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Military Justice Changes for Child Sex Offenses: Special Trial Counsel, Sentencing, and Expert Requests

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How have the 2021–2025 military justice reforms changed who prosecutes and sentences child sex offense courts-martial, and how defense experts are obtained?
  • What changed: Offices of Special Trial Counsel now have exclusive authority over covered offenses, including Article 120b and the Article 134 child pornography offense, to refer charges and make plea agreements. A military judge, not members, sentences in non-capital cases within published parameters unless specific facts stated in writing warrant a departure. Members are randomly selected from a convening-authority pool, and defense expert requests may go directly to the military judge (ex parte after referral under one trial judiciary’s rules).
  • Who it affects: The covered-offense and sentencing provisions apply to offenses committed after December 27, 2023 (special trial counsel may elect to take earlier ones); a conviction that includes any earlier offense is sentenced under the prior rules, so a case alleging conduct over several years may be governed partly by each system.
  • Open questions: Published data cannot yet show whether the reforms changed outcomes in child cases, and the sentencing parameters rest on limited historical data and will continue to evolve. The necessity standard for expert assistance is unchanged (Garries, Gonzalez, Bresnahan, Freeman), and a substitute expert must be adequate in fact (McAllister).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should establish offense dates, give timely expert notice, and avoid arguing outcomes to show the reforms succeed; defense counsel should test covered-offense status and dates and show why counsel cannot do an expert’s work alone, without claiming unsupported systemic effects.

Child sexual abuse (CSA) occurs and is underreported, many children whose abuse is later substantiated delay or disclose incrementally, and courts-martial for offenses under Article 120b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), child pornography offenses, and related charges often turn on a child’s account, forensic interviews, and expert testimony. Between 2021 and 2025, Congress and the President changed who decides whether those cases go to trial, who imposes sentence, how sentences are determined, how court-martial members are selected, and how defense requests for expert assistance are handled. Commentators have described the changes as a fundamental restructuring of the military justice system (Schlueter & Schenck, 2023).

The reforms reach court in practical ways. A charge sheet now raises threshold questions about whether an offense is a “covered offense” and when it occurred; plea negotiations run through a different office; a military judge rather than the members imposes sentence, within published parameters; and the procedure for obtaining a defense expert has changed. Some of these rules apply only to offenses committed after December 27, 2023, so a case involving conduct over several years may be governed partly by the old system and partly by the new.

This paper summarizes the Offices of Special Trial Counsel and the offenses they control, the sentencing reforms, the current procedure for expert assistance, related changes to member selection, privileges, and victims’ rights, and what published data can and cannot show about outcomes. It then sets out the limits of the evidence, the governing law, and recurring issues for each side. It is primarily a legal paper; the substantive science of child interviews, memory, and disclosure is addressed in the other papers in this hub.

The Offices of Special Trial Counsel

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY2022 NDAA), enacted December 27, 2021, created special trial counsel (Article 24a, UCMJ) and directed each service to establish a dedicated office to supervise them (10 U.S.C. § 1044f). Each office is headed by a lead special trial counsel in grade O-7 or higher who reports directly to the service Secretary without intervening authority, and its personnel must be independent of the chains of command of both the complainant and the accused. Commanders of the complainant and the accused may provide input on disposition, but that input does not bind special trial counsel.

Special trial counsel have exclusive authority to determine whether a reported offense is a covered offense and, for covered offenses, exclusive authority to refer charges to a special or general court-martial, to withdraw or dismiss charges, to enter into plea agreements, and to determine whether an authorized rehearing is impracticable. A referral decision by special trial counsel binds the convening authority. If special trial counsel decline to prefer or refer charges, a commander may dispose of the matter through other means, but may not refer a covered offense to a special or general court-martial. Special trial counsel may also take authority over known and related offenses, which matters when a child abuse allegation is charged alongside obstruction, false official statements, or other misconduct.

