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Courtroom Accommodations for Child Witnesses

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: Do accommodations such as support persons, facility dogs, child-appropriate oaths, and simplified questioning help child witnesses, and do they unfairly influence jurors?
  • What the research shows: A simple promise to tell the truth reduced lying in experiments, and children can identify truths and lies before they can define them. Confusing or cross-examination-style questions led children to change accurate as well as inaccurate answers, and in trial transcripts most claimed inconsistencies involved developmentally difficult questions. In one preliminary mock-jury study, a support person seated beside the child lowered the child’s perceived credibility; in two experiments, a facility dog did not affect verdicts or perceptions.
  • What it does not show: The studies are few and use simulated trials, often without deliberation; research on facility dogs is especially limited. No study shows whether a particular child needs a particular accommodation or how it will affect a particular jury, and a promise does not protect against errors from suggestion or memory change.
  • The law: Courts control questioning under Rule 611(a), and a child’s oath may be tailored (Washington). 18 U.S.C. § 3509, Arizona Rule 39, and A.R.S. § 13-4442 provide for support persons and, in Arizona, facility dogs with a required jury instruction; other states differ on requiring necessity (Tohom, Dye).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should build a child-specific record and keep accommodations unobtrusive, without suggesting the child is a victim or truthful; defense counsel should seek placement out of the jury’s view and limiting instructions, recognizing that an objection framed solely as bolstering may find limited empirical support.

Child sexual abuse (CSA) occurs and is underreported, and when a case is prosecuted the child is often the central witness. Many children whose abuse is later substantiated disclosed late or gradually, and children questioned well can give accurate, detailed accounts. The courtroom, however, was designed for adult witnesses. A child may have to speak in a formal room before strangers and the accused, answer questions in adult legal language, and withstand leading cross-examination. Courts therefore receive requests to adapt the proceeding: a support person seated nearby, a facility dog, a child-appropriate oath, simplified questioning, testimonial aids, breaks, or a partially closed courtroom.

Each accommodation sits between two legitimate interests. The child’s welfare and the accuracy of the testimony favor reducing unnecessary stress and confusion. The accused’s rights to a fair trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to a verdict based on evidence rather than sympathy require that accommodations neither bolster the child’s credibility nor impair legitimate testing of the account.

This paper reviews research on courtroom stress, support persons, facility dogs, oaths, questioning and its judicial control (including the English intermediary system), questioning aids, and juror perceptions, then the limits of the evidence and the law. Remote testimony and its constitutional standard are addressed in Confrontation, Child Hearsay, and Remote Testimony, and competency and taint in Taint Hearings and Child Witness Competency; this paper refers to them only where they bear on the accommodations discussed here.

Why Accommodations Are Requested: Stress and Communication in Court

Research on children who testify has consistently found that testifying is stressful for many of them and that fear of facing the defendant is a common concern (Goodman et al., 1992); that work is summarized in the Confrontation paper. A separate question is whether the setting itself affects what children say. Nathanson and Saywitz (2003) staged an event involving bodily touch with 81 children aged 8 to 10 and questioned them two weeks later, half in a mock courtroom and half in a small private room. Children questioned in the courtroom showed poorer memory performance and physiological signs of stress. The event was mild and the setting simulated, but the study supports the premise that the environment, not only the questions, can affect a child’s account.

The American Academy of Pediatrics has recommended measures to reduce the secondary traumatization of child witnesses (Pantell & Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, 2017); such statements describe professional consensus on good practice, not evidence that a particular accommodation improves accuracy.

Support Persons and Comfort Items

The most common accommodation is a support person, such as a parent, relative, or advocate, seated near the child. Federal law permits an adult attendant to remain close to the child, to hold the child’s hand, or, in the court’s discretion, to have the child sit on the attendant’s lap, but bars the attendant from answering for or prompting the child and requires that the attendant’s image be recorded while the child testifies (18 U.S.C. § 3509(i)). Arizona and many other states have comparable provisions.

The effect on jurors has been tested only recently, and the results counsel attention to how support is arranged. McAuliff et al. (2015) showed 200 jury-eligible community members a recording of an 11-year-old girl’s simulated testimony, with or without a female support person seated beside her. With the support person present, participants rated the child as less accurate and trustworthy and the defendant as less likely to be guilty, and they tended to believe the support person had probably coached the child. The effect was mediated by how far the child’s behavior violated participants’ expectations. The authors called the findings preliminary and suggested alternative seating if they are replicated. The study used one child actor and measured perceptions rather than accuracy, but it shows that an accommodation can affect the factfinder in unexpected directions.

In two mock-trial experiments, Burd and McQuiston (2019) found that a teddy bear held by a child witness was prejudicial to the defendant in one experiment but not the other, so the effect of comfort items on jurors has not been established in either direction.

Facility Dogs

Facility dogs are trained animals, typically graduates of an accredited assistance-dog organization, placed with a prosecutor’s office, child advocacy center, or court; they differ from volunteer-handled therapy dogs and from service dogs. Their courtroom use has grown, and many state appellate courts have addressed it.

The research base is thin. Studies of dogs’ effects on children’s stress come largely from forensic-interview settings (Krause-Parello et al., 2018), and research has not established whether a dog changes the accuracy, completeness, or consistency of courtroom testimony. In Burd and McQuiston’s (2019) two experiments, a facility dog did not affect verdicts, verdict confidence, sentencing, or perceptions of the child. Those simulated-trial results do not resolve the concern, voiced in some appellate opinions, that a dog is a powerful symbol whose effect an instruction may not cure.

Oaths, Competency Questions, and Truth Promises

Every witness must declare by oath or affirmation that he or she will testify truthfully. Traditional competency questioning, which asks a child to define truth and lies, is reviewed in the Taint Hearings and Child Witness Competency paper. Lyon and Saywitz (1999) found that young maltreated children could identify statements as truths or lies before they could define the terms, so definitional questions underestimate what children understand. Among 183 children aged 4 to 6, even the youngest performed at ceiling when asked simply to accept or reject true and false statements, and maltreated children appeared, if anything, more sensitive to the immorality of lying (Lyon et al., 2010).

Research suggests that the form of the oath matters more than the child’s ability to explain it. Promising to tell the truth reduced lying among young children who had transgressed (Talwar et al., 2002), and among 5- to 7-year-old maltreated children a promise increased true disclosures of a minor transgression without increasing false reports (Lyon & Dorado, 2008). In actual CSA trials, definitional and “do you know” competency questions produced the most errors, and the authors recommended a child-friendly version of the oath (Evans & Lyon, 2012).

These findings support a child-appropriate oath; they do not show that a child who takes one will be accurate. A promise reduces deliberate falsehood in experiments, but it does not protect against errors produced by suggestive questioning, misunderstanding, or memory change.

Questioning Children in Court

U.S. transcript studies show that open-ended questions are rare from either side and that suggestive questions produce more self-contradictions (Andrews et al., 2015, described in the Confrontation paper). In matched acquittals and convictions, attorneys who used more suggestive questions, including declarative statements inviting confirmation, were more likely to prevail, although suggestive questions elicited less new information than open-ended or closed-ended ones (Klemfuss et al., 2014). In 46 CSA trial transcripts, the complexity of defense questions predicted verdicts, but in the direction opposite to the authors’ prediction: more complex defense questioning was associated with conviction (Evans et al., 2009).

Two recent U.S. transcript studies locate specific problems. In 156 CSA trials with witnesses aged 5 to 9, 84% of attorneys’ before/after questions left the time interval unspecified, 78% were option-posing, and 84% of the children’s answers to them were unelaborated, which makes it hard to know what the child meant (Szojka et al., 2026a). In 120 prosecutions with witnesses aged 6 to 12, attorneys impeached children with allegedly inconsistent prior statements in 96 cases; in 11% the statements were not in fact inconsistent, and in 94% of the rest the questioning involved at least one developmental difficulty, most often time and number, distinguishing among incidents, sexual terminology, or “any” and “ever” questions, with suggestive tag questions in 45% (Sullivan et al., 2026). Neither study determined which answers were accurate, and an inconsistency produced by a difficult question may still bear on the account.

Studies from New Zealand describe heavy reliance on leading and complex questions in cross-examining children (Zajac et al., 2003; Hanna et al., 2012; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). Comparing Australian CSA trials from the 1950s with contemporary cases, Zajac et al. (2018) found that leading questions still predominated, that contemporary questions were less often open-ended and more often complex, and that contemporary child complainants were asked about three times as many cross-examination questions.

Experimental research explains why question form matters to both sides. In analogue studies, cross-examination-style questioning led children to change earlier answers whether those answers had been accurate or inaccurate (Zajac & Hayne, 2003, 2006; Zajac et al., 2012). Among 185 children aged 5 to 6 and 9 to 10, accuracy declined at a second interview regardless of format, but declined most after a cross-examination-style interview (O’Neill & Zajac, 2013). Children can also be taught to signal that they do not understand a question rather than guess (Saywitz et al., 1999). The conclusions run in both directions: confusing or credibility-challenging questions can lead children to abandon accurate answers, and suggestive questions on direct examination or in a forensic interview can lead them to adopt inaccurate ones. Short, concrete, single-idea questions free of negatives and legal terms produce more informative answers for whichever party asks them.

