Snap Shot
- The question: How often are child sexual abuse allegations true, unproven, or false, and what do substantiation, charging, and verdict figures actually measure?
- What the research shows: Investigations sort allegations into founded and unfounded, not true and false. In the studies most often cited, roughly half of investigated reports were unfounded, while the share documented as false or fictitious ranged from about 1.5 to 6 percent depending on the study and what was counted. That second figure is a floor. Erroneous allegations, sincerely made but not reflecting abuse, are a separate category from deliberate fabrication.
- What it does not show: The actual rate of false allegations is unknown, and no single figure can be presented as established; a documented false-allegation rate is best understood as a floor. Non-substantiation and acquittal are not findings of falsity, and the typology of false allegations describes confirmed false cases, not indicators that a particular allegation is false. Exoneration studies describe wrongful convictions, not how often allegations are false.
- The law: Quantifying a complainant’s likely truthfulness is vouching (Brooks, Mullins, Lindsey), and the same logic applies to statistics offered to suggest falsity. Motive evidence is proper impeachment (Davis, Mil. R. Evid. 608(c)), but a prior accusation is admissible as false only on a showing that it was false (Erikson, A.R.S. § 13-1421, Gilfillan).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can explain that many unfounded cases are unproven rather than disproven (though in some studies a substantial share were judged not to involve abuse) and should not offer the rarity of false allegations to support credibility; defense counsel can examine how an allegation arose and pair false-allegation figures with unfounding rates, without treating a motive or typology context as proof of falsity.
Few questions in child sexual abuse (CSA) litigation generate more argument, or more misused statistics, than how often allegations are true and how often they are false. Figures are offered for both propositions: that false allegations are rare, so a particular allegation is probably true, or that most allegations are never substantiated, so many must be false. Both arguments rest on the same error. Investigations and the legal system do not sort allegations into true and false; they sort them into founded (substantiated or proven) and unfounded (not substantiated). The unfounded group contains true allegations that could not be proven, concerns that turned out not to involve abuse, and a small number of allegations shown to be false. Founded and unfounded are what the system measures; true and false are what it usually cannot know.
The distinction reaches court when experts are asked about false-allegation rates, when counsel must interpret prior investigations that ended as “unsubstantiated” or “unfounded,” and when a defense theory rests on a motive to fabricate or a prosecution response rests on the rarity of fabrication. Investigations ask whether abuse can be established, not whether an allegation was false, so a formal determination of falsity is uncommon. The unfounding rate, the proportion of allegations investigated and not substantiated, is the figure every agency produces; a false-allegation rate counts only the smaller set of cases in which someone documented that an allegation was untrue. Any discussion of false allegations that omits the unfounding rate is incomplete.
This paper explains what substantiation, charging, and verdicts measure; why the unfounding rate is the more complete measure; what studies have found about false allegations and why no single “false allegation rate” can be treated as established; what exoneration data do and do not show; how deliberately false allegations differ from erroneous ones; and why the typology of false allegations does not supply indicators that a given allegation is false. It then reviews the limits of the evidence and the governing law.
Founded and Unfounded, Not True and False
A factfinder asks whether abuse happened. An investigation asks whether an allegation can be substantiated, and a large share cannot be resolved either way: a child’s account may be plausible but uncorroborated, a very young child may be unable to describe what happened, or an investigation may end because a family moves or the evidence is insufficient. Those cases are unfounded, which describes the state of the evidence, not the truth of the allegation.
