Snap Shot
- The question: What evidence besides the child’s account is usually available in child sexual abuse cases, and what do charging and conviction rates say about whether allegations are true?
- What the research shows: Corroboration is often limited. In one study of 329 Dallas County cases, a confession was present in 22% and medical evidence in 9%; charging rose with a corroborating witness, a confession, or more evidence types. Most medical examinations are normal, and children whose abuse was documented by recordings or chat logs often described less than the records showed.
- What it does not show: Outcome research measures what the legal system found provable, not what happened. Attrition and non-prosecution rates are not false-allegation rates, and convictions do not show that every convicted case was well proven. A confession may add little independent weight if the suspect was told the details of the allegation.
- The law: Federal, military, and Arizona law do not require corroboration of a complainant’s testimony (Jackson, Jerousek). Confessions do require it: under Opper in federal court, Mil. R. Evid. 304(c) (Whiteeyes), and Arizona’s corpus delicti rule (Gillies, Carlson).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can explain that missing corroboration and normal examinations are common, but should not treat derivative evidence or a contaminated confession as independent; defense counsel should test whether claimed corroboration is independent and reaches the act itself, without presenting attrition rates as false-allegation rates.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and substantially underreported, and much of it occurs in private, without witnesses, and without lasting physical injury. Delayed and incremental disclosure are common in substantiated cases, and children who are interviewed well can give accurate, detailed accounts; delay and incremental disclosure also occur in other circumstances, so they do not by themselves show what happened. Those features shape what evidence exists when a case reaches a prosecutor: the child’s account is usually central, and the question at every stage, from the first report to the verdict, is what other evidence supports or contradicts it.
Corroboration reaches court in several ways. Prosecutors decide whether to charge in light of the evidence they expect to present. Judges rule on motions for judgment of acquittal and on whether a confession has been corroborated enough to be considered. Counsel and experts encounter statistics showing that most reports do not lead to conviction, and those statistics are sometimes offered to suggest that unconvicted allegations were false, or that convicted ones were all well proven.
This paper summarizes research on which evidence types are present and which predict charging and conviction; reviews interview quality, medical findings, confessions, and digital records; explains why attrition from report to conviction measures provability rather than falsity; and reviews the federal, military, and Arizona law on corroboration, confessions, and sufficiency.
What Corroboration Means in These Cases
Corroboration is evidence independent of a witness’s account that tends to confirm it, and in CSA cases the term covers evidence of very different strength. The strongest forms are confessions, eyewitness accounts, physical or forensic evidence, and recordings of the acts. In the middle are witnesses who confirm parts of the account, such as the accused’s access to the child at the time and place described or the child’s earlier statements; reports by other children against the same person; and electronic records of contact. At the weaker end are behavioral and psychological findings, which occur in both abused and non-abused children and therefore cannot establish abuse, though they cannot disprove it either.
Two distinctions matter throughout. Corroboration of peripheral details, such as the layout of a room or the date of a visit, shows that parts of the account are accurate but does not establish the act itself. And corroboration has value only to the extent that it is independent: a parent’s report of what the child said shows that an account existed at a certain time but does not check its accuracy, and a confession obtained by confronting a suspect with the details of the allegation may carry less independent weight than it appears to.
Which Evidence Is Present, and Which Predicts Charging and Conviction
The most detailed U.S. data come from 329 CSA cases with adult offenders in Dallas County, Texas, drawn from a children’s advocacy center and two comparison communities, reported between 2001 and 2003 and followed through 2005 (Walsh et al., 2010). The child disclosed in 87% of cases; a corroborating witness was present in 46%, a confession in 22%, behavioral evidence in 20%, an eyewitness in 18%, physical evidence in 14%, an additional report against the same offender in 11%, and medical evidence in 9%. Excluding the disclosure, 26% of cases had no other evidence type and 40% had two or more. In a 2015 survey of 203 prosecutors from 37 states, the child’s testimony was ranked the most commonly available evidence and DNA, other physical evidence, and images of the acts the least (Cross & Whitcomb, 2017). Cases resting on the child’s account alone are common, but the Dallas County authors noted that describing these prosecutions as the child’s word against the accused’s overstates the matter.
Charges were filed in 64% of the Dallas County cases. Charging rates were 85% with a corroborating witness and 45% without, 91% with a confession and 59% without, and 68% with a disclosure and 42% without, and they rose from 46% of cases with no other evidence type to 95% of cases with three or more. In a multivariate model, the child’s disclosure, a corroborating witness, an additional report against the same suspect, a confession, and alleged penetration were associated with charging, and cases involving children 7 or younger or adolescents were less likely to be charged than cases involving children 8 to 11; eyewitness, physical, medical, and behavioral evidence did not independently predict charging. Of 43 cases without a disclosure, 18 were charged, most with two or three other evidence types. Of charged cases, 80% ended in conviction, most by guilty plea (Walsh et al., 2010). Among cases without a confession, physical evidence, or an eyewitness, a corroborating witness was associated with nearly twice the likelihood of charging.
Earlier and later studies show a similar pattern and add factors beyond the evidence. Among 431 cases referred to prosecutors in four urban jurisdictions in 1988 and 1989, about 61% were accepted, and cases with a confession were accepted about 90% of the time; among other cases, physical or eyewitness evidence was the strongest predictor, older child age and force increased the odds, medical evidence did not independently predict acceptance, and maternal support was associated with acceptance (Cross et al., 1994). A study of 1,043 cases at a children’s advocacy center found that 56% were referred to prosecutors (Stroud et al., 2000). In 100 charged and rejected cases from another center, caregiver support and evidence beyond the child’s statement were associated with charging, and prosecutors described weighing the child’s details and willingness to testify (Duron, 2018). In 500 cases referred to four New England prosecutors’ offices between 2009 and 2013, caregiver support, the child’s willingness to proceed, and the age of the accused were associated with prosecution, and notations of insufficient evidence and disclosure problems with cases not going forward (Block & Williams, 2019, pp. 16–20); a peer-reviewed analysis of 500 such reports found caregiver support and the age of the accused associated with every stage of the decision (Block et al., 2023). In 56 Australian prosecution files, the complainant’s perceived consistency and credibility were the most important decisional factors: 82.3% of cases with a complainant seen as inconsistent ended in discontinuance or acquittal, and 78% with a largely consistent complainant ended in conviction, while recorded concerns about memory, cognitive capacity, or confusion were not associated with outcome (Martschuk et al., 2024). The sample was small and from one country, and perceived consistency is a judgment about provability, not accuracy; incremental disclosure is common in substantiated cases.
Charging decisions thus track the amount and type of evidence, as well as the child’s age, the family’s support, and the child’s ability to participate. Those associations describe how prosecutors predict provability; they do not show that less-corroborated cases are less likely to be true.
Interview Quality and Case Outcomes
Because the child’s account is the core of most cases, the forensic interview bears on outcomes. In 987 cases from four states, full disclosure at the forensic interview was more likely among girls, older children, children whose own disclosure began the investigation, and children with a supportive caregiver; disclosure rates varied across communities, but the presence of a children’s advocacy center was not associated with a difference (Lippert et al., 2009). In a Utah county in which the same 16 police detectives interviewed children before and after training in the NICHD protocol, charges were filed in 52.9% of 410 protocol-period cases and 42% of 350 pre-protocol cases; regardless of interview method, charges were least often filed when the child was younger than 5 (31%); most charged cases ended in plea agreements in both periods (77% pre-protocol and 82% protocol), and of the 23 cases tried, 10 of 11 protocol cases and 6 of 12 pre-protocol cases ended in conviction (Pipe et al., 2013). The design compared two periods rather than randomly assigning methods, so other changes could have contributed. The findings support the proposition that protocol-based interviews produce accounts more useful to the legal process; a charging rate measures what prosecutors found persuasive, not accuracy.
Medical Findings
Medical evidence is rarely the deciding factor, because the examination is usually normal. It was present in 9% of the Dallas County cases and did not independently predict charging (Walsh et al., 2010), and it did not independently predict acceptance in the four-jurisdiction study (Cross et al., 1994). Among 236 children whose abuse was confirmed by the perpetrator’s conviction, most genital examinations were normal or nonspecific (Adams et al., 1994), and among 2,384 children referred for possible sexual abuse, 96% had normal examinations, including most who described penetration (Heger et al., 2002). A normal examination therefore does not contradict an allegation of abuse. A finding diagnostic of trauma or sexual contact is significant corroboration, but interpretive standards have changed over time, and the companion paper on medical examinations reviews the current consensus classification. Physical evidence can also mislead: in 326 CSA exonerations, physical or forensic evidence was presented at many original trials and in most of those cases was later found false or misleading (Miller et al., 2026). Exonerations are a selected group of wrongful convictions and do not show how often such evidence is wrong.
Confessions and Suspect Admissions
Confessions strongly predict charging and conviction. In four communities studied in the multisite evaluation of children’s advocacy centers, 30% of 282 interviewed adult suspects admitted sexual acts with the child; a full disclosure by the child and a corroborating witness were associated with confession, and older suspects were less likely to confess (Lippert et al., 2010). The authors noted that 96% of confessions were accompanied by a disclosure and the rest by other implicating evidence, and they judged the risk of false confession in the sample to be low while acknowledging that they had no data on interrogation methods and could not rule it out.
The false-confession research counsels care in treating a confession as independent corroboration. A review of police-induced confessions identified risk factors that include lengthy interrogation, the presentation of false evidence, minimization of the seriousness or consequences of the offense, and suspect vulnerabilities such as youth and intellectual disability (Kassin et al., 2010). Among 241 DNA exonerations, 59 involved false confessions; 78% of those cases contained other evidentiary errors, compared with 54% of eyewitness misidentification cases, and in most multiple-error cases the confession came first (Kassin et al., 2012). The authors read the pattern as evidence that a confession can shape how other evidence is gathered and interpreted, creating an appearance of corroboration, a form of forensic confirmation bias (Kassin et al., 2013). In CSA exonerations specifically, false confessions were rare and perjury or false accusation was the most frequent contributor (Miller et al., 2026). Contamination can also run from the allegation to the confession when details of the child’s account are conveyed to the suspect, so the probative question is whether the confession contains accurate information the suspect could not have learned from investigators. Polygraph examinations are sometimes used to prompt admissions, although the validity of the polygraph for detecting deception is not well established (Lippert et al., 2010).
Digital Evidence and the Child’s Account
Messages, images, call and location records, and account data can establish that contact occurred, when, what was said, and sometimes what was done, but studies comparing children’s accounts with such records show a complex relationship. When police interviews of 68 adolescent girls deceived online by one man were compared with chat logs, the girls reported most offline meetings but only about half of the more severe online acts, some maintained denials when shown the evidence, and the authors identified no reports of acts the record did not show (Leander et al., 2008). Children whose abuse had been videotaped by the offender described substantially less than the recordings showed, and none described acts the recordings did not contain (Sjöberg & Lindblad, 2002).
These small, police-identified samples suggest that an account reporting less than the record is common among children whose abuse is documented and is not, by itself, evidence of fabrication. A record can also contradict an account, for example on who initiated contact or when. Records may be incomplete and accounts can be used by another person, so a message’s absence from a recovered record does not establish that it was not sent. A child shown messages or images before giving an account in the child’s own words may describe the record rather than the experience. Interpretation of device data is the work of a qualified digital forensic examiner.
Attrition From Report to Conviction
Most CSA reports do not end in conviction, and most attrition occurs before charging. A meta-analysis of 21 studies found that charging rates ranged from 28% to 94% across jurisdictions, but that charged cases were carried forward rather than dismissed at rates of 72% or higher, and that among cases carried forward, guilty pleas averaged 82% and convictions 94% (Cross et al., 2003). Studies that begin earlier show more attrition. Among sexual offenses reported to police in Northern Ireland between 2001 and 2006, nearly half of child cases were not detected and about one in five resulted in a formal sanction, with lower rates for children under 5, teenagers, and children who reported long after the abuse (Bunting, 2008); a later analysis found teenagers most disadvantaged by reporting delay (Bunting, 2014). A review of 204 concluded Polish case files found the opposite on both points: reporting delay did not predict conviction or acquittal, abuse that began at ages 11 to 17 was more likely to end in conviction than abuse that began before 11, and the extent of investigative activity was the strongest predictor (Lewulis, 2026). The studies come from different legal systems and periods, so whether delay and adolescence reduce the chance of conviction is unsettled. In the New England study, of the 453 referred cases whose outcome was known (47 others were transferred to another jurisdiction), about 28% did not progress beyond intake, about 52% were investigated but not prosecuted, and about 20% were prosecuted (Block & Williams, 2019, p. 12). In Dallas County, the reasons recorded for not charging were most often insufficient evidence and a vague or incomplete disclosure, with smaller numbers involving recantation, suspected coaching, a passed polygraph, or the victim’s nonparticipation (Walsh et al., 2010).
Attrition is sometimes presented as though every case short of conviction were a false allegation. That inference conflates the unproven with the disproven. A case is not charged when the evidence is unlikely to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and an acquittal is a finding that the burden of proof was not met; neither is a determination that the allegation was untrue. The predictors of attrition, including very young complainants, lack of caregiver support, and in some studies adolescent complainants and delayed reports, are characteristics of cases that are harder to prove, and several are common in substantiated cases. The opposite inference is equally unwarranted, because attrition also includes concerns that proved not to involve abuse and a smaller number of allegations shown to be false. In a review of 551 CSA reports to one child protection agency, 43% were substantiated, 21% were inconclusive, and 34% were not considered abuse, so more than half were not substantiated, while 1.5% (8 of the 551) were classified as deliberately false allegations by children and nine (about 1.6% by simple calculation) as fabrications by adults documented as such in the case records (Oates et al., 2000, pp. 149, 151–152). The two figures answer different questions. Child protection agencies use “unfounded” to mean not substantiated, while police crime-reporting rules use it to mean that no offense occurred; the companion paper on founded, unfounded, and false allegations discusses these figures.
Limits of the Evidence
Outcome research relies on case files, which record what investigators chose to document and measure the presence of evidence rather than its quality. Most studies come from a few U.S. jurisdictions and from periods before current digital evidence practices; the Dallas County and multisite data date from 2001 to 2003. In the Dallas County study, information on whether the suspect confessed was missing in 28% of cases, and the authors had no data on the accused’s prior record or on delayed reporting (Walsh et al., 2010). The research cannot establish causation: corroboration may increase the chance of charging, or cases prosecutors already find persuasive may be investigated more thoroughly. Studies that define abuse by substantiation or conviction overrepresent clear disclosures and corroborated cases, which biases estimates of how children disclose and how cases proceed (Lyon, 2007).
Above all, research on charging and conviction measures what the legal system found provable, not what happened. No outcome study can tell a court whether a particular allegation is true, whether an uncorroborated account is accurate, or whether a defendant committed the offense. Group-level rates of charging, conviction, or attrition are not evidence of how a particular case should be decided.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the prosecution cites charging rates such as 91% with a confession and 59% without (Walsh et al., 2010), counsel should ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since the study measured what prosecutors found provable, could not establish causation, and lacked confession data in 28% of cases. When a witness relies on the finding that children whose abuse was recorded described less than the records showed (Sjöberg & Lindblad, 2002; Leander et al., 2008), counsel should ask how much evidence it rests on and whether it applies to this child, given the small, police-identified samples. When the defense presents attrition as a measure of false allegations, counsel should ask what exactly was counted: in Oates et al. (2000), 1.5% of reports were classified as false allegations by children, while more than half were not substantiated, and the two figures answer different questions. When the defense cites the 59 false confessions among 241 DNA exonerations (Kassin et al., 2012), counsel should ask who was studied and whether this confession contains accurate information the suspect could not have learned from investigators. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Corroboration and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Federal law does not require corroboration of a complainant’s testimony in a sexual offense prosecution. Evidence is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt (Jackson v. Virginia, 1979), and the credibility of an uncorroborated complainant is for the factfinder. Confessions are treated differently: the government must introduce substantial independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of the accused’s statement, though the corroboration need not independently prove the offense (Opper v. United States, 1954; Smith v. United States, 1954).
In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 304(c) permits an admission or confession to be considered on guilt only if independent evidence has been admitted that would tend to establish its trustworthiness; the independent evidence need raise only an inference of the statement’s truth, and the military judge alone decides whether corroboration is adequate. The rule was revised in 2016, as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, to align military with federal practice. In United States v. Whiteeyes (2022), an Article 120b prosecution, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces described the required quantum as slight and the weight of the corroboration as a question for the factfinder. No rule requires a complainant’s testimony to be corroborated. For offenses committed on or after January 1, 2021, Article 66(d)(1)(B), UCMJ, permits factual sufficiency review only on the accused’s request and a specific showing of a deficiency in proof, and a finding may be set aside only if the Court of Criminal Appeals is clearly convinced it was against the weight of the evidence (United States v. Harvey, 2024). For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including Article 120b offenses, charging and referral decisions rest with the Offices of Special Trial Counsel (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022). Evidence of other sexual offenses is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 414 and Military Rule of Evidence 414 and is addressed in the companion paper on other-act and propensity evidence.
Arizona
Arizona does not require corroboration of a child complainant’s testimony; in State v. Jerousek (1979), the Arizona Supreme Court stated that a defendant in a child molestation case can be convicted on the victim’s uncorroborated testimony. Sufficiency is tested on a motion for judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, which asks whether substantial evidence supports a conviction (State v. West, 2011).
Arizona applies a corpus delicti rule to confessions rather than the federal trustworthiness doctrine. Before a confession may be considered, the State must present evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the charged crime was actually committed; circumstantial evidence suffices, and the corroboration may come before the State rests (State v. Gillies, 1983; State v. Hall, 2003). In State v. Morgan (2002), which involved sexual offenses including oral sexual contact with a minor, the Court of Appeals held that a confession to several closely related crimes may be corroborated by independent evidence of some of them. In State v. Carlson (2015), the Arizona Supreme Court agreed with that reasoning under its corpus delicti rule, stated that it had not adopted the trustworthiness doctrine, and noted that once the modest corroboration requirement is met, the truth of the confession is for the jury. Other-act evidence offered to show an aberrant sexual propensity is governed by Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports explaining that most CSA cases lack medical or eyewitness evidence, that a normal examination is the expected result, that attrition reflects the difficulty of proof rather than a finding that unproven allegations were false, and that federal, military, and Arizona law does not require a complainant’s testimony to be corroborated. Investigators and prosecutors control much of the evidence the research associates with cases that can be evaluated reliably: recorded, protocol-based forensic interviews; prompt investigation of the access, opportunity, earlier statements, and electronic records a child describes, which can corroborate an account even when they do not prove the act; support for the nonoffending caregiver; and suspect interviews recorded in full, so that the independence and accuracy of any admission can be shown. In one file study, more extensive investigation was the strongest predictor of conviction (Lewulis, 2026), although stronger cases may also attract more investigation.
The research also counsels caution. A confession is strong evidence only to the extent it is reliable and independent; interrogation that relies on minimization, false evidence, or the details of the child’s account can produce admissions that add little, and the exoneration research shows that a confession can shape how other evidence is read. Confirmed peripheral details do not establish the central act, and evidence derived from the child’s own statements is not independent corroboration. Testimony suggesting that a complainant should be believed because corroboration is rarely available, or because convicted cases are usually true, moves from explaining the research toward vouching.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports careful examination of what the asserted corroboration shows: whether it confirms the act or only peripheral details, whether it is independent of the child’s account or derived from it, whether a confession contains accurate information not available from investigators, how the interrogation was conducted and recorded, and whether digital records are complete and attributable. The confession research supports scrutiny of admissions obtained by confronting a suspect with the allegation or after a polygraph, and the corroboration rules in courts-martial and Arizona provide a procedural vehicle for it.
The research also counsels caution. The absence of corroboration is common in cases in which abuse occurred and does not show that an allegation is false; a normal medical examination does not contradict an allegation; and in the small samples studied, an account reporting less than a digital record shows was common among children whose abuse was documented. Attrition and non-prosecution rates are not false-allegation rates, and presenting them as such misstates the research. A challenge is most persuasive when it identifies a specific defect in the independence or reliability of the evidence offered rather than relying on the general rarity of corroboration.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Adams, J. A., Harper, K., Knudson, S., & Revilla, J. (1994). Examination findings in legally confirmed child sexual abuse: It’s normal to be normal. Pediatrics, 94(3), 310–317. https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.94.3.310
Block, S. D., Johnson, H. M., Williams, L. M., Shockley, K. L., Wang, E., & Widaman, K. F. (2023). Predictors of prosecutorial decisions in reports of child sexual abuse. Child Maltreatment, 28(3), 488–499. https://doi.org/10.1177/10775595221074375
Block, S. D., & Williams, L. M. (2019). The prosecution of child sexual abuse: A partnership to improve outcomes (Final summary overview, NIJ Award No. 2014-MU-MU-0001; Document No. 252768). National Institute of Justice. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252768.pdf
Bunting, L. (2008). Sexual offences against children: An exploration of attrition in the Northern Ireland criminal justice system. Child Abuse & Neglect, 32(12), 1109–1118. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2008.09.002
Bunting, L. (2014). Exploring the influence of reporting delay on criminal justice outcomes: Comparing child and adult reporters of childhood sexual abuse. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 23(5), 577–594. https://doi.org/10.1080/10538712.2014.920457
Cross, T. P., De Vos, E., & Whitcomb, D. (1994). Prosecution of child sexual abuse: Which cases are accepted? Child Abuse & Neglect, 18(8), 663–677. https://doi.org/10.1016/0145-2134(94)90016-7
Cross, T. P., Walsh, W. A., Simone, M., & Jones, L. M. (2003). Prosecution of child abuse: A meta-analysis of rates of criminal justice decisions. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 4(4), 323–340. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838003256561
Cross, T. P., & Whitcomb, D. (2017). The practice of prosecuting child maltreatment: Results of an online survey of prosecutors. Child Abuse & Neglect, 69, 20–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2017.04.007
Duron, J. F. (2018). Legal decision-making in child sexual abuse investigations: A mixed-methods study of factors that influence prosecution. Child Abuse & Neglect, 79, 302–314. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2018.02.022
Heger, A., Ticson, L., Velasquez, O., & Bernier, R. (2002). Children referred for possible sexual abuse: Medical findings in 2384 children. Child Abuse & Neglect, 26(6–7), 645–659. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0145-2134(02)00339-3
Kassin, S. M., Bogart, D., & Kerner, J. (2012). Confessions that corrupt: Evidence from the DNA exoneration case files. Psychological Science, 23(1), 41–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611422918
Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. A., Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. (2010). Police-induced confessions: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 34(1), 3–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-009-9188-6
Kassin, S. M., Dror, I. E., & Kukucka, J. (2013). The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and proposed solutions. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2(1), 42–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.01.001
Leander, L., Christianson, S. Å., & Granhag, P. A. (2008). Internet-initiated sexual abuse: Adolescent victims’ reports about on- and off-line sexual activities. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 22(9), 1260–1274. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1433
Lewulis, P. (2026). Delayed reporting and legal outcomes in child sexual abuse cases: An empirical analysis. Child Abuse & Neglect, 173, Article 107892. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2026.107892
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Legal Authorities
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079 (2015).
State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983).
State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442, 65 P.3d 90 (2003).
State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 590 P.2d 1366 (1979).
State v. Morgan, 204 Ariz. 166, 61 P.3d 460 (App. 2002).
State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 250 P.3d 1188 (2011).
United States v. Harvey, 85 M.J. 127 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. Whiteeyes, 82 M.J. 168 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 545, 129 Stat. 726 (2015).
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 542, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).
10 U.S.C. § 866 (Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Fed. R. Evid. 414.
Mil. R. Evid. 304(c).
Mil. R. Evid. 414.
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20.
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