Judicial Control and the English Intermediary Model

England and Wales have gone furthest in structuring judicial control of children’s questioning. Under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, eligible young and vulnerable witnesses may receive special measures, including examination through an intermediary and pre-recorded cross-examination. Registered intermediaries, communication specialists aligned with neither party, assess the witness, advise the court and counsel at a “ground rules hearing” before testimony, and may intervene when a question is likely to be misunderstood. Intermediaries have been used there since 2004, and versions of the model operate in Northern Ireland and New South Wales; a comparative review found significant differences among the schemes and a pressing need for research on the role’s efficacy (Cooper & Mattison, 2017). In interviews with 182 young witnesses aged 5 to 19 in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, Plotnikoff and Woolfson (2009) found that 65% described problems with questioning, such as questions they did not understand or that were too complex or too fast, and 58% said the defense lawyer had tried to put words in their mouth; the intermediary special measure was rarely used. These are the witnesses’ own reports, and the researchers could not identify any young defense witnesses to interview. A later book by the same authors describes the intermediary role’s development in practice (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2015).

English appellate courts have endorsed active judicial management. In R v Barker (2010), concerning a very young child, the Court of Appeal stated that advocates must adapt questioning to the child’s developmental needs, an approach R v Lubemba later treated as witness-specific for young children; in Lubemba (2014), the court held that a ground rules hearing is expected in every case with a vulnerable witness, that limits on questioning must be clearly defined there, and that the judge must intervene when questioning is confusing. The editors and contributors of one edited volume argue that standard cross-examination often confuses or intimidates children rather than eliciting accurate testimony and, drawing on procedures in Western Australia, New Zealand, Austria, and Norway, that courts can safeguard defendants’ rights while protecting young witnesses (Spencer & Lamb, 2012). The opposing concern is that limits on questioning can impair the defense’s ability to test a child’s account, and whether cross-examination can be adapted for children without that cost remains debated. American courts have not adopted an intermediary system; the comparable tool is the trial judge’s control of questioning under Rule 611(a).

Questioning Aids, Recesses, and the Courtroom Setting

Federal law permits a child to use anatomical dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins, or other demonstrative devices the court considers appropriate (18 U.S.C. § 3509(l)). The research on these aids, whose effects depend heavily on the child’s age and how they are used, is reviewed in Anatomical Dolls, Drawings, and Other Interview Aids; the same cautions apply at trial, where an aid can elicit as well as clarify.

Recesses, scheduling, limits on session length, and pretrial courtroom visits are within a court’s ordinary authority. Controlled research on these measures is sparse; their justification rests on the general findings about stress and on the child’s needs as shown on the record. Federal law also permits closing the courtroom to persons without a direct interest during a child’s testimony, on a finding that open testimony would cause substantial psychological harm or prevent effective communication, with any closure narrowly tailored (18 U.S.C. § 3509(e)).

How Accommodations Affect Jurors

The central legal objection to accommodations is that they may signal that the child is a genuine victim. In a survey of 261 people reporting for jury duty, participants expected a child testifying live to be more nervous and tearful, and less confident and fluent, than a child using an alternative form of testimony, and believed live testimony made it easiest to judge truthfulness (McAuliff & Kovera, 2012). Jurors may therefore judge a child negatively when an accommodation does not produce the behavior they expect, consistent with the support-person findings above; closed-circuit research, described in the Confrontation paper, likewise found no direct bias against the defendant but a modest reduction in how favorably jurors viewed the child.

On present evidence, the concern that accommodations bolster children has not been shown to be general, and some accommodations may instead reduce perceived credibility. Neither conclusion is firm, because the studies are few, use simulated trials, and rarely include deliberation. Juror beliefs about child witnesses are treated more fully in What Jurors Understand About Child Witnesses and in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource.

Limits of the Evidence

Most research on accommodations uses staged, non-abusive events, simulated courtrooms, and mock jurors who know no one will be punished; juror studies typically present one child and one accommodation, often without deliberation. Transcript studies cannot determine which answers were accurate. Research on facility dogs is especially limited.

No study can tell a court whether a particular child needs a particular accommodation, whether it will help that child testify more completely or accurately, or how it will affect a particular jury. Those are case-specific determinations that depend on evidence about the child and on the court’s own observations. Group-level research can inform that record; it cannot substitute for it.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the prosecution cites Nathanson and Saywitz (2003) to support an accommodation, counsel should ask who was studied and whether the finding applies to this child, since 81 children aged 8 to 10 were questioned about a mild staged event in a simulated courtroom. When a witness reports that a facility dog did not affect verdicts or perceptions (Burd & McQuiston, 2019), counsel should ask how much evidence the finding rests on, because it comes from two mock-trial experiments and research on facility dogs remains especially limited. When the defense cites the experiment in which a teddy bear was prejudicial to the defendant, counsel should ask whether the finding has held up, since the same authors did not find the effect in their second experiment. When either side relies on the support-person finding (McAuliff et al., 2015), counsel should ask what was counted and whether it has been replicated, because the study used one child actor, measured perceptions rather than accuracy, and was described by its authors as preliminary. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Courtroom Accommodations and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) directs the court to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses so as to make those procedures effective for determining the truth, avoid wasting time, and protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment, and Rule 611(c) permits leading questions on direct examination when necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Rule 603 requires an oath or affirmation in a form designed to impress the duty to testify truthfully on the witness’s conscience, without prescribing a formula.

In federal prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 3509 provides child-specific measures for persons under 18 who are alleged victims of abuse or exploitation or witnesses to a crime against another: a presumption of competence and limits on competency examinations (§ 3509(c)); courtroom closure (§ 3509(e)); a guardian ad litem (§ 3509(h)); an adult attendant (§ 3509(i)); expedited trial (§ 3509(j)); and testimonial aids (§ 3509(l)). Under Coy v. Iowa (1988), a screen blocking the child’s view of the defendant without an individualized finding violates the Confrontation Clause.

In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 611(a) and (c) parallel the federal rule, and Military Rule of Evidence 611(d) and Rule for Courts-Martial 914A govern remote live testimony of a child. In United States v. Washington (2006), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Military Rule of Evidence 603 requires no special formula, that a child’s oath must be meaningful to the child and may be tailored to emphasize honesty without explaining perjury, and that failing to administer any oath was obvious error but not prejudicial where the child showed she understood her duty and later affirmed that her testimony was true. Victims have rights under Article 6b, UCMJ, and may be represented by Special Victims’ Counsel (10 U.S.C. § 1044e). For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including Article 120b offenses, the Offices of Special Trial Counsel prosecute and seek accommodations for the government. No published decision of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces on facility dogs was located.

Arizona

The Arizona Constitution guarantees victims the right to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse throughout the criminal justice process (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(1)). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 39 gives a victim the right to be accompanied at any interview, deposition, or criminal proceeding by a parent or other relative, or by an appropriate support person the victim names, including a caseworker or advocate, unless that person’s testimony is required in the case, and, if eligible, the right to a facility dog when testifying. On request, the court must appoint a representative for a minor victim (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39; A.R.S. § 13-4403).

Enacted in 2016, A.R.S. § 13-4442 provides that the court shall allow a victim under eighteen to have a facility dog, if one is available, accompany the victim while testifying, and may allow an adult victim or any witness to use one. The requesting party must give notice of the dog’s certification and insurance, and the court must instruct the jury on the dog’s role and that it is a trained animal. A parallel provision applies in juvenile court (A.R.S. § 8-422). In State v. Millis (2017), decided without the statute, which took effect while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals upheld a ruling allowing a facility dog to sit with an adult witness, the infant victim’s mother, in the gallery rather than at the witness stand. It found no abuse of discretion despite arguments that Rule 39’s reference to a support “person” excluded a dog and that the dog signaled that the witness was an innocent victim, noting that the trial court had weighed the witness’s reduced stress against possible prejudice (242 Ariz. 33, ¶¶ 28–33).

Arizona Rules of Evidence 603 and 611 track the federal rules. Recorded and remote testimony of minors (A.R.S. §§ 13-4251 to 13-4253) and limits on a self-represented defendant’s personal cross-examination of a child (State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla, 2016) are discussed in the Confrontation paper.

Other State Decisions on Facility Dogs

Most appellate decisions have upheld facility or comfort dogs, but they differ on the showing required. In People v. Tohom (2013), a New York appellate court upheld a comfort dog for a 15-year-old complainant with posttraumatic stress disorder under a state statute, holding that no necessity finding was required and relying on the child’s therapist’s testimony and a limiting instruction. In State v. Dye (2013), the Washington Supreme Court upheld a facility dog for an adult witness with developmental disabilities but required the proponent to show necessity; a concurring justice called the dog a powerful symbol and urged counterbalancing measures, such as keeping it out of the jury’s view. California courts have held that a dog is not a “person” under the state’s support-person statute (People v. Spence, 2012) and that a court may permit one under its general authority over witness examination, without an individualized necessity showing, when steps are taken to minimize prejudice (People v. Chenault, 2014). The Connecticut Supreme Court held that trial courts have inherent discretion to permit a dog after balancing its benefit to the witness against prejudice, without a compelling-need requirement (State v. Devon D., 2016). Decisions upholding dogs commonly rest on a record of need, minimal visibility to the jury, and a limiting instruction.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports accommodations that reduce stress and confusion: a child-appropriate oath built on a simple promise, competency questions asking the child to identify true and false statements rather than define them, short and concrete questions, breaks, and courtroom preparation. Prosecutors can support accommodations on appeal by building a child-specific record, through a parent, advocate, or clinician who knows the child; by complying with the notice requirements of A.R.S. § 13-4442 and requesting the required instruction; by keeping a support person or dog unobtrusive and bringing them in and out outside the jury’s presence; and by ensuring that a support person is not a witness and does not prompt the child. When a child is impeached with a prior statement, the transcript research supports examining whether the earlier or later question involved time, number, separate incidents, or “any” and “ever” wording before treating the difference as significant.

The research also counsels caution. One preliminary mock-jury study (McAuliff et al., 2015; 200 jury-eligible participants, one child actor) found that a support person seated beside the child lowered the child’s perceived accuracy and trustworthiness, so the most visible accommodation is not necessarily the most helpful. A promise to tell the truth does not make testimony accurate, and an accommodation should not be described to the jury in terms suggesting that the child is a victim or is truthful. A statutory entitlement does not relieve the court of its duty to guard against prejudice.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports insisting that accommodations be justified by a record about the particular child and limited to that child’s needs; where a statute confers an entitlement, as Arizona’s does for facility dogs, the focus shifts to placement and the required instruction. Defense counsel can request measures that reduce prejudice: placing a support person or dog out of the jury’s direct view, recording the adult attendant’s image as § 3509(i) requires, a limiting instruction when the accommodation first appears and again at the close of the case, and confirmation that a support person is not a witness. Many appellate decisions rejecting challenges rest on the absence of a timely objection or of record evidence of prejudice, so objections and any observed prompting belong on the record.

The research also counsels caution about overreading. Juror studies to date have not shown that facility dogs prejudice defendants, and some accommodations may reduce rather than increase a child’s credibility, so an objection framed solely as bolstering may find limited empirical support. Confusing, complex, or credibility-challenging questions lead children to change accurate as well as inaccurate answers, and complex defense questioning has been associated with conviction rather than acquittal; contradictions produced that way may not show that the original account was false, and factfinders may weigh them accordingly. In one transcript study, about one in ten claimed prior inconsistencies were not inconsistent at all (Sullivan et al., 2026), so confirming the inconsistency, and the clarity of both questions, before impeaching protects its force. Clear, single-idea questions, including questions testing the source of the child’s account, are generally the most effective, and limits on the form of questions, as English practice illustrates, can coexist with full testing of the substance.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

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Legal Authorities

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).

People v. Chenault, 227 Cal. App. 4th 1503, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (2014).

People v. Spence, 212 Cal. App. 4th 478, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374 (2012).

People v. Tohom, 109 A.D.3d 253, 969 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 2013).

R v Barker [2010] EWCA Crim 4.

R v Lubemba; R v JP [2014] EWCA Crim 2064.

State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla, 239 Ariz. 314, 371 P.3d 642 (App. 2016).

State v. Devon D., 321 Conn. 656, 138 A.3d 849 (2016).

State v. Dye, 178 Wash. 2d 541, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013).

State v. Millis, 242 Ariz. 33, 391 P.3d 1225 (App. 2017).

United States v. Washington, 63 M.J. 418 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.

10 U.S.C. § 806b (Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 1044e.

18 U.S.C. § 3509.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-422.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4403.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4442.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4251 to 13-4253.

Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, c. 23 (England and Wales).

Fed. R. Evid. 603, 611.

Ariz. R. Evid. 603, 611.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39.

Mil. R. Evid. 603, 611.

R.C.M. 914A.

Related topic papers: Confrontation, Child Hearsay, and Remote Testimony · Taint Hearings and Child Witness Competency · What Jurors Understand About Child Witnesses · Interviewing Young Children: Development and Language Comprehension · Children with Intellectual Disabilities as Witnesses · Anatomical Dolls, Drawings, and Other Interview Aids · Arizona Victims’ Rights and Child Witnesses · Adolescent Complainants

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom