Military Rule of Evidence 513; in United States v. Mellette (2022), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that diagnoses and treatments in medical records are not themselves uniformly privileged under that rule, although confidential communications are.

Arizona

Under A.R.S. § 13-107(A), a prosecution for any offense listed in chapter 14 or 35.1 of Title 13 that is a class 2 felony, among other listed offenses, may be commenced at any time; for other felonies, the period runs from actual or reasonably diligent discovery by the State (A.R.S. § 13-107(B)). Stogner applies to older offenses here as well. Civil actions based on sexual conduct or contact with a minor may be brought within twelve years after the plaintiff turns 18 (A.R.S. § 12-514), and the 2019 legislation enacting that period revived otherwise time-barred claims filed before December 31, 2020, subject to particular proof and damages provisions (2019 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 259). Earlier, in Doe v. Roe (1998), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the discovery rule may delay accrual of a civil claim based on repressed memories and that, on that record, when the claim accrued and whether the period was tolled for unsound mind were questions for the jury (¶¶ 30–36, 55). The court assumed for summary judgment, rather than decided, the validity of repressed memory (¶ 15), while observing that such memories can be inaccurate or implanted (¶ 26).

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). The 2012 amendment superseded Logerquist v. McVey (2000), a recovered-memory civil action in which the Arizona Supreme Court had held that Frye did not apply to experience-based expert testimony on repressed memory (196 Ariz. 470, ¶¶ 30, 62). State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986) bar an expert from opining, directly or indirectly, on the truthfulness of a witness or class of witnesses (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 475), and State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits general “cold” expert testimony that satisfies Rule 702 and survives Rule 403.

In State v. Mena (1981), the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a conviction resting on a victim’s hypnotically refreshed testimony. In State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court (1982), which modified Mena, the court held under Frye that hypnotically induced recall is inadmissible, rejecting a case-by-case approach with safeguards, but permitted a previously hypnotized witness to testify to facts demonstrably recalled before hypnosis, and recognized hypnosis as an investigative tool whose leads may produce independently admissible evidence. Under Rock, the rule cannot bar a defendant’s own testimony. Whether the 2012 adoption of Daubert affects the Collins rule should be confirmed in current case law.

Other Jurisdictions

In State v. Hungerford (1997), the New Hampshire Supreme Court required a pretrial showing that a recovered memory is reasonably likely to be as accurate as ordinary memory, considering scientific factors, the witness’s age at the time, the interval before recovery, corroboration, and the circumstances of recovery, including therapy, and affirmed exclusion. By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Shanley (2010), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld expert testimony on dissociative amnesia and a conviction resting on recovered memories.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports educational testimony that many people who were abused first disclose as adults, often after decades; that men tend to disclose later than women; that most adults with documented childhood abuse remember it years later; that some who denied abuse as children disclose it as adults; that a person may stop thinking about abuse and later remember it, particularly when it was not understood as abuse at the time; and that uncertainty about dates and peripheral details is expected in accurate accounts (Goodman et al., 2003; Hartman et al., 2023; McNally & Geraerts, 2009; Royal Commission, 2017; Smith et al., 2000). Prosecutors can keep such testimony within its supported scope by stating figures with their sampling limits, distinguishing delay in telling from absence of memory, and avoiding claims about repression that the research does not settle.

The research also counsels caution. A case resting on a memory recovered after complete amnesia, especially in therapy or after hypnosis, invites a Rule 702 hearing and, in Arizona, the Collins rule; documenting what the complainant remembered and said before any therapy or memory-related procedure is often decisive. Early disclosures, contemporaneous records, independent accounts, and admissions most strengthen a historical case, and limitation periods should be checked against every version of the statute since the offense date.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports careful examination of how a historical account originated: when and to whom the complainant first described the events, and what intervened, including therapy, hypnosis or guided imagery, publicity, and contact with other complainants. Research on retrospective reports, memory for dates and details, implanted memories, the low rate of recovered memory in legally documented cases, and the absence of a test for true and false memories is a legitimate subject of expert testimony and cross-examination (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Carey et al., 2026; Hardt & Rutter, 2004; Scoboria et al., 2017). Where an account rests on a recovered memory, Hungerford, Borawick, and the amended Rule 702 identify the questions a reliability hearing can address.

The research also counsels caution. Most historical reports involve memories that were always present, and long delay, adult first disclosure, therapy, and uncertainty about dates are common among people who were abused; none of them shows that an account is false. Implantation research uses plausible, generally benign events and does not establish how often recovered memories of abuse are false. A defense expert who suggests that a particular memory was implanted, or that uncorroborated historical allegations are usually false or fabricated, faces the same anti-vouching limits that apply to prosecution experts. The most persuasive analysis focuses on how and when the account emerged and what independent evidence supports or contradicts it.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Patihis, L., Ho, L. Y., Tingen, I. W., Lilienfeld, S. O., & Loftus, E. F. (2014). Are the “memory wars” over? A scientist-practitioner gap in beliefs about repressed memory. Psychological Science, 25(2), 519–530. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613510718

Paz-Alonso, P. M., & Goodman, G. S. (2008). Trauma and memory: Effects of post-event misinformation, retrieval order, and retention interval. Memory, 16(1), 58–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210701363146

Radcliffe, P. J., & Patihis, L. (2024). Judges and lawyers’ beliefs in repression and dissociative amnesia may imperil justice: Further guidance required. Memory, 32(8), 1083–1099. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2024.2383311

Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. (2017). Final report: Volume 4, Identifying and disclosing child sexual abuse. Commonwealth of Australia. https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/identifying-and-disclosing-child-sexual-abuse

Scoboria, A., Wade, K. A., Lindsay, D. S., Azad, T., Strange, D., Ost, J., & Hyman, I. E. (2017). A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies. Memory, 25(2), 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2016.1260747

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Williams, L. M. (1994). Recall of childhood trauma: A prospective study of women’s memories of child sexual abuse. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62(6), 1167–1176. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.62.6.1167

Legal Authorities

Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995).

Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 919 N.E.2d 1254 (2010).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, 955 P.2d 951 (1998).

Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 1 P.3d 113 (2000).

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).

State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).

State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 110, 697 A.2d 916 (1997).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981), modified by State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).

United States v. Briggs, 592 U.S. 69 (2020).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Mellette, 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

Eliminating Limits to Justice for Child Sexual Abuse Victims Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-176 (2022).

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).

10 U.S.C. § 843 (Article 43, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 2255.

18 U.S.C. § 3283.

18 U.S.C. § 3299.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-514.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-107.

2019 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 259 (H.B. 2466).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Mil. R. Evid. 513.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Related topic papers: Delayed Disclosure: Timing, Age, and Gender · Stress, Trauma, and Children’s Memory · Dissociation, Hyperarousal, and Freezing · Autobiographical Memory and Childhood Amnesia · Script Memory, Repeated Events, and Dating Alleged Abuse · Fuzzy-Trace Theory and How Children’s Memories Change Over Time · Co-Witness and Peer Contamination · Therapy and the Forensic Process: Therapeutic and Forensic Roles · Access to the Complainant’s Counseling, Child Protective Services, School, and Medical Records · Sleep-Related Experiences: Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic Phenomena

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Courts-Martial