Studies that looked inside the unfounded group have consistently found that only a small part of it was documented as false. Of 551 Denver CPS reports, 43 percent were substantiated; 21 percent were inconclusive, meaning abuse may have occurred but the evidence was insufficient; and 34 percent were judged not to be abuse, a group that included good-faith concerns by parents, community members, and professionals that proved groundless and nine fabrications by adults documented as such in the case records (9 of 551, about 1.6 percent by simple calculation). Erroneous accounts by children were 2.5 percent, of which 1.5 percent were deliberately false (Oates et al., 2000, pp. 149, 151–152). The authors recommended separate outcome categories, partly because the binary label “unsubstantiated” tends to suggest that abuse probably occurred but could not be proven (p. 154). In a 12-state study of extended forensic evaluations of 137 children whose initial statements were unclear, about 19 percent were judged abuse unlikely and about 36 percent unclear, and an adult appeared to have coached the child in 3 percent (Carnes et al., 2001). Neither the clinical judgment “abuse unlikely” nor “unclear” is a count of false allegations.
The Unfounding Rate and the False-Allegation Rate
Every agency classifies every case it closes, so the unfounding rate is available in virtually every study. A false-allegation rate exists only when an investigator, clinician, or court made an affirmative determination of falsity, for example by crediting a recantation, obtaining an admission that a child was coached, or documenting a fabrication. Unfounded cases that were in fact false but were closed without such a finding are not counted, so a false-allegation rate is a floor, not an estimate of how many allegations were untrue, and quoting it alone, as though it were the complement of the rate of true allegations, is misleading. The unfounding rate has the opposite limitation: it includes true allegations that could not be proven, so it cannot be read as the proportion false either. Its value is completeness. In the studies most often cited, roughly half of investigated reports were unfounded, while the share documented as false or fictitious ranged from about 1.5 to 6 percent depending on the study and what was counted:
[[TABLE]]
In each study in the table, the cases documented as false were a minority of the cases classed as unfounded, and the table gives each study’s own counts. A low false-allegation rate is fully compatible with a high unfounding rate, and when a witness offers one figure, the other is needed to interpret it.
What Substantiation, Charging, and Verdicts Measure
These terms measure provability under a particular standard, not truth. A child protective services (CPS) finding of “unsubstantiated” or “unfounded” in most systems means maltreatment could not be established, not that the report was shown false. In Arizona, a Department of Child Safety finding is substantiated only if supported by a preponderance of the evidence, after administrative review and, if requested, a hearing before an administrative law judge (A.R.S. § 8-811). Nationally, about 18 percent of the nearly 3 million children who received a CPS investigation or alternative response in fiscal year 2024 were determined to be victims of any form of maltreatment (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2026); the rest include children who received a non-investigative response (less relevant to sexual abuse, which several states require be investigated), children who were not maltreated, children whose maltreatment could not be established, and good-faith reports made on incomplete information. Under FBI crime-reporting rules, by contrast, a police report is “unfounded” only when investigation shows that no offense occurred, so police and CPS figures are not comparable without checking which meaning applies. Substantiation can also track factors other than what happened. In 315 forensic interviews at one Midwestern Children’s Advocacy Center, substantiation was more likely when the child disclosed, when the child was White, and when the alleged perpetrator was a person of color, and disclosure raised the likelihood of substantiation more for White children (Stevenson & Rivers, 2023). The study was archival and from one site, and it did not test which determinations were accurate.
Prosecutors charge when they expect the evidence to support conviction; charging has been associated with a child’s disclosure, a corroborating witness, an offender confession, and additional reports against the same suspect (Walsh et al., 2010). An acquittal means the government did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, 1970), not that the allegation was false. Attrition from report to conviction reflects the difficulty of proving CSA as well as some mistaken or false reports. Treating every case short of conviction as false conflates the unproven with the disproven; treating every case not shown false as true makes the same error in reverse.
What Studies Have Found About False Allegations
Studies that tried to identify false allegations directly find deliberately false allegations to be a small minority of reports within a much larger unfounded group. In 576 Denver CPS reports, about 6 percent were fictitious, most made by adults and some arising in custody or visitation disputes; the authors cautioned that their figures had already been misused in court to decide whether particular cases were true (Jones & McGraw, 1987). North Carolina caseworkers judged about 4.7 percent of 1,249 cases to involve a false report by the child, a figure the authors considered likely inflated by questionable determinations (Everson & Boat, 1989). Canadian national data on all forms of maltreatment classified 4 percent of investigations as intentionally fabricated, 12 percent where there was a custody or access dispute, with neglect the most common fabricated report (Trocmé & Bala, 2005).
A critical review concluded that the large majority of allegations are true and that false allegations occur at a rate that is not negligible, but that the actual rate is unknown, because studies use unclear or invalid criteria for truth and falsity, unrepresentative samples, and no control for context such as the stage at which an allegation is made; the authors cautioned against courtroom claims about specific rates (O’Donohue et al., 2018). Estimates in the low single digits, near 10 percent in some contexts, and higher in small clinical samples measure different things by different methods. No single figure can be presented as the established rate of false allegations, while unfounding rates are reported consistently near half of reports.
Exonerations: What Wrongful-Conviction Data Show
Two 2026 analyses of the National Registry of Exonerations describe CSA convictions later set aside. In 326 cases from 1989 to 2024, perjury or false accusation was the most frequent contributing factor; mistaken identification and false confessions were rare; physical or forensic evidence offered at trial was often later found false or misleading; and post-conviction recantation was the most common basis for exoneration, DNA rarely (Miller et al., 2026). In all 339 known U.S. cases, features included recantation (49.0 percent), delayed disclosure (47.5 percent), a family member or caregiver as the alleged perpetrator (47.2 percent), suggestive questioning (21.8 percent), and a custody dispute (19.5 percent); 28.3 percent had some corroborative evidence (Denne et al., 2026). The authors wrote that case characteristics appear quite similar for true and false allegations and are not necessarily clear indicators of allegation veracity.
These data describe wrongful convictions, not the rate of false allegations; these features occur in both groups, so neither shows which group a case belongs to. The Registry counts only overturned convictions, is not a random sample of false allegations, and has no denominator, so an exoneration count is not a false-allegation rate and says nothing about the unfounding rate, which remains roughly half of reports. Because recantation was the usual route to exoneration, its frequency here partly reflects how cases were identified. The data show that false accusations sometimes survive investigation and trial, and that recantation and delay also appear in wrongful convictions; they do not show that either feature indicates falsity, because both are common in substantiated cases.
Erroneous and Deliberately False Allegations
A deliberately false allegation is one the person making it knows to be untrue. An erroneous allegation is sincerely made but does not reflect abuse. In the Denver series, erroneous concerns included parents or relatives reacting to exploratory sexual play between siblings or to vaginal redness later found unrelated to abuse, a preschool teacher reporting a child’s masturbation, and children who confused or misinterpreted an innocent event (Oates et al., 2000, p. 152). An adult who holds such a concern may then question the child in ways that shape the account. A fabrication raises questions about motive and opportunity; an erroneous allegation raises questions about how the concern arose, who spoke with the child, what was asked, and whether the forensic interview was conducted under conditions associated with accurate reporting. Repeated suggestive questioning combined with negative stereotypes can lead preschool children to make false claims they appear to believe (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; see Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Treating every erroneous allegation as a lie overstates fabrication; treating every allegation not fabricated as true ignores the erroneous pathway. When an expert says false allegations are rare, the statement often refers only to deliberate fabrication.
Typologies of False Allegations and Their Limits
The most widely cited framework is a clinical typology drawn from a literature review, case reports, and clinical experience, describing false allegations arising in a custody dispute, from psychological disturbance in the accuser, as conscious manipulation by a child or adolescent, and from iatrogenic factors introduced by those who questioned or evaluated the child (Mikkelsen et al., 1992). The authors noted that cases may combine subtypes and emphasized a comprehensive evaluation as free of bias as possible.
The typology describes circumstances found in cases judged false. It was not developed or validated to determine whether a particular allegation is false, and each subtype describes a context in which true allegations also arise: abuse is sometimes first disclosed during a custody dispute, a person with a psychological disorder can accurately report abuse, an angry adolescent can be truthful, and a flawed interview can follow a real event. A context is an indicator of falsity only if research shows it occurs substantially more often in false cases than in true ones, and the typology does not supply that comparison. Group-level patterns, such as fabricated reports coming more often from noncustodial parents and anonymous reporters (Trocmé & Bala, 2005) and false reports being more frequent among adolescents than young children (Everson & Boat, 1989), do not establish that an adolescent’s allegation is suspect or that a young child’s is reliable.
Errors in Both Directions
Investigations can accept false allegations and can fail to recognize true ones. Lyon (1995) argued that attention to false allegations must be matched by attention to false denials by abused children. In a 2024 study, police officers and laypersons who watched recorded interviews of 3- and 5-year-olds tended to believe false denials, and officers were relatively more accurate with false reports than with false denials (Johnson et al., 2024); the children were preschoolers, so the findings may not extend to older children. Researchers who documented the conditions producing false reports have identified unwarranted assumptions on both sides, including about how much suggestion taints a report, whether observers can detect it, and how children deny, disclose, and recant (Ceci et al., 2007). If every disclosure is accepted as true and every denial or recantation is explained away, no evidence could show an allegation was mistaken; if every inconsistency, delay, or interview flaw is treated as proof of fabrication or taint, no evidence could show it was true. Sound analysis evaluates the particular allegation on how it arose and what corroborates or contradicts it.
Limits of the Evidence
The central limitation is ground truth: in most field studies no one knows with certainty what happened. Classifications rest on CPS determinations, clinical judgments, confessions, convictions, or recantations, each imperfect: confessions and convictions cluster in stronger cases, recantations follow both false reports and true reports withdrawn under pressure, and caseworker judgments reflect their makers’ attitudes and information. Samples defined by substantiation favor children who disclosed clearly, distorting estimates of disclosure and of how often reports are true or false (Lyon, 2007). These problems are why the actual rate of false allegations is unknown (O’Donohue et al., 2018) and why reported false rates run low. The most cited studies were collected between the early 1980s and 1998, before recorded, protocol-based forensic interviews and Children’s Advocacy Centers became widespread, and the typology was built from case reports rather than systematic comparison of true and false cases. No rate can establish whether a particular allegation is true or false.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the 4.7 percent false-report figure (Everson & Boat, 1989) is offered to show that false allegations are rare, ask what was counted: the same study’s unfounding rate was 44 percent, and the figure counts only cases caseworkers judged false. When the 55.5 percent of children without a credible disclosure (Carnes et al., 2001) is offered to suggest that many allegations are false, ask the same question: that group combined abuse judged unlikely with unclear cases, and an adult appeared to have coached the child in 3 percent. When the 12 percent custody-dispute rate (Trocmé & Bala, 2005) is cited, ask who was studied: the data covered all maltreatment, and overall 4 percent of cases were intentionally fabricated while 35 percent were unsubstantiated. When the Mikkelsen et al. (1992) typology is applied to a case, ask compared with whom. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Founded, Unfounded, and False Allegations and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, 1970) is the reason a criminal verdict is a judgment about proof rather than about truth. Expert testimony about false-allegation research is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Military Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and United States v. Houser (1993); the December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702, incorporated in the 2025 Military Rules of Evidence amendments, requires the proponent to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that each opinion reflects a reliable application of reliable methods (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). Given the measurement problems described above, a specific numerical claim about the frequency of false allegations raises a substantial reliability question.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that testimony quantifying the likelihood that a child complainant is truthful is the functional equivalent of vouching. In United States v. Brooks (2007), expert testimony about the rarity of false allegations that implied a better than 98 percent likelihood that the complainant was truthful was plain error, and in United States v. Mullins (2010), testimony implying that only about one in two hundred such allegations is false was error. The logic of those decisions applies equally to statistics offered to suggest falsity, such as non-substantiation, non-prosecution, or acquittal rates presented as though they were false-allegation rates.
Evidence of a motive to fabricate is a recognized form of impeachment. The Confrontation Clause protects cross-examination directed to a witness’s bias or motive (Davis v. Alaska, 1974), and Military Rule of Evidence 608(c) permits bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent to be shown by examination of the witness or by other evidence. Evidence that a complainant previously made a false accusation is treated differently. In United States v. Erikson (2017), the court held that evidence of a prior accusation is admissible only if the accused shows that the prior accusation was false, and that an acquittal at the earlier proceeding was not dispositive of falsity. Where Military Rule of Evidence 412 applies, its procedural requirements must be met.
Arizona
State v. Lindsey (1986) bars expert testimony quantifying the proportion of complainants who tell the truth (149 Ariz. at 475–76), and State v. Moran (1986) bars expert opinion, direct or indirect, on whether a particular complainant is credible; Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment, governs the reliability of any expert testimony on the research. Arizona’s rape shield statute permits evidence of false allegations of sexual misconduct made by the victim against others if, after a hearing on written motions, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the evidence is relevant and material and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value (A.R.S. § 13-1421(A)(5), (B)); in State v. Gilfillan (2000), the Court of Appeals upheld exclusion of alleged prior false accusations where that showing had not been made. Department of Child Safety substantiation decisions are made under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (A.R.S. § 8-811), so an unsubstantiated finding means that standard was not met. Knowingly and intentionally making a false report of child abuse or neglect with malice, or coercing another to do so, is a class 1 misdemeanor (A.R.S. § 13-3620.01).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports explaining to a factfinder that the unfounding rate is not a false-allegation rate, that many unsubstantiated, unprosecuted, and unconvicted cases are unproven rather than disproven (although in some studies a substantial share of unfounded reports were judged not to involve abuse, which is still different from a deliberately false report), and that deliberately false allegations were a minority of reports in the studies that tried to identify them, including those cited above. When the defense relies on a prior investigation that ended without substantiation, or on general claims that many allegations are false, a qualified expert can explain what those categories measure. A possible motive, such as a pending custody dispute or an adolescent’s conflict with the accused, does not by itself make an allegation false, because true allegations arise in the same contexts.
The research also counsels caution about the converse argument. A low rate of proven-false allegations does not show that a particular allegation is true, and presenting it without the unfounding rate from the same studies understates how often allegations go unconfirmed. Testimony that false allegations are rare, offered to support the complainant’s credibility, is the error identified in Brooks, Mullins, and Lindsey. Exoneration research found recantation (49.0%) and delayed disclosure (47.5%) in a nonrandom group of 339 known wrongful CSA convictions (Denne et al., 2026), so testimony that these features are typical of true allegations should not imply that they confirm one. Where the record shows both a context associated with false or erroneous reports and suggestive questioning or an interested adult’s involvement before the forensic interview, the reliability question is legitimate and is best met with a documented, protocol-based interview and independent corroboration rather than with base rates.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports a disciplined inquiry into how an allegation arose. Counsel can identify whether the facts fit a recognized pathway, including the erroneous pathway of misinterpreted behavior and suggestive questioning and the iatrogenic pathway of contaminated interviewing, and can distinguish a deliberately false allegation from an honestly mistaken one. Where testimony relies on the rarity of false allegations, counsel can ask for the unfounding rate in the same studies and show that false-allegation figures count only documented falsity and do not address the large unfounded category, that the true rate of false allegations is unknown, and that the courts have treated quantified truthfulness testimony as vouching. Exoneration research documents wrongful CSA convictions built on false accusations and on physical or forensic evidence later found false or misleading (Miller et al., 2026), which supports scrutiny of how an allegation and any forensic evidence arose; exoneration counts are not, however, a false-allegation rate.
The research also counsels caution. The typology of false allegations describes circumstances found in confirmed false cases; it does not establish that an allegation arising in those circumstances is false, and an expert may not opine that a particular allegation is false any more than that it is true. The unfounding rate measures uncertainty, not falsity; non-substantiation and acquittal are not findings that an allegation was false, and evidence of a prior allegation is admissible as a prior false accusation only on a showing that it was in fact false. A motive argument is most persuasive when it is tied to specific evidence of how the allegation was produced rather than to the existence of a motive alone.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Carnes, C. N., Nelson-Gardell, D., Wilson, C., & Orgassa, U. C. (2001). Extended forensic evaluation when sexual abuse is suspected: A multisite field study. Child Maltreatment, 6(3), 230–242. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077559501006003004
Ceci, S. J., & Bruck, M. (1993). Suggestibility of the child witness: A historical review and synthesis. Psychological Bulletin, 113(3), 403–439. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.113.3.403
Ceci, S. J., Kulkofsky, S., Klemfuss, J. Z., Sweeney, C. D., & Bruck, M. (2007). Unwarranted assumptions about children’s testimonial accuracy. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 3, 311–328. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.3.022806.091354
Denne, E., Sullivan, C. E., & Neal, T. M. S. (2026). Characteristics of exonerated cases of child sexual abuse. Frontiers in Psychology, 17, Article 1794898. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1794898
Everson, M. D., & Boat, B. W. (1989). False allegations of sexual abuse by children and adolescents. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 28(2), 230–235. https://doi.org/10.1097/00004583-198903000-00014
Johnson, H. M., Block, S. D., Shestowsky, D., Gonzales, J. E., Shockley, K. L., & Goodman, G. S. (2024). Discernment of children’s true and false memory reports: Police officers and laypersons. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 39(9–10), 2238–2260. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605231220022
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Jones, D. P. H., & McGraw, J. M. (1987). Reliable and fictitious accounts of sexual abuse to children. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2(1), 27–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/088626087002001002
Leichtman, M. D., & Ceci, S. J. (1995). The effects of stereotypes and suggestions on preschoolers’ reports. Developmental Psychology, 31(4), 568–578. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.31.4.568
Lyon, T. D. (1995). False allegations and false denials in child sexual abuse. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 1(2), 429–437. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.1.2.429
Lyon, T. D. (2007). False denials: Overcoming methodological biases in abuse disclosure research. In M.-E. Pipe, M. E. Lamb, Y. Orbach, & A.-C. Cederborg (Eds.), Child sexual abuse: Disclosure, delay, and denial (pp. 41–62). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Mikkelsen, E. J., Gutheil, T. G., & Emens, M. (1992). False sexual-abuse allegations by children and adolescents: Contextual factors and clinical subtypes. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 46(4), 556–570. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.psychotherapy.1992.46.4.556
Miller, Q. C., Fessinger, M. B., & Klemfuss, J. Z. (2026). An archival analysis of 326 child sexual abuse cases from the National Registry of Exonerations. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1555(1), Article e70199. https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.70199
Oates, R. K., Jones, D. P. H., Denson, D., Sirotnak, A., Gary, N., & Krugman, R. D. (2000). Erroneous concerns about child sexual abuse. Child Abuse & Neglect, 24(1), 149–157. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0145-2134(99)00108-8
O’Donohue, W., Cummings, C., & Willis, B. (2018). The frequency of false allegations of child sexual abuse: A critical review. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 27(5), 459–475. https://doi.org/10.1080/10538712.2018.1477224
Stevenson, M. C., & Rivers, M. A. (2023). When disclosure fails to substantiate abuse: Child and perpetrator race predict child sexual abuse substantiation. Child Maltreatment, 28(4), 621–633. https://doi.org/10.1177/10775595231157729
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Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 998 P.2d 1069 (App. 2000).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Erikson, 76 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-811.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1421.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3620.01.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 412.
Mil. R. Evid. 608(c).
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Related topic papers: Introduction to Child Sexual Abuse Allegations · Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference · Allegations in Divorce and Custody Disputes, and Parental Alienation · Misinformation and Pre-Interview Contamination · Recantation in Child Sexual Abuse Cases · Vouching, Bolstering, and Profile Evidence
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Courts-Martial