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Child-CERT

Independent Psychological Examinations of Child Complainants

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: When may a court order a child complainant to undergo a psychological examination by a defense-chosen or court-appointed expert, and what can such an examination show?
  • What the research shows: An examination can assess characteristics that bear on how a child’s statements should be evaluated, such as language comprehension, intellectual functioning, competency-related capacities, and a mental health condition linked in time to the events. Repeated neutral, open-ended interviews do not necessarily reduce accuracy, but repeated suggestive interviews, especially with young children, increase false reports.
  • What it does not show: No test or clinical method has been shown to reliably determine whether a child was abused or whether an account is true, for either side. A finding that a child is suggestible or has a diagnosis describes a vulnerability, not proof that suggestion or error occurred.
  • The law: No federal criminal rule authorizes ordering a non-party witness examined, and circuits differ on courts’ power (Ramirez, Scuito); 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(9) requires compelling need for competency examinations, and no rule provides for compelled examination of a victim in courts-martial. A.R.S. § 13-4065 bars examinations to assess credibility, and Arizona victims may refuse defense discovery (O’Neil).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should resist credibility-driven requests, build a record of few, recorded interviews, and anticipate parity requests when calling an examining expert; defense counsel should tie requests to a specific capacity and evidentiary need and connect any finding to specific features of the child’s interviews.

Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and underreported, disclosure is often delayed, and children who are interviewed well can give accurate, detailed accounts. Many prosecutions therefore rest largely on the account of a child who was interviewed by investigators, forensic interviewers, or therapists before trial. Those professionals may have evaluated the child’s development, emotional state, or mental health, and some prosecutions call an expert who has seen the child. The defense, by contrast, usually has no access to the child beyond the recorded interviews and the child’s testimony. That imbalance produces a recurring motion: a request that the court order the child to submit to a psychological examination by an expert chosen by the defense, or by a neutral expert appointed by the court.

Courts approach these requests with caution. A compelled examination intrudes on the privacy of a child who is not a party, adds to the burden of an already stressful process, and adds another interview to the record of how the child’s account developed. Yet a child’s developmental level, language, intellectual functioning, or mental health can bear on how the child perceived, remembered, and reported events. Jurisdictions have answered these competing concerns differently: some hold that courts lack authority to order an examination, some allow one only on a showing of compelling need, and some, including Arizona, restrict it by statute and through constitutional victims’ rights.

This paper describes what such an examination is, what it cannot determine, the risks of additional interviewing, and what it can legitimately assess. It then discusses alternatives, the case for and against examinations in narrow circumstances, the limits of the evidence, federal, military, Arizona, and other state law, and the recurring issues for each side.

What an Independent Examination Is and Why It Is Requested

An independent psychological examination is an evaluation of the complainant by a mental health professional who was not part of the investigation or treatment, conducted under court order or by agreement. It is distinct from the forensic interview, which gathers the child’s account for investigative purposes; from a medical examination; from therapy, whose purpose is treatment rather than forensic assessment (Greenberg & Shuman, 1997); from a competency hearing conducted by the court; and from review of existing records, which is governed by separate rules of privilege and discovery.

Requests tend to rest on recurring grounds: the State’s expert has examined the child and will testify, and the defense seeks parity; the child’s mental condition, such as a psychotic disorder, intellectual disability, or dissociative condition, is said to bear on the capacity to perceive, remember, or report; the child’s competency is in question; the child was interviewed repeatedly or suggestively, and the defense seeks an assessment of susceptibility to suggestion; or the State has alleged psychological injury as an element or aggravating circumstance. Requests for a general assessment of whether the child is truthful are the ones courts most consistently reject, and the ones the science can least support.

What an Examination Cannot Determine

No psychological test, interview technique, or clinical method has been shown to determine whether a child was sexually abused or whether a child’s account is true. Practice guidance for forensic evaluations of children who may have been abused emphasizes neutrality, alternative hypotheses, and documentation because the evaluator’s conclusion is a judgment drawn from limited information, not the output of a validated test (American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 1997). That guidance is dated, but its central caution is consistent with later research.

Professional judgments about whether abuse occurred carry error in both directions. A review of research on substantiation decisions concluded that they lacked adequate reliability and validity, with a combined false-positive and false-negative error rate of at least 24 percent (36 percent under another assumption) (Herman, 2005), and, working from 110 professionals’ own substantiation rates and probability judgments, Herman and Freitas (2010) estimated median false-positive and false-negative rates of 18 percent and 36 percent, with wide individual variation. Those are model-based estimates rather than measurements against known outcomes, but they illustrate that seeing a child does not enable an evaluator to resolve the question the trial exists to decide. The retaining party can also shape how an evaluator weighs evidence. In an online experiment, 159 German participants with prior knowledge of credibility assessment were randomly assigned to be retained by the defense, by the accessory prosecution (the complainant’s side under German procedure), or by the court before reading a written summary of a CSA case. Overall credibility ratings did not differ, but defense-retained participants emphasized evidence undermining the statement more than those retained for the complainant, and a structured method for comparing competing hypotheses did not reduce that tendency (Otzipka & Volbert, 2026). The study used a case summary rather than an examination of a child, so it does not show how retention affects a real examination.

The limit applies to both sides. A defense-retained examiner cannot determine that a child was coached or that an account is false, just as a State-retained examiner cannot determine that abuse occurred. Behaviors and symptoms that occur in both abused and non-abused children cannot prove abuse, and their absence cannot disprove it. An examination framed as an inquiry into credibility promises something no evaluator can deliver, on a question the law reserves to the factfinder.

The Risks of Additional Interviewing

An examination is also an interview, and research on repeated interviewing bears directly on its risks. That research is more nuanced than is sometimes assumed. Repeated interviews that are neutral and soon after the event have not been shown to reduce accuracy and often yield new information (Goodman & Quas, 2008; La Rooy et al., 2010). In a field study of 40 children alleging sexual abuse who were interviewed twice with the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) protocol, about a quarter of the information in the second interview was new, and a larger share of the second interview’s details were central to the allegation (Hershkowitz & Terner, 2007). By contrast, repeated interviews that include suggestive questions, especially with young children and by interviewers who hold a particular belief about what happened, increase false reports (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; Quas et al., 2007).

Three implications follow. First, the effect depends on how the examination is conducted: a neutral, recorded, developmentally appropriate assessment poses less risk than one that probes the allegations with leading or confrontational questions. Second, the child’s statements during the examination become evidence, so an examination meant to test the account can generate new details, inconsistencies, or disclosures that must themselves be evaluated. Third, an examination months or years later assesses the child as the child is now, after intervening conversations, interviews, therapy, and development, and cannot recover how the child remembered events when first questioned; some courts that permit examinations weigh remoteness in time against them for this reason.

Examinations also add to the child’s burden. Research on children’s involvement in criminal proceedings associates repeated involvement, lack of support from a non-offending caregiver, and prolonged proceedings with poorer emotional outcomes for some children (Goodman et al., 1992; Quas & Goodman, 2012). Those studies concern testimony and court involvement rather than examinations, but they explain why courts weigh the child’s welfare and the cumulative number of evaluations.

What an Examination Can Legitimately Assess

An examination can address characteristics of the child that bear on how the child’s statements should be evaluated, and those are the subjects on which a narrowly drawn request is most defensible. Developmental level and language comprehension bear on whether the child could understand the questions in a recorded interview, including questions with complex syntax, abstract terms, or concepts of time and number. Intellectual functioning matters because children with intellectual disability recall less and are more vulnerable to leading questions than children of average ability, although they can give accurate accounts when questioned appropriately (Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003). Competency-related capacities, such as the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, can be assessed, although research shows that children’s performance depends heavily on the form of the question (Evans & Lyon, 2012).

Suggestibility-relevant individual differences can also be assessed, within limits. A synthesis of 69 studies found that language ability and creativity were the cognitive factors most consistently related to suggestibility, and that self-concept, maternal attachment style, and the parent-child relationship showed the highest psychosocial correlations, although only 16% of all correlations were significant (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004), and an updated review concluded that children with intellectual impairment or limited language skills may be particularly vulnerable, while the roles of stress, mental health, and maltreatment history need further study (Klemfuss & Olaguez, 2020). Standardized suggestibility scales for preschool children have been developed for research (Scullin & Ceci, 2001; Scullin et al., 2002), but they have not been validated for deciding whether a particular child’s account was shaped by suggestion. A finding that a child is relatively suggestible describes a vulnerability; whether suggestion occurred depends on what happened in the child’s interviews and conversations, a question about the record rather than the child.

Mental health conditions can bear on perception and memory. Psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations can bear on a witness’s ability to distinguish what happened from what was imagined, and courts have permitted such conditions to be explored when linked in time to the events. Research on dissociation and trauma symptoms is more mixed: in a study of 328 maltreated children aged 3 to 16, higher cortisol and trauma symptoms were associated with more memory errors among children with more dissociative tendencies but not among those with fewer, and children with histories of sexual or physical abuse were more accurate than other children in the sample (Eisen et al., 2007). A diagnosis alone says little about reliability; what matters is whether the condition affected perception or memory of the events at issue. And when the State alleges psychological injury as an element or aggravator, an examination may bear on an issue the State must prove, a ground different in kind from a general attack on credibility.

Alternatives to Examination

Much of what an examination might provide can often be obtained in other ways. Recorded forensic interviews allow an expert to assess the child’s language, the questions asked, the child’s responses, and the sequence in which details emerged, without further contact with the child. Records of evaluations and treatment may be obtainable through the procedures governing privileged and confidential records, discussed in a separate paper in this hub. A defense expert may testify to general research findings and may observe the child’s testimony. And when the State’s expert has examined the child and the defense cannot, a court can limit or exclude the State’s case-specific testimony rather than order a second examination (State v. Horn, 1994).

Each alternative has limits. An expert who has not examined a person should ordinarily refrain from opinions about that person’s psychological characteristics and should explain how the absence of an examination limits any opinion offered (American Psychological Association, 2013). Recorded interviews may not reveal a mental health condition that existed at the time of the events.

The Case For and Against Examinations

The case for permitting examinations in narrow circumstances rests on fairness and accuracy. When the State presents an expert who has examined the child and offers case-specific testimony, the defense may be unable to test it without comparable access, and its own expert is constrained by the professional limits on opinions about persons not examined. When there is specific evidence that a mental condition affected the child’s perception or memory, or when the child’s condition is an element of the offense, the information may matter to an accurate verdict and be unavailable elsewhere. And a limited, recorded, neutral examination by a qualified evaluator may pose less risk than its critics assume, particularly with older children.

The case against rests on the child’s interests and on the limited value of what an examination can show. A compelled examination intrudes on the privacy and dignity of a witness who is not a party, and courts have expressed concern that the prospect of such examinations could deter victims from reporting. Each examination adds to the number of times the child is questioned and can generate new statements of uncertain reliability. Many requests seek, in substance, an opinion on credibility, which no examination can reliably supply. And the information a legitimate examination would provide is often available from recorded interviews and records. An interview analysis by an expert for either side describes the questioning and the order in which details appeared and what research says about those conditions; it gives no opinion on whether the account is true or false or whether abuse occurred.

Both positions rest on the same research. A request tied to a specific capacity and a specific evidentiary need is far more consistent with the science than a general request to determine whether a child is truthful, and the law in most jurisdictions reflects that distinction.

Limits of the Evidence

There is little direct research on court-ordered examinations of child complainants: how often they occur, how they are conducted, how often they yield information unavailable elsewhere, and how they affect children. The evidence is indirect. Research on repeated interviews comes from laboratory studies of benign events and field studies of structured protocols, neither of which replicates an adversarial examination for litigation. Research on individual differences identifies factors associated with suggestibility in groups, with modest and inconsistent effects, and does not establish how suggestible a particular child was in a particular interview. Research on professional judgments about abuse relies on modeling and self-report rather than cases with known outcomes.

No examination can tell a court whether a particular child was abused or whether a particular child’s account is accurate. An examination can describe the child’s present abilities and conditions; it cannot establish, without more, that those abilities or conditions affected the child’s account of the events at issue.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a witness cites the median false-positive and false-negative rates of 18 percent and 36 percent for substantiation judgments (Herman & Freitas, 2010), counsel should ask what exactly was counted: they are model-based estimates from 110 professionals’ own rates and judgments, not measurements against known outcomes. When the finding that about a quarter of the information in a second NICHD interview was new (Hershkowitz & Terner, 2007) is offered to show another interview poses little risk, the question is whether it applies here, since it came from 40 children in structured protocol interviews, not an adversarial examination. When suggestibility research (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004) or preschool suggestibility scales (Scullin & Ceci, 2001) are offered to show that a particular child was suggestible, counsel should ask whether group findings with modest and inconsistent effects apply to this person, because the scales have not been validated for that purpose. And when research on court involvement (Goodman et al., 1992; Quas & Goodman, 2012) is offered to oppose an examination, counsel should ask whether the conclusion follows, since those studies concern testimony, not examinations. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Independent Examinations and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

No federal rule of criminal procedure authorizes a court to order a non-party witness to submit to a psychological examination. In United States v. Ramirez (1989), the Sixth Circuit stated that a court cannot order a non-party witness to be examined by a psychiatrist, that at most it may condition the witness’s testimony on a prior examination, and that any such power should be exercised sparingly, stressing that credibility is for the trier of fact. Other circuits have treated the question as one of discretion. In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scuito (1980), the Third Circuit upheld the denial of a psychiatric examination of a rape complainant, reasoning that the policy of Rule 412, though the rule did not literally apply, weighed against intrusive inquiry into a complainant’s private life.

In United States v. Rouse (1997), in which the defense contended that the children’s accounts were the product of suggestive interviewing, the Eighth Circuit on rehearing upheld the denial of defense requests for psychological examinations of the child witnesses, agreeing that the showing of need was insufficient; the earlier panel opinion, which had reversed partly on this ground, was vacated. In federal prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(9) provides that psychological and psychiatric examinations to assess a child witness’s competency may not be ordered without a showing of compelling need. There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and the Confrontation Clause is generally understood as a trial right rather than a guarantee of pretrial access (Weatherford v. Bursey, 1977; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 1987).

In courts-martial, Rule for Courts-Martial 706 provides for an inquiry into the mental capacity or responsibility of the accused; no corresponding rule provides for compelled examination of a victim or other witness, and no published military appellate decision squarely deciding whether a military judge may order one was located. Defense requests for expert assistance proceed under R.C.M. 703. Article 6b, UCMJ, gives victims the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for their dignity and privacy and permits a victim to petition for a writ of mandamus. Article 46(b), UCMJ, requires defense counsel to request an interview of a victim through trial counsel and permits the victim to have counsel or a victim advocate present. Mil. R. Evid. 513 protects confidential psychotherapist–patient communications, and Mil. R. Evid. 412 limits evidence of a victim’s other sexual behavior. For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including Article 120b offenses, prosecution decisions rest with the Offices of Special Trial Counsel (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022), which affects who retains government experts and responds to defense requests.

No military decision located in this review addresses a compelled examination of a child complainant; the related decisions arose with adult complainants or on other questions. Admission of a rape-trauma expert’s general sentencing testimony in a case with an adult victim was not an abuse of discretion (United States v. Hammond, 1984), and denial of defense sleep-related expert assistance and testimony was upheld, again with an adult complainant, where the defense did not establish the expert-evidence factors (United States v. Blaney, 1999). A witness’s mental condition conducive to hallucination may be explored on cross-examination where a temporal relationship to the events is shown (United States v. Jones, 1998, finding error but no prejudice). Any examining expert, for either side, may not testify that a complainant is credible (United States v. Brooks, 2007; United States v. Mullins, 2010).

Arizona

Before Arizona adopted its Victims’ Bill of Rights, the Arizona Supreme Court held that whether to order a psychiatric examination of a child sex-offense complainant rested in the trial court’s discretion, quoting the California view that an examination might be warranted when the charge had little or no corroboration and the defense raised the effect of the witness’s mental or emotional condition on her veracity, and found no abuse of discretion where the testimony was strongly corroborated (State v. Jerousek, 1979). A.R.S. § 13-4065, discussed below, now restricts examinations ordered to assess credibility.

A.R.S. § 13-4065 now provides that, except on agreement of the parties or as otherwise provided by statute, a court may not require an adult or child victim or witness in a prosecution for an offense under chapter 14 of title 13 (sexual offenses), a dangerous crime against children in the first or second degree, or child abuse to submit to a psychological or psychiatric examination for the purpose of assessing credibility. The statute does not expressly address examinations sought for other purposes. Independently, the Victims’ Bill of Rights gives a victim the right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(5); A.R.S. § 13-4433(A)), and the court of appeals has held that the victims’ rights provisions bar court-ordered defense discovery from an unwilling victim (State v. O’Neil, 1991). A minor victim’s rights may be exercised by a parent or other designated person (A.R.S. § 13-4403(C)).

Arizona courts have held that a defendant’s federal due process rights prevail over a victim’s state constitutional right to refuse discovery in a direct conflict. In State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court (Roper) (1992), the court of appeals held that a victim’s right to refuse discovery of medical records must yield where the records are essential to the defense (172 Ariz. at 236, 240–41), and in R.S. v. Thompson (2021), the Arizona Supreme Court set the showing required for in camera review of a victim’s privileged records: a reasonable possibility, on a specific basis, that they contain information material to the defense or necessary to cross-examine a witness (¶¶ 1, 30). Those decisions concern existing records, and no published Arizona decision applying them to require a victim to submit to an examination was located. Arizona’s limits on expert testimony apply to any examining expert: under State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986), an expert may not opine that a child is truthful or that the child’s behavior is consistent with abuse (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 474–75).

Other Jurisdictions

State courts have taken three broad approaches. Some give trial courts discretion to order an examination on a showing of compelling need. California took this view in Ballard v. Superior Court (1966), later displaced by statute for credibility examinations in sexual assault prosecutions (Cal. Penal Code § 1112). Kansas requires a compelling reason, such as evidence of mental instability, lack of veracity, or similar prior false charges, and rejects fishing expeditions (State v. Gregg, 1979; State v. McIntosh, 2002), and Tennessee recognized the power only for the most compelling reasons (Forbes v. State, 1977). West Virginia requires a compelling need and then weighs the examination’s intrusiveness, the victim’s age, its likely physical and emotional effects, its probative value, its remoteness in time, and the evidence already available to the defendant (State v. Delaney, 1992).

Other courts hold that trial courts lack authority to order an examination. North Carolina has so held even where the victim’s mental condition was an element of the offense, reasoning that compelled examination is a drastic invasion of privacy that could deter reporting, and identifying alternatives such as defense expert review of existing evaluations and exclusion of the State’s psychological evidence (State v. Looney, 1978; State v. Horn, 1994). Virginia reached the same conclusion and left any change to the legislature (Nobrega v. Commonwealth, 2006). A third group, including Arizona, California, and Illinois, restricts examinations by statute (A.R.S. § 13-4065; Cal. Penal Code § 1112; 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/115-7.1). At least one court has held that where the State placed the complainant’s mental condition in issue as an element of the offense, relevance rather than compelling need governed (State v. Garcia, 1980).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports resisting requests that seek, in substance, a determination of whether a child is truthful, because no examination can reliably provide one, and it supports attention to the child’s welfare and to the risk that another interview will add statements whose origins must later be explained. Both parties can reduce the need for an examination when the record includes prompt, recorded forensic interviews under a recognized protocol, few interviews, and timely production of the non-privileged information the defense is entitled to receive. Where the law permits a limited examination, either party can propose conditions that reduce its risks, such as a neutral examiner, recording, a scope that excludes questioning about the allegations, and limits on duration and number.

The research also counsels caution. When the State calls an expert who has examined the child and offers case-specific opinions, the defense’s inability to obtain comparable access is a fairness concern, and a prosecutor relying on an examining expert should anticipate a request for parity or a motion to limit that testimony. Specific evidence of a mental health condition that may have affected the child’s perception or memory bears on the reliability of the State’s case as well as the defense’s. Whatever the examination’s source, an examining expert may not testify that the child was abused or is credible under Lindsey, Moran, Brooks, and Mullins.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports requests that are tied to a specific capacity and a specific evidentiary need: an assessment of language comprehension relevant to the questions in a recorded interview, of intellectual functioning, of a documented mental health condition linked in time to the events, or of a psychological injury the State has alleged. Defense counsel seeking an examination can identify the showing such a request requires: what the recorded interviews and records do and do not reveal, why the information cannot be obtained another way, and how the examination would be conducted to limit its burden on the child. Where an examination is unavailable, the same analysis supports expert review of recorded interviews, requests for records through the governing procedures, general expert testimony, and motions to limit an examining State expert’s case-specific opinions.

The research also counsels caution about overreading. An examination cannot show that a child was coached or that an account is false, and a request framed as an inquiry into credibility is the kind most courts reject and most statutes prohibit. A finding that a child is suggestible, has a diagnosis, or has limited language skills describes a vulnerability, not proof that suggestion or error occurred, and must be connected to specific features of the child’s interviews and statements. An examination may also produce new statements or disclosures, and a defense expert who examines the child is bound by the same limits on credibility testimony as a prosecution expert.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. (1997). Practice parameters for the forensic evaluation of children and adolescents who may have been physically or sexually abused. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 36(10, Suppl.), 37S–56S. https://doi.org/10.1097/00004583-199710001-00004

American Psychological Association. (2013). Specialty guidelines for forensic psychology. American Psychologist, 68(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029889

Bruck, M., & Melnyk, L. (2004). Individual differences in children’s suggestibility: A review and synthesis. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18(8), 947–996. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1070

Eisen, M. L., Goodman, G. S., Qin, J., Davis, S., & Crayton, J. (2007). Maltreated children’s memory: Accuracy, suggestibility, and psychopathology. Developmental Psychology, 43(6), 1275–1294. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.6.1275

Evans, A. D., & Lyon, T. D. (2012). Assessing children’s competency to take the oath in court: The influence of question type on children’s accuracy. Law and Human Behavior, 36(3), 195–205. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0093957

Goodman, G. S., & Quas, J. A. (2008). Repeated interviews and children’s memory: It’s more than just how many. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(6), 386–390. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2008.00611.x

Goodman, G. S., Taub, E. P., Jones, D. P., England, P., Port, L. K., Rudy, L., & Prado, L. (1992). Testifying in criminal court: Emotional effects on child sexual assault victims. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 57(5), 1–142. https://doi.org/10.2307/1166127

Greenberg, S. A., & Shuman, D. W. (1997). Irreconcilable conflict between therapeutic and forensic roles. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 28(1), 50–57. https://doi.org/10.1037/0735-7028.28.1.50

Gudjonsson, G. H., & Henry, L. (2003). Child and adult witnesses with intellectual disability: The importance of suggestibility. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 8(2), 241–252. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532503322363013

Herman, S. (2005). Improving decision making in forensic child sexual abuse evaluations. Law and Human Behavior, 29(1), 87–120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-005-1400-8

Herman, S., & Freitas, T. R. (2010). Error rates in forensic child sexual abuse evaluations. Psychological Injury and Law, 3(2), 133–147. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12207-010-9073-0

Hershkowitz, I., & Terner, A. (2007). The effects of repeated interviewing on children’s forensic statements of sexual abuse. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21(9), 1131–1143. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1319

Klemfuss, J. Z., & Olaguez, A. P. (2020). Individual differences in children’s suggestibility: An updated review. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 29(2), 158–182. https://doi.org/10.1080/10538712.2018.1508108

La Rooy, D., Katz, C., Malloy, L. C., & Lamb, M. E. (2010). Do we need to rethink guidance on repeated interviews? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 16(4), 373–392. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019909

Leichtman, M. D., & Ceci, S. J. (1995). The effects of stereotypes and suggestions on preschoolers’ reports. Developmental Psychology, 31(4), 568–578. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.31.4.568

Otzipka, J., & Volbert, R. (2026). The analysis of competing hypotheses and expert witness testimony: Counteracting adversarial allegiance in witness credibility assessments? PLOS One, 21(4), Article e0346891. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0346891

Quas, J. A., & Goodman, G. S. (2012). Consequences of criminal court involvement for child victims. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 18(3), 392–414. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026146

Quas, J. A., Malloy, L. C., Melinder, A., Goodman, G. S., D’Mello, M., & Schaaf, J. (2007). Developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on young children’s event memory and false reports. Developmental Psychology, 43(4), 823–837. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.4.823

Scullin, M. H., & Ceci, S. J. (2001). A suggestibility scale for children. Personality and Individual Differences, 30(5), 843–856. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00077-5

Scullin, M. H., Kanaya, T., & Ceci, S. J. (2002). Measurement of individual differences in children’s suggestibility across situations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8(4), 233–246. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.8.4.233

Legal Authorities

Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838 (1966).

Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1977).

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1980).

Nobrega v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 508, 628 S.E.2d 922 (2006).

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).

R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 485 P.3d 1068 (2021).

State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), 172 Ariz. 232, 836 P.2d 445 (App. 1992).

State v. Delaney, 187 W. Va. 212, 417 S.E.2d 903 (1992).

State v. Garcia, 94 N.M. 583, 613 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1980).

State v. Gregg, 226 Kan. 481, 602 P.2d 85 (1979).

State v. Horn, 337 N.C. 449, 446 S.E.2d 52 (1994).

State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 590 P.2d 1366 (1979).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Looney, 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612 (1978).

State v. McIntosh, 274 Kan. 939, 58 P.3d 716 (2002).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. O’Neil, 172 Ariz. 180, 836 P.2d 393 (App. 1991).

United States v. Blaney, 50 M.J. 533 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Hammond, 17 M.J. 218 (C.M.A. 1984).

United States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85 (C.A.A.F. 1998).

United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1989).

United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997) (on rehearing, vacating 100 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1996)).

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).

10 U.S.C. § 806b (Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 846 (Article 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 3509(c).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4065.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4403.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4433.

Cal. Penal Code § 1112.

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/115-7.1.

Fed. R. Evid. 412.

Mil. R. Evid. 412.

Mil. R. Evid. 513.

R.C.M. 703.

R.C.M. 706.

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