Article 1(17), UCMJ, defines the covered offenses. As now codified, they include offenses under Articles 117a (wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images), 118 (murder), 119 (manslaughter), 119a, 120, 120a, 120b (rape and sexual assault of a child and sexual abuse of a child), 120c, 125 (kidnapping), 128b (domestic violence), 130 (stalking), and 132 (retaliation); the standalone Article 134 offense of child pornography; and attempts, conspiracies, and solicitations to commit them. The FY2023 NDAA added Articles 119a and 120a to the list effective with the original provisions, and added the standalone Article 134 offense of sexual harassment, when a formal complaint is made and substantiated, for offenses committed after January 1, 2025. Executive Order 14130 also revised the definitions for the Article 134 child pornography offense: a “minor” is still a person under 18, but for obscene depictions of what appears to be a minor the minor need not actually exist; a “visual depiction” now includes images “made, adapted, modified, or generated by any means”; and lascivious exhibition now includes the anus (MCM pt. IV, ¶ 95.c, as amended, 89 Fed. Reg. at 105375-76).

The dividing line in time is important in child cases. The covered-offense provisions apply to offenses committed after December 27, 2023. The FY2024 NDAA amended Article 24a to allow special trial counsel, in their sole discretion, to exercise authority over the same offenses committed earlier, and the FY2025 NDAA extended that authority to sexual harassment committed before January 1, 2025. Executive Order 14103 (July 28, 2023) implemented these provisions in the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), and the offices reached full operational capability on December 27, 2023 (Department of Defense, 2025a). For an offense that predates the effective date and over which special trial counsel have not exercised authority, the traditional command-based process continues to apply.

Sentencing Reform: Military Judge Sentencing and Parameters

Section 539E of the FY2022 NDAA made the military judge the sentencing authority in all non-capital general and special courts-martial (Article 53(b), UCMJ). An accused may no longer elect sentencing by members. In capital cases the members decide whether the sentence will be death or life without eligibility for parole, or return the matter to the military judge. These changes apply to sentences adjudged in cases in which all findings of guilty are for offenses that occurred after December 27, 2023. A conviction that includes any earlier offense is sentenced under the prior rules, which in a child case alleging conduct across several years can determine whether the members or the judge sentence and whether parameters apply.

The same section directed the President to prescribe sentencing parameters and criteria. Article 56(c) now requires the military judge to sentence within the applicable parameter for each offense unless the judge finds specific facts that warrant a sentence outside it and states the factual basis in writing. For offenses without a parameter, the judge must consider the applicable sentencing criteria. Executive Order 14103 added Appendix 12B (the offense categories and their confinement ranges), Appendix 12C (assignment of offenses to categories), and Appendix 12D (sentencing criteria) to the MCM, effective December 27, 2023, and amended Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1002 to implement them. The parameters govern confinement only. The judge also specifies confinement for each offense and whether terms run concurrently or consecutively; Executive Order 14130 (December 20, 2024) restored the concurrency guidance, which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces describes as redesignated R.C.M. 1002(b)(2)(B), including a requirement that terms run concurrently for specifications involving the same victim and the same act or transaction (United States v. Batres, No. 25-0019 (C.A.A.F. 2025), n.3). The 2023 version of R.C.M. 1002 had omitted that language, and decisions applying the earlier version cite it as R.C.M. 1002(d)(2)(B).

Three further features bear on Article 120b cases. First, Article 56(b) continues to require dismissal or a dishonorable discharge for rape of a child and sexual assault of a child under Article 120b(a) and (b), and for attempts and conspiracies to commit them. Second, the United States may appeal a sentence that violates the law, results from an incorrect application of a parameter, or is plainly unreasonable (Article 56(d)). Third, for covered offenses, plea agreements are made between special trial counsel and the accused (Article 53a(a)(3)), and a military judge may reject a plea agreement whose proposed sentence lies outside the applicable parameter if the sentence is plainly unreasonable (Article 53a(b)). Practitioners should confirm the category assigned to each charged offense in the current Appendix 12C, because the parameters have been and will continue to be revised.

Expert Assistance After the Reforms

Military due process entitles an accused to expert assistance at government expense when it is necessary for an adequate defense (United States v. Garries, 1986), a principle rooted in Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) and in Article 46’s guarantee of equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and evidence. The test for necessity is longstanding: the defense must show a reasonable probability both that an expert would be of assistance and that denial would result in a fundamentally unfair trial, which requires explaining why the assistance is needed, what it would accomplish for the accused, and why defense counsel cannot gather and present the evidence themselves (United States v. Gonzalez, 1994; United States v. Bresnahan, 2005). A mere possibility of assistance is not enough. In United States v. Freeman (2008), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld denial of a consultant on police interrogation techniques because the defense had not shown why counsel could not acquire the needed knowledge themselves. The accused is entitled to competent assistance, not to a particular expert, but an adequate substitute must actually be adequate (United States v. McAllister, 2001). An expert consultant assigned to the defense is the lawyer’s representative under Military Rule of Evidence 502, so that trial counsel’s interview of the consultant violated the privilege, although the error was not prejudicial, in a court-martial that did not involve a sex offense (United States v. Turner, 1989).

The procedure changed with the 2023 and 2024 amendments. Under the earlier rule, the defense first submitted a request to the convening authority and could renew it before the military judge only after denial. The amendments implemented by Executive Order 14103 allow, but no longer require, the defense to seek funding from the convening authority, and expand the requests that may be presented to the military judge; the Navy-Marine Corps trial judiciary’s rules of court, for example, provide that after referral a defense request for an expert consultant may be raised before the military judge ex parte (W. Jud. Cir. R. 8.2b). Executive Order 14130 amended R.C.M. 703(d)(2)(B) to provide that when the military judge grants a defense motion for an expert witness or consultant, the expert or an adequate substitute is provided in accordance with service regulations. The services have also created defense-side approval channels; the Department of the Air Force, for example, reports that its Trial Defense Division now independently authorizes defense experts through designated Defense Expert Authorization Officials, with approved requests funded by the general court-martial convening authority (Department of the Air Force, 2025).

Special trial counsel are the opposing party in a covered-offense case, not the decision-maker on defense expert requests, and the commander’s administrative roles, including funding through the convening authority, continue. The government’s own experts in a covered-offense case are identified and prepared by special trial counsel, and the 2023 amendments added a requirement that both parties give notice of expert witnesses. The amendments changed the procedure; the necessity standard itself comes from the case law described above, and a request is strongest when it explains, for the specific case, what the expert will review and why counsel cannot do it alone, such as analyzing recorded forensic interviews, explaining suggestibility or memory research, addressing medical findings, or, at sentencing, conducting a psychosexual risk evaluation.

Members, Privileges, and Victims’ Rights

Section 543 of the FY2023 NDAA amended Article 25(e) to require that members be selected under presidential regulations for the randomized selection of qualified personnel to the maximum extent practicable, effective December 23, 2024. Executive Order 14130 implemented the requirement by amending R.C.M. 503(a)(1) to require the convening authority to detail a minimum pool, generally 16 members for a non-capital general court-martial and 8 for a special court-martial, from which members are randomly selected under R.C.M. 911. The convening authority still chooses the pool using the Article 25 criteria. Because the military judge now sentences in non-capital cases, the members decide findings only. Research on how members and jurors approach CSA allegations is discussed in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource.

Victims’ rights and privileges were also adjusted. Article 6b gives a victim the rights, among others, to be reasonably protected from the accused, to receive notice of proceedings, to be reasonably heard at sentencing, to confer with government counsel, and to be informed of plea agreements; for a victim under 18 who is not a servicemember, a guardian, family member, or other suitable person designated by the military judge may assume those rights, but not the accused. A victim may petition the Court of Criminal Appeals for mandamus to enforce Military Rules of Evidence 412, 513, 514, and 615. Executive Order 14130 amended Rule 513(a) to state that the psychotherapist-patient privilege covers records of confidential communications, an amendment adopted after United States v. Mellette (2022) held that diagnoses and treatments are not privileged merely because they appear in a mental health record, and also revised the procedures for subpoenas seeking a victim’s personal or confidential information, requiring timely notice to any victim (not only one named in a specification) and allowing that victim to request relief from the military judge (R.C.M. 703(g)(3)(C)(ii), (I), as amended, 89 Fed. Reg. at 105357). Access to a child’s counseling and other records is addressed in a separate paper in this hub.

What the Data Show About Outcomes

Whether the reforms have changed prosecution outcomes in child cases cannot yet be answered from published data. The Department’s annual sexual assault reports concern reports of sexual assault involving adult service members and do not report trial outcomes separately by whether special trial counsel or commanders held authority. In fiscal year 2024, the first year with special trial counsel, the Department received 8,195 reports; of 3,233 cases in which special trial counsel or commanders had authority to act, the evidence supported disciplinary action in 2,128, disciplinary action was not possible in 1,079 because of insufficient evidence, the victim’s non-participation, or the statute of limitations, and 26 (about 1%) were unfounded (Department of Defense, 2025a). The fiscal year 2025 report showed 7,998 reports; it divided the 340 sexual assault cases with court-martial charges preferred into 220 preferred by special trial counsel and 120 by commanders, but did not break out convictions or other dispositions by authority (Department of War, 2026, p. 17; app. B, pp. 20–21, Table 4). Cases in which action was not possible are not cases shown to be false, and the department’s “unfounded” category, which refers to allegations determined to be false or baseless, is a separate and much smaller group.

Child sexual abuse in military families is tracked separately by the Family Advocacy Program, which recorded 230 incidents of child sexual abuse meeting its criteria in fiscal year 2024, a rate of 0.280 per 1,000 military children; its central registry does not include command action or legal disposition (Department of Defense, 2025b). Service reports describe caseloads and staffing; the Air Force reported a daily caseload of almost 1,000 investigation and prosecution support cases in fiscal year 2025 but not referral, conviction, or acquittal rates for covered offenses (Department of the Air Force, 2025). The Military Justice Review Panel (2024) found that the services do not maintain uniform, comprehensive data on several covered offenses. The limits of these data sources are discussed in “What Department of Defense Sexual Assault Data Can and Cannot Show,” a paper in the Counterintuitive Testimony hub.

Limits of the Evidence

No published study has compared outcomes in child sex offense courts-martial before and after the reforms with a design that could attribute differences to the reforms. Any early comparison faces several obstacles: the effective date divides cases by offense date rather than trial date, so cases tried in 2024 and 2025 included many governed by the old rules; reporting, investigation, and charging practices changed at the same time; and child cases are relatively few, so rates fluctuate. Conviction, acquittal, and referral rates also do not measure accuracy. A higher referral rate could reflect stronger cases or lower thresholds, and a lower conviction rate could reflect more cautious factfinding or weaker cases. Group-level data cannot show whether any particular referral, conviction, or acquittal was correct.

The sentencing parameters raise a parallel caution. The parameters reflect policy judgments informed by limited historical data: the Military Sentencing Parameters and Criteria Board described the available Defense Legal Services Agency sentencing data report as of limited use in crafting the initial parameters and stated that the parameters will continue to evolve as more information is received (Military Justice Review Panel, 2024). Expert testimony at sentencing, including psychosexual risk evaluation, describes group-level research and an individual’s characteristics; it does not establish what a particular person will do.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the fiscal year 2024 finding that 26 of 3,233 cases (about 1%) were unfounded (Department of Defense, 2025a) is cited to suggest that false reports are rare, an attorney can ask what exactly was counted: the same report placed 1,079 cases where disciplinary action was not possible, which is not a finding of falsity, and the data concern adult service members, not children. When those 1,079 cases are cited to suggest that allegations are often doubtful, ask the same question in reverse, since insufficient evidence, non-participation, and the statute of limitations do not show falsity. When outcome rates are offered to show that the reforms succeeded or failed, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, because no published study can yet attribute differences to the reforms. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Military Justice Reform and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The statutory framework is set out above: Article 1(17) (covered offenses), Article 24a and 10 U.S.C. § 1044f (special trial counsel), Article 25(e)(4) (randomized selection), Articles 53 and 53a (sentencing authority and plea agreements), Article 56 (mandatory minimums, parameters and criteria, and government appeal), and Article 6b (victims’ rights), together with the FY2022 through FY2025 NDAAs and Executive Orders 14103 and 14130. The MCM has been amended regularly since, and further amendments were proposed for public comment in 2025, so practitioners should confirm the current text of each rule.

On expert assistance, military law applies a due process standard that is stricter in its articulation than the civilian federal statute, which authorizes services “necessary for adequate representation” for financially eligible defendants (18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)); the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has described that statute as the functional equivalent of R.C.M. 703(d) (United States v. Kaspers, 1997). Military entitlement does not depend on indigency. The necessity test in Gonzalez, Bresnahan, and Freeman is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and its third element, why counsel cannot gather and present the evidence themselves, is frequently decisive. Admissibility of expert testimony at trial is a separate question governed by Military Rule of Evidence 702 and United States v. Houser (1993), discussed in the paper on expert testimony in this hub.

Arizona

Servicemembers stationed in Arizona may be prosecuted in state court for offenses within state jurisdiction, and the civilian framework differs at each point discussed above. Charging decisions in Arizona are made by county attorneys or the Attorney General rather than by an officer within a command structure. Sentencing is by the judge within statutory ranges, and offenses classified as dangerous crimes against children carry enhanced ranges and, in the first and second degree, sentences that generally must run consecutively to any other sentence (A.R.S. § 13-705). Defense experts for an indigent defendant charged with a felony are appointed when they are “reasonably necessary to adequately present a defense” (A.R.S. § 13-4013(B); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.7(a)), and an ex parte request requires a showing of a need for confidentiality (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.7(b)). Victims’ rights arise under the Arizona Victims’ Bill of Rights (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1) and A.R.S. title 13, chapter 40, discussed in a separate paper in this hub.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The reforms give special trial counsel control of covered-offense cases from the initial determination through plea negotiations and referral, and with that control comes responsibility for the record. Prosecutors can establish the offense dates that determine whether the covered-offense and sentencing provisions apply, to document any election to exercise authority over earlier offenses, and to retain qualified government experts early and give timely notice of them. At sentencing, a request for a sentence within the parameter, or for a departure supported by specific facts, is most durable when grounded in evidence of the offense’s impact presented through the child’s Article 6b rights and admissible expert testimony.

The law and the available data also counsel caution. Department-wide data cannot show that the reforms have improved or worsened outcomes in child cases, and an argument that a case should be referred or a sentence imposed to demonstrate the success of the reforms has no support in the evidence and invites claims of improper influence. Because the defense may now present expert requests directly to the military judge, sometimes ex parte, opposition to a request should address the necessity elements on the case’s facts rather than presume that a government expert is an adequate substitute; McAllister requires that a substitute be adequate in fact.

Special Issues for Defense

The reforms create new procedural questions that the defense can raise: whether each charged offense is a covered offense, whether its date places it under the new rules, whether special trial counsel properly exercised authority over earlier or related offenses, and whether a conviction that includes any offense committed on or before December 27, 2023 requires sentencing under the prior rules. The amended expert procedure allows a request to go directly to the military judge, and after referral a consultant request may be presented ex parte. A request is most persuasive when it identifies the specific materials the expert will review, the questions the expert will answer, and why counsel cannot answer them without help, the element on which Freeman turned.

The law and the available data also counsel caution. The absence of published outcome data means that claims that the new system produces unwarranted referrals or convictions are no better supported than claims of the opposite, and they do not bear on whether a particular child’s account is accurate. Arguments for a sentence below the parameter must rest on specific facts the judge can state in writing, and risk-assessment evidence offered for that purpose should be described in the group-level terms the research supports. Requests for a child’s mental health records remain governed by Military Rule of Evidence 513, now expressly covering records of communications, and the victim’s right to be heard on such requests is enforceable by mandamus.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Department of Defense. (2025a). Department of Defense annual report on sexual assault in the military: Fiscal year 2024. https://www.sapr.mil/Portals/156/FY24_Annual_Report.pdf

Department of Defense. (2025b). Report on child abuse and neglect and domestic abuse in the military for fiscal year 2024. https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/DOD-Child-Abuse-and-Neglect-and-Domestic-Abuse-Report-FY2024.pdf

Department of the Air Force. (2025). Department of the Air Force report on the state of military justice for fiscal year 2025 [Report under Article 146a, UCMJ]. Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/JSC%20-%20FY25%20Art%20146a%20Reports%20-%20Combined_1.pdf

Department of War. (2026). Annual report on sexual assault in the military: Fiscal year 2025. https://www.sapr.mil/Portals/156/FY25_Annual_Report.pdf

Military Justice Review Panel. (2024). The Military Justice Review Panel: 2024 comprehensive review and assessment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/ConfHandout/2025ConfHandout/WMHillmanOsbornEwersMJRP2024ComprehensiveAndAssessmentOfTheUCMJ4abc.pdf

Schlueter, D. A., & Schenck, L. M. (2023). This is not your grandparents’ military justice system: The 2022 and 2023 National Defense Authorization Acts. The Army Lawyer, 2023(2), 74–83. https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1744&context=facarticles

Legal Authorities

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).

United States v. Batres, No. 25-0019 (C.A.A.F. 2025).

United States v. Bresnahan, 62 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2005).

United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

United States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986).

United States v. Gonzalez, 39 M.J. 459 (C.M.A. 1994).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Kaspers, 47 M.J. 176 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

United States v. McAllister, 55 M.J. 270 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

United States v. Mellette, 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

United States v. Turner, 28 M.J. 487 (C.M.A. 1989).

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, §§ 531–539E, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).

James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, §§ 541–545, 136 Stat. 2395 (2022).

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31, § 531, 137 Stat. 136 (2023).

Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, Pub. L. No. 118-159, § 562, 138 Stat. 1773 (2024).

Exec. Order No. 14103, 88 Fed. Reg. 50535 (Aug. 2, 2023) (2023 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial).

Exec. Order No. 14130, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024) (2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial).

10 U.S.C. § 801(17) (Article 1(17), Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 806b (Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 824a (Article 24a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 825(e)(4) (Article 25(e)(4), Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 846 (Article 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 853 (Article 53, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 853a (Article 53a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 856 (Article 56, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 1044f.

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).

A.R.S. § 13-705.

A.R.S. § 13-4013(B).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.7.

Mil. R. Evid. 513.

Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary, Western Judicial Circuit Rules of Court, R. 8.2 (Dec. 19, 2024).

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

R.C.M. 503.

R.C.M. 703.

R.C.M. 1002.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 ed.), apps. 12B, 12C, 12D.

Related topic papers: Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Daubert, Frye, and Arizona’s Cold-Expert Cases · Access to the Complainant’s Counseling, Child Protective Services, School, and Medical Records · Corroboration and Case Outcomes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases · Other-Act and Propensity Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Cases · Arizona Victims’ Rights and Child Witnesses · Founded, Unfounded, and False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Counterintuitive Testimony · Online Sex Offense