Snap Shot
- The question: When may evidence of a defendant’s other sexual acts against children be used to show propensity, and how much does it prove?
- What the research shows: People with a history of sexual offending reoffend sexually at higher rates than other offenders, but in one meta-analysis the average detected sexual recidivism rate was 13.7% over about five to six years, an underestimate because many offenses go undetected; risk declines with time offense-free. Older mock-jury studies found that prior-record evidence increases convictions despite limiting instructions; recent CSA-specific studies, largely from one Australian research group, found improper propensity reasoning rare. Similar accounts from several children corroborate one another to the extent they are independent.
- What it does not show: Group recidivism rates do not measure the probative value of a particular act or the likelihood that a defendant committed the charged offense. No study can establish from content alone whether several accounts are independent, and an uncharged or acquitted act has not thereby been shown to be false.
- The law: Federal Rules 413–415, Military Rules 413–414, and Arizona Rule 404(c) permit propensity use subject to threshold findings and Rule 403 (Enjady, Guardia, LeMay, Wright). Arizona requires clear and convincing proof and specific findings (Terrazas, Aguilar); in courts-martial, charged acts may not be used under Rule 413 as propensity evidence for other charged acts when the accused pleads not guilty (Hills, Hukill).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should document each child’s first disclosure before contact and avoid presenting recidivism figures as proof; defense counsel should test proof, similarity, remoteness, and independence rather than relying on general claims of prejudice.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and substantially underreported, it usually occurs without eyewitnesses, and physical findings are often absent. Many prosecutions therefore turn on a child’s account, which can be accurate and detailed when the child is interviewed well, and the defendant’s denial. Evidence that the defendant sexually abused another child, or the same child on other occasions, can be among the most persuasive evidence a factfinder hears and among the most prejudicial, because it invites the inference that a person who did it before did it again, and because the other act may itself be disputed, remote, or uncharged.
The law generally forbids using a person’s other acts to prove character and conforming conduct; sexual-offense cases are the principal exception. Federal Rules of Evidence 413 through 415, Military Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, and Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c) each permit propensity use of other sexual acts, subject to threshold findings and balancing for unfair prejudice. The same questions recur when several children make allegations against one defendant: whether the counts may be tried together, whether each child’s account may be used to support the others, and whether the accounts are truly independent.
This paper describes the logic of the propensity inference, what sexual recidivism research does and does not say about it, how jurors use other-act evidence and joined charges, and how independence affects the value of multiple complainants. It then sets out the limits of the evidence, the law, and the recurring issues for each side.
The Propensity Inference and Its Logic
The rule against character evidence does not rest on a belief that past conduct is irrelevant. It rests on concerns that jurors will give it too much weight, convict to punish past conduct, or turn a trial about an act into a trial about a person. When Congress enacted Rules 413 through 415 in 1994, supporters argued that sexual offenses against children justify an exception because they are private, the child’s testimony is often uncorroborated, and a sexual interest in children may be a relatively stable disposition.
Probative value is a question of comparative frequency. Lyon and Koehler (1996), writing about behavioral evidence in CSA cases, framed it as a relevance ratio: how often a piece of evidence occurs when the proposition is true compared with when it is false. Applied here, the question is how much more likely the other act would be for a defendant who committed the charged offense than for one who did not. That ratio depends on how well the other act is proved, how closely it resembles the charged conduct, and how much time has passed. The research below bears on parts of that question; no study supplies the ratio for an individual case.
What Recidivism Research Shows
In a meta-analysis of 82 studies involving 29,450 people convicted of sexual offenses, Hanson and Morton-Bourgon (2005) found an average sexual recidivism rate of 13.7% over follow-up periods averaging five to six years. The strongest predictors were sexual deviancy, including sexual interest in children, and antisocial orientation, and the authors cautioned that the figures underestimate offending because many offenses are not detected. The Bureau of Justice Statistics followed people released from state prisons in 30 states in 2005 and found that 7.7% of those released after a sex offense were arrested for rape or sexual assault within nine years, compared with 2.3% of other released prisoners (Alper & Durose, 2019). People released after a sex offense were thus more than three times as likely to be arrested for a new one, although most were not.
Official records miss much offending. In a meta-analysis of men with online sexual offenses, Seto et al. (2011) found that about 12% had an officially known contact sexual offense, but about 55% in the six studies with self-report data admitted one; detected new contact offenses after the index offense were about 2% over 1.5 to 6 years.
Risk also changes over time. Hanson et al. (2018), analyzing about 7,000 men from 20 samples followed for up to 25 years, found that the risk of a new sexual offense declined the longer a person remained offense-free in the community, and that after 10 to 15 years offense-free most were no more likely to commit a new sexual offense than people with nonsexual criminal histories; those initially rated higher risk took longer to reach that level. For adolescents, a meta-analysis of 106 studies of 33,783 youth adjudicated for sexual offenses found a weighted mean sexual recidivism rate of 4.92% over about five years, with markedly lower rates in more recent studies (Caldwell, 2016). Finally, most sexual offenses are committed by people with no prior sexual-offense record: in an analysis of more than 170,000 sexual-offense arrests in New York between 1986 and 2006, about 95% involved people with no previous sexual-offense conviction (Sandler et al., 2008, pp. 288, 297).
These findings cut in more than one direction. People with a history of sexual offending reoffend sexually at higher rates than other offenders, consistent with the premise of the propensity rules, and low official rates do not show that such a history is uninformative, because detection is incomplete. But most people with a detected sexual offense are not detected reoffending within five to ten years, risk declines with time offense-free, and detected recidivism after adolescent adjudication is low. And because most sexual offenses are committed by people without a known history, the absence of prior acts says little about whether a defendant committed the charged offense.
What Recidivism Research Cannot Tell a Court
Recidivism studies follow people whose earlier offense was established by conviction and count new offenses detected later. An other-act ruling asks whether a past act, often uncharged and sometimes disputed, makes it more likely that an accused person committed a particular offense. Group rates do not answer that question, and testimony presenting a recidivism figure as the likelihood that a defendant committed the charged act would misstate the research.
The research does inform the factors courts weigh. Sexual interest in children, the strongest predictor, is a characteristic a pattern of similar acts may reflect, which helps explain why similarity of victims and conduct carries weight. Seto (2018) describes offending against children as heterogeneous: some offenders have a persistent sexual interest in children, while others offend in circumstances shaped by opportunity, intoxication, or general antisociality. The decline in risk with time bears on remoteness, and the adolescent data bear on juvenile acts. These patterns do not establish what a particular act shows about a particular defendant and offer no basis for testimony that a defendant fits an offender profile.
How Jurors Use Other-Act Evidence
Older mock-jury research found that evidence of a defendant’s prior record increases convictions and that limiting instructions do little to confine its use. Wissler and Saks (1985) found that mock jurors convicted most often when the defendant had a prior conviction for the same crime, despite instructions to use it only on credibility, and Greene and Dodge (1995) found that a prior conviction increased guilty verdicts through attributions of criminal propensity that limiting instructions did not prevent. A meta-analysis of 48 studies with 8,474 participants found that instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence do not reliably eliminate its effect, although a judge’s explanation of the ruling may improve compliance (Steblay et al., 2006). Joinder research found that mock jurors were more likely to convict on a charge tried with others, particularly similar ones, and sometimes confused evidence across charges (Bordens & Horowitz, 1985; Tanford et al., 1985).
More recent research on CSA trials with deliberating mock juries reports a more qualified picture. In a study for the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 1,029 jury-eligible participants deliberated in 90 mock juries after viewing one of ten versions of a videotaped trial (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2016). Conviction rates rose as inculpatory evidence was added, and separate trials with tendency evidence from other complainants produced conviction rates similar to the joint trial; the researchers found no separate joinder effect, impermissible propensity reasoning was rare, and no verdict rested on conflating the evidence across complainants. In a later study of 325 jury-eligible citizens, evidence of uncharged sexual acts increased ratings of the accused’s culpability, but jurors were reluctant to convict on the complainant’s account alone, their inferences tracked the source and type of the evidence, and deliberations showed little sign of improper reasoning or a lowered standard of proof (Goodman-Delahunty & Martschuk, 2020).
The two bodies of work are not necessarily in conflict. The older studies mostly used nonsexual prior convictions, individual jurors, and rules that forbade propensity reasoning; the newer ones concern sexual-offense trials in which propensity use was permitted and ask whether juries used it in proportion to its strength. Together they suggest that other-act evidence substantially influences verdicts, that limiting instructions may have limited effect, and that the risk of unfair prejudice depends on how well the other act is proved, how it is presented, and how many disputed incidents the jury must resolve. Juror beliefs are discussed further in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource.
Multiple Complainants: Independence and Corroboration
When several children independently describe similar conduct by the same person, the accounts can corroborate one another in a way that propensity evidence alone does not. The reasoning, sometimes called the doctrine of chances, is that independent, similar accounts by unrelated children are unlikely to arise by coincidence or separate fabrication. The strength of that inference depends on independence: accounts independent in origin that converge on distinctive details provide substantial mutual support; accounts that share a common source do not.
Research on memory conformity and peer conversation shows that children who discuss an event, hear a rumor, or are told what another child said can incorporate that information into their own reports, in their own words and with confidence, so that non-independent accounts can look independent (Principe & Schindewolf, 2012; Wright et al., 2009). The research also cuts the other way. One child’s disclosure often prompts others, children abused by the same person may talk to one another, and an opportunity for contact does not show that influence occurred. Children who experienced the same conduct will often describe it similarly, and independent accounts commonly differ in peripheral detail. The companion paper on co-witness and peer contamination reviews the questions an independence analysis asks, including when the children had contact relative to each first statement, which details first appeared in which account, and whether the children were interviewed separately and on the record.
Contamination is distinct from fabrication: it can alter details of a true account. Equally, the absence of documented contact does not prove independence, because the relevant conversations are usually informal and unrecorded. Whether multiple allegations corroborate one another is a factual question about the history of each child’s disclosure.
Limits of the Evidence
Recidivism research relies on official records that undercount offending by unknown amounts, and follow-up periods, samples, and definitions differ across studies; self-report data come from small, often treatment-based samples. The research describes people already convicted, not people accused. Jury research relies on simulations with no real consequences and shortened trials, and the CSA-specific studies come largely from one research group working under Australian tendency-evidence law, so their findings may not generalize to every trial format or set of instructions.
No study can tell a court whether a particular defendant committed a particular other act, whether it shows a propensity, or whether a propensity explains the charged allegation, and none can establish from the content of several accounts alone whether they are independent. An uncharged, unprosecuted, or acquitted other act has not thereby been shown to be false, and an act proved under a clear-and-convincing or preponderance standard has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The research identifies the questions; the answers depend on the evidence in the case.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the average sexual recidivism rate of 13.7% (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005) is cited to minimize a prior act, a use the defense commonly makes, an attorney can ask what exactly was counted: detected reoffending by convicted people over about five to six years, which the authors cautioned underestimates offending. When the finding that 7.7% of people released after a sex offense were arrested for rape or sexual assault within nine years, against 2.3% of other released prisoners (Alper & Durose, 2019), is offered to show that the charged act is likely, a use the prosecution commonly makes, ask how large the effect is in absolute terms and whether it applies to this person: most were not rearrested, and a group rate is not the likelihood that a defendant committed the charged offense. When jury research is cited, ask who was studied: older studies of limiting instructions (Wissler & Saks, 1985) mostly used nonsexual prior convictions and individual jurors, while the CSA-specific findings (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2016) come largely from one research group under Australian tendency-evidence law. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Other-Act and Propensity Evidence and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) bars other-act evidence offered to prove character and conforming conduct but permits it for other purposes, such as motive, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake; since December 1, 2020, the prosecution must give written pretrial notice articulating the permitted purpose and its reasoning. Under Huddleston v. United States (1988), the court admits the evidence if the jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the act, and in Dowling v. United States (1990) the Supreme Court permitted evidence of conduct underlying an acquittal under Rule 404(b).
Rules 413 through 415 depart from that framework. Rule 414 provides that in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child molestation, which may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant, including propensity. The prosecutor must disclose the evidence at least 15 days before trial unless the court allows later disclosure for good cause. The rule defines a child as a person below age 14. Rule 413 applies the same approach to sexual-assault cases, and Rule 415 extends both rules to civil cases. The Supreme Court has reserved whether admitting propensity evidence violates due process (Estelle v. McGuire, 1991, n. 5).
The courts of appeals have upheld the rules on the condition that Rule 403 continues to apply. In United States v. Enjady (1998), the Tenth Circuit upheld Rule 413 against due process and equal protection challenges, reasoning that the rule would raise serious concerns without Rule 403’s safeguards; it required evidence sufficient for a jury to find the other act occurred and listed considerations including how clearly it was proved, how seriously the fact is disputed, the availability of less prejudicial evidence, and the risk of distraction and delay. In United States v. Guardia (1998), the court held that Rule 403 applies to Rule 413 evidence without any especially lenient standard and affirmed exclusion of other patients’ allegations against a physician, because each examination’s medical propriety was disputed and the evidence would have produced a six-incident trial with competing expert testimony. In United States v. LeMay (2001), the Ninth Circuit upheld Rule 414, emphasizing that district courts must conduct careful Rule 403 balancing on the record, considering the similarity of the prior acts, closeness in time, frequency, intervening circumstances, and the necessity of the evidence beyond testimony already offered (Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 2000). The prior act in LeMay, committed at age 12, was found similar and not too remote.
Military Rules of Evidence 404(b), 413, and 414 follow the federal structure. In United States v. Wright (2000), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld Rule 413 and required three threshold findings: that the accused is charged with an offense of sexual assault or child molestation, that the proffered evidence is evidence of the accused’s commission of another such offense, and that the evidence is relevant under Rules 401 and 402. The military judge then conducts Rule 403 balancing, considering factors including the strength of proof of the prior act, its probative weight, less prejudicial alternatives, distraction, time needed, temporal proximity, frequency, intervening circumstances, and the relationship between the parties. In United States v. Solomon (2013), the court held that acquitted conduct may be admitted with a proper Rule 403 analysis but reversed where the judge did not address alibi evidence and the prior allegation overtook the trial.
In United States v. Hills (2016), the court held that evidence of charged sexual misconduct may not be used under Rule 413 as propensity evidence to prove other charged sexual misconduct in the same court-martial when the accused has pleaded not guilty, because that use, and instructions permitting members to find the other charged acts by a preponderance of the evidence, is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. United States v. Hukill (2017) held that the rule applies regardless of forum, number of victims, or connection between the events, and United States v. Guardado (2017) and United States v. Upshaw (2021) applied the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. These cases arose under Rule 413; Rule 414 has the same structure, but its treatment in child-molestation cases should be confirmed in current decisions. Uncharged acts remain admissible after the Wright findings and Rule 403 balancing. For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including Article 120b offenses, charging and referral decisions rest with special trial counsel (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022), so their decisions whether to join allegations determine which of these rules governs.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) parallels the federal rule, but Arizona requires clear and convincing proof that the other act occurred and that the defendant committed it (State v. Terrazas, 1997), rejecting the Huddleston standard. Rule 404(c) provides that in a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a sexual offense, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted if relevant to show that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged. The court must first find that the evidence is sufficient for the trier of fact to find that the defendant committed the other act; that the other act provides a reasonable basis to infer such a propensity; and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or other Rule 403 concerns, considering among other factors remoteness, similarity, strength of the evidence, frequency, surrounding circumstances, and intervening events. The court must make specific findings on each requirement and instruct the jury on the evidence’s proper use, and the State must disclose the evidence before trial. “Sexual offense” is defined by reference to A.R.S. § 13-1420(C).
In State v. Aguilar (2004), a case in which one indictment charged sexual assaults of four women, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the first finding requires clear and convincing evidence, applying Terrazas; that the trial court must make specific findings on each element rather than repeating the language of the rule; and that a finding of cross-admissibility made on the grand jury transcript and argument, without assessing the credibility on which the disputed issue of consent turned, could not support denial of severance. The court reversed the convictions.
In State v. Ferrero (2012), the court held that uncharged sexual acts with the same child are governed by Rule 404(c) unless they are intrinsic to the charged offense, and it defined intrinsic evidence narrowly as evidence that directly proves the charged act or is performed contemporaneously with and directly facilitates its commission.
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3(a) permits joinder of offenses of the same or similar character, offenses based on the same or connected conduct, and offenses that are part of a common scheme or plan. Under Rule 13.4(b), a defendant is entitled to severance as of right of offenses joined only because they are of the same or similar character, unless evidence of the other offenses would be admissible if the offenses were tried separately. In multiple-complainant CSA cases, the severance question therefore usually turns on cross-admissibility under Rule 404(c), with the findings Aguilar requires. In State v. Conley (2023), where the State had not invoked Rule 404(c), the Court of Appeals held that offenses spanning about twelve years were not a common scheme or plan and that Rule 404(b) purposes masking character reasoning could not support joinder, but found the error harmless. Unlike the military rule in Hills, Arizona law permits charged acts involving one child to be considered as propensity evidence on counts involving another when the Rule 404(c) findings are made.
Data on how these rulings fare on appeal are limited. In a study of 168 appellate opinions reviewing CSA convictions from Maricopa County between 2005 and 2015, character evidence, which the authors defined to include uncharged acts and reputation or opinion testimony, was the most common issue when a specific type of evidence was challenged (49%). Convictions were almost never reversed (5 cases), relief when granted was a minor reduction in charges or sentence, and all four published opinions concerned character evidence (George et al., 2024). The study covers one county and describes appellate outcomes only; it does not show whether the trial rulings were correct or how the evidence affected verdicts.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The law permits use of well-proved, similar other acts in CSA cases, and the recidivism research is consistent with the premise that a sexual-offense history is informative at the group level; it does not measure the probative value of any particular act. Accounts from children who had no contact with one another and who describe similar, distinctive conduct can be among the strongest corroboration available. Prosecutors can support that evidence: documenting each child’s first disclosure and the circumstances of each forensic interview before the children have contact; building a record on every required finding, including Arizona’s clear-and-convincing standard and the factors the courts list; proposing a precise limiting instruction; and, in courts-martial, structuring charges and proffers with Hills in mind.
The research and the case law also counsel caution. Group recidivism figures do not measure the probative value of a particular act, and an expert or argument that presents them as the likelihood that the defendant committed the charged offense misstates the research and approaches profile evidence. Remote, adolescent, dissimilar, or weakly proved acts carry less weight, and Guardia and Solomon show that a trial that becomes a series of disputed mini-trials risks exclusion or reversal. When children knew one another or were interviewed in ways that conveyed what another child said, the value of their convergence depends on showing independence, and findings made without assessing the evidence, as in Aguilar, may not survive appeal.
Special Issues for Defense
The law and the research support rigorous scrutiny of other-act evidence. Defense counsel can test whether the other act is proved to the required standard, whether it is genuinely similar, how remote it is, whether intervening events matter, and whether the State needs it; can insist on specific findings under Aguilar, Wright, and LeMay; and can object to cross-use of charged acts under Hills and Hukill in courts-martial. The jury research supports the concern that other-act evidence strongly influences verdicts and that limiting instructions may not confine it. A chronology of contact, disclosure, and interviewing can show whether accounts that appear independent share a common source, and the research on adolescent recidivism and time offense-free bears on remote and juvenile acts.
The research and the case law also counsel caution. The recent CSA-specific jury studies did not find that propensity evidence routinely produced improper reasoning, so arguments premised on inevitable prejudice may be less persuasive than arguments about specific weaknesses. That children knew one another shows an opportunity for influence, not contamination or fabrication, and peripheral differences are expected in independent accounts. Low official recidivism rates do not show that a history of sexual offending is uninformative, because detection is incomplete, and an uncharged or unprosecuted allegation has not been shown to be false. Challenges that are specific to the proof, similarity, remoteness, and independence of the other acts are more persuasive, and more durable on appeal, than general objections to the propensity rules. Because appellate courts in one Arizona county rarely reversed convictions on character-evidence grounds (George et al., 2024), the record made in the trial court matters most.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Alper, M., & Durose, M. R. (2019). Recidivism of sex offenders released from state prison: A 9-year follow-up (2005–14) (NCJ 251773). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/recidivism-sex-offenders-released-state-prison-9-year-follow-2005-14
Bordens, K. S., & Horowitz, I. A. (1985). Joinder of criminal offenses: A review of the legal and psychological literature. Law and Human Behavior, 9(4), 339–353. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044475
Caldwell, M. F. (2016). Quantifying the decline in juvenile sexual recidivism rates. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 22(4), 414–426. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000094
George, S. S., Henderson, H., Flippin, M., Stolzenberg, S. N., & Lyon, T. D. (2024). Appellate review of child sexual abuse convictions: The importance of character evidence. Child Maltreatment, 29(4), 661–671. https://doi.org/10.1177/10775595231196096
Goodman-Delahunty, J., Cossins, A., & Martschuk, N. (2016). Jury reasoning in joint and separate trials of institutional child sexual abuse: An empirical study. Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. https://apo.org.au/node/65875
Goodman-Delahunty, J., & Martschuk, N. (2020). Mock jury and juror responses to uncharged acts of sexual misconduct: Advances in the assessment of unfair prejudice. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 228(3), 199–209. https://doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/a000410
Greene, E., & Dodge, M. (1995). The influence of prior record evidence on juror decision making. Law and Human Behavior, 19(1), 67–78. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499073
Hanson, R. K., Harris, A. J. R., Letourneau, E., Helmus, L. M., & Thornton, D. (2018). Reductions in risk based on time offense-free in the community: Once a sexual offender, not always a sexual offender. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 24(1), 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000135
Hanson, R. K., & Morton-Bourgon, K. E. (2005). The characteristics of persistent sexual offenders: A meta-analysis of recidivism studies. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 73(6), 1154–1163. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.73.6.1154
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Lyon, T. D., & Koehler, J. J. (1996). The relevance ratio: Evaluating the probative value of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases. Cornell Law Review, 82(1), 43. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol82/iss1/4
Principe, G. F., & Schindewolf, E. (2012). Natural conversations as a source of false memories in children: Implications for the testimony of young witnesses. Developmental Review, 32(3), 205–223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2012.06.003
Sandler, J. C., Freeman, N. J., & Socia, K. M. (2008). Does a watched pot boil? A time-series analysis of New York State’s sex offender registration and notification law. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 14(4), 284–302. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013881
Seto, M. C. (2018). Pedophilia and sexual offending against children: Theory, assessment, and intervention (2nd ed.). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0000107-000
Seto, M. C., Hanson, R. K., & Babchishin, K. M. (2011). Contact sexual offending by men with online sexual offenses. Sexual Abuse, 23(1), 124–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063210369013
Steblay, N., Hosch, H. M., Culhane, S. E., & McWethy, A. (2006). The impact on juror verdicts of judicial instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 30(4), 469–492. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9039-7
Tanford, S., Penrod, S., & Collins, R. (1985). Decision making in joined criminal trials: The influence of charge similarity, evidence similarity, and limiting instructions. Law and Human Behavior, 9(4), 319–337. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044474
Wissler, R. L., & Saks, M. J. (1985). On the inefficacy of limiting instructions: When jurors use prior conviction evidence to decide on guilt. Law and Human Behavior, 9(1), 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044288
Wright, D. B., Memon, A., Skagerberg, E. M., & Gabbert, F. (2009). When eyewitnesses talk. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18(3), 174–178. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01631.x
Legal Authorities
Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000).
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 97 P.3d 865 (2004).
State v. Conley, 523 P.3d 976 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).
State v. Ferrero, 229 Ariz. 239, 274 P.3d 509 (2012).
State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 944 P.2d 1194 (1997).
United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998).
United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Solomon, 72 M.J. 176 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
United States v. Upshaw, 81 M.J. 71 (C.A.A.F. 2021).
United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1420(C).
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Fed. R. Evid. 413.
Fed. R. Evid. 414.
Fed. R. Evid. 415.
Mil. R. Evid. 403.
Mil. R. Evid. 404(b).
Mil. R. Evid. 413.
Mil. R. Evid. 414.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b).
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4.
Related topic papers: Co-Witness and Peer Contamination · Grooming and the Process of Victimization · Harmful Sexual Behavior by Children and Adolescents · Vouching, Bolstering, and Profile Evidence · What Jurors Understand About Child Witnesses · Corroboration and Case Outcomes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom