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Child-CERT

Therapy and the Forensic Process: Therapeutic and Forensic Roles

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: How should therapy for a child who may have been abused be kept separate from the forensic process, and what can a treating clinician properly say in court?
  • What the research shows: Therapy takes the child’s account as its starting point, while forensic work tests it, and professional guidelines encourage referring one of the two roles to another provider when feasible. TF-CBT has strong evidence for reducing children’s posttraumatic stress symptoms. A recorded forensic interview before treatment addresses the abuse details, with separate interviewer and therapist, reconciles the two in most settings.
  • What it does not show: The treatment trials measured symptom change, not accuracy; no study has established whether, or how often, a trauma narrative changes what a child later reports. Research on adults in memory-focused psychotherapy does not show that evidence-based treatment of children who already disclosed produces false reports.
  • The law: Statements for diagnosis or treatment may be admitted under Rule 803(4) with a proper foundation (Renville, Donaldson, Robinson, Sumner). Treating clinicians may describe observations and treatment but may not state or imply that the child was abused or is truthful (Whitted, Birdsall, Brooks, Lindsey, Moran).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should support timely treatment, keep roles separate, and offer educational testimony through a non-treating expert; defense counsel can establish what the child said before therapy and how new details emerged, without treating the fact of therapy as proof the account was altered.

Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and substantially underreported, and it can cause lasting harm. Many children who disclose abuse, or whose abuse comes to light in other ways, need mental health treatment, and effective treatments exist. Many of the same children are also witnesses in criminal, military, dependency, or custody proceedings, and the investigation and trial may take months or years. Treatment and investigation therefore often run in parallel, and the professionals involved, the records they create, and the statements children make to them regularly become evidence.

The two activities have different purposes. Therapy is designed to help the child and ordinarily takes the child’s account as its starting point; a forensic interview or evaluation gathers or assesses information for a legal decision and treats the account as something to be tested. Problems arise when one professional tries to serve both purposes, when therapeutic methods are used to obtain an account that will be offered as evidence, and when a treating clinician’s opinions are offered as forensic conclusions. They also arise in the other direction, when concern about the trial delays needed treatment, or when the fact of therapy is treated as evidence that an account was contaminated.

This paper describes how the two roles differ, the evidence for trauma-focused treatment and its interaction with the investigation, disclosures that first emerge in therapy, and treating clinicians as fact witnesses and as experts. It then sets out the limits of the evidence, the governing federal, military, and Arizona law, and the recurring issues for each side. Access to therapy records is addressed in the companion paper “Access to the Complainant’s Counseling, Child Protective Services, School, and Medical Records.”

Two Different Professional Tasks

Greenberg and Shuman (1997) set out the most frequently cited account of why therapeutic and forensic roles conflict. They identified ten differences between the two relationships, among them who the professional’s client is; which privilege governs the communications; the clinician’s stance, which in therapy is supportive, accepting, and empathic and in forensic work is neutral and detached; the hypotheses being tested, which in therapy concern diagnosis and treatment and in forensic work concern a legal question; and the scrutiny applied to information, which in therapy is usually limited and in forensic work includes checking the account against other sources. They concluded that combining the roles risks impairing the treatment, impairing the accuracy of the legal decision, and producing testimony on legal questions for which the treating clinician lacks an adequate professional basis, and they maintained the distinction when they revisited it a decade later, in reply to an article arguing that the roles can be compatible: they restated the ten differences, including the client, the governing privilege, the supportive versus neutral stance, the hypotheses tested, and the degree of scrutiny applied to the patient-litigant’s account, and added that a treating therapist becomes part of the facts of the case. They also acknowledged that courts ordinarily do not bar treating therapists from testifying on matters for which they have an adequate foundation, treating role conflict as a professional rather than an admissibility issue (Greenberg & Shuman, 2007, pp. 129–131). Strasburger et al. (1997) reached a similar conclusion from forensic psychiatry: therapy seeks the meaning of the patient’s account and may provisionally accept it, while forensic work tests it for historical accuracy.

Professional guidelines reflect the same distinction. The American Psychological Association’s Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology (American Psychological Association, 2013) state that providing both forensic and therapeutic services to the same person involves multiple relationships that may impair objectivity or cause harm, and they encourage practitioners to refer one of the roles to another qualified provider when feasible. The guidelines also distinguish two kinds of testimony from a treating clinician: testimony about a patient’s reported history, mental status, diagnosis, progress, prognosis, and treatment is not ordinarily considered forensic practice, while testimony offering opinions on psycholegal issues ordinarily is.

The child-maltreatment field draws the same line. The U.S. Department of Justice’s consensus bulletin describes the forensic interview as fact-finding by a trained, neutral professional within an investigation, not treatment (Newlin et al., 2015), and the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children (APSAC) describes it as an investigative interview by a specially trained, objective professional (American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, 2023). APSAC’s guidelines for forensic mental health evaluations distinguish such evaluations from clinical evaluations and treatment and state that conclusions about an examinee’s truthfulness are generally not recommended (APSAC Taskforce, 2022).

Why the Separation Matters in Child Cases

The supportive stance that makes therapy effective is also the feature that makes it a poor method for determining what happened. A therapist who accepts a child’s report as the basis for treatment, or who has been told by a referring caregiver or agency that abuse occurred, is not positioned to test alternative explanations, and the therapist’s questions are not designed to separate what the child remembers from what the child has been told. That is a statement about method, not about any therapist’s honesty or competence.

The suggestibility research identifies the conditions under which children’s reports become less accurate, and those conditions are not limited to investigative settings. Reviews of that research identify interviewer bias, in which an interviewer’s belief about what happened shapes the questions asked; repeated suggestive questions; selective reinforcement of some answers; conveying negative information about a suspect; and props or imagination exercises used before a child has given an account (Bruck et al., 1998; Ceci & Bruck, 1995). The same body of research shows that children questioned with open-ended, non-suggestive methods can give accurate, detailed accounts, and that children can resist misleading questions under good conditions. The risk lies in the conditions, especially in combination, rather than in the setting or the child’s age alone.

Concerns about therapy as a source of inaccurate reports have been raised most prominently about adults. In surveys of 145 U.S. and 57 British doctoral-level therapists, 71% reported having used at least one technique, such as hypnosis or dream interpretation, to help clients recover suspected memories of childhood abuse, and 25% reported a combination of beliefs and practices suggesting a focus on memory recovery; the authors noted that their data could not show whether the memories those clinicians reported were accurate or illusory (Poole et al., 1995, pp. 426, 434), and a cognitive analysis concluded that combinations of such practices could lead some adults to report events that had not occurred (Lindsay & Read, 1994). A 2026 systematic review found that 27% to 78% of surveyed therapists reported having encountered clients with recovered memories, and it called for training on the risks of suggestive practices (Carey et al., 2026). In a survey of 61 self-selected members of a German support organization for people who say they were falsely accused, 72% said the allegation arose while the accuser was in psychotherapy; the allegations were not shown to be false (Houben et al., 2024). That research concerns mainly adults in memory-focused psychotherapy and accused persons’ own accounts; it does not show that evidence-based treatment of children who have already disclosed produces false reports.

Therapy Before and During an Investigation

Children need not wait for a trial to receive treatment, and the evidence for some treatments is strong. Trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy (TF-CBT), developed by Judith Cohen, Anthony Mannarino, and Esther Deblinger, is a structured, time-limited treatment for children and their non-offending caregivers that includes psychoeducation, parenting skills, relaxation, emotion regulation, cognitive coping, a trauma narrative, gradual exposure to trauma reminders, joint child-caregiver sessions, and safety skills (Cohen et al., 2017). In a multisite randomized trial with 229 children aged 8 to 14 who had sexual abuse-related posttraumatic stress symptoms, children who received TF-CBT improved more than those who received child-centered therapy on measures of posttraumatic stress, depression, behavior problems, and shame, and their parents also improved more on several measures (Cohen et al., 2004). Gains in a later trial with children aged 4 to 11 were maintained 6 and 12 months after treatment (Mannarino et al., 2012). A review commissioned by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration rated the level of evidence for TF-CBT as high, based on ten randomized trials, three conducted independently of the developers; it found robust reductions in posttraumatic stress symptoms but less consistent advantages over comparison groups for depression and behavior problems, and it noted concerns about investigator bias and the exclusion of vulnerable populations (de Arellano et al., 2014, pp. 591, 595, 601). A meta-analysis of 28 randomized trials and 33 uncontrolled studies (4,523 participants) found TF-CBT superior to control conditions for posttraumatic stress at post-treatment, with a large effect compared with waitlist conditions and a small effect compared with treatment as usual or other active treatments; the authors also reported estimates adjusted for risk of bias and publication bias, which they noted limited the quality of the data (Thielemann et al., 2022, pp. 1, 8).

Delaying such treatment until a case that may take years has ended has its own costs. Branaman and Gottlieb (2013) observed that professional guidance had focused on the risk that a therapist’s biases could distort a child’s memory, with little attention to treating an alleged victim while a criminal case is pending, and proposed preliminary guidelines for that situation; Kuehnle and Connell (2010) addressed treatment decisions while an investigation is incomplete. A scoping review of literature from 1980 to 2016 on pretrial therapy for child witnesses found no agreed definition of the practice and little empirical research on how different therapeutic approaches affect children’s testimony, and it urged therapists to remain aware of that question (Fouché & Fouché, 2017).

Two practices reconcile treatment and investigation in most settings. The first is sequence: the forensic interview is conducted, and recorded where possible, before treatment addresses the details of the alleged abuse. The second is separation: the forensic interviewer, any forensic evaluator, and the treating therapist are different people, and the therapist does not undertake to determine whether abuse occurred. Neither practice requires withholding treatment, and neither supports an assumption that a child who has received therapy has given a less reliable account.

The Trauma Narrative

The TF-CBT trauma narrative is the component most often raised in litigation, because it involves repeated, structured discussion of the abuse. As described by its developers, the narrative is introduced after the child has learned coping skills, concerns experiences the child has already described, is developed gradually with the therapist, and is directed at the child’s thoughts and feelings, at reducing avoidance, and at correcting distorted beliefs such as self-blame, rather than at gathering facts (Cohen et al., 2017). In a dismantling trial, TF-CBT was effective with and without the narrative component, and the conditions that included it showed somewhat greater improvement on some measures of abuse-related fear and anxiety (Deblinger et al., 2011).

Properly conducted, the narrative is therefore not a forensic interview: it does not seek a first disclosure, does not test the account, and is not designed to produce a record of the child’s independent memory. That distinction rests on the treatment’s design and professional practice, however, not on research measuring accuracy; the trials measured symptom change, and no study has established whether, or how often, developing a trauma narrative changes what a child later reports. The narrative may also be shared with a caregiver in joint sessions, and a narrative that adds details to an earlier account raises a question about their source that the treatment research does not answer. The National Child Traumatic Stress Network notes that clinicians disagree about whether narratives and similar work products belong in the clinical file and that such materials can be misinterpreted if offered in court (National Child Traumatic Stress Network, n.d.).

Disclosures First Made in Therapy

Some children first disclose abuse in therapy, often after being referred for behavioral or emotional problems. That pattern is consistent with research showing that disclosure is often dialogical. In a Norwegian study of 22 children whose caregivers had raised concerns about possible abuse, children found it difficult to find a private moment and a way to begin and disclosed more readily when they perceived an opportunity to talk, a purpose for speaking, and a connection between the conversation and their experience (Jensen et al., 2005). A therapy session can provide those conditions.

A first disclosure in therapy also raises questions that the clinical setting is not designed to answer. Early studies of disclosure drew heavily on children seen in therapy. One, a retrospective review of 116 cases confirmed mainly by confession or plea, selected from 630 cases the authors had seen as therapists or evaluators, described 72% of children as initially denying abuse and 22% as recanting (Sorensen & Snow, 1991), and another, of 63 children in psychotherapy who had reported sexual and ritualistic abuse in a preschool setting, found that 27% recanted at some point and that all but two later redisclosed (Gonzalez et al., 1993). Across the studies discussed in this hub, reported recantation rates range from about 4% to about 27% depending on how the sample was drawn and how recantation was defined, and none shows what share of recantations in contested cases are accurate (see the paper on recantation). Reviews have cautioned that clinical samples of this kind may include children who were questioned suggestively or whose therapists assumed that abuse had occurred, and that whether abuse occurred in those cases is difficult to verify (London et al., 2005). Those cautions concern how the research samples were drawn; they do not show that disclosures made in therapy are generally inaccurate.

What matters for evaluating a particular disclosure is its context: why the child was referred and what the therapist had been told; whether the therapist suspected abuse beforehand; what was said or asked immediately before the disclosure; whether drawings, toys, or other aids were used; and how the statement was documented. Clinical notes are usually summaries written after the session. Investigators’ contemporaneous notes of recorded forensic interviews omitted more than half of the interviewers’ questions and tended to attribute details to more open questions than the ones that produced them (Lamb et al., 2000), and interviewers recalled the gist of children’s statements better than the questions that elicited them (Warren & Woodall, 1999); there is little reason to expect therapy notes to be more complete. Therapists are ordinarily mandated reporters, and the investigative questioning that follows a disclosure is best conducted by a trained forensic interviewer rather than by the therapist.

Treating Clinicians in Court: Fact Witnesses and Experts

A treating therapist can be an important witness, describing when and why the child came to treatment, what the child said and when, the child’s observable condition, the diagnosis made for treatment, and the course of treatment. That testimony is part of the factual history, although an opinion based on specialized knowledge, such as a diagnosis, is subject to the rules governing expert testimony.

The difficulty arises when a treating clinician is asked to say that the child was abused or is credible, that symptoms show abuse, or that the account is consistent with abuse in a sense that implies corroboration. A clinician who accepted the account as the premise of treatment has not tested it, so such an opinion usually rests on the child’s history, and courts treat it as a comment on credibility. Professional guidance points the same way: a treating clinician who testifies is best limited to observations and treatment, because opinions on legal questions are forensic work requiring an adequate foundation (American Psychological Association, 2013; Strasburger et al., 1997). The risk also runs to the child, since a therapist who becomes a forensic witness may disclose more of the treatment than anyone expected, and the therapeutic relationship may not survive. Symptoms such as anxiety, sleep disturbance, or sexualized behavior occur in children who have and have not been abused; a clinician’s description of them can explain the child’s condition and needs, but they cannot prove abuse, and their absence cannot disprove it.

Limits of the Evidence

The treatment trials enrolled children referred for symptoms after disclosed abuse, generally in specialty clinics with trained and supervised therapists, and measured symptom change; they do not show that treatment either improves or degrades the accuracy of children’s accounts. The suggestibility research was largely conducted in laboratory settings with verifiable events and techniques not typical of evidence-based treatment, and it identifies risk conditions rather than the frequency of error in any setting. Studies of disclosure in clinical samples rarely had independent confirmation of whether abuse occurred, and the guidelines separating therapeutic and forensic roles rest on professional consensus and reasoning about method rather than controlled comparisons.

No study can tell a court whether a particular child’s account was shaped by therapy, whether a particular disclosure in therapy was accurate, or whether a particular child was abused. Those questions depend on the evidence in the case, including the sequence of the child’s statements, the conditions under which each was obtained, and corroborating or contradicting evidence.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the TF-CBT trials (Cohen et al., 2004; Deblinger et al., 2011) are cited to show that a trauma narrative does not affect a child’s testimony, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: the trials measured symptom change, and no study has established whether a narrative changes what a child later reports. When the therapist surveys (Poole et al., 1995) and cognitive analysis (Lindsay & Read, 1994) are offered to suggest that therapy produced an account, ask who was studied, since that research concerns adults in memory-focused psychotherapy, not children who disclosed before evidence-based treatment. When the 27% who recanted in a therapy sample (Gonzalez et al., 1993) is presented as typical, ask who was studied, since in such clinical samples whether abuse occurred is difficult to verify (London et al., 2005). When the suggestibility research (Bruck et al., 1998; Ceci & Bruck, 1995) is applied to a child’s therapy, ask whether it applies to this child: it was largely conducted in laboratories with techniques not typical of evidence-based treatment, and it identifies risk conditions rather than how often errors occur. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Therapy, Treating Providers, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) excepts from the hearsay rule statements made for, and reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment, including descriptions of medical history, symptoms, and their general cause. The advisory committee note explains that statements of fault ordinarily do not qualify. Federal and military courts have applied the rule to statements to psychologists and social workers in appropriate circumstances (see United States v. Donaldson, 2003, collecting cases), and federal courts have admitted a child’s identification of an abuser who is a member of the household where the provider made clear that identity was important to treatment and the child’s motive was consistent with obtaining treatment (United States v. Renville, 1985). The Eighth Circuit has held that a child’s statement identifying the father to a pediatrician was not shown to be admissible under the medical-treatment exception or the Confrontation Clause, granting habeas relief on that count (Olesen v. Class, 1999), and held that a six-year-old’s statements to a clinical psychologist did not qualify where he had not explained his role or the importance of truthfulness (United States v. Sumner, 2000). Under Federal Rules 701 and 702, an opinion based on specialized knowledge, such as a clinical diagnosis, must satisfy Rule 702, and a physician’s diagnosis of sexual abuse resting on the child’s history rather than distinguishing findings is an impermissible opinion on credibility (United States v. Whitted, 1993; United States v. Charley, 1999). Statements to providers acting principally for law enforcement may also be testimonial under the Confrontation Clause (Crawford v. Washington, 2004; Ohio v. Clark, 2015).

Military Rule of Evidence 803(4) is applied through a two-part test: the statement must be made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, and the patient must make it with some expectation of receiving medical benefit (United States v. Edens, 1990). The exception extends to psychologists and other non-physicians who perform health care functions (United States v. Welch, 1987), and because a young child may not be able to articulate an expectation of benefit, the record should show that the treatment was explained in terms the child could understand (United States v. Siroky, 1996). In United States v. Donaldson (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld admission of a young child’s statements to a child clinical psychologist whom the child understood to be a doctor who would help her, while describing the question as close. In United States v. Cucuzzella (2008), an adult case, the court upheld admission of statements to a Family Advocacy nurse who performed mental health intake and referral, distinguished a case in which the recipient had played a forensic role, and cautioned that in counseling settings, where motives may be mixed, the exception should not be applied in a rote or mechanical manner. Statements in an examination arranged by law enforcement were testimonial in United States v. Gardinier (2007); statements to physicians whose questioning was directed to medical care were not in United States v. Squire (2013).

Military Rule of Evidence 513 protects confidential psychotherapist-patient communications made for diagnosis or treatment, subject to enumerated exceptions, including one for communications that are evidence of child abuse or neglect (Mil. R. Evid. 513(d)(2), as quoted in United States v. Beauge, 2022); diagnoses and treatments are not privileged merely because they appear in a mental health record (United States v. Mellette, 2022). The companion records paper discusses the rule’s procedures. On testimony, the human lie detector rule bars an expert, including a treating clinician, from stating or implying that a child is truthful or was abused (United States v. Birdsall, 1998; United States v. Brooks, 2007), although an expert may describe symptoms associated with abuse and whether the child exhibits them (United States v. Mullins, 2010), and a qualified counselor has been permitted to testify to a working PTSD diagnosis made in treatment (United States v. Norris, 2001). Expert testimony that merely mirrors and bolsters a complainant’s account is improper (United States v. Flesher, 2014). For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including offenses under Article 120b, UCMJ, prosecution decisions rest with the Offices of Special Trial Counsel (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022), which therefore determine whether treating providers are called as government witnesses.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(4) follows the federal rule. In State v. Robinson (1987), the Arizona Supreme Court held the statutory child-hearsay exception unconstitutional, so that children’s out-of-court statements are evaluated under the rules of evidence, and upheld admission under Rule 803(4) of a child’s statements to a treating psychologist, including the abuser’s identity, based on the clinician’s testimony that the information was important to diagnosis and treatment (153 Ariz. at 196–200). The court noted that identity statements ordinarily fall outside Rule 803(4) and held that in child sexual abuse cases they come within it when identity is relevant to diagnosis and treatment and is elicited and given for that purpose (153 Ariz. at 200). Arizona Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 track the federal rules, and Rule 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004).

Arizona’s limits on testimony about credibility apply to treating clinicians as to any expert. An expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of abused children but may not opine on a particular witness’s truthfulness or quantify how often complainants tell the truth (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 473–75), and may not offer particularized opinions, direct or indirect, that a child was truthful or was abused (State v. Moran, 1986). General educational testimony is permitted if it satisfies Rule 702 and Rule 403 (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), and profile evidence may not be used as substantive proof of guilt (State v. Haskie, 2017).

Communications with psychologists and licensed behavioral health professionals are privileged (A.R.S. §§ 32-2085, 32-3283), but A.R.S. § 13-3620 makes most privileges other than the attorney-client privilege inapplicable in proceedings in which a child’s abuse or neglect is at issue. A victim may refuse a defense interview, deposition, or other discovery request (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(5); A.R.S. § 13-4433), and in camera review of a victim’s privileged mental health records requires a sufficiently specific showing of a reasonable possibility that they contain material information (R.S. v. Thompson, 2021, ¶¶ 1, 30), as the companion records paper and “Arizona Victims’ Rights and Child Witnesses” discuss.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports timely, evidence-based treatment for children who need it, and the research does not show that evidence-based therapy itself makes a child’s account unreliable, although few studies have tested that question directly. Prosecutors can protect both the child and the evidence: by encouraging a recorded forensic interview before treatment addresses the details of the abuse; by keeping the interviewer, any evaluator, and the therapist in separate roles; by learning early what the child said in therapy, when, and in response to what, so that disclosure obligations are met; and, where a treating clinician testifies, by laying a Rule 803(4) foundation showing the treatment purpose and the child’s understanding of it, as Donaldson and Sumner illustrate, or, where the child’s motive is unclear, that the clinician elicited and needed the information for treatment, as in Robinson (153 Ariz. at 199).

The research and the law also counsel caution. A treating clinician’s belief that abuse occurred, a diagnosis resting on the child’s history, or testimony that symptoms or a trauma narrative are consistent with abuse invites reversal under Birdsall, Brooks, Whitted, Lindsey, and Moran. Educational testimony about disclosure is better offered through a qualified expert who has not treated the child. Where a first disclosure or new details emerged in therapy, a record documenting the conditions under which they emerged is the best answer to the questions the defense will ask.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports careful examination of how and when therapy intersected with the child’s account. Defense counsel can establish the sequence: what the child said before any therapy, why the child was referred and what the therapist was told, whether the therapist suspected abuse before a disclosure, what was asked and what aids were used, whether a trauma narrative or caregiver sessions preceded new details, and how statements were documented. Counsel can also test whether a treating clinician’s opinions exceed the clinician’s role and method, whether statements offered under Rule 803(4) were made for treatment by a child who understood that purpose, and whether a diagnosis rests on anything beyond the history.

The research and the law also counsel caution. The fact of therapy, including TF-CBT and its trauma narrative, does not show that a child’s account was altered, and research on adults in memory-focused psychotherapy does not transfer to a child who disclosed before treatment without a factual basis. A detail that first appears in therapy may reflect incremental disclosure, which is common in substantiated cases, and an omission from a therapy note does not show that the child failed to say something. A defense expert is bound by the same limits as a treating clinician: an opinion that a particular child’s account was produced by therapy is a credibility judgment the research cannot supply. An analysis of therapy records by either side’s expert describes the sequence of statements and what research says about those conditions; it gives no opinion on whether the account is true or false or whether abuse occurred.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Mannarino, A. P., Cohen, J. A., Deblinger, E., Runyon, M. K., & Steer, R. A. (2012). Trauma-focused cognitive-behavioral therapy for children: Sustained impact of treatment 6 and 12 months later. Child Maltreatment, 17(3), 231–241. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077559512451787

National Child Traumatic Stress Network. (n.d.). Testifying in court about trauma: How to prepare [Tip sheet for clinicians]. https://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/resources//testifying_how_to_prepare.pdf

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Legal Authorities

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).

Olesen v. Class, 164 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 1999).

R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 485 P.3d 1068 (2021).

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Beauge, 82 M.J. 157 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

United States v. Birdsall, 47 M.J. 404 (C.A.A.F. 1998).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Cucuzzella, 66 M.J. 57 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

United States v. Donaldson, 58 M.J. 477 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Edens, 31 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1990).

United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J. 60 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Mellette, 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

United States v. Norris, 55 M.J. 209 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).

United States v. Siroky, 44 M.J. 394 (C.A.A.F. 1996).

United States v. Squire, 72 M.J. 285 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Welch, 25 M.J. 23 (C.M.A. 1987).

United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1993).

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(5).

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).

10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

A.R.S. § 13-3620.

A.R.S. § 13-4433.

A.R.S. § 32-2085.

A.R.S. § 32-3283.

Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702, 803(4).

Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 701, 702, 803(4).

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Mil. R. Evid. 513, 702, 803(4).

Related topic papers: Access to the Complainant’s Counseling, Child Protective Services, School, and Medical Records · Forensic Interviews of Children: Purpose, Protocols, and Practice · Independent Psychological Examinations of Child Complainants · Vouching, Bolstering, and Profile Evidence · Misinformation and Pre-Interview Contamination · Types of Disclosure: Piecemeal, Tentative, and Under-Disclosure · Trauma Impact and PTSD in Children · Confrontation, Child Hearsay, and Remote Testimony

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Courts-Martial · Counterintuitive Testimony