Snap Shot
- The question: What does developmental and neuroscientific research show about adolescents’ decision-making and self-control, how has the Supreme Court used it in deciding the culpability of juvenile offenders, and what can it and can it not say about a particular adolescent or young adult charged with a sexual offense?
- What the research shows: On average, basic cognitive capacity approaches adult levels around age 16, while psychosocial maturity, including self-restraint in emotional or exciting situations and resistance to peers, continues to develop beyond 18 and into the twenties (Icenogle et al., 2019). In one small imaging study (n = 110), 18- to 21-year-olds matched adults on a cognitive-control task under neutral conditions but performed worse than adults over 21 under laboratory threat of an aversive noise (Cohen et al., 2016). Brain regions supporting self-regulation continue to mature into the twenties. In longitudinal studies of boys and justice-involved adolescent males reviewed by Casey et al. (2022), most with high early callous-unemotional or psychopathic traits declined by adulthood while a minority stayed high; the studies cannot identify which individual belongs to which group, and none concerned sexual offending specifically.
- What it does not show: These are group averages with wide variation within each age. No brain scan or test can determine an individual’s maturity or culpability, distinguish a 17-year-old from a 20-year-old, or show why a particular person offended. The research was not designed around sexual offending and does not lessen the harm to victims.
- The law: Roper v. Simmons (2005), Graham v. Florida (2010), Miller v. Alabama (2012), Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), and Jones v. Mississippi (2021) define Eighth Amendment limits on punishing offenders under 18, and J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) made age part of the Miranda custody analysis. Age is also a statutory mitigating factor in Arizona (A.R.S. § 13-701(E)(1)) and enters federal sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and military sentencing as mitigation under R.C.M. 1001(d).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can show that adolescents and young adults, as a group, have adult-level reasoning in calm, deliberate situations and that the science does not excuse offending; defense counsel can show that self-control in emotional and peer-influenced situations matures into the twenties and that most youth outgrow antisocial behavior, without claiming that a brain scan measures a client’s culpability.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,” as it summarized in Miller v. Alabama (2012), and it has drawn on developmental psychology and, increasingly, neuroscience to explain why. Attorneys in sexual offense cases encounter this research in juvenile transfer and disposition, in adult sentencing of defendants who offended at 16 or 17, in courts-martial of service members aged 17 to 20, and in arguments that young adults aged 18 to 25 share some features of adolescence.
This paper summarizes the behavioral and brain research on adolescent and young-adult development, describes how the Supreme Court has used it, and sets out its limits. Two premises frame the discussion. First, developmental immaturity is a reason to consider reduced culpability and greater capacity for change; it is not an excuse, and it does not lessen the harm of a sexual offense to the person victimized. Second, the research describes averages across groups, and its application to a particular person requires individual evidence. Competency and Miranda waiver are addressed in “Juvenile Transfer and Competency in Sex Offense Cases” and “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations,” and the young-adult period in “Young Adults Aged 18 to 25.”
Behavioral Research on Adolescent Decision-Making
Steinberg and Scott (2003) set out the framework the Court later drew on. Under general principles of criminal law, culpability is mitigated when decision-making capacity is diminished, when the act was influenced by coercive circumstances, or when it was out of character. The authors argued that adolescents qualify on each ground: their judgment is less mature, they are more susceptible to peer influence and less able to leave settings that pressure them, and their character is still forming. They distinguished mitigation, which places an offender on a continuum of punishment, from excuse, which removes responsibility altogether, and argued that adolescence is a mitigating rather than an excusing condition.
The strongest evidence that different capacities mature at different ages comes from a cross-sectional study of 5,227 people aged 10 to 30 in eleven countries, balanced by sex (Icenogle et al., 2019). Cognitive capacity, the basic reasoning abilities underlying logical thinking, reached adult levels at about 16. Psychosocial maturity, a composite of resistance to peer influence, impulse control, future orientation, and reduced sensation seeking and reward sensitivity, did not reach adult levels until after 18, producing what the authors called a “maturity gap.” The pattern held in most but not all countries; for example, adults in their late twenties showed greater psychosocial maturity than 18- to 21-year-olds in eight of the eleven. The authors concluded that it is reasonable to use different age boundaries for different legal purposes: an earlier one where deliberation is possible, such as medical decisions or participation in legal proceedings, and a later one where self-restraint in emotional or exciting situations matters, such as criminal culpability. Psychosocial maturity was measured mainly by laboratory tasks, with one self-report measure, and the study was cross-sectional, comparing different people at different ages rather than following the same people over time.
The same distinction appears in adjudicative competence. In a study of 927 adolescents and 466 young adults in detention, jails, and the community, youths aged 15 and younger performed more poorly than young adults on a standardized measure of competence-related abilities, a greater share showed impairment comparable to that of adults found incompetent, and adolescents more often made choices, such as about plea offers, reflecting compliance with authority and psychosocial immaturity (Grisso et al., 2003). The capacities of 16- and 17-year-olds, as a group, did not differ significantly from those of young adults, and these age patterns held across gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.
Sex differences have been examined in this research. In longitudinal data on 8,270 U.S. youth aged 10 to 25, sensation seeking rose and then fell, and impulse control increased into the twenties, in both sexes (Shulman et al., 2015). On average, males showed higher sensation seeking and lower impulse control than females, females reached peak sensation seeking earlier and declined faster, and males’ impulse control developed more gradually, so the period of heightened vulnerability to risk-taking was larger and longer for males. Most defendants in juvenile and young-adult sexual offense cases are male, but these are group averages based on self-report and say nothing about the maturity of a particular adolescent of either sex.
Brain Development
Research on brain development is consistent with these behavioral patterns. Brain systems that respond to reward and emotion become especially active in adolescence, while the prefrontal and fronto-parietal circuitry that supports planning and self-regulation, and its connections with other regions, continue to mature into the twenties (Casey et al., 2022; Steinberg, 2013). In a functional imaging study of 110 people aged 13 to 25, 18- to 21-year-olds performed as well as older adults on a cognitive-control task under neutral conditions but worse than adults over 21 under brief and sustained threat, with performance resembling that of 13- to 17-year-olds; the reduced performance was accompanied by lower activity in fronto-parietal control circuitry and greater sustained activity in a prefrontal region involved in emotional processing (Cohen et al., 2016). That study was small, involved a laboratory threat of an aversive noise, and was not designed to examine sex differences.
Casey et al. (2022) reviewed this work and argued for extending juvenile protections into the early twenties. Their review is written as an argument for sentencing reform, but it also documents the limits of the science. They reported that, in their imaging and behavioral data, people of the same age differed from one another about as much as the age groups differed on average, and they concluded that one could not tell, for any one person, whether that person’s capacity was typical of 17 or of 21. Studies using brain connectivity to estimate age could distinguish children from adults but could not reliably distinguish 17- to 20-year-olds, and some developmental changes in connectivity appeared earlier in females than in males. The review also summarized longitudinal studies of boys and of justice-involved adolescent males in which most of those with high early levels of psychopathic or callous-unemotional traits showed declines by adulthood, while a small group remained persistently high.
Steinberg (2013), reviewing the Court’s decisions, concluded that the neuroscience was probably persuasive not because it revealed something new about adolescence but because it aligned with common sense and behavioral science. That observation bears on how the evidence should be used: the behavioral findings carry the explanatory weight, and brain imaging adds a consistent account of mechanism rather than an independent measure of an individual’s culpability.
How the Supreme Court Has Used the Research
In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for offenders who were under 18 at the time of the offense. It identified three general differences between juveniles and adults: a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, greater vulnerability to negative influences and outside pressures, and a character that is less fully formed. The Court acknowledged that these qualities do not disappear at 18 and that some individuals under 18 are more mature than some adults, but it drew a categorical line because of the difficulty of identifying, case by case, the rare juvenile whose offense reflects irreparable corruption.
In Graham v. Florida (2010), the Court held that life without parole may not be imposed on juveniles for nonhomicide offenses, a category that includes sexual offenses, and required that such offenders have “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” It noted that developments in psychology and brain science continued to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. Miller v. Alabama (2012) held that mandatory life without parole for offenders under 18 violates the Eighth Amendment because it prevents the sentencer from considering youth and its attendant characteristics. Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) held that Miller announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively and that a state may remedy a violation by permitting parole consideration. Jones v. Mississippi (2021) held that a sentencer need not make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility, or provide an on-the-record explanation, before imposing discretionary life without parole on an offender under 18; a discretionary sentencing procedure that allows consideration of youth is sufficient.
The Court has also applied developmental reasoning outside sentencing. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011), it held that a child’s age, when known to the officer or objectively apparent, properly informs whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have felt free to end questioning, and therefore whether Miranda warnings were required. Each of these decisions rests on group-level characteristics of people under 18; none holds that a particular adolescent is less culpable because of brain evidence, and none extends constitutional protection to offenders 18 or older.
Limits of the Evidence
The behavioral and imaging findings are averages, and the overlap between ages is large; within-age variation can equal the difference between ages (Casey et al., 2022). Imaging samples are small, laboratory tasks are not real offenses, and brain activity measured in a scanner cannot be translated into a measure of self-control at the moment of a particular act. Many studies are cross-sectional and rely partly on self-report. None of the studies reviewed here examined sexual offending, which is often private and may involve planning, secrecy, or repeated acts over time, circumstances that differ from the peer-driven, emotionally charged situations in which the maturity gap is most evident. Several prominent authors have also advocated policy positions, which does not make their data wrong but calls for attention to what the data, as opposed to the arguments, show. Researchers in this field also disagree about how far the findings extend: Scott et al. (2016), whose own work documents development into the early twenties, cautioned against overstating the research and against extending juvenile court jurisdiction to 21 across the board, proposing instead that young adults be treated as a transitional legal category. Group findings cannot establish that a particular adolescent or young adult was less able to control his or her conduct, and there is no brain-scan test of an individual’s culpability.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the finding that psychosocial maturity continues past 18 (Icenogle et al., 2019) is offered, ask what was measured: mostly laboratory tasks plus a self-report measure, averaged across thousands of people, not the defendant’s maturity. When Cohen et al. (2016) is cited for the proposition that young adults are like adolescents, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: the difference appeared only under laboratory threat, not in neutral conditions, in a sample of 110. When brain imaging of a particular defendant is offered to show immaturity, ask whether the finding applies to an individual at all, given that age-prediction methods cannot distinguish 17- from 20-year-olds (Casey et al., 2022). When the research is offered about a planned or repeated sexual offense, ask whether the situations studied resemble the offense. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Adolescent Development, Culpability, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery, and Jones govern the Eighth Amendment limits on sentences for crimes committed before 18. In sexual offense cases, Graham is the most directly applicable, because it bars life without parole for any nonhomicide offense committed before 18. In federal juvenile proceedings, a court considering transfer for adult prosecution must weigh, among other factors, the juvenile’s present intellectual development and psychological maturity (18 U.S.C. § 5032). At federal sentencing, the defendant’s history and characteristics are considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025) moved most departures, including the Chapter 5H specific-offender-characteristic policy statements, to Appendix B; the Commission described the change as outcome neutral, and the same facts may be considered for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2025). Expert testimony on development must meet Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023 (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993), and under Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) the court’s gatekeeping extends to all expert testimony, not only scientific testimony. Rule 704(b) bars an expert from stating an opinion on whether the defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the offense.
The military has no juvenile justice system, and the youngest service members are 17. Developmental evidence enters courts-martial chiefly as matter in mitigation, which the rules describe as matter introduced to lessen the punishment or to furnish grounds for a recommendation of clemency (R.C.M. 1001(d)(1)(B)), and as matter in extenuation explaining the circumstances of the offense (R.C.M. 1001(d)(1)(A)). The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions concern offenders under 18 and do not by themselves limit sentences for service members 18 or older. The 2023 federal amendment to Rule 702 took effect in Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. These provisions are quoted from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; later amendments should be checked.
Arizona
Arizona lists the age of the defendant as a mitigating circumstance the court must consider in noncapital sentencing (A.R.S. § 13-701(E)(1)). A juvenile 14 or older charged with a class 2 felony, which includes sexual conduct with a minor under 15, may be prosecuted as an adult (A.R.S. § 13-501(B)), and transfer decisions in either direction turn in part on the juvenile’s mental and emotional condition and the likelihood of rehabilitation (A.R.S. §§ 8-327, 13-504). In State v. Soto-Fong (2020), the Arizona Supreme Court held that Graham, Miller, and Montgomery do not prohibit consecutive sentences for separate crimes committed as a juvenile even when the aggregate term exceeds the offender’s life expectancy, a holding that may matter in cases with multiple counts; none of the three consolidated cases involved a sexual offense, but the opinion discussed a Ninth Circuit decision involving serial sexual assaults and rejected its result. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the position that adolescents’ basic reasoning approaches adult levels by about 16, that immaturity is a matter of mitigation rather than excuse, and that the maturity gap is most evident in emotionally charged, peer-influenced situations rather than in deliberate conduct. Prosecutors are often best positioned to show the circumstances of the offense, including planning, concealment, grooming, repetition over time, or acting alone, that bear on whether developmental findings describe the conduct at issue, and to keep the harm to the victim at the center of sentencing.
The research also counsels caution. The maturation of self-control into the twenties and the decline of antisocial traits in most youth are group tendencies in the studies reviewed, not findings about any one person; for offenders under 18, the Eighth Amendment limits on death and life-without-parole sentences (Roper, Graham, Miller) are well established, and the weight of age in other sentencing is governed by statute and case law. Arguments that a particular adolescent is fully mature because the adolescent is close to 18, or that the offense shows irreparable corruption, go beyond what group data can establish, as the Supreme Court recognized in Roper.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports the position that self-control under emotional arousal and peer influence continues to develop into the twenties, that adolescents are more susceptible to pressure and more likely to change, and that, in the longitudinal studies reviewed by Casey et al. (2022), most youth with high early antisocial or callous traits declined by adulthood. Defense counsel are often best positioned to gather developmental, school, family, and treatment history and evidence of growth since the offense, which give the group findings individual content at transfer, disposition, and sentencing.
The research also counsels caution. It cannot show that a particular defendant’s self-control was impaired at the time of the offense, the imaging and laboratory findings are averages with large overlap between ages, and none of the studies reviewed examined sexual offending, which may involve planning or repeated acts that differ from the situations in which the maturity gap is most evident.
The research also counsels caution. Brain imaging cannot show that a particular client was less able to control the conduct at issue, and offering a scan for that purpose invites a Rule 702 challenge. Basic reasoning is near adult levels by 16, a planned or repeated offense may fall outside the situations in which the maturity gap is most evident, and the research was not designed around sexual offending. Arguments that a particular adolescent must have been less mature because of age alone, or that group findings on maturation predict this client’s conduct, likewise go beyond what group data can establish. Developmental evidence mitigates; presenting it as an excuse, or in a way that minimizes harm to the victim, is unsupported by the research and is likely to be unpersuasive.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Casey, B. J., Simmons, C., Somerville, L. H., & Baskin-Sommers, A. (2022). Making the sentencing case: Psychological and neuroscientific evidence for expanding the age of youthful offenders. Annual Review of Criminology, 5, 321–343. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-030920-113250
Cohen, A. O., Breiner, K., Steinberg, L., Bonnie, R. J., Scott, E. S., Taylor-Thompson, K., Rudolph, M. D., Chein, J., Richeson, J. A., Heller, A. S., Silverman, M. R., Dellarco, D. V., Fair, D. A., Galván, A., & Casey, B. J. (2016). When is an adolescent an adult? Assessing cognitive control in emotional and nonemotional contexts. Psychological Science, 27(4), 549–562. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615627625
Grisso, T., Steinberg, L., Woolard, J., Cauffman, E., Scott, E., Graham, S., Lexcen, F., Reppucci, N. D., & Schwartz, R. (2003). Juveniles’ competence to stand trial: A comparison of adolescents’ and adults’ capacities as trial defendants. Law and Human Behavior, 27(4), 333–363. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024065015717
Icenogle, G., Steinberg, L., Duell, N., Chein, J., Chang, L., Chaudhary, N., Di Giunta, L., Dodge, K. A., Fanti, K. A., Lansford, J. E., Oburu, P., Pastorelli, C., Skinner, A. T., Sorbring, E., Tapanya, S., Uribe Tirado, L. M., Alampay, L. P., Al-Hassan, S. M., Takash, H. M. S., & Bacchini, D. (2019). Adolescents’ cognitive capacity reaches adult levels prior to their psychosocial maturity: Evidence for a “maturity gap” in a multinational, cross-sectional sample. Law and Human Behavior, 43(1), 69–85. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000315
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Scott, E. S., Bonnie, R. J., & Steinberg, L. (2016). Young adulthood as a transitional legal category: Science, social change, and justice policy. Fordham Law Review, 85(2), 641–666.
Shulman, E. P., Harden, K. P., Chein, J. M., & Steinberg, L. (2015). Sex differences in the developmental trajectories of impulse control and sensation-seeking from early adolescence to early adulthood. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 44(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-014-0116-9
Steinberg, L. (2013). The influence of neuroscience on US Supreme Court decisions about adolescents’ criminal culpability. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14(7), 513–518. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3509
Steinberg, L., & Scott, E. S. (2003). Less guilty by reason of adolescence: Developmental immaturity, diminished responsibility, and the juvenile death penalty. American Psychologist, 58(12), 1009–1018. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.58.12.1009
U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2025). Guidelines manual (November 1, 2025).
Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
State v. Soto-Fong, 250 Ariz. 1, 474 P.3d 34 (2020).
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 5032.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-327, 13-501(B), 13-504, 13-701(E)(1).
Fed. R. Evid. 702, 704(b).
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Rule for Courts-Martial 1001(d)(1).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2024) (deleted effective Nov. 1, 2025, by amendment 836; former departure provisions compiled in Appendix B).
Related topic papers: Juvenile Transfer and Competency in Sex Offense Cases · Young Adults Aged 18 to 25 · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation · Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Normative and Problematic Sexual Behavior in Children and Adolescents · Sexual Recidivism Among Adolescents Who Sexually Offend
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: False Confessions · Courts-Martial · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations