Snap Shot
- The question: Do defendants with intellectual disability, borderline intellectual functioning, or other cognitive impairments understand the plea agreements they sign and the supervision conditions they must follow, and how do courts and probation agencies respond when they do not?
- What the research shows: In one study of 99 adult defendants (IQ not analyzed), about two-thirds answered fewer than 60% of plea-comprehension questions correctly although almost all said they understood their pleas, and in a review of 208 plea forms most exceeded most defendants’ reading level. A probation contract rewritten in plain language was understood and recalled better. In a 2006 review, people with serious mental illness on probation or parole were about twice as likely to have supervision revoked for a technical violation or new offense, and the reviewers called the link indirect and complex; in one matched observational study of 359 probationers with serious mental health problems, rearrest was lower under specialty supervision. Neither tested people with intellectual disability, and data on intellectual disability are sparse and mixed.
- What it does not show: No controlled study has tested plain-language conditions or specialized caseloads for people with intellectual disability convicted of sexual offenses. Group findings cannot show whether a particular defendant understood his plea or why he violated a condition.
- The law: A guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary on the record (Boykin; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17; R.C.M. 910 and the Care inquiry). Federal supervised-release conditions may involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary (18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)); Arizona conditions must be individually determined and narrowly tailored (A.R.S. § 13-901(B)). Courts have vacated vague or overly broad conditions.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should ask whether a claimed lack of understanding is supported by records, testing, and the defendant’s own words; defense counsel should document comprehension and seek conditions explained at the defendant’s level, without implying that a limitation excuses a violation that endangered someone.
Most criminal convictions in the United States come from guilty pleas, and many people convicted of sexual offenses serve at least part of their sentence on probation, supervised release, or parole. Two documents therefore shape the case for most defendants: the plea agreement and the list of supervision conditions. For a defendant with intellectual disability, borderline intellectual functioning, a brain injury, or fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, both may exceed what he can read or follow without help.
Two premises frame this paper. First, a cognitive limitation is a reason to check understanding, not proof that understanding was absent. Many people with mild impairments understand their pleas and follow their conditions, and the conditions in sex offense cases exist to protect children and other potential victims. Second, the research is thin and mostly concerns general defendants or people with mental illness.
Competency and accommodations in court are covered in “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations”; adapted treatment in “Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability”; and registration duties in “Registration and Compliance by People With Cognitive Disabilities.”
Understanding Guilty Pleas
About 95% of state and federal convictions result from guilty pleas, and a review asked whether defendants understand the conditions and consequences of their pleas and examined the cognitive, social, and developmental factors that shape plea decisions (Redlich et al., 2017). In one study of 99 adult defendants interviewed shortly after pleading guilty, almost all showed few competency-related deficits and said they understood their plea, yet about two-thirds answered fewer than 60% of plea-comprehension questions correctly (Redlich & Summers, 2012). The study did not analyze IQ, so applying the gap to people with cognitive impairments is an inference, not a finding.
Written forms do not close the gap. A national review of 208 tender-of-plea forms, the written instruments many courts use to record that a defendant understands the rights being waived, found that their content varied widely and that most exceeded the reading comprehension of most defendants. The authors concluded that the forms should not replace a full judicial colloquy or meaningful discussion with counsel (Redlich & Bonventre, 2015).
Developmental research points the same way. In a study of 152 defendants aged 11 to 17 (73 girls and 79 boys), those with poorer legal abilities were more likely to waive legal protections, such as counsel and appeal, and younger defendants’ plea decisions were not related to the strength of the evidence against them (Viljoen et al., 2005). The sample was adolescents, but the study suggests that weaker understanding can affect choices, not just test scores.
A Wiley handbook chapter lists court adaptations for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, such as simplified written information and shorter delays between offense and court (Ellem et al., 2020). No study was found measuring plea comprehension in adults with intellectual disability charged with sexual offenses.
Case Example: In State v. Garner (2014), a 40-year-old man described by the Montana Supreme Court as developmentally disabled pleaded guilty on the third day of trial to sexual assault of a four-year-old child he sometimes babysat. An earlier evaluation had found him fit to proceed despite very low verbal scores, and a later neuropsychological evaluation placed his abilities in the low-average range, not intellectual disability, with reading at about a seventh-grade level. Moving to withdraw the plea, he testified that he had expected probation and did not understand the mandatory minimum. The court affirmed denial of the motion. It relied on the colloquy, his description of the plea terms to an evaluator (though he could not tell that evaluator the potential sentence), his accurate recall of the sentencing recommendations, repeated advice about the mandatory minimum, and the absence of any objective basis, beyond his attorneys’ impressions, for concluding that he could not understand. The case shows one court relying on specific evidence of understanding rather than diagnosis; a different record could support a different result.
Reading and Remembering Supervision Conditions
A sex offense probation order often contains many standard and special conditions, some using terms such as “associate,” “frequent,” or “without prior approval” whose limits are unclear even to unimpaired readers.
The clearest evidence comes from a study of an English probation service’s contract with the people it supervised. A readability analysis estimated that full comprehension of the original document required an IQ of about 111 or higher. After revision by readability criteria, the estimate fell to about 84, and an exploratory test found that both understanding and recall were significantly better for the revised version (Mason & Morris, 2000). The study is old, small, and British, and it did not test people with intellectual disability separately, but it is the closest direct test of plain-language supervision documents.
The same chapter notes that people with intellectual and developmental disabilities on parole have difficulty remembering and keeping appointments and understanding the specific conditions of their orders. It also cautions that simplified documents help only when staff understand intellectual disability and when the person’s stress at the time is taken into account (Ellem et al., 2020). For a person who reads at an elementary level, conditions are learned largely from someone’s explanation, and the explanation is often not documented.
Violations and Revocation
People under supervision can be returned to custody for new crimes or for technical violations, such as missed appointments or unapproved contact. According to a review, people with serious mental illness on probation or parole were about twice as likely as others to have their supervision revoked for a technical violation or new offense. The reviewers concluded that the link between mental illness and supervision failure is indirect and complex (Skeem & Louden, 2006). In an experiment, 234 probation officers assessed a vignette probationer with a mental disorder, a substance use disorder, both, or neither. Mental disorder affected their risk ratings more strongly than substance abuse did, although substance abuse is the stronger risk factor, and it most increased their wish to manage risk through mandated treatment (Eno Louden & Skeem, 2013). Those studies concern mental illness, not intellectual disability, and whether officers respond the same way to cognitive impairment has not been tested.
For intellectual disability, the data are mixed. Among 90 people on probation in southeast England who were screened, 7% scored in the range suggesting possible intellectual disability. They were younger than the others, but the outcome of their probation orders did not differ (Mason & Murphy, 2002). That finding cuts against assuming that people with intellectual disability fail supervision, although the sample was small. In a St. Louis case-management program for 252 offenders with developmental disabilities, 40% were arrested while in the program; 21% of those arrests were for probation or parole violations without a new offense, 39% for misdemeanors, 27% for nonviolent felonies, and 12% for felonies against persons. Clients who completed the program were less often arrested after it closed (25% vs. 43%), although completers and dropouts may have differed in other ways (Linhorst et al., 2003).
Technical violations are not trivial in sex offense cases. Unapproved contact with a child or concealed internet use may be the earliest sign of renewed risk, whatever the person’s understanding. The research shows only that some violations may reflect a failure to understand or remember a condition, which is a question of fact.
Hypothetical Example: Consider a hypothetical probationer with mild intellectual disability, convicted of a contact offense, whose conditions bar him from places “primarily used by children.” He is found at a fast-food restaurant with a play area. The file shows the conditions were read to him but not that he restated them. Whether he understood the term is a question of fact; records, his own account, and the officer’s notes bear on it. The safety concern remains either way, and a court could respond by clarifying the condition, adding supervision, or imposing a sanction.
Specialized Caseloads and Adapted Supervision
Specialty mental health probation assigns small caseloads to trained officers who participate in treatment and rely more on positive compliance strategies. In an observational study of 359 probationers, matched on age, sex, and other factors, with serious mental health problems (205 men and 154 women), at two urban agencies, specialty probation did not reduce violence, but the odds of rearrest were 2.68 times higher for traditional probationers, with estimated two-year rearrest of 51.8% vs. 28.6%; the effect lasted up to five years (Skeem et al., 2017). The earlier review reported that a few studies suggested specialty agencies reduced violations, with mixed evidence on longer-term rearrest (Skeem & Louden, 2006).
For intellectual disability, research is limited to uncontrolled follow-ups such as Linhorst et al. (2003) and the programs described in “Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability.” Adaptations that follow from the comprehension research include conditions written in short sentences with one rule each, verbal explanation with the person restating each condition in his own words, written schedules, involvement of a caregiver or support worker, and reminders before appointments. These follow general responsivity principles, but none has been tested for its effect on violations or reoffending in this population.
Internet, Contact, Residence, and Polygraph Conditions
Sex offense conditions frequently restrict internet and device use, contact with minors, presence near places where children gather, and residence. For a person with a cognitive impairment, the practical question is whether he can tell what is allowed. A blanket ban is simple to state but may forbid ordinary tasks, while use “with approval” depends on rules he may not understand. Research on how people with intellectual disability understand these specific terms was not found.
Polygraph testing is a common condition in sex offense supervision. A National Research Council review concluded that polygraph accuracy in specific-incident testing is well above chance but well below perfection, and that screening accuracy is likely lower; it noted possible deterrent value and warned against overconfidence (National Research Council, 2003). The report did not study post-conviction testing of people convicted of sexual offenses. No polygraph validation research on people with intellectual disability was found. Suggestibility and the reliability of disclosures are discussed in the False Confessions hub.
Limits of the Evidence
The plea comprehension studies used general samples of defendants or adolescents and did not analyze IQ or diagnosis. The readability work involved one British probation contract, and the comprehension test was exploratory. The violation and specialty-probation research concerns mental illness. The intellectual disability data come from one small English screening study and one uncontrolled American program, neither separating sexual offenses. No study reported results separately by sex, although the specialty-probation and adolescent studies enrolled both. Detected violations and arrests undercount both rule-breaking and reoffending, and officer discretion affects which are recorded.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When Redlich and Summers (2012) is cited to suggest that a defendant did not understand his plea, ask who was studied: general adult defendants, without IQ data, interviewed shortly after the plea, and not this defendant. When Mason and Morris (2000) is cited for plain-language conditions, ask what was counted: comprehension and recall of one probation contract in an exploratory test, not violations or reoffending. When mental illness findings (Skeem & Louden, 2006; Skeem et al., 2017) are applied to a defendant with intellectual disability, ask whether that sample applies to him. When Mason and Murphy (2002) is cited to suggest that intellectual disability does not affect probation success, ask how large the sample was: about six people with possible intellectual disability. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Pleas, Supervision Conditions, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
A guilty plea waives the right to trial, to confront witnesses, and against self-incrimination, and the record must affirmatively show that it was intelligent and voluntary; waiver is not presumed from a silent record (Boykin v. Alabama, 1969). The competency standard for pleading guilty is the Dusky standard, but the court must also find that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, a separate inquiry into whether the defendant actually understands its significance and consequences (Godinez v. Moran, 1993). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) requires the court to address the defendant personally and confirm that he understands the rights waived, the nature of each charge, the maximum and mandatory minimum penalties including supervised release, and any appeal waiver, to determine that the plea is voluntary, and to find a factual basis. The rule does not prescribe how understanding is checked.
For registrants, compliance with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act is a mandatory supervised-release condition. Other conditions must be reasonably related to the nature of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, public protection, and treatment, and must involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary (18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) held that a state law barring registrants from social media sites violated the First Amendment. The Court noted that the law reached people who had completed their sentences, and, as of November 2026, lower courts differ on how far it reaches supervision conditions. Circuits have vacated a near-total internet ban that the record did not show was reasonably related to the sentencing factors (United States v. Eaglin, 2019, slip op. at 2-3, 15-16, 23), and internet conditions that conflicted with one another so that the defendant could not tell what was forbidden (United States v. Holena, 2018). The Ninth Circuit has held unconstitutionally vague standard conditions requiring a person to meet “other family responsibilities,” work regularly at a lawful occupation, and notify third parties of risks arising from his personal history (United States v. Evans, 2018), and has required particularized findings, supported by the record, for conditions that restrict contact with one’s own children or fiancée, holding such a condition substantively unreasonable where the record had no supporting evidence (United States v. Wolf Child, 2012, slip op. at 12811-12, 12838-39). Vagueness is judged by an ordinary reader, not the defendant’s reading level, but his characteristics are part of tailoring under § 3583(d). Polygraph and disclosure requirements raise Fifth Amendment questions: revoking supervised release because a person refused to make incriminating disclosures in treatment without immunity violated the privilege (United States v. Antelope, 2005). Expert testimony on comprehension is subject to Fed. R. Evid. 702 as amended December 1, 2023; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extends gatekeeping to all expert testimony.
In courts-martial, the military judge must personally advise the accused of the offense, the punishment, the plea agreement’s effect, and the rights waived, and must determine that the plea is voluntary (R.C.M. 910(c)–(d)). Under R.C.M. 910(e) and its Discussion, the accused is questioned under oath, must admit every element, and must be able to describe the facts establishing guilt; the Care inquiry (United States v. Care, 1969) calls for the accused’s own account rather than agreement with leading questions. A plea-agreement term the accused does not understand must be conformed to his understanding or the plea withdrawn (R.C.M. 910(f)). If he later says something inconsistent with the plea, the judge must inquire into its providence (R.C.M. 910(h)(2); Article 45, UCMJ). The Military Judges’ Benchbook directs further inquiry, including about an R.C.M. 706 examination, when lack of mental responsibility is raised during the plea (Dep’t of the Army, 2025). Courts-martial do not impose probation, but a suspended sentence operates on written conditions that must be served on the probationer, who signs a receipt, and vacation requires a hearing on the alleged violation (R.C.M. 1107(c), 1108). Mil. R. Evid. 702 governs expert testimony; the 2023 federal amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and practitioners should confirm current text.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 requires the court to address the defendant personally, advise him of the charge, the sentencing range, and the rights waived, and determine that the plea is voluntary, intelligent, and factually supported (Rules 17.1(b), 17.2(a), 17.3). Under Rule 27.1, the court and the probation officer must each give the probationer a written copy of the conditions and regulations. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to align with the federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).
Under A.R.S. § 13-901(B), probation conditions must be reasonably necessary, individually determined, and narrowly tailored to help the person lead a law-abiding life, protect public safety, and promote rehabilitation, and must be informed by criminogenic risk and needs as established by a validated risk assessment tool. Standard conditions that are not needed should be considered for waiver, and a special condition requires record support and consideration of whether it is more restrictive than necessary. For a person with a cognitive impairment, these requirements bear on whether conditions can be understood and met and whether the risk tool is valid for him (see “Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples”). Probation for many sexual offenses may extend for life (A.R.S. § 13-902(E)), which makes the clarity of conditions a long-term matter.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports a plea record that shows understanding directly. A colloquy in which the defendant explains the charge, the sentence, and the main conditions in his own words is stronger evidence of understanding than signed forms or yes answers, and Garner illustrates one court’s reliance on such evidence. The research also supports conditions that protect children and that the defendant can actually follow. A later claim of misunderstanding is harder to make when the record shows the condition was explained and repeated back. In one small English screening study (about six people with possible intellectual disability), probation outcomes did not differ from others (Mason & Murphy, 2002), and in one matched observational study of probationers with serious mental health problems, rearrest was lower under specialty supervision (Skeem et al., 2017); neither tested people with intellectual disability convicted of sexual offenses.
The research also counsels caution. Plea comprehension is weak even among competent defendants, so competency findings and signed forms may not show understanding of a particular term, and an unexamined plea may be vulnerable later. In one vignette experiment with 234 probation officers, a vignette probationer’s mental disorder influenced risk ratings (Eno Louden & Skeem, 2013); that study did not involve cognitive impairment. Whether a person knew and understood a rule is a question of fact for any violation. Broad or inconsistent internet conditions have been vacated in federal court.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports raising comprehension early: obtaining school, special-education, and prior testing records, measuring reading level, and asking an evaluator to test the defendant’s understanding of the actual plea agreement and conditions rather than of court procedure in general. It supports asking whether the court can provide plain-language conditions, verbal explanation with the defendant restating each condition, involvement of a support person, and a specialized caseload (studied only for probationers with mental illness). At a violation hearing, evidence that a condition was never understood may be relevant to the sanction.
The research also counsels caution. The plea and probation studies did not test people with intellectual disability charged with sexual offenses, and the specialty-probation results come from mental illness samples. Garner illustrates that a court may give more weight to demonstrated understanding than to a diagnosis, counsel’s impressions, or later claims of confusion. A violation involving contact with a child or concealed internet use remains a safety concern whatever the person’s understanding, and the research does not support treating cognitive impairment as an explanation for every violation.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Dep’t of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9).
Ellem, K., Denton, M., & Davidson, D. (2020). Supporting people with intellectual and developmental disabilities leaving prison. In W. R. Lindsay, L. A. Craig, & D. Griffiths (Eds.), The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities: An evidence-based approach to theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 261–281). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268.ch13
Eno Louden, J., & Skeem, J. L. (2013). How do probation officers assess and manage recidivism and violence risk for probationers with mental disorder? An experimental investigation. Law and Human Behavior, 37(1), 22–34. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0093991
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Linhorst, D. M., McCutchen, T. A., & Bennett, L. (2003). Recidivism among offenders with developmental disabilities participating in a case management program. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 24(3), 210–230. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0891-4222(03)00029-5
Mason, J., & Morris, L. (2000). Improving understanding and recall of the probation service contract. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 10(3), 199–210. https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-1298(200005/06)10:3<199::AID-CASP565>3.0.CO;2-9
Mason, J., & Murphy, G. (2002). Intellectual disability amongst people on probation: Prevalence and outcome. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 46(3), 230–238. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2788.2002.00399.x
National Research Council. (2003). The polygraph and lie detection. National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/10420
Redlich, A. D., Bibas, S., Edkins, V. A., & Madon, S. (2017). The psychology of defendant plea decision making. American Psychologist, 72(4), 339–352. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0040436
Redlich, A. D., & Bonventre, C. L. (2015). Content and comprehensibility of juvenile and adult tender-of-plea forms: Implications for knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty pleas. Law and Human Behavior, 39(2), 162–176. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000118
Redlich, A. D., & Summers, A. (2012). Voluntary, knowing, and intelligent pleas: Understanding the plea inquiry. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 18(4), 626–643. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026066
Skeem, J. L., & Louden, J. E. (2006). Toward evidence-based practice for probationers and parolees mandated to mental health treatment. Psychiatric Services, 57(3), 333–342. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.57.3.333
Skeem, J. L., Manchak, S., & Montoya, L. (2017). Comparing public safety outcomes for traditional probation vs specialty mental health probation. JAMA Psychiatry, 74(9), 942–948. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2017.1384
Viljoen, J. L., Klaver, J., & Roesch, R. (2005). Legal decisions of preadolescent and adolescent defendants: Predictors of confessions, pleas, communication with attorneys, and appeals. Law and Human Behavior, 29(3), 253–277. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-005-3613-2
Legal Authorities
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017).
State v. Garner, 2014 MT 312, 377 Mont. 173, 339 P.3d 1.
United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969).
United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2019).
United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2018).
United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2018).
United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2012).
Article 45, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 845.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (conditions of supervised release).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).
Fed. R. Evid. 702 (as amended Dec. 1, 2023).
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 ed.), R.C.M. 706, 910, 1107, 1108.
A.R.S. § 13-901 (probation; conditions).
A.R.S. § 13-902(E) (periods of probation).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1–17.4.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.1.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702 (as amended effective Jan. 1, 2024, Order R-23-0004).
Related topic papers: Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability · Borderline Intellectual Functioning: Defendants Between the Categories · Registration and Compliance by People With Cognitive Disabilities · Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples · The ADA in Criminal Proceedings, Treatment, and Corrections
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial · False Confessions: Suggestibility