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Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How do intellectual disability and related cognitive conditions affect a defendant’s understanding of Miranda warnings, the reliability of statements, competence to stand trial, and the accommodations that may allow fair participation?
  • What the research shows: In small U.S. samples from the 1990s (18 to 29 adults with intellectual disability), 67% to 90% scored zero on at least one of four warning items on a research measure, compared with 17% in a 30-person comparison group and 23% in an older normative sample of adults; that research criterion is not a finding that any waiver was invalid, and the samples were tested in calm research settings. In laboratory studies, people with intellectual disability were also more susceptible than comparison groups to leading questions and mild negative feedback; these are group findings and do not describe any one defendant. Defendants with IQs of 70 to 85 also showed impaired Miranda abilities. In retrospective samples from single states, restoration of defendants with intellectual disability ranged widely, from a minority in one study (75 defendants) to 83.7% in another (74 defendants), reflecting different definitions, programs, and severity; these figures cannot predict any individual defendant’s restoration.
  • What it does not show: Group findings cannot establish whether a particular defendant understood a warning, gave a false statement, or is competent. A suggestibility score does not show that a statement is untrue, and an IQ score alone does not decide competency.
  • The law: Dusky underlies the competency standards in federal, military, and Arizona courts, and Arizona applies the Dusky wording expressly to defendants under 18 (A.R.S. § 13-4501). A Miranda or Article 31 waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. ADA Title II requires reasonable modifications in court programs, and Tennessee v. Lane upheld Title II as applied to access to the courts.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should ask whether claimed deficits are documented by records and valid testing and whether the defendant’s functioning and recorded statements show understanding; defense counsel should obtain early evaluation, records, and recordings, and should ask which specific accommodations would make participation meaningful.

Many sexual offense prosecutions depend heavily on what the accused said. In cases without physical evidence, a recorded interview, a pretext call, or an admission to a family member may be the most important evidence offered. When the accused has an intellectual disability, borderline intellectual functioning, fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, or another condition that limits verbal understanding, three questions recur: whether a waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent, whether the statement is reliable, and whether the defendant can understand the proceedings and assist counsel. A fourth question runs through all three: what accommodations would allow the defendant to participate fairly.

Two premises frame this paper. First, a cognitive limitation is a reason to evaluate, not a conclusion. Some people with mild intellectual disability understand their rights, many give accurate accounts, and many are competent or can be restored; the condition is no defense to sexual offending. Second, the research summarized here comes from group comparisons, most of them small, and it cannot by itself say what a particular defendant understood or whether a particular statement is true. This paper uses person-first language (“people with intellectual disability”); the term “mental retardation” appears only where it is the title of an older study, a case, or the wording of a court. Autism-specific issues are addressed in the Autism and Online Sexual Offense hub, and interrogation and suggestibility are addressed in the False Confessions resource.

Understanding Miranda Warnings

Fulero and Everington (1995) administered Grisso’s Miranda comprehension measures to two samples of adults with intellectual disability in Ohio: 29 adults recruited at a sheltered workshop and 25 adults on probation (mean IQ 65). Grisso’s scoring treats a score of zero on any of the four warnings as a failure to show adequate understanding of that right. By that criterion, 89.7% of the workshop sample and 68% of the probation sample failed at least one warning, compared with 55.3% of juveniles and 23.1% of adults in Grisso’s earlier normative samples. The probation group, nearly all of whom had prior convictions, scored better than the workshop group, suggesting that experience with the justice system, as well as intellectual level, affects scores.

Everington and Fulero (1999) then compared 18 probationers with intellectual disability (mean IQ 68) with 30 probationers without it. Two-thirds (67%) of the group with intellectual disability, compared with 17% of the comparison group, scored zero on at least one warning; the warnings concerning silence, the use of statements in court, and counsel during questioning were the hardest. Within the group with intellectual disability, IQ correlated with comprehension. The Supreme Court cited this study in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) when it noted the possibility of false confessions by defendants with intellectual disability.

Later studies used the Standardized Assessment of Miranda Abilities. Among 62 adults with intellectual disability, Erickson et al. (2020) found worse recall, vocabulary, and knowledge than in the instrument’s normative sample, little improvement after hearing a warning, and higher acquiescence; verbal intelligence strongly predicted recall and vocabulary, but IQ did not predict misconceptions about Miranda or acquiescence. In a sample of 820 pretrial defendants, Tazi and Rogers (2023) found that defendants with IQs between 70 and 85, a group that does not meet criteria for intellectual disability, also showed impaired recall and vocabulary and often held important misconceptions, such as believing that the interrogating officers were on their side. The point matters for practice: a defendant can fall outside the diagnosis and still have limited understanding of a warning.

The warnings themselves vary. An analysis of 560 Miranda warnings from across the United States found reading levels ranging from below third grade to postgraduate, with substantial differences in content, such as whether the warning said that appointed counsel would be free (Rogers et al., 2007). The exact wording read to the defendant, and whether it was read aloud, given in writing, or both, is therefore part of any evaluation.

Suggestibility, Acquiescence, and Statement Reliability

Understanding a warning is distinct from the reliability of what follows it. Using the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, Clare and Gudjonsson (1993) found that people with mild learning disabilities (the British term for intellectual disability; IQ 57 to 75) were more susceptible than people of average ability to leading questions, and that they confabulated more and acquiesced more. Everington and Fulero (1999), using a version adapted to a lower reading level, found that probationers with intellectual disability yielded to more leading questions and changed more answers after mild criticism, and that lower Miranda comprehension was associated with greater suggestibility. Among 60 adults with mild intellectual disability, who also showed marked difficulty understanding Miranda rights, O’Connell et al. (2005) found that participants changed answers more often after friendly feedback than after unfriendly or neutral feedback, and often reported more confidence in answers that were no more accurate. A meta-analysis of studies with diagnosed samples and comparison groups found greater suggestibility and false memory in people with intellectual disability than in the general population (Griego et al., 2019), and a single recent meta-analysis, published in 2026, found suggestibility on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale in people with fetal alcohol spectrum disorder comparable to, and on some indices greater than, that in people with intellectual disability (Gilbert et al., 2026); these are scores on laboratory-style scales.

Acquiescence, a tendency to answer “yes” regardless of content, is especially relevant to yes-or-no questioning. It can make an interview appear to confirm details that the interviewer supplied. A scientific review paper of the American Psychology-Law Society identified intellectual disability, along with youth and certain mental disorders, as a dispositional risk factor for false confession and recommended recording interrogations in their entirety (Kassin et al., 2010).

These findings must be applied with care. Suggestibility scales measure responses to questions about a story heard minutes earlier, under mild pressure from a researcher; they do not reproduce a custodial interrogation about one’s own conduct, and some researchers have questioned how well the scales work with adults with intellectual disability (see Salekin et al., 2010). Greater suggestibility increases the importance of how an interview was conducted; it does not show that any statement is false. A statement with accurate, independently corroborated details that the interviewer did not supply differs from one in which every detail first appears in the questions; question-by-question analysis of the recording is usually more informative than a test score. These issues are addressed in detail in False Confessions: Suggestibility.

Competence to Stand Trial

Under Dusky v. United States (1960), a defendant must have a sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings. Intellectual disability can affect each of these abilities through limited vocabulary, difficulty with abstract concepts such as a plea bargain or the burden of proof, poor recall of events, and difficulty weighing options.

A meta-analysis of 68 studies published from 1967 to 2008 found that about 27.5% of defendants referred for evaluation were found incompetent (Pirelli et al., 2011). A psychotic disorder was the strongest predictor: defendants with one were about eight times more likely to be found incompetent. Competent defendants scored about six Full Scale IQ points higher than incompetent defendants, a small-to-medium difference. Intellectual disability was diagnosed in 7.5% of incompetent and 5.2% of competent defendants in the studies reporting it, but the authors did not compute an effect size for it, and studies limited to defendants with intellectual disability were excluded. The meta-analysis therefore says little about how often defendants with intellectual disability are found incompetent.

Standard competency instruments assume verbal skills and reasoning that defendants with intellectual disability may lack, and a specialized instrument, the Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation (CAST-MR), was developed for this group but has had limited independent study (Salekin et al., 2010). Effort and feigning must also be considered, and the evidence cuts both ways. Defendants with and without intellectual disability who were instructed to fake poor performance on the CAST-MR scored significantly lower than control defendants (Everington et al., 2007), so poor scores can be produced deliberately. At the same time, commonly used validity tests misclassify some people with genuine intellectual disability as feigning when standard cutoffs are used (Salekin et al., 2010). An opinion should rest on records predating the charges, adaptive-functioning information from informants, and performance across several measures, not on one test.

A further caution concerns rote learning: a defendant may recite correct answers without understanding how they bear on his own decisions. Salekin et al. (2010) warned against confusing recitation with comprehension, and evaluators commonly ask defendants to explain concepts in their own words and apply them to their own case.

Restoration of Competence

Restoration outcomes for defendants with intellectual disability vary widely by sample, program, and severity. Among 75 defendants with intellectual disability who received restoration training, significantly more were not restored than were, and higher IQ predicted restoration (Anderson & Hewitt, 2002). In a Rhode Island hospital, 61.1% of defendants with intellectual disability or borderline functioning who received a specialized training program attained clinical competence, compared with 16.7% of those who received standard treatment alone; the study was a small record review of 30 people (Wall & Christopher, 2012). In larger samples of men committed for restoration, intellectual disability predicted failure to restore (Morris & DeYoung, 2012), and defendants with intellectual disability or neurocognitive disorders were less likely to be restored than those with mood or psychotic disorders, although 90.4% of the full sample of 492 was restored (Porter Staats et al., 2021). In contrast, 83.7% of 74 defendants with diagnoses related to intellectual deficits in a midwestern state were restored, and the authors identified an IQ of about 63.5 as the point below which restoration became less likely (Grabowski et al., 2024); that cutoff comes from one sample and has not been cross-validated.

Restoration is therefore possible for many defendants with mild intellectual disability, particularly with programs designed for them, but less likely when impairment is more severe; a prolonged commitment that produces no change raises the legal questions addressed below.

Accommodations

Accommodations are changes in how information is presented and proceedings are conducted that allow a person with a disability to participate: plain-language explanations, shorter sessions with breaks, checking understanding by having the defendant explain in his own words, visual aids, a support person, simple non-leading questions, and additional time with counsel. Wood et al. (2019) argued that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires reasonable accommodations in competency evaluation, restoration, and trial, and that appropriate modifications may prevent some defendants with intellectual disability from being found incompetent at all. That article is a legal and clinical argument, not an outcome study.

The research on whether simplified materials improve understanding is limited and mixed. In a randomized trial with 60 adults with intellectual disability, neither simplified “easy read” wording nor mediation by a helper, separately or combined, made a significant overall difference in comprehension of health information, although one post hoc comparison favored simplified text with mediation over complex text with mediation (Buell et al., 2020). In a study of 82 adolescents, a simplified Miranda warning did not improve comprehension compared with a standard warning (Baker & Haney-Caron, 2025). These findings do not show that accommodations are useless; they suggest that rewording alone may be insufficient and that accommodations should be fitted to the person’s measured abilities and checked against what he actually understands. An evaluation that recommends specific accommodations, and reports whether the defendant could participate with them, is more useful to a court than a statement that he has a disability.

Limits of the Evidence

The Miranda studies of adults with intellectual disability are small, many are more than 20 years old, and several used the same instruments in the same region. Participants were tested in calm research settings, not in custody after arrest. The restoration studies are mostly retrospective record reviews from single states, with different definitions of intellectual disability and different programs. Most samples were predominantly or entirely male. Pirelli et al. (2011) found female defendants about as likely as male defendants to be found incompetent (odds ratio 1.12 across 18 studies) and noted that only about half of the studies included women; Everington and Fulero (1999) found that gender was unrelated to Miranda comprehension or suggestibility scores in their small sample; and the restoration samples of Morris and DeYoung (2012) and Porter Staats et al. (2021) were men only. No study located examined these questions specifically in defendants charged with sexual offenses, and none can determine whether a particular defendant understood a warning or gave a true statement.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the 67% figure from Everington and Fulero (1999) is cited, ask what was counted: participants who scored zero on at least one of four warnings on a research measure, in a sample of 18 probationers, not people who were found to have made invalid waivers. When suggestibility research such as Clare and Gudjonsson (1993) or Griego et al. (2019) is offered to suggest a statement is unreliable, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: the studies measured responses to questions about a story, not the accuracy of a confession. When a restoration rate is offered, ask who was studied: the low restoration rate of Anderson and Hewitt (2002) and the 83.7% of Grabowski et al. (2024) came from different states, eras, programs, and levels of impairment. When an IQ cutoff such as 63.5 is offered as predicting restoration, ask whether it has been replicated. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Competency, Miranda Waiver, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Dusky v. United States (1960) sets the competency standard, and 18 U.S.C. § 4241 applies it in federal court. Drope v. Missouri (1975) requires further inquiry when the evidence raises a sufficient doubt about competency, and Godinez v. Moran (1993) held that the same standard applies to pleading guilty and waiving counsel, although the court must separately find that the waiver is knowing and voluntary (that reasoning appears in a lead opinion that two Justices did not join, and Indiana v. Edwards, 2008, later held that a state may require counsel at trial for a defendant who is competent to stand trial but gravely impaired). In Jackson v. Indiana (1972), involving a deaf defendant with severe intellectual and communication limitations, the Court held that a defendant committed solely because of incompetence cannot be held longer than the reasonable period needed to determine whether he is likely to regain competence in the foreseeable future.

Under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), a suspect may waive the rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently; the waiver must be voluntary and made with awareness of the right being given up and the consequences of giving it up (Moran v. Burbine, 1986). Colorado v. Connelly (1986) held that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a confession involuntary under the Due Process Clause, so a mental condition alone does not make a statement involuntary, although it remains relevant to whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent and to the weight of the statement. Fare v. Michael C. (1979) applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test that includes the suspect’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence. Expert testimony on these questions is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits public entities from excluding qualified individuals with disabilities from their services, programs, or activities (42 U.S.C. § 12132), and its regulations require reasonable modifications unless they would fundamentally alter the program (28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). In Tennessee v. Lane (2004), brought by people who could not physically reach courtrooms, the Court held that Title II, as applied to cases implicating the right of access to the courts, validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. How far Title II requires particular accommodations in a criminal proceeding is decided case by case.

In courts-martial, R.C.M. 909 provides that an accused may not be tried while a mental disease or defect renders him unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or to conduct or cooperate intelligently in the defense, presumes capacity, and requires that incompetence be established by a preponderance of the evidence. An inquiry is ordinarily conducted by a board under R.C.M. 706, which must answer, among other questions, whether the accused presently has such a condition. An accused found incompetent is committed to the Attorney General and hospitalized under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Rights warnings are governed by Article 31(b), UCMJ, and Mil. R. Evid. 305, under which a waiver must be made freely, knowingly, and intelligently, and the suspect must affirmatively acknowledge understanding the rights. Expert testimony is subject to Military Rule of Evidence 702; the 2023 federal amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and practitioners should confirm the current text. The other rules described here come from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; later amendments should be checked.

Arizona

Competency proceedings are governed by Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and A.R.S. §§ 13-4501 to 13-4517. Under A.R.S. § 13-4501, a defendant is incompetent if, as a result of a mental illness, defect, or disability, he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceeding or to assist in his defense; for a defendant under 18, the statute adds the Dusky formulation (see “Juvenile Transfer and Competency in Sex Offense Cases”). The definition of mental illness, defect, or disability includes developmental disabilities as defined in A.R.S. § 36-551, and the presence of such a condition alone is not grounds for finding a defendant incompetent. Under the statutory definition of “clinical liaison” in A.R.S. § 13-4501, when intellectual disability is an issue the clinical liaison is to be an expert in intellectual disabilities (verify the current text).

Restoration treatment is ordered in the least restrictive setting consistent with treatment and public safety (A.R.S. § 13-4512), and a restoration order may not remain in effect longer than 21 months or the maximum sentence for the offense, whichever is less (A.R.S. § 13-4515). A report that there is no substantial probability of restoration within 21 months ends the treatment order and leads to further proceedings under the statutes. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports asking whether a claimed impairment is established by records predating the charges, adaptive-functioning information, and testing with effort assessed, since poor performance on competency measures can be feigned (Everington et al., 2007). It also supports examining the recorded interview itself: whether the warning was read in plain language, whether the defendant explained the rights in his own words, and whether incriminating details came from him or from the questions. Some defendants with mild intellectual disability understand their rights, many are competent, and in some programs most of those found incompetent were restored (Grabowski et al., 2024). Plain-language advisements, complete recordings, and documented accommodations protect both the reliability of the evidence and the durability of a conviction.

The research also counsels caution. Defendants with IQs above 70 can have impaired Miranda abilities (Tazi & Rogers, 2023), so the absence of a diagnosis does not establish understanding. In groups with intellectual disability, acquiescence and limited vocabulary mean that a signed form or a statement that the person understood may overstate understanding; the recording, the person’s own explanation of each right, and later testing show more about this defendant, as they do for any defendant. Rote answers learned during restoration may not reflect rational understanding, and a validity-test failure by a person with genuine intellectual disability is not, by itself, proof of malingering.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports raising competency and the validity of a waiver early, and obtaining school and special-education records, prior testing, informants, the exact warning used, and complete recordings. It supports asking an evaluator to address specific abilities, such as understanding of each warning, susceptibility to leading questions, and the capacity to weigh a plea offer, and to recommend accommodations that would allow participation.

The research also counsels caution. Group findings on Miranda comprehension and suggestibility do not show that this client misunderstood his rights or that his statement is false, and a statement with independently corroborated details may withstand challenge. Prolonged incompetence findings can lead to extended commitment without trial, and a client who can participate with accommodations may be better served by obtaining them than by an incompetence finding. Testimony that relies on a diagnosis without connecting it to the specific abilities at issue invites challenge under Rule 702.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Anderson, S. D., & Hewitt, J. (2002). The effect of competency restoration training on defendants with mental retardation found not competent to proceed. Law and Human Behavior, 26(3), 343–351. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015328505884

Baker, S., & Haney-Caron, E. (2025). Evaluating the effectiveness of simplified Miranda warnings: An empirical examination of policy on youth comprehension and waiver decisions. Law and Human Behavior, 49(5), 411–425. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000627

Buell, S., Langdon, P. E., Pounds, G., & Bunning, K. (2020). An open randomized controlled trial of the effects of linguistic simplification and mediation on the comprehension of “easy read” text by people with intellectual disabilities. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 33(2), 219–231. https://doi.org/10.1111/jar.12666

Clare, I. C. H., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (1993). Interrogative suggestibility, confabulation, and acquiescence in people with mild learning disabilities (mental handicap): Implications for reliability during police interrogations. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32(3), 295–301. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1993.tb01059.x

Erickson, S. L., Salekin, K. L., Johnson, L. N., & Doran, S. C. (2020). The predictive power of intelligence: Miranda abilities of individuals with intellectual disability. Law and Human Behavior, 44(1), 60–70. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000356

Everington, C., & Fulero, S. M. (1999). Competence to confess: Measuring understanding and suggestibility of defendants with mental retardation. Mental Retardation, 37(3), 212–220. https://doi.org/10.1352/0047-6765(1999)037<0212:CTCMUA>2.0.CO;2

Everington, C., Notario-Smull, H., & Horton, M. L. (2007). Can defendants with mental retardation successfully fake their performance on a test of competence to stand trial? Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 25(4), 545–560. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.735

Fulero, S. M., & Everington, C. (1995). Assessing competency to waive Miranda rights in defendants with mental retardation. Law and Human Behavior, 19(5), 533–543. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499342

Gilbert, D. J., Azumara, S. I., Wheatcroft, J. M., Steele, K., Cook, P., Mukherjee, R., Gudjonsson, G., & Brown, N. N. (2026). FASD and intellectual disability equivalence: A meta-analysis of suggestibility during forensic interviews. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 44(3), 450–460. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.70052

Grabowski, K., Morgan, R., & Scanlon, F. (2024). Intellectual deficits and restoration to competency to stand trial: An examination of IQ cut off scores. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities, 28(4), 1038–1052. https://doi.org/10.1177/17446295231218782

Griego, A. W., Datzman, J. N., Estrada, S. M., & Middlebrook, S. S. (2019). Suggestibility and false memories in relation to intellectual disability and autism spectrum disorder: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 63(12), 1464–1474. https://doi.org/10.1111/jir.12668

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. A., Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. (2010). Police-induced confessions: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 34(1), 3–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-009-9188-6

Morris, D. R., & DeYoung, N. J. (2012). Psycholegal abilities and restoration of competence to stand trial. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 30(6), 710–728. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2040

O’Connell, M. J., Garmoe, W., & Goldstein, N. E. S. (2005). Miranda comprehension in adults with mental retardation and the effects of feedback style on suggestibility. Law and Human Behavior, 29(3), 359–369. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-005-2965-y

Pirelli, G., Gottdiener, W. H., & Zapf, P. A. (2011). A meta-analytic review of competency to stand trial research. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 17(1), 1–53. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021713

Porter Staats, M. L., Kivisto, A. J., & Connell, R. E. (2021). The role of cognitive functioning in predicting restoration among criminal defendants committed for inpatient restoration of competence to stand trial. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 74, Article 101654. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2020.101654

Rogers, R., Harrison, K. S., Shuman, D. W., Sewell, K. W., & Hazelwood, L. L. (2007). An analysis of Miranda warnings and waivers: Comprehension and coverage. Law and Human Behavior, 31(2), 177–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9054-8

Salekin, K. L., Olley, J. G., & Hedge, K. A. (2010). Offenders with intellectual disability: Characteristics, prevalence, and issues in forensic assessment. Journal of Mental Health Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 3(2), 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/19315861003695769

Tazi, K. Y., & Rogers, R. (2023). Falling through the cracks: Failing to identify compromised Miranda abilities for defendants with limited cognitive capacities. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 41(5), 326–342. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2610

Wall, B. W., & Christopher, P. P. (2012). A training program for defendants with intellectual disabilities who are found incompetent to stand trial. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 40(3), 366–373.

Wood, M. E., Lawson, K. M., Anderson, J. L., Kinney, D. I., Nitch, S., & Glassmire, D. M. (2019). Reasonable accommodations for meeting the unique needs of defendants with intellectual disability. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 47(3), 310–320. https://doi.org/10.29158/JAAPL.003855-19

Legal Authorities

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (Article 31(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 4241.

42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II).

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4501, 13-4512, 13-4515, 36-551.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 305, 702.

Rule for Courts-Martial 706, 909.

Related topic papers: Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods · Special Populations in Sex Offense Cases: Who They Are and What the Research Shows · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation · Juvenile Transfer and Competency in Sex Offense Cases · Adolescent Brain Development and Culpability

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: False Confessions: Suggestibility · False Confessions · Courts-Martial