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The ADA in Criminal Proceedings, Treatment, and Corrections

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What do Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act require of police, courts, jails, prisons, probation departments, and court-ordered sex-offender treatment programs when the person involved has a disability, and what do they not require?
  • What the research shows: In a national survey of 2011–12, about 32% of state and federal prisoners and 40% of jail inmates reported at least one disability, most often cognitive, with women reporting cognitive disability more often than men. Across offender programs, about 27% of participants drop out, lower measured intelligence is a small correlate of dropout (r = -.14), and dropout is associated with higher recidivism (114 studies, Olver et al., 2011). In one uncontrolled UK multisite adapted program, 92% of 46 men who began treatment completed it, with no comparison group and many attending voluntarily (SOTSEC-ID, 2010); completion is not the same as reduced reoffending.
  • What it does not show: No outcome study shows that ADA accommodations in arrest, court, supervision, or treatment change recidivism. The research cannot say whether a particular person needs a particular accommodation or whether a particular denial affected that person’s progress.
  • The law: Title II applies to state prisons (Yeskey, 1998) and, as applied to access to the courts, validly abrogates state immunity (Lane, 2004). Its regulations require reasonable modifications short of a fundamental alteration and communication as effective as communication with others. As of November 2026, whether Title II governs arrests was left open in Sheehan (2015), and the circuit decisions on the point date from 2000 and 2014. One federal circuit has held uniformed service members outside the Rehabilitation Act for personnel claims.
  • Issues for each side: For prosecutors and agencies, the fundamental-alteration, direct-threat, and safety limits are part of the law, and the ADA does not excuse offense conduct. For defense counsel, unaccommodated communication or program design, rather than unwillingness, may explain poor progress, although a disability does not lessen the duty to comply.

Many people who pass through arrest, court, custody, and supervision have a disability: intellectual disability, autism, a hearing or vision loss, a brain injury, or a serious mental illness. Sex-offense cases add a step that most cases lack. Release, the end of probation, or the end of civil commitment often depends on completing a treatment program that relies on group discussion, written homework, and abstract concepts. When a person cannot hear the group, read the workbook, or follow the vocabulary, the record may show “non-compliance” for reasons that have little to do with motivation or risk.

Two federal statutes govern this ground. Title II of the ADA bars state and local public entities from excluding qualified individuals with disabilities from their services, programs, or activities, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does the same for programs that receive federal funds or are conducted by federal executive agencies. Neither statute excuses offense conduct. A disability does not make a sexual offense against a child or adult less harmful, and the statutes do not require a program to drop its essential requirements, waive supervision conditions, or admit a person who poses a direct threat. What they require is a fair opportunity to take part on the same terms, through modified methods where needed.

This paper covers who is affected, what research shows about access to and completion of treatment, communication in supervision and treatment, the limits of what accommodations change, and the federal, military, and Arizona law. Accommodations during competency proceedings and police interviews are addressed in “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations”; the content of adapted programs in “Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability”; and interpreters for deaf defendants in “Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Defendants: Interpreters, Miranda, and Competency.” This paper does not repeat them.

How Many People in the System Have Disabilities

The most widely cited U.S. figures come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 2011–12 National Inmate Survey (Bronson et al., 2015), discussed further in “Jail, Prison, and Vulnerability: Special Populations in Custody.” About 32% of state and federal prisoners and 40% of local jail inmates reported at least one of six disability types, and cognitive disability, defined by a single question about serious difficulty concentrating, remembering, or making decisions, was the most common. About 40% of women and 31% of men in prison reported a disability, and 30% of women compared with 19% of men reported a cognitive disability. The data are self-reports not checked against records, the cognitive item does not distinguish intellectual disability from attention problems, mental illness, or brain injury, and the survey is now more than a decade old.

Intellectual disability specifically is harder to count. A systematic review of international prison studies put the prevalence of prisoners with intellectual disability at roughly 7% to 10%, with wide variation across studies (Hellenbach et al., 2017). The included studies differed in how they screened for intellectual disability, and few screening approaches amount to a full assessment of intellectual and adaptive functioning. These figures describe prison populations generally, not people convicted of sexual offenses, and no comparable U.S. estimate for people in sex-offender treatment was located.

Access to Treatment Programs and Completion

Access matters because completion matters. A meta-analysis of 114 studies covering 41,438 offenders found an overall attrition rate of 27.1% from treatment programs, and 27.6% from the 34 samples of sex-offender programs (Olver et al., 2011). Higher-risk offenders were more likely to drop out, and lower measured intelligence was a small correlate of attrition (weighted r = −.14, about 2% of the variance). Dropping out was associated with several recidivism outcomes across the 114 studies. The authors concluded that the people with the most to gain from treatment are the least likely to finish and that attention to responsivity, meaning delivery fitted to how a person learns, can improve retention. The association between intelligence and dropout does not show that disability causes dropout; program design, risk level, and motivation are all intertwined in these data.

The same pattern appears in practice accounts. In New South Wales, Corrective Services found that people with intellectual and developmental disabilities were often excluded from mainstream prison programs and that earlier adapted programs had high attrition; it responded by building a separate suite of self-regulation programs, including one for sexual offending, with smaller groups, longer duration, and teaching through several modalities (Snoyman et al., 2020). In the United Kingdom, a multisite one-year adapted cognitive-behavioral group program reported that 92% of the 46 men who began treatment completed it, although only 57% were required by law to attend; the authors noted that men with intellectual disability and sexually abusive behavior were rarely offered treatment at all (Sex Offender Treatment Services Collaborative–Intellectual Disabilities [SOTSEC-ID], 2010). The program’s outcomes, including further abusive behavior during and after treatment, are summarized in “Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability” (see also Craig, 2020). These are uncontrolled studies of men, and high completion in a voluntary-leaning sample does not predict completion under court order.

Case Example: In Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons (2017), a man deaf since birth whose primary language was American Sign Language had been civilly committed under the Adam Walsh Act as a sexually dangerous person, after a federal child pornography conviction, and was confined at a federal facility where committed detainees are expected to take part in a Commitment and Treatment Program. Recounting the record in his favor, as summary-judgment review requires, the Fourth Circuit noted that interpreters were not provided for the program until September 2012, and then only for some portions, and that the psychologist in charge of his treatment had found the non-signing inmate assigned to help him communicate inadequate for treatment. His Fifth Amendment claim rested on the point that the length of his confinement depended largely on the Bureau’s assessment of his mental health. The court vacated summary judgment for the Bureau on that claim, holding that the Bureau’s post-litigation decision to provide interpreters for some parts of treatment was no basis for rejecting it, and it also returned his medical-care, safety, and First Amendment communication claims for trial. The court made no finding that his rights had been violated. His Rehabilitation Act claim had been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and was not appealed, so the court did not decide what Section 504 required. The case illustrates how treatment access can matter where release depends on treatment progress; it does not decide what any particular program must provide.

Communication, Comprehension, and Supervision

Sex-offender treatment and supervision depend on language. Group therapy requires following discussion; relapse-prevention plans require reading and writing; supervision requires understanding conditions about contact with minors, internet use, residence, and reporting. Title II regulations require public entities to make communication with people with disabilities as effective as communication with others, to provide auxiliary aids and services where necessary, and to give primary consideration to the person’s own request (28 C.F.R. § 35.160). For a deaf person the aid may be a qualified interpreter; for a person with intellectual disability, the modification is more often in method: plain-language conditions, shorter sessions, repetition, visual materials, having the person explain a rule in their own words, and a support person. How probation conditions can be fitted to comprehension is addressed in “Plea Comprehension, Probation Conditions, and Supervision for Defendants With Cognitive Impairments.”

Police contact raises a separate set of questions. An advocacy-oriented book on autism and the justice system argues that arrest is itself a Title II activity, that police should ensure effective communication, and that in practice accommodations during arrest are rare, while acknowledging that courts treat situations involving a violent threat differently (Dubin, 2021). The U.S. Department of Justice’s technical-assistance guidance lists street encounters, arrests, interviews, bail and release conditions, sentencing, probation and parole revocation decisions, and jail and prison rehabilitative programs among the activities Title II covers, and describes settlement agreements that required crisis-intervention training and diversion options (U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2017). The guidance states that it is not legally binding.

What Accommodations Do and Do Not Change

The statutes limit as well as require. A modification is not required if it would fundamentally alter the nature of the program (28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); § 35.164). A program may exclude a person who poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, but only after an individualized assessment of the nature, severity, and probability of the risk and whether reasonable modifications would reduce it (28 C.F.R. § 35.139). An entity may also impose legitimate safety requirements needed for the safe operation of its programs, provided they rest on actual risks rather than speculation or stereotypes (28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h)). In jails and prisons, the integrated-setting and program-access rules apply unless an exception is appropriate (§ 35.152(b)(2)), which leaves room for security classification. A person must be “qualified,” meaning that with reasonable modifications the person meets the program’s essential eligibility requirements (42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)). Accordingly, the ADA can support a request that a treatment program teach the same content with different methods. It does not ordinarily support a request that a court drop a treatment requirement, waive a no-contact condition, or overlook a violation that occurred after appropriate accommodations were in place.

Hypothetical Example: Consider a hypothetical probationer with mild intellectual disability who is ordered to complete community sex-offender treatment and is reported for failing homework and missing two sessions. His counsel asks that the treatment condition be removed. The court instead asks the program and the probation department what modifications are available. The program offers oral rather than written assignments, a shorter group with a peer mentor, and appointment reminders by phone; the condition itself stays. Under those modifications, later attendance and participation, or continued failure, give the court a fairer basis for its next decision than the original record did.

Limits of the Evidence

This research was not designed to answer the legal question. The prevalence data are self-reports from one national survey a decade old, with a broad cognitive item; the prison review pools studies with varied screening methods; the attrition meta-analysis pools many program types and does not test whether accommodations reduce dropout; and the adapted-program studies are small, uncontrolled, and limited to men. No study was located that measures whether ADA accommodations in arrest, court, supervision, or sex-offender treatment change completion, revocation, or recidivism, or that compares accommodated with unaccommodated participants. Women with disabilities who are in sex-offender treatment are essentially unstudied, although women in custody report cognitive disability more often than men. The legal sources and practice accounts describe obligations and models, not outcomes. Group findings cannot establish what a particular person needs, whether a denial affected that person’s progress, or what that person’s risk is.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the 32% or 40% disability figure (Bronson et al., 2015) is offered to suggest that a defendant probably has a disability, ask what was measured: a self-reported answer to a single question about concentrating, remembering, or deciding, not a diagnosis. When the attrition finding (Olver et al., 2011) is offered to suggest that a client’s dropout reflects a disability, ask whether the design permits that conclusion: intelligence was a modest correlate in pooled data, and dropout was also tied to risk and motivation. When the 92% completion rate (SOTSEC-ID, 2010) is offered to suggest that any adapted program will succeed, ask who was studied: 46 men in one country, many attending voluntarily, with no comparison group. When a program’s exclusion of a person is defended on risk grounds, ask whether an individualized direct-threat assessment was done. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

The ADA and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Title II provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of disability, be excluded from or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, defined to include state and local governments and their instrumentalities (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132); the Department of Justice’s regulations are at 28 C.F.R. Part 35 (42 U.S.C. § 12134). Section 504 applies the same principle to programs receiving federal financial assistance and to programs conducted by federal executive agencies (29 U.S.C. § 794), so a federal prison or commitment program falls under Section 504 rather than Title II. The regulations require reasonable modifications unless they would fundamentally alter the program (§ 35.130(b)(7)), effective communication (§ 35.160), and, for jails, prisons, and community correctional facilities, including privately operated ones, housing in the most integrated appropriate setting and, unless an exception is appropriate, no placement in facilities that lack the programs the person would otherwise receive (§ 35.152). Public entities with 50 or more employees must designate an ADA coordinator and adopt grievance procedures (§ 35.107).

In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey (1998), a man recommended for a motivational boot camp whose completion would have led to parole in six months was refused admission because of a history of hypertension; the Supreme Court held that state prisons fall within Title II’s definition of a public entity. In Tennessee v. Lane (2004), brought by people who could not reach courtrooms, the Court held that Title II, as applied to cases implicating the right of access to the courts, validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. United States v. Georgia (2006), involving a prisoner who used a wheelchair, held that Title II validly abrogates immunity for damages for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and directed lower courts to proceed claim by claim. These immunity rulings concern damages against states; they do not by themselves define what a program must provide.

Whether Title II applies to arrests remains unsettled. The Fifth Circuit held that Title II does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street response to a reported disturbance before the scene is secured (Hainze v. Richards, 2000). The Ninth Circuit held that the ADA applied to the arrest of a woman with mental illness who had threatened officers with a knife in her room at a group home and that a jury should decide whether the city should have accommodated her (Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 2014). In City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan (2015), the Supreme Court dismissed the ADA question as improvidently granted after the city changed its argument, and decided only that the officers had qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. As of November 2026 the question remains unsettled in the decisions cited, which date from 2000 and 2014; practitioners should check current circuit law before testimony.

The ADA does not apply to the federal government, and courts have held that uniformed members of the armed forces have no remedy under the Rehabilitation Act for personnel decisions (Doe v. Garrett, 1990, involving reenlistment). No reported decision was located on whether Section 504 reaches military confinement or treatment programs, and military confinement facilities are operated under Department of Defense and service regulations. Courts-martial provide accommodations through their own rules: interpreters may be detailed as court personnel (R.C.M. 502(e)), and questions of mental capacity go to an R.C.M. 706 inquiry. In military practice, a request for an accommodation is therefore usually framed under those rules, due process, and the military judge’s control of the proceedings rather than the ADA.

Arizona

Arizona’s courts, prisons, jails, and county probation departments are public entities under Title II. The Arizona Supreme Court’s policy on court access for persons with disabilities provides reasonable accommodations on request, designates an ADA coordinator, asks that requests be made at least 10 days before a proceeding where possible, gives primary consideration to the accommodation requested while reserving the decision to the court, and provides a grievance procedure (Arizona Administrative Office of the Courts, 2023). Superior, justice, and municipal courts publish their own coordinators and request forms. Because the presiding judge of each county’s superior court appoints the chief adult probation officer (A.R.S. § 12-251), probation supervision is a court function in Arizona, and accommodation requests about probation conditions or court-ordered treatment can be raised with the court and its coordinator as well as the probation department. A court placing a person on probation sets its terms and conditions (A.R.S. § 13-901). No Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure specific to disability accommodation was located; competency is governed by Rule 11 and A.R.S. §§ 13-4501 to 13-4517, discussed in “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations.”

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The law and research support close attention to what the ADA does not require. A program need not abandon its essential content or a court its supervision conditions, a custodial facility may keep safety and security requirements grounded in actual risk, a direct threat supported by an individualized assessment can justify exclusion, and a disability does not excuse an offense or a violation committed after appropriate accommodations were made. Prosecutors are often best positioned to ask whether a claimed communication barrier is documented, whether the person used the accommodations offered, and whether the person’s functioning in other settings matches the claim. Documented accommodations in plea colloquies, probation conditions, and treatment referrals also serve the victim’s and the public’s interest in an outcome that holds up, and give the court a clearer record for any later revocation decision.

The research also counsels caution. Dropout is common and is associated with lower measured intelligence as well as risk, so a record of “non-compliance” may reflect an unaccommodated program rather than refusal, and a court reviewing such a record may ask whether accommodations were offered. Exclusion on risk grounds without an individualized assessment conflicts with the direct-threat regulation. Group prevalence figures cut both ways: they do not show that a particular defendant has a disability, and they do not show that he lacks one.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports asking early what a client needs to take part in court, supervision, and treatment, and documenting it. Defense counsel are often best positioned to gather records of hearing, vision, intellectual, or adaptive functioning; to make a specific written request to the court’s ADA coordinator or the program; and to propose modifications that keep the treatment content intact, such as interpreters, oral assignments, shorter sessions, or a support person. Where progress reports show failure, counsel can ask whether the program provided effective communication. Heyer illustrates a setting in which treatment participation bore on the length of confinement, although it was decided on constitutional grounds, not under the ADA or Section 504.

The research also counsels caution. No study shows that accommodations reduce recidivism, and courts and programs may decline modifications that would fundamentally alter a program or waive its requirements. Arguments that a disability excuses violations, or that a treatment condition should be removed rather than adapted, find little support in regulations that preserve essential program requirements, and a claimed limitation that is not documented, or that differs from the person’s functioning elsewhere, can be tested. Administrative remedies must be pursued as the governing rules require; in Heyer, the Rehabilitation Act claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust them.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Arizona Administrative Office of the Courts. (2023). Court access information for persons with disabilities (Policies and Procedures Manual § 4.12, rev. March 15, 2023). Arizona Supreme Court. https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/24/4_12CourtAccessforPersonswithDisabilitiesFillableFinal.pdf

Bronson, J., Maruschak, L. M., & Berzofsky, M. (2015). Disabilities among prison and jail inmates, 2011–12 (NCJ 249151). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/dpji1112.pdf

Craig, L. A. (2020). Treatment of inappropriate sexual behaviour by people with intellectual developmental disabilities. In W. R. Lindsay, L. A. Craig, & D. Griffiths (Eds.), The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities (pp. 311–326). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268.ch16

Dubin, N. (2021). Autism spectrum disorder, developmental disabilities, and the criminal justice system: Breaking the cycle. Jessica Kingsley Publishers. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781805015536

Hellenbach, M., Karatzias, T., & Brown, M. (2017). Intellectual disabilities among prisoners: Prevalence and mental and physical health comorbidities. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 30(2), 230–241. https://doi.org/10.1111/jar.12234

Olver, M. E., Stockdale, K. C., & Wormith, J. S. (2011). A meta-analysis of predictors of offender treatment attrition and its relationship to recidivism. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 79(1), 6–21. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022200

Sex Offender Treatment Services Collaborative–Intellectual Disabilities. (2010). Effectiveness of group cognitive-behavioural treatment for men with intellectual disabilities at risk of sexual offending. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 23(6), 537–551. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-3148.2010.00560.x

Snoyman, P., Aicken, B., & Ware, J. (2020). Prison-based programmes for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. In W. R. Lindsay, L. A. Craig, & D. Griffiths (Eds.), The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities (pp. 283–296). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268.ch14

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. (2017, January). Examples and resources to support criminal justice entities in compliance with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. https://archive.ada.gov/cjta.html

Legal Authorities

City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015).

Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990).

Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000).

Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2017).

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).

Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014).

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).

Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134.

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794.

28 C.F.R. §§ 35.107, 35.130(b)(7), 35.130(h), 35.139, 35.152, 35.160, 35.164.

A.R.S. §§ 12-251, 13-901, 13-4501 to 13-4517.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.

Rule for Courts-Martial 502(e), 706.

Related topic papers: Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability · Plea Comprehension, Probation Conditions, and Supervision for Defendants With Cognitive Impairments · Jail, Prison, and Vulnerability: Special Populations in Custody · Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Defendants: Interpreters, Miranda, and Competency · Sexually Violent Person Commitment and Special Populations

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial