Snap Shot
- The question: How do Canada, England and Wales, Victoria (Australia), Germany, Sweden, and Norway define consent and the incapacity that heavy drinking can cause, and what does the comparison mean for sexual assault cases tried under Arizona law or the Uniform Code of Military Justice?
- What the research shows: The laws reviewed share a core idea, that a person who lacks the ability to understand or to choose, or who is unconscious or asleep, is not treated as consenting, but they differ on how consent is defined, whether intoxication is named, and how an accused’s belief or negligence is treated. None of the provisions reviewed makes later non-recall an element. Two small English studies, one of 14 barristers and one of mock-jury deliberations, reported that some provisions were applied narrowly or interpreted in varied ways; they do not show how jurors apply U.S. definitions.
- What it does not show: Foreign law does not govern a U.S. case, and a difference in wording does not show that one system reaches better or more accurate outcomes. The comparison does not show whether a particular person was capable of consenting, and the blackout research has not been shown to supply that answer in any system.
- The law: In courts-martial, Article 120 separates lack of consent from incapacity due to an intoxicant, and the definition of incapacity turns on appraising the conduct or declining or communicating unwillingness (Art. 120(g)(8); Pease; Mendoza). Arizona defines “without consent” to include incapacity by reason of drugs, alcohol, sleep, or similar impairment that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can use the comparison to show that incapacity standards are widely recognized and none of the provisions reviewed makes later memory the test; defense counsel can use it to show that standards differ and that the accused’s knowledge, belief, or negligence is addressed separately in most of the systems reviewed, while both should avoid treating a foreign rule as if it governed a U.S. court.
Sexual assault cases that involve alcohol raise a question that legal systems answer in different words: when does heavy drinking leave a person unable to consent? The question reaches court in the United States whenever a complainant says, or is shown, to have been drinking heavily, and it is often confused with a different question, whether the person later remembers the events. Legislatures and courts in many countries have addressed both, and their solutions show which features of the problem are matters of legal design and which are matters of fact.
This paper summarizes how six jurisdictions outside the United States define consent and incapacity due to intoxication, as of the dates noted in the legal authorities: Canada, England and Wales, the Australian state of Victoria, Germany, Sweden, and Norway. It compares them briefly with Arizona and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and then discusses, neutrally, what the comparison does and does not mean. The summaries are general descriptions of the statutes and decisions named, not a survey of all case law, and foreign laws change.
Two Questions That Different Laws Keep Apart
A blackout is a failure to form lasting memories of events while a person remains awake and able to act; it is a statement about later recall. Capacity to consent is a statement about a person’s condition at the time: whether the person could understand what was happening, make a choice, or communicate it. The blackout research has not identified a validated behavioral sign of a blackout in progress (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016), and a person can be in a blackout and capable, or incapable without a blackout (see Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity: How They Overlap). The legal definitions reviewed below are written in terms of the person’s state at the time, such as unconsciousness, understanding, choice, or the ability to form or express a will. None of the provisions reviewed refers to later memory.
Two other questions are also kept apart in most of these systems. One is whether the complainant consented or was capable of consenting; the other is what the accused knew, believed, or should have recognized. The second question carries most of the differences among the countries, because it determines whether an accused’s own drinking, a mistaken belief, or a failure to check affects liability.
Canada
The Criminal Code defines consent for sexual assault offences as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question,” and it provides that consent must exist at the time of the activity (Criminal Code, s. 273.1(1), (1.1)). It lists circumstances in which no consent is obtained, including that the complainant is unconscious and that the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity for any other reason, and the list does not limit other circumstances (s. 273.1(2), (3)). In R. v. J.A. (2011), the Supreme Court of Canada held that the consent required for sexual assault is conscious agreement to each sexual act as it occurs, so advance consent does not cover activity that takes place while the person is unconscious. In R. v. G.F. (2021), the Court described capacity as a precondition of consent: the person must have a mind able to understand what the physical act is, that it is sexual in nature, who the partner is, and that the person is free to choose whether to take part.
The accused’s side is addressed separately. A belief that the complainant consented is not a defence where it arose from the accused’s self-induced intoxication, recklessness or wilful blindness, where the accused did not take reasonable steps in the circumstances known to the accused to ascertain consent, or where there is no evidence that the complainant’s agreement was affirmatively expressed by words or conduct (Criminal Code, s. 273.2). A different line of law concerns an accused’s own extreme intoxication. The Supreme Court struck down the earlier provision that barred the defence of extreme intoxication akin to automatism for violent offences (R. v. Brown, 2022), and Parliament replaced it in June 2022 with a provision under which a person can be held responsible for harm caused in that state if the person was negligent in becoming so intoxicated (Department of Justice Canada, 2022). That regime concerns the accused’s capacity for voluntary action and does not define a complainant’s capacity to consent.
England and Wales
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides that a person consents if the person agrees by choice and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice (s. 74). The Act separately sets out circumstances in which the court presumes, unless sufficient evidence is raised to the contrary, that the complainant did not consent and that the defendant did not reasonably believe in consent. These apply when the prosecution proves that the defendant knew of the circumstance, and they include that the complainant was asleep or otherwise unconscious and that a substance capable of causing the complainant to be stupefied or overpowered was administered without the complainant’s consent (s. 75(1), (2)(d), (2)(f)). The second circumstance concerns substances given to the complainant without agreement; it does not apply to a complainant’s own voluntary drinking. Whether a defendant’s belief in consent was reasonable is decided with regard to all the circumstances, including any steps taken to ascertain consent (s. 1(2)).
For a complainant who drank voluntarily, the leading decision is R v Bree (2007). The Court of Appeal held that a complainant who has temporarily lost the capacity to choose because of drink is not consenting, that a complainant who remained capable of choosing and agreed has not been raped even if she had drunk heavily, and that capacity to consent can fail well before a person becomes unconscious. The court rejected the idea that a complainant who was too drunk to consent is nonetheless treated as having consented, and it treated the absence of a jury direction on capacity as a ground for quashing the conviction.
Case Example. In R v Bree (2007), the Court of Appeal of England and Wales quashed a rape conviction in a case in which the complainant had been drinking heavily before intercourse. The court held that the trial had not given the jury adequate directions on whether the complainant had the capacity to choose, on how the prosecution’s case had been put, and on how her drinking bore on what she did and said. It explained the legal line between a person who has lost the capacity to choose and a person who remains able to choose despite heavy drinking. The case illustrates how a legal system can state a capacity test in words while leaving the question of where an individual falls to the fact-finder; it does not say how much alcohol produces incapacity, and it says nothing about what the complainant in that case remembered.
Practitioners and mock jurors in England have reported difficulty with the concepts. In interviews with 14 barristers about alcohol-involved rape cases, the authors found that some provisions introduced in 2003, including the consent definition and the section 75(2)(f) presumption, were not always used as intended and had been applied narrowly (Gunby et al., 2010). In mock jury deliberations after a trial reconstruction, the concepts of freedom, capacity, and reasonableness proved open to varied interpretation, and the authors cautioned about the limits of mock-jury methods (Finch & Munro, 2006). These are small studies of particular samples and describe perceptions and deliberations, not outcomes in real trials.
Victoria, Australia
Victoria’s reforms are the most recent of the common-law examples. Under the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), consent means free and voluntary agreement (s 36). A list of circumstances in which a person does not consent includes that the person does not say or do anything to indicate consent, that the person is asleep or unconscious, and that the person is so affected by alcohol or another drug as to be incapable of consenting or of withdrawing consent (s 36AA). The current official text of s 36AA was not read for this paper; a commentary on the earlier s 36(2) quotes this limb as incapable of consenting and, separately, as incapable of withdrawing consent, so the exact current wording and numbering should be confirmed.
The accused’s belief is addressed in two further provisions. A belief in consent is not reasonable if, within a reasonable time before or at the time of the act, the accused did not say or do anything to find out whether the other person consented; an exception applies where a cognitive impairment or mental illness other than self-induced intoxication was a substantial cause of the failure to check, and the accused bears the burden of proving it on the balance of probabilities (s 36A). Where the accused’s intoxication was self-induced, the reasonableness of the belief is judged by the standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated (s 36B). The amendments to s 36 and s 36AA and the “say or do something” requirement came from the Justice Legislation Amendment (Sexual Offences and Other Matters) Act 2022 (Vic) and are reported to have taken effect on July 30, 2023.
Germany
German criminal law moved in 2016 from a model that required force, threat, or a defenseless position toward one based on the other person’s recognizable will. Section 177(1) of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) punishes sexual acts performed against another person’s recognizable will. Section 177(2) separately reaches several situations, including where the offender exploits that the person is unable to form or express a will opposed to the act (no. 1), and where the offender exploits that the person’s ability to form or express a will is considerably restricted by physical or mental state, unless the offender has assured himself of the person’s consent (no. 2). The statute does not name alcohol or other intoxicants; intoxication reaches the provision through the person’s resulting state, and how particular levels of intoxication are classified is a matter for the courts.
Sweden
Sweden’s 2018 reform made participation that is not voluntary the core of the offence of rape. Chapter 6, section 1 of the Penal Code (Brottsbalken) punishes anyone who has sexual intercourse, or a comparable sexual act, with a person who is not participating voluntarily. In assessing voluntariness, particular attention is to be paid to whether it was expressed through words, actions, or otherwise. A person is never regarded as participating voluntarily if participation results from violence or threats, or from the offender’s improper exploitation of the person’s particularly vulnerable situation because of unconsciousness, sleep, severe fear, intoxication or other drug influence, illness, injury, or mental disorder, or similar circumstances. The law took effect on July 1, 2018 (SFS 2018:618). The same reform created the offence of negligent rape, which applies to a person who commits the act and is grossly negligent as to whether the other person is participating voluntarily (Brottsbalken 6 kap. 1 a §), with a lower maximum penalty than rape.
How Swedish courts apply the vulnerable-situation provision to a person who is intoxicated was not reviewed for this paper.
Norway
In June 2025 the Norwegian Parliament adopted a consent-based definition of rape in Chapter 26 of the Penal Code (Straffeloven). Section 291, as amended, punishes sexual intercourse with a person who has consented neither in words nor in conduct, with a maximum penalty of six years, and sets higher penalties, up to ten years, for specified forms, including intercourse with a person who by words or conduct expresses unwillingness and with a person who is unable to resist the act. A former provision on exploiting a person unable to resist (section 292) was repealed. The enacted text does not define consent beyond “in words or conduct,” and it does not name sleep or intoxication. The Storting decision (June 6, 2025) leaves entry into force to the King, and this paper did not confirm the date on which the consent-based text took effect. How Norwegian courts will treat an intoxicated complainant under the new text will develop through decisions and commentary.
Comparing the Definitions, Briefly
Across the six jurisdictions, three patterns recur. First, a baseline definition of consent now stands apart from force: voluntary or free agreement (Canada, Victoria, England and Wales), a recognizable contrary will (Germany), voluntary participation (Sweden), and consent in words or conduct (Norway). Second, each system recognizes that some people cannot consent: unconscious or sleeping persons are addressed expressly in Canada (unconscious), England and Wales, Victoria, and Sweden, and the other statutes reach such persons through inability to form, express, or resist a will. Third, intoxication is named in the statutory text as read for this paper in Victoria and Sweden and is reached through capacity or state in Canada, England and Wales (by decision, in Bree), Germany, and Norway.
The systems differ more on the accused’s side. Canada bars a belief in consent that arises from self-induced intoxication, and Victoria judges the belief by the standard of a sober person; both require the accused to say or do something to find out. England and Wales judge reasonableness on all the circumstances, with presumptions in limited circumstances. Germany’s second category excuses the actor who assured himself of consent. Sweden and Norway add negligence-based offences with lower penalties. These are policy choices about who bears the risk of a mistake, not findings about intoxication.
Arizona and the Military Compared
Under Article 120, UCMJ, a sexual act is an offense when done without consent (Art. 120(b)(2)(A)), when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)), and when the other person is incapable of consenting because of impairment by an intoxicant and the accused knows or reasonably should know of the condition (Art. 120(b)(3)(A)). “Incapable of consenting” means incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct at issue, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act (Art. 120(g)(8)). Under the earlier statute, United States v. Pease (2016) approved a definition of incapacity as lacking the ability to appreciate the conduct or to make or communicate a decision about it. In United States v. Mendoza (2024), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories and that the government cannot prove lack of consent merely by showing that the complainant was too intoxicated to consent, although intoxication evidence remains admissible on consent; United States v. Moore (2026) applied the same separation to sleep.
In Arizona, “without consent” includes that the victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep, or any other similar impairment of cognition, and the condition is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). The State must also prove that the defendant acted knowing the act was without consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406; RAJI (Criminal) 14.06.01), and voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503). Read beside the foreign provisions, both U.S. systems resemble the Canadian and Victorian structure in separating incapacity from non-consent, and resemble England’s structure in tying the accused’s liability to what was known or reasonably should have been known. Neither U.S. system, as described here, imposes a “say or do something” duty on the accused; the military mistake-of-fact rule instead asks whether a belief is one an ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have held.
Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical in which a person who drank heavily over several hours has no memory of the later part of an evening, while two witnesses describe the person as talking, walking without help, and sending text messages. Under each framework the legal question would be about the person’s condition at the relevant time, whether the person understood the act and could choose or communicate, not about the memory gap. The witnesses’ descriptions would bear on that question, and so would any evidence of slurred speech, confusion, or unresponsiveness. The memory gap alone would not decide it in any of the systems discussed, and the example does not say how a fact-finder should resolve a particular case.
What the Comparison Does and Does Not Mean for U.S. Cases
The comparison supports a few modest points. The first is that the separation of capacity from memory is not peculiar to U.S. law. The provisions reviewed address the person’s state at the time, and a witness or expert, for either side, who treats later non-recall as if it alone settled capacity is not answering the question the reviewed provisions ask. The second is that the definitions use different mental vocabularies: appraising conduct, understanding the act and the choice, forming or expressing a will, physical inability to decline or communicate. These point to different kinds of evidence, and an expert asked about capacity should first learn which definition governs.
The comparison also has clear limits. Foreign statutes and decisions do not bind Arizona courts or courts-martial. A legislative choice, such as requiring an accused to take steps to check consent, is a policy decision about risk allocation; it is not evidence that intoxicated complainants are more or less capable than a U.S. definition assumes. Cross-national comparisons of conviction or reporting rates are confounded by differences in definitions, investigative practice, trial structure, and data collection, and this paper does not rely on them. Finally, nothing in the comparison supplies a method to determine, afterward, whether a particular person was capable of consenting; the research describes groups, no blood alcohol concentration is a cutoff for an individual, and the question remains one for the fact-finder on all the evidence.
Limits of the Evidence
The legal summaries rest on the statutes and decisions named, several read through secondary sources or mirror sites rather than the official gazette, and the German, Swedish, and Norwegian provisions are summarized here without a certified legal translation or review by a lawyer from those jurisdictions. Foreign law changes, and decisions after the dates noted may alter the picture. The empirical studies cited are small: 14 barristers in one interview study, mock-jury deliberations in one English study, and 261 mock jurors in a study of witness intoxication (Dilevski et al., 2024), in which witness intoxication and role did not change judgments of defendant guilt, victims were rated lower than bystanders on credibility, competence, and honesty, and amphetamine-intoxicated witnesses were rated less credible than sober witnesses, while witnesses who had drunk alcohol or used cannabis did not differ from sober witnesses on any rating. Mock-juror studies cannot show what real juries do, and the abstracts consulted did not report separate findings by participant sex. The statutory language in the provisions reviewed is sex-neutral and applies to complainants and accused persons of any sex, although most reported cases involve female complainants and male accused. No study reviewed compared how the definitions affect outcomes across countries.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a foreign statute or decision is offered, counsel can ask which jurisdiction and date it comes from, whether it is a statute or a decision, and whether it addresses the complainant’s capacity or the accused’s belief, since the two are often confused. When a comparison is offered to suggest that U.S. law is stricter or looser, counsel can ask what outcome measure supports it and whether differences in definitions and trial systems were accounted for. When an expert is asked whether a person had capacity, counsel can ask which definition the expert applied, what evidence of the person’s condition at the time the opinion rests on, and whether later non-recall was treated as evidence of capacity or of its absence. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Intoxication, Consent, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Article 120(b)(2)–(3) and (g)(8), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920, are described above, together with Pease, Mendoza, and Moore. In courts-martial, a mistake of fact about consent must be honest and, for general-intent elements, reasonable, and an intoxicated accused’s mistake is judged by what an ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have believed (R.C.M. 916(j)(1); Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2). Voluntary intoxication may be considered on actual knowledge or specific intent when those are elements (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)). For the full treatment of these rules, see The Goldilocks Challenge and the Counterintuitive Testimony paper on consent communication and mistake of fact. Expert testimony on these subjects must satisfy Fed. R. Evid. 702 as amended Dec. 1, 2023, and the military rule, which took on the 2023 federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025; practitioners should confirm current text); Kumho Tire extends gatekeeping to all expert testimony. An expert may not vouch for a witness’s credibility (United States v. Brooks, 2007), and Fed. R. Evid. 704(b) bars an expert in a criminal case from stating an opinion on whether the defendant had the mental state that is an element; counsel should check the corresponding military rule, whose text is not identical.
Arizona
Arizona’s definition appears in A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b), and sexual assault requires intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact without consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406). The State must prove that the defendant knew the act was without consent (State v. Witwer, 1993; State v. Kemper, 2011; RAJI (Criminal) 14.06.01). A mistaken belief relieves liability when it negates the required mental state (A.R.S. § 13-204(A)), and temporary intoxication from voluntary use of alcohol is not a defense to any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503). Expert testimony is governed by Ariz. R. Evid. 702, as amended effective Jan. 1, 2024; general educational testimony is permitted if it satisfies Rules 702 and 403 (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but an expert may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The comparison supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. Recognition that a person who is unconscious, asleep, or unable to understand or choose is not consenting is widespread among the legal systems reviewed, and none of the provisions reviewed makes later memory the test, so a complainant’s incapacity can be proved through evidence of the person’s condition at the time, such as the accounts of other witnesses, recordings, and records. Mendoza also tells the prosecution to match the evidence to the charged theory.
The comparison also counsels caution. A foreign rule does not govern a U.S. court, and a statute that places a duty on an accused to check consent, as in Canada or Victoria, has no counterpart in Arizona or the UCMJ. The comparison does not show that a complainant who drank heavily was incapable; it does not supply a blood alcohol level at which capacity fails; and a memory gap alone, for a complainant or any witness, does not show incapacity. The same standard applies to an accused’s claimed memory loss.
Special Issues for Defense
The comparison supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. The definitions of capacity differ in wording and in what they ask, and in most of the systems reviewed the accused’s knowledge, belief, or negligence is a separate question, so proof of a complainant’s heavy drinking does not by itself establish what the accused knew or should have known. In Arizona the State must prove that the defendant knew the act was without consent, and in courts-martial the evidence must fit the theory charged under Mendoza. Two small English studies (14 barristers; one mock-jury study) reported that some concepts were applied narrowly or interpreted in varied ways; they do not show how jurors apply Arizona or military definitions.
The comparison also counsels caution. A foreign rule does not apply in Arizona or in courts-martial because it would help one side: England’s presumptions, for example, are limited to listed circumstances the defendant knew of and, for substances, to those given without the complainant’s agreement. Several foreign rules also reduce an accused’s room to rely on self-induced intoxication, as does A.R.S. § 13-503. Nothing in the comparison shows that a complainant who has no memory of events was capable of consenting; a blackout does not by itself show capacity, and an accused’s own memory gap is assessed under the same standard.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Department of Justice Canada. (2022). Changes to section 33.1 of the Criminal Code on self-induced extreme intoxication. https://justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/sei-ive/index.html
Department of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9, 29 July 2025).
Dilevski, N., Cullen, H. J., van Golde, C., Flowe, H. D., Paterson, H. M., Takarangi, M. K. T., & Monds, L. A. (2024). Juror perceptions of bystander and victim intoxication by different substances. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 51(4), 569–587. https://doi.org/10.1177/00938548241227543
Finch, E., & Munro, V. E. (2006). Breaking boundaries? Sexual consent in the jury room. Legal Studies, 26(3), 303–320. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121X.2006.00023.x
Gunby, C., Carline, A., & Beynon, C. (2010). Alcohol-related rape cases: Barristers’ perspectives on the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and its impact on practice. The Journal of Criminal Law, 74(6), 579–600. https://doi.org/10.1350/jcla.2010.74.6.670
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051
Legal Authorities
R v Bree, [2007] EWCA Crim 804 (Eng.).
R. v. Brown, 2022 SCC 18 (Can.).
R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20 (Can.).
R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28 (Can.).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Kemper, 229 Ariz. 105 (App. 2011).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590 (2014).
State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305 (App. 1993).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. Moore, 86 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2026).
United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 273.1, 273.2, 33.1 (Can.) (checked Nov. 11, 2026).
Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42, ss. 1, 74, 75 (U.K.) (checked Nov. 11, 2026).
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 36, 36AA, 36A, 36B (Austl.); Justice Legislation Amendment (Sexual Offences and Other Matters) Act 2022 (Vic) (checked Nov. 11, 2026).
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], § 177 (Ger.) (checked Nov. 11, 2026).
Brottsbalken [BrB] [Penal Code], ch. 6, §§ 1, 1 a (Swed.), as amended by SFS 2018:618 (checked Nov. 11, 2026).
Straffeloven [Penal Code], § 291 (Nor.), as amended by Storting decision of June 2025 (checked Nov. 11, 2026).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-204, 13-503, 13-1401, 13-1406.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 702, 704(b).
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, Art. 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2024 ed.); Mil. R. Evid. 702; R.C.M. 916(j), (l).
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) (6th ed. 2022), 14.06.01.
Related topic papers: Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity: How They Overlap · The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent? · Blacked Out Versus Passed Out · Alcohol, Disinhibition, and Sexual Decision-Making · Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Prosecution · Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Defense
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony: Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases · Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom: Intoxication and Memory