Snap Shot
- The question: How do Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of Rights and parallel federal and military provisions shape what each side can learn from, and do with, a child complainant?
- What the research shows: In a prospective study, children who testified showed more behavioral disturbance seven months later, especially with repeated testimony, little maternal support, or little corroboration; the differences diminished after cases ended, and testifying was not uniformly harmful. In 120 trial transcripts, open-ended questions were rare from either side.
- What it does not show: Research has not isolated the effect of any specific right, such as refusing a defense interview, on children’s well-being, accuracy, or case outcomes. It cannot say whether a procedure will harm a particular child or whether a refusal reflects anything beyond exercise of the right.
- The law: A victim may refuse a defense interview or deposition (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(5); A.R.S. § 13-4433), a parent may exercise the child’s rights (§ 13-4403), and absent a showing bearing on credibility, a refusal is presumed to reflect the right (Riggs). The rights yield to the accused’s federal constitutional rights (Romley). Federal and military law give narrower rights.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should secure a fully recorded forensic interview and a conflict-free representative while meeting disclosure obligations; defense counsel should evaluate the recorded interview, raise representative conflicts under § 13-4403(D), and keep cross-examination developmentally appropriate.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and underreported, and when an allegation is prosecuted the child is usually both the central witness and, in law, a crime victim. Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of Rights, adopted by the voters in 1990 as article 2, section 2.1 of the Arizona Constitution, and the statutes and court rules that implement it give that child, or a parent or other representative acting for the child, rights that most witnesses do not have: to refuse a defense interview, deposition, or other discovery request; to be present at proceedings; to be heard at specified stages; to a speedy trial; to privacy in identifying and locating information; and to restitution. Federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice provide parallel but narrower rights.
These rights shape what the defense can learn before trial, who speaks for the child, who may be in the courtroom, and what information experts on either side can review. Supporters regard them as protection for children who would otherwise face repeated questioning and contact with the accused’s representatives; critics regard some of them as limits on pretrial investigation and on the ability to test an account before trial. Both perspectives describe real effects, and courts have defined how the rights operate alongside the accused’s constitutional guarantees.
This paper summarizes the research on how children experience the justice process and its limits, describes the practical effects of victims’ rights on interview planning, trial preparation, and expert evaluation, and sets out the Arizona, federal, and military law. Access to a complainant’s counseling, child protective services, school, and medical records is addressed in a separate paper.
How Children Experience Criminal Proceedings
The research most often cited in support of protections for child witnesses is a prospective study in which Goodman et al. (1992) followed 218 children whose sexual abuse cases were referred for prosecution and compared those who testified with matched children who did not. Seven months after testifying, the children who testified showed more behavioral disturbance, especially if they testified more than once, lacked maternal support, or had little corroboration for their accounts; after the cases ended, the differences diminished. Fear of facing the defendant was the concern children most often expressed, and children who appeared more frightened of the defendant were less able to answer the prosecutor’s questions.
Quas et al. (2005) located and interviewed many of the same participants about twelve years later. They reported that long-term outcomes depended less on whether a child had testified than on the combination of legal experiences and case characteristics; poorer outcomes appeared in subgroups, including those who testified repeatedly in cases involving more severe abuse, and participants’ attitudes toward the legal system were related to their experiences, including the outcome of the case. Quas and Goodman (2012) reviewed this and related work and identified features of legal involvement associated with better and worse outcomes for children, including repeated testimony, prolonged proceedings, and the presence or absence of a supportive caregiver.
This research supports policies that limit repeated and unnecessary questioning, expedite cases, and provide support to the child, which are the purposes of several of the rights discussed below. It also shows that testifying is not uniformly harmful, which is relevant when a party argues that a particular child cannot participate in some part of the process.
Questioning, Accuracy, and the Timing of Contact
Because an Arizona child victim may refuse a defense interview, the first time defense counsel asks the child any question may be cross-examination at trial. Transcript research shows that courtroom questioning of children by both sides relies heavily on closed-ended and suggestive questions. In 120 trial transcripts of children aged 6 to 12, Andrews et al. (2015) found that open-ended invitations were rare from either side, that defense questions were more often suggestive, and that suggestive questions produced more self-contradictions than any other question type. Experimental research indicates that cross-examination-style questioning can lead young children to change accurate as well as inaccurate answers (Zajac & Hayne, 2003).
These findings cut in more than one direction. They support limiting how often a child is questioned, particularly by adversarial questioners, to reduce opportunities for error and distress. They also raise the possibility that, without pretrial defense contact, the first questioning of the child by the defense occurs at trial, where question forms are often poorly suited to children, although research has not tested the effect of this sequence. Research on repeated interviewing adds a qualification: additional non-suggestive interviews can yield new, accurate information, while repeated suggestive questioning increases risk (La Rooy et al., 2010). How interviews are conducted matters more than their number.
Practical Effects on Investigation and Evaluation
When a child victim, or a parent exercising the child’s rights, declines a defense interview, the defense ordinarily learns the child’s account from the recorded forensic interview, police reports, the child’s statements to others, any prior testimony, and the State’s disclosure. A recorded forensic interview shows both questions and answers. It serves both sides, preserving the child’s account without additional questioning and providing the record against which suggestibility and contamination concerns are evaluated.
Victims’ rights also shape expert work. A defense-retained psychologist usually cannot interview or test the child without consent, and records may be limited by privilege and by the victim’s right to refuse discovery. Prosecution experts are often in a similar position, because many testify as “cold” educational experts who have not met the child. The American Psychological Association’s Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology (2013) direct practitioners who offer opinions about persons they have not examined to explain the limits of those opinions and their sources. For either side, expert testimony in many child cases is therefore properly confined to general research, analysis of recorded interviews and other documents, and the limits of what those sources show, rather than a clinical conclusion about the child. Court-ordered examinations of child complainants are addressed in a companion paper.
Representatives, Parents, and Conflicts of Interest
Arizona law allows a minor’s parent or other immediate family member to exercise the minor’s rights, but not a family member alleged to have committed the offense (A.R.S. § 13-4403(C)). The representative therefore has significant influence over what the defense can learn and who accompanies the child. The role also intersects with research on disclosure and contamination: parents are often the first people to whom children disclose, are frequently witnesses to the disclosure, and may discuss the allegations with the child in ways that affect later reports. Arizona addresses part of this concern by providing that a representative may not discuss the facts of the case with a minor witness unless the court orders otherwise (§ 13-4403(E)).
Conflicts arise in recurring situations: a parent aligned with an accused partner or relative, a parent with a stake in a related custody dispute, a parent who is both representative and a central fact witness, and a parent whose own conduct is under investigation. The statute addresses them through a court determination of who would best represent the child, considering whether a relative is so affected by the allegation that the relative cannot do so, the person’s willingness and ability to accompany and communicate with the child, any relevant training, and the likelihood that the person will be called as a witness (§ 13-4403(D)). Behavioral research offers no test that identifies which representative will best serve a particular child.
Presence, Support, and Being Heard
Witness-exclusion rules address the concern that a witness who hears other testimony may adjust his or her own, and victims’ rights limit exclusion of victims. Because young children rarely attend trial apart from their own testimony, the issue more often concerns parents who are both representatives and witnesses. Research on co-witness influence supports the general concern (see the paper on co-witness and peer contamination), but how often a victim’s presence alters trial testimony has not been directly measured.
Support during testimony rests on field findings that children’s distress and responsiveness in court vary with fear of the defendant and with caregiver support (Goodman et al., 1992). Research on the effects of support persons and facility dogs on children’s accuracy and on jurors’ perceptions remains limited and is reviewed in the paper on courtroom accommodations. A child’s right to be heard is often exercised through a representative or a written or recorded statement prepared with adult assistance.
Limits of the Evidence
The leading field studies are observational; children were not randomly assigned to testify, to receive support, or to face particular procedures, so differences between groups may reflect case characteristics rather than the effects of the process. The Goodman et al. (1992) and Quas et al. (2005) samples came from one region in the 1980s and 1990s, before recorded forensic interviews, child advocacy centers, and facility dogs were common. Laboratory studies use non-abusive events and simulated proceedings.
Research has not isolated the effect of any specific victims’ right, such as the right to refuse a defense interview, on children’s well-being, on the accuracy of their testimony, or on case outcomes. Arguments that a right protects children, or that it impairs the search for truth, therefore rest on inference from related research rather than direct evidence. No research can tell a court whether a particular child will be harmed by a particular procedure, whether a particular representative has influenced a child’s account, or whether a particular refusal reflects anything other than the exercise of a constitutional right.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When Goodman et al. (1992) is cited to show that testifying harms children, the attorney should ask who was studied and compared with whom: 218 children from one region, not randomly assigned to testify, so group differences may reflect case characteristics, and the same study found that differences diminished after cases ended. When the 120 trial transcripts (Andrews et al., 2015) are cited to show that defense questions were more often suggestive, or that refusal of pretrial interviews leaves testing to trial questioning poorly suited to children, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since the study described question forms, not the effect of any victims’ right. Because research has not isolated the effect of any specific right, ask whether the research applies to this child. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Victims’ Rights and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Crime Victims’ Rights Act gives federal crime victims rights that include reasonable protection from the accused; notice of proceedings; the right not to be excluded from public proceedings unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that the victim’s testimony would be materially altered by hearing other testimony; the right to be reasonably heard at release, plea, and sentencing proceedings; full and timely restitution as provided by law; proceedings free from unreasonable delay; and treatment with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy (18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)). For a victim under eighteen, a legal guardian, family member, or other suitable person appointed by the court may assume the victim’s rights, but the defendant may not be named (§ 3771(e)), and a victim may seek mandamus in the court of appeals (§ 3771(d)(3)). The non-exclusion standard requires more than a possibility that testimony will be altered (In re Mikhel, 2006). The Act contains no right to refuse a defense interview; federal witnesses generally may decline interviews by either side, and criminal depositions are available only in exceptional circumstances (Fed. R. Crim. P. 15). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3509, child witnesses receive confidentiality of identifying information (subsec. (d)), a possible guardian ad litem ((h)), an adult attendant for emotional support while testifying ((i)), and expedited handling ((j)), and restitution is mandatory for sexual exploitation offenses (18 U.S.C. § 2259; Paroline v. United States, 2014).
In courts-martial, Article 6b, UCMJ, provides rights closely modeled on the federal statute, including non-exclusion under the same standard, the right to be reasonably heard at specified hearings, and proceedings free from unreasonable delay (10 U.S.C. § 806b). For a victim under eighteen who is not a member of the armed forces, the military judge may designate a guardian, family member, or other suitable person to assume the victim’s rights, and the accused may not be designated. A victim may petition the Court of Criminal Appeals for mandamus when a ruling violates rights under specified provisions, including Article 6b and Military Rules of Evidence 412, 513, 514, and 615. A victim may decline a defense interview request, which is routed through the victim’s counsel when the victim is represented, and a victim may not be required to testify at a preliminary hearing (Article 32(d)(3), UCMJ).
Eligible victims of sex-related offenses are entitled to representation by Special Victims’ Counsel, with eligibility tied to the legal-assistance rules of 10 U.S.C. § 1044, called Victims’ Legal Counsel in the Navy and Marine Corps (10 U.S.C. § 1044e). Military Rules of Evidence 412 (sexual behavior), 513 (psychotherapist–patient privilege), and 514 (victim advocate–victim privilege) require that the victim be afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend and be heard at the closed hearing, and LRM v. Kastenberg (2013) held that the victim may be heard through counsel on those issues; its jurisdictional holding has since been superseded by Article 6b, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that it lacks jurisdiction over victim petitions (Randolph v. HV, 2017; M.W. v. United States, 2023). For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including offenses under Article 120b, prosecution decisions rest with the Offices of Special Trial Counsel rather than commanders (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022), which affects who communicates with the child and family before trial.
Arizona: Sources and Scope of the Rights
Article 2, section 2.1(A) enumerates twelve rights, including the rights to be present at proceedings the accused has the right to attend (A)(3), to be heard at release, plea, and sentencing proceedings (A)(4), to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant or the defendant’s agents (A)(5), to prompt restitution (A)(8), and to a speedy trial or disposition (A)(10). The definition of “victim” excludes a person in custody for an offense or who is the accused, and exercising a right is not grounds for dismissal or for setting aside a conviction or sentence (art. 2, § 2.1(B), (C)). The rights are implemented by A.R.S. title 13, chapter 40, and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 39; a victim has standing to assert them and may be represented by counsel (A.R.S. § 13-4437; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39).
The Arizona Supreme Court has said that courts must follow the plain language of the Victims’ Bill of Rights and may not create ad hoc exceptions based on the perceived needs of a particular case. In Knapp v. Martone (1992), the mother of murdered children, whom the State had acknowledged would be the co-conspirator under an alternative accessory theory but who had never been charged, was a victim entitled to refuse the defendant’s deposition request, because the only persons the constitutional definition excludes are those in custody for an offense or the accused (170 Ariz. at 238-39). The case concerned a deposition; it did not address records or other discovery, and the constitutional text itself contains the two exclusions. When a victim’s state constitutional rights conflict with the accused’s federal constitutional rights, however, the victim’s rights must yield (State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 1992, 172 Ariz. at 236; Morehart v. Barton, 2011), and the Court has since refined the threshold showings for defense discovery from victims (R.S. v. Thompson, 2021, ¶¶ 1, 30; Draper v. Gentry, 2023), as discussed in the records paper.
Arizona: Interviews, Depositions, and Discovery
A victim may not be compelled to submit to an interview by the defendant, defense counsel, or a defense agent, including on charges arising out of the same occasion (A.R.S. § 13-4433(A)). Defense contact must go through the prosecutor, who must inform the victim of the request and of the right to refuse; a victim who agrees may set reasonable conditions, end the interview, or decline particular questions; and the prosecutor may attend unless the victim objects (§ 13-4433(B)–(E); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39). A victim may likewise refuse a defense deposition, although Rule 15.3 otherwise permits depositions of material witnesses who will not grant an interview. The right protects a victim of the charged offense; a person who witnessed a charged offense but was a victim of a different offense on another occasion may be deposed (Champlin v. Sargeant, 1998). And the right runs against the defense: the Victims’ Bill of Rights right to refuse an interview or deposition runs against requests by the defendant, not the State, so it does not bar a State-requested deposition of a minor victim if Rule 15.3 is satisfied; the court vacated the deposition order and remanded because the basis under Rule 15.3(a) was unclear, and did not finally authorize the deposition (E.L. v. Carman, 2021).
A defense interview of a minor who has agreed to one may proceed only if the prosecutor has at least five days’ actual notice and the child is told that the prosecutor may be present (§ 13-4433(G)). A parent who exercises a minor’s rights may refuse an interview personally, even when the parent is a significant fact witness (Lincoln v. Holt, 2007), and that right does not expire when the child turns eighteen during the case (J.D. v. Hegyi, 2014). On request, the court must appoint a representative for a minor victim (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39). Since 2019 the right to refuse has continued after final disposition, except after an acquittal or a dismissal with prejudice (§ 13-4433(H)).
If the defense comments at trial on a victim’s refusal, the court must instruct the jury that the victim has a constitutional right to refuse (§ 13-4433(F)). In State v. Riggs (1997), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a victim has no blanket right to be free from questioning about a refusal, but that absent a showing that the refusal was made for a reason or in a manner bearing on credibility, the court presumes the victim refused solely in exercise of the constitutional right, and admissibility is governed by ordinary relevance rules.
Arizona: Presence, Support, Being Heard, Speedy Trial, Privacy, and Restitution
A victim has the right to be present throughout all criminal proceedings in which the defendant has the right to be present (A.R.S. § 13-4420), but not at proceedings the defendant has no right to attend (Morehart v. Barton, 2011). Arizona Rule of Evidence 615 does not authorize excluding a crime victim who wishes to be present, and the victims’ rights provisions removed the presumption of prejudice formerly attached to a refusal to exclude a witness (State v. Fulminante, 1999; see also State v. Gonzales, 1995). A victim may be accompanied at interviews, depositions, and proceedings by a parent, relative, or support person unless that person’s testimony is required (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39), and the court must allow an available, certified facility dog to accompany a minor victim while testifying and must instruct the jury on the dog’s role (A.R.S. § 13-4442).
A victim heard under Rule 39 is not subject to cross-examination. The court, prosecutor, and law enforcement must act to secure a speedy trial for the victim; a continuance may be granted only for extraordinary circumstances when indispensable to the interests of justice, after considering the victim’s views, with the reason stated on the record (A.R.S. § 13-4435). A victim may refuse to testify about identifying or locating information absent a compelling need, and agencies must redact such information from records disclosed to the defense, subject to a court order protecting the defendant’s constitutional rights (A.R.S. § 13-4434; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39). Restitution for the victim’s full economic loss is mandatory on conviction (A.R.S. §§ 13-603(C), 13-804).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
Field research associates repeated testimony, prolonged proceedings, and lack of support with poorer outcomes for some children, and Arizona’s rights to refuse defense interviews, to a support person and facility dog, to privacy, and to a speedy trial address those concerns. Prosecutors can make them durable. A fully recorded, well-conducted forensic interview preserves the child’s account without additional questioning and answers much of the concern that a refusal deprives the defense of information. Timely appointment of a representative without a conflict, compliance with the notice and procedural requirements of § 13-4433, and observance of the rule that a representative not discuss the facts with the child reduce later challenges.
The research and the law also counsel caution. The rights belong to the victim, not the State; they yield to the accused’s federal constitutional rights, and a refusal does not relieve the State of its disclosure obligations. When a parent who exercises the child’s rights is also an outcry witness, the parent’s presence in the courtroom, conversations with the child, and role in preparation can become subjects of examination, and § 13-4403(D) and Rule 39 bear on whether someone else should serve. Because testifying is not uniformly harmful, generalized claims about harm to children do not substitute for case-specific showings where the law requires them.
Special Issues for Defense
When a child declines an interview, the recorded forensic interview, prior statements, and disclosure records still allow systematic evaluation of how the account was elicited, and the research on question types, suggestibility, and contamination applies to that record. Defense counsel can ensure that statutory procedures are followed, that a representative’s conflicts are brought to the court’s attention under § 13-4403(D), that a person claimed to be a victim is one for the charged occasion (Champlin), and that discovery and examination requests are made under the governing due-process standards. Where a refusal was made for a reason bearing on bias, Riggs permits the issue to be raised on an adequate showing.
The research and the law also counsel caution. A refusal is presumed to reflect the exercise of a constitutional right and, without more, says nothing about the child’s credibility; comment on it brings a mandatory instruction. Research on cross-examination indicates that leading and complex questioning can produce contradictions that do not show the original account was false, so a cross-examination that is the defense’s first contact with the child is most informative when its questions are clear and developmentally appropriate. A defense expert who has not examined the child must, like a prosecution expert, confine opinions to general research and the documented record and state their limits.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
American Psychological Association. (2013). Specialty guidelines for forensic psychology. American Psychologist, 68(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029889
Andrews, S. J., Lamb, M. E., & Lyon, T. D. (2015). Question types, responsiveness and self-contradictions when prosecutors and defense attorneys question alleged victims of child sexual abuse. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 29(2), 253–261. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3103
Goodman, G. S., Taub, E. P., Jones, D. P., England, P., Port, L. K., Rudy, L., & Prado, L. (1992). Testifying in criminal court: Emotional effects on child sexual assault victims. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 57(5), 1–142. https://doi.org/10.2307/1166127
La Rooy, D., Katz, C., Malloy, L. C., & Lamb, M. E. (2010). Do we need to rethink guidance on repeated interviews? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 16(4), 373–392. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019909
Quas, J. A., & Goodman, G. S. (2012). Consequences of criminal court involvement for child victims. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 18(3), 392–414. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026146
Quas, J. A., Goodman, G. S., Ghetti, S., Alexander, K. W., Edelstein, R., Redlich, A. D., Cordon, I. M., & Jones, D. P. H. (2005). Childhood sexual assault victims: Long-term outcomes after testifying in criminal court. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 70(2), vii–128. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2005.00336.x
Zajac, R., & Hayne, H. (2003). I don’t think that’s what really happened: The effect of cross-examination on the accuracy of children’s reports. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 9(3), 187–195. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.9.3.187
Legal Authorities
Champlin v. Sargeant, 192 Ariz. 371, 965 P.2d 763 (1998).
Draper v. Gentry, 255 Ariz. 417, 532 P.3d 1153 (2023) (No. CR-22-0175-PR, July 31, 2023).
E.L. v. Carman, 500 P.3d 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).
In re Mikhel, 453 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2006).
J.D. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39, 335 P.3d 1118 (2014).
Knapp v. Martone, 170 Ariz. 237, 823 P.2d 685 (1992).
Lincoln v. Holt, 215 Ariz. 21, 156 P.3d 438 (App. 2007).
LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364 (C.A.A.F. 2013), jurisdictional aspects superseded by Article 6b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 806b, as treated in Randolph v. HV, 76 M.J. 27 (C.A.A.F. 2017), and M.W. v. United States, 83 M.J. 361 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
Morehart v. Barton, 226 Ariz. 510 (2011).
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014).
R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 485 P.3d 1068 (2021).
State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 232, 836 P.2d 445 (App. 1992), standard refined by R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 485 P.3d 1068 (2021), and Draper v. Gentry, 255 Ariz. 417, 532 P.3d 1153 (2023).
State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 975 P.2d 75 (1999).
State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 892 P.2d 838 (1995).
State v. Riggs, 189 Ariz. 327, 942 P.2d 1159 (1997).
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).
10 U.S.C. § 806b (Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 832 (Article 32, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 1044e.
18 U.S.C. § 2259.
18 U.S.C. § 3509.
18 U.S.C. § 3771.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-603(C).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-804.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4403.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4420.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4433.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4434.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4435.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4437.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4442.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 15.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.3.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39.
Ariz. R. Evid. 615.
Mil. R. Evid. 412.
Mil. R. Evid. 513.
Mil. R. Evid. 514.
Mil. R. Evid. 615.
Related topic papers: Confrontation, Child Hearsay, and Remote Testimony · Courtroom Accommodations for Child Witnesses · Access to the Complainant’s Counseling, Child Protective Services, School, and Medical Records · Independent Psychological Examinations of Child Complainants · Repeated Interviews of Children · Co-Witness and Peer Contamination
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom