Snap Shot
- The question: Do the developmental findings that shape the law’s treatment of adolescents extend to young adults aged 18 to 25 charged with sexual offenses, and what does research show about risk in this age group?
- What the research shows: Psychosocial maturity, including self-restraint under emotional arousal, continues to develop after 18, and in one laboratory study 18- to 21-year-olds controlled their responses less well than adults over 21 under negative emotional arousal. Sexual recidivism generally declines with age, but among adult men released from custody, rapists’ risk was highest at the youngest ages and young men aged 18 to 24 who offended within the family had a recidivism rate (30.7%) well above that of older men in the same group (about 8% overall); this is one subgroup, measured by charges or convictions in samples released from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s (Hanson, 2002). Most adolescents who sexually offend do not continue into adulthood.
- What it does not show: Developmental findings are group averages; no brain scan or test can measure an individual’s maturity or culpability. No validation study of the Static-99R or other adult tools has been conducted specifically in men aged 18 to 25, and no research addresses young service members who sexually offend.
- The law: At 18, defendants are adults for constitutional purposes under Roper and its successors. Youth remains relevant at sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), where, after Amendment 836 moved most departures, including the Chapter 5H policy statements, to Appendix B, the same facts may be considered for a variance; in courts-martial as a matter in mitigation; and in Arizona as a statutory mitigating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-701(E).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can rely on the finding that risk does not uniformly decline after 18, on the elevated recidivism of young men with adult victims, and on the legal line at 18; defense counsel can rely on continuing psychosocial development, the age-crime curve, and the capacity for change, without implying that group findings establish an individual’s immaturity or low risk.
The law treats 18 as the threshold of adulthood for most criminal purposes, including the constitutional protections the Supreme Court has extended to juveniles. Developmental science does not show a sharp change at 18. Many people charged with sexual offenses are in their late teens and early twenties: college students, young service members, and young adults, most of them men, whose partners or victims are close to them in age or much younger. In these cases, courts increasingly hear evidence that the developmental features of adolescence persist into the early twenties, and they also hear evidence that sexual reoffending by some young men is relatively frequent.
Two premises frame this paper. First, sexual offenses by young adults cause the same harm to victims as offenses by older adults, and young adults are legally responsible for their conduct. Second, age is relevant both to culpability and to risk, and the two can point in opposite directions: the developmental features that some courts treat as mitigating are also part of the context in which young men, as a group, offend more than older men; the research does not establish causation for an individual.
This paper reviews what developmental research shows about the period from 18 to 25, what recidivism research shows about sexual offending at these ages, how risk tools treat age, and how federal, military, and Arizona sentencing law address youth. The underlying research on adolescent brain development is covered in “Adolescent Brain Development and Culpability,” and sentencing generally in “Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation.”
Development After 18
The idea that the late teens and early twenties form a distinct developmental period, often called emerging adulthood, was proposed as a theory grounded in changes in education, marriage, and work in industrialized societies (Arnett, 2000). The concept describes social and psychological change; it is not itself evidence about brain maturation or culpability.
The more directly relevant research distinguishes two kinds of capacity. In a cross-sectional study of 5,227 people aged 10 to 30 in 11 countries (about half female), cognitive capacity, measured by working memory and verbal fluency tasks, reached adult levels around age 16, whereas psychosocial maturity, a composite of mostly behavioral measures of self-restraint such as impulse control, sensation seeking, and future orientation, did not reach adult levels until after 18, in the twenties (Icenogle et al., 2019). The authors described this difference as a “maturity gap” and suggested that the law might reasonably use different age boundaries for decisions made with deliberation and decisions made in emotionally charged situations. The gap appeared in most countries, although the age pattern of psychosocial maturity varied considerably among them, and participants were recruited from urban centers rather than sampled at random.
A laboratory study of 110 people aged 13 to 25 from New York and Los Angeles tested impulse control under sustained negative and positive emotional arousal while participants underwent functional brain imaging (Cohen et al., 2016). Under negative emotional arousal, 18- to 21-year-olds performed worse than adults aged 22 to 25, and their brain activity in regions involved in cognitive control and emotional processing differed in corresponding ways. Under neutral conditions, the young adults performed like older adults. The study used experimentally induced emotion, not real-world situations, and the sample was small; the authors called for replication and noted that earlier research on young adults as a distinct group had produced mixed results.
A review addressed to sentencing questions concluded that behavior, brain function, and personality, including psychopathic traits, change substantially into the twenties and that prior criminal behavior alone is a weak basis for predicting later conduct (Casey et al., 2022). The same review reported a limit that matters in court: methods that could distinguish children’s brain connectivity from adults’ could not reliably distinguish 17-, 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds from one another. Its authors wrote explicitly to support extending juvenile sentencing protections to people in their late teens and early twenties.
These findings describe group averages under laboratory or survey conditions. They show that, on average, young adults are less mature than older adults in some respects, particularly when emotionally aroused. They do not show that a particular 20-year-old was impaired at the time of an offense, and there is no validated brain scan or psychological test that measures an individual’s maturity for purposes of culpability. Planned or repeated offending, or offending in calm conditions, is less directly addressed by research on emotionally charged decision making.
Age and Sexual Recidivism
Across offense types, crime peaks in late adolescence and early adulthood and declines thereafter. For sexual offending the pattern is less uniform. In a combined analysis of 10 follow-up samples of 4,673 adult men released from custody or sentenced to community treatment in Canada, the United States, and England and Wales, sexual recidivism declined with age overall, but the pattern differed by offense type (Hanson, 2002). Men who had offended against adult women (described as rapists) were younger than other groups, and their recidivism risk declined steadily with age, so the youngest men had the highest risk. For men who offended against unrelated children, risk peaked between 25 and 35 and declined little until after 50. Men who offended against children in their own families had a low overall rate (about 8%), except for those aged 18 to 24, whose rate (30.7%) the author described as relatively high. Recidivism was measured by charges or convictions in samples released between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s, when recidivism rates were generally higher than in recent cohorts, and detected recidivism undercounts offending. The study is dated, but it remains the most direct evidence that risk in the 18-to-24 group is not uniformly low and in some subgroups is relatively high.
Continuity from adolescence is a separate question. In a Dutch birth cohort followed into early adulthood, the large majority of adolescents who sexually offended did not sexually offend as adults, and the large majority of young adults who sexually offended had not done so as adolescents (Lussier & Blokland, 2014). A small group of adolescents with repeated sexual offenses was at risk of persisting, and adolescents with frequent nonsexual offending were at risk of a first sexual offense in adulthood. For a young adult with an adolescent sexual offense history, these findings suggest that continued sexual offending is not the typical outcome but that a broad and persistent pattern of offending is a warning sign.
Risk Tools and Age
Actuarial tools for adult men include age because it predicts recidivism. When the Static-99 and Static-2002 were revised, analyses of 8,390 men in 24 samples found that age added predictive information beyond the original scores, and new age weights were adopted chiefly to correct the overestimation of risk for older men (Helmus et al., 2012). In both revised tools, men aged 18 to 24 receive the same age weight as men in their late twenties and early thirties, so the tools do not give additional weight to the youngest adults. In a population-based Austrian prison sample of 1,077 men, the original Static-99 predicted sexual reoffending somewhat better than the revised version (Rettenberger et al., 2013), a reminder that the age weights perform differently across samples.
There is no published validation study of the Static-99R, the STABLE-2007, or comparable tools specifically in men aged 18 to 25, and no study comparing their predictive accuracy for men who offended at 18 to 20 with older men. The tools are designed for adults and can be scored for young adults according to their manuals, but an evaluator should acknowledge that their accuracy in this age band has not been separately established, that a young man’s history is short and his criminal-history items may understate or overstate his trajectory, and that dynamic factors such as impulsivity and intimacy deficits may reflect developmental stage as well as entrenched risk. Tools for adolescents, discussed in “Assessing Risk in Adolescents: ERASOR, J-SOAP-II, and PROFESOR,” are not designed for adults, although an evaluator may consider their developmental framework when the offense occurred shortly after 18. The use of adult tools outside their normative samples is addressed in “Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples.”
Young Service Members and Age-Gap Offenses
Because many junior enlisted members are in their late teens or early twenties, accused in this age range are common in courts-martial. No published research addresses young service members who sexually offend, so research on civilian young adults must be applied by analogy, with attention to features of military life such as living in barracks, alcohol use in group settings, separation from family, and the age mix of military communities. Courts-martial have no juvenile system.
Age-gap offenses are common in this age group: sexual contact or image exchange between an 18- to 20-year-old and a partner under the age of consent. Statutory definitions differ. Under the UCMJ, a “child” for purposes of Article 120b is a person under 16, and in prosecutions for sexual assault or sexual abuse of a child who was in fact at least 12, the accused may raise the defense, proved by a preponderance of the evidence, of a reasonable belief that the child was at least 16; apart from a marriage defense, there is no close-in-age defense (Manual for Courts-Martial, pt. IV, ¶ 62 (2024 ed.)). Sexually explicit images of anyone under 18, by contrast, fall within the Article 134 child pornography offense, so a relationship that is lawful under Article 120b may still produce a charge if images are exchanged. Arizona provides a defense to sexual conduct with a minor and to certain related offenses when the victim is 15, 16, or 17, the defendant is under 19 or attending high school and no more than 24 months older than the victim, and the conduct is consensual (A.R.S. § 13-1407(E)). Federal law defines sexual abuse of a minor to require that the minor be 12 to 15 and at least four years younger than the defendant (18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)). Minors cannot legally consent, and these defenses mark where legislatures have chosen to draw lines, not judgments that conduct outside them is harmless. Images in such relationships are discussed in “Teen Sexting: Research and Law.”
Limits of the Evidence
The developmental studies are cross-sectional, compare age groups rather than following individuals, and measure laboratory or self-reported behavior; they sampled males and females in roughly equal numbers but did not report results separately by sex in the sections reviewed. The recidivism data on age are older, derived entirely from men, measured by charges or convictions, and drawn from samples released before the recent decline in recidivism rates. No validation study addresses risk tools specifically for ages 18 to 25, and no research addresses young women who sexually offend in this age group or young service members. Some of the developmental literature was written to support sentencing reform; its findings are peer-reviewed, but readers should know the purpose for which a review was written. Above all, group findings cannot establish that a particular young adult was immature, impulsive, or low in risk at the time of an offense; that requires evaluation of the individual, including history, informants, the nature of the offense, and conduct since.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the finding that 18- to 21-year-olds performed worse than older adults under emotional arousal (Cohen et al., 2016) is offered for a particular defendant, ask whether the conclusion follows: the study measured 110 people on a laboratory task, and the offense may not have occurred under comparable arousal. When the “maturity gap” (Icenogle et al., 2019) is cited, ask what was measured: average scores on a psychosocial maturity composite, mostly laboratory tasks plus a self-report measure, across 11 countries, not any individual’s capacity. When the 30.7% recidivism rate for young men who offended within the family (Hanson, 2002) is offered to show high risk, ask who was studied and when: men released decades ago, in one subgroup, with charges or convictions as the outcome. When a Static-99R score is offered for a 19-year-old, ask whether the tool has been validated in this age group; it has not been studied separately. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Young Adults and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing decisions, Roper v. Simmons (2005), Graham v. Florida (2010), Miller v. Alabama (2012), Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), and Jones v. Mississippi (2021), rely on developmental differences between juveniles and adults but draw the constitutional line at 18. Roper recognized that a categorical line at 18 is open to the objections raised against any categorical rule but chose it as the point where society generally draws the line between childhood and adulthood. Some state courts have extended protections to young adults under their own constitutions, in cases involving mandatory or automatic life without parole for homicide (In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 2021, ages 18 to 20; People v. Parks, 2022, 18-year-olds only, the court expressly not addressing older defendants; Commonwealth v. Mattis, 2024, ages 18 to 20); those decisions do not govern elsewhere, and none involved a sexual offense.
In federal sentencing, the court must impose a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment, deter, protect the public, and provide rehabilitation, considering among other things the history and characteristics of the defendant (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). In 2024 the Sentencing Commission amended the age policy statement, § 5H1.1, to address youthfulness at the time of the offense as a possible ground for a downward departure. Subsequently, Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025) moved most departures, including the Chapter 5H specific-offender-characteristic policy statements, to Appendix B; the Commission described the change as outcome neutral, and the same facts may be considered for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2025). Age is therefore now argued principally under § 3553(a). Expert testimony is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, and under Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) the court’s gatekeeping extends to all expert testimony; in courts-martial, the 2023 federal amendment took effect in Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025, and practitioners should confirm current text.
In courts-martial, the military judge must impose a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary, considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the accused (R.C.M. 1002(c)), and the defense may present matters in mitigation and extenuation (R.C.M. 1001). For offenses subject to sentencing parameters, the judge must sentence within the parameter unless specific facts warrant a sentence outside it and must state the factual basis on the record (R.C.M. 1002(a)(2)). An accused’s youth and developmental history are matters in mitigation; the parameters do not specifically address age. The rules quoted come from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; later amendments should be checked.
Arizona
Under A.R.S. § 13-701(E), the court must consider the age of the defendant as a mitigating circumstance, along with significantly impaired capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct to the law, and any other factor relevant to the defendant’s character or background. Many sexual offenses against children are sentenced under the dangerous crimes against children provisions, A.R.S. § 13-705, which prescribe enhanced sentencing ranges and generally bar release before the sentence is served, limiting the weight mitigation can carry. Arizona does not permit evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate the mental state element of an offense (State v. Mott, 1997), so developmental evidence is generally offered for mitigation rather than on intent. Expert testimony is governed by Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, amended effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports recognizing that risk does not uniformly decline after 18: among men who offended against adult women, the youngest had the highest recidivism rates in the most direct age study, young men aged 18 to 24 who offended within the family had a higher rate (30.7%) than older men in the same group (one subgroup, samples from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s), and continuity of offending is most likely for those with repeated sexual offenses or broad offending histories. The law places adult responsibility at 18, and planned or repeated conduct is less directly addressed by research on emotionally charged decision making. Prosecutors are often best positioned to show from the record whether an offense was impulsive or planned and how the defendant has functioned in work, school, or military service.
The research also counsels caution. Findings that psychosocial maturity continues to develop after 18 have been reported with several methods and in most of the countries studied, but individual findings, such as the laboratory study of emotional arousal, have not been independently replicated and some earlier work was mixed; young adults as a group do change in their twenties. Risk tools have not been validated specifically for this age group, and because recidivism rates in general have declined since the 1990s, older figures may overstate current rates, although this has not been tested specifically for ages 18 to 24. Treating youth as an aggravating factor because young men as a group offend more is not the same as showing that a particular defendant is high risk.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports presenting evidence that psychosocial maturity, particularly self-control under emotional arousal, continues to develop into the early to mid-twenties, that most adolescents who sexually offend do not continue as adults, and that young people’s capacity for change supports rehabilitation-focused sentencing and supervision. The facts addressed by the Commission’s 2024 youthfulness language, which remain available as a basis for a variance after Amendment 836, the statutory age mitigator in Arizona, and the military rules on mitigation each make this evidence relevant. An individualized evaluation linking developmental history, the circumstances of the offense, and conduct since is more persuasive than group research alone.
The research also counsels caution. Developmental findings are group averages and cannot show that a particular defendant was immature at the time of the offense; neuroimaging cannot distinguish one 19-year-old’s maturity from another’s. Some young adults, particularly those who offend against adult victims, those with repeated sexual offenses, and those with broad antisocial histories, have relatively high risk in the available data. Arguments that rely on the immaturity of young adults should not suggest that the victim’s harm is less, and they must account for the law’s placement of adult responsibility at 18.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. American Psychologist, 55(5), 469–480. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.5.469
Casey, B. J., Simmons, C., Somerville, L. H., & Baskin-Sommers, A. (2022). Making the sentencing case: Psychological and neuroscientific evidence for expanding the age of youthful offenders. Annual Review of Criminology, 5, 321–343. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-030920-113250
Cohen, A. O., Breiner, K., Steinberg, L., Bonnie, R. J., Scott, E. S., Taylor-Thompson, K. A., Rudolph, M. D., Chein, J., Richeson, J. A., Heller, A. S., Silverman, M. R., Dellarco, D. V., Fair, D. A., Galván, A., & Casey, B. J. (2016). When is an adolescent an adult? Assessing cognitive control in emotional and nonemotional contexts. Psychological Science, 27(4), 549–562. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615627625
Hanson, R. K. (2002). Recidivism and age: Follow-up data from 4,673 sexual offenders. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 17(10), 1046–1062. https://doi.org/10.1177/088626002236659
Helmus, L., Thornton, D., Hanson, R. K., & Babchishin, K. M. (2012). Improving the predictive accuracy of Static-99 and Static-2002 with older sex offenders: Revised age weights. Sexual Abuse, 24(1), 64–101. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063211409951
Icenogle, G., Steinberg, L., Duell, N., Chein, J., Chang, L., Chaudhary, N., Di Giunta, L., Dodge, K. A., Fanti, K. A., Lansford, J. E., Oburu, P., Pastorelli, C., Skinner, A. T., Sorbring, E., Tapanya, S., Uribe Tirado, L. M., Alampay, L. P., Al-Hassan, S. M., Takash, H. M. S., & Bacchini, D. (2019). Adolescents’ cognitive capacity reaches adult levels prior to their psychosocial maturity: Evidence for a “maturity gap” in a multinational, cross-sectional sample. Law and Human Behavior, 43(1), 69–85. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000315
Lussier, P., & Blokland, A. (2014). The adolescence–adulthood transition and Robins’s continuity paradox: Criminal career patterns of juvenile and adult sex offenders in a prospective longitudinal birth cohort study. Journal of Criminal Justice, 42(2), 153–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2013.07.004
Rettenberger, M., Haubner-Maclean, T., & Eher, R. (2013). The contribution of age to the Static-99 risk assessment in a population-based prison sample of sexual offenders. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 40(12), 1413–1433. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854813492518
U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2025). Guidelines manual. https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines
Legal Authorities
Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216 (2024).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021).
Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
People v. Parks, 510 Mich. 225, 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2243(a), 3553(a).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-701(E), 13-705, 13-1407(E).
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Rule for Courts-Martial 1001, 1002.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, ¶¶ 62, 95 (2024 ed.).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2024) (now in Appendix B); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 836 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2025).
Related topic papers: Adolescent Brain Development and Culpability · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation · Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples · Sexual Recidivism Among Adolescents Who Sexually Offend · Teen Sexting: Research and Law · Juvenile Registration and the Research on Its Effects
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial