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Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods

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  • The question: What professional standards and methods should govern a forensic evaluation of a person charged with a sexual offense who has, or is claimed to have, an intellectual disability, borderline intellectual functioning, or attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)?
  • What the research shows: Both conditions are diagnosed by convergent evidence, not a single score. IQ scores carry measurement error and drift upward on outdated norms by about 2 to 3 points per decade; adaptive functioning must be documented from records and informants; ADHD self-report checklists are easily feigned; and validity tests built for people of average ability can misclassify some people with genuine intellectual disability, although results across small studies differ.
  • What it does not show: No single test establishes or rules out either condition, detects feigning with certainty in people of low ability, or answers a legal question such as competency, the validity of a waiver, or risk.
  • The law: Fed. R. Evid. 702, as amended in 2023, asks whether an expert’s methods are reliable and reliably applied. Atkins, Hall and Moore require clinically informed assessment of intellectual disability in capital cases, and Arizona’s competency statute requires an intellectual disability expert as clinical liaison when the condition is at issue.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should ask whether a claimed condition rests on records predating the charges, adaptive data and validity testing; defense counsel should ensure the evaluation is adapted to the client’s reading level and communication, and that low scores are not mistaken for malingering or high ones for the absence of impairment.

When a person charged with a sexual offense has an intellectual disability, borderline intellectual functioning, or ADHD, a psychological evaluation may bear on several decisions: competency to stand trial, the validity of a waiver of rights, mitigation, risk, and the kind of treatment and supervision that would work. The quality of each opinion depends on how the underlying condition was established. This paper describes the professional standards that govern such evaluations and the methods the research supports for establishing intellectual disability and ADHD in adults, assessing effort, gathering collateral information, and adapting testing. Autism is addressed in the separate Autism and Online Sexual Offense hub.

Two premises frame the paper. First, a developmental or cognitive condition is not a defense to a sexual offense and does not lessen the harm to the person who was victimized. It raises questions about knowledge, capacity, culpability, and risk; it does not answer them. Second, flawed methods can err in either direction. An evaluation can find a disability that is not present, or miss one that is, and either error can distort every opinion built on it.

Professional Standards That Frame the Evaluation

The Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology call on evaluators to use methods appropriate to the examinee and the legal question, to rely on multiple sources of information, to consider the limits of tests for the population being examined, and to remain impartial regardless of who retained them (American Psychological Association, 2013). Their relevance is concrete: in an experiment in which 108 forensic psychologists and psychiatrists scored the same case files, those who believed they had been retained by the prosecution assigned higher risk scores, and those who believed they worked for the defense assigned lower ones, on two widely used instruments (Murrie et al., 2013). Structured procedures, documented reasoning, and disclosure of limitations are the profession’s safeguards against that tendency.

The current guidelines of the Association for the Treatment and Prevention of Sexual Abuse (ATSA) apply to adult men aged 18 and older. They state that they should not be generalized to other client groups and identify children, adolescents, and women as distinct populations with different risk factors and needs (Association for the Treatment and Prevention of Sexual Abuse, 2025). Within adult men they treat cognitive functioning and young adulthood as characteristics that should shape practice. A comprehensive assessment is to identify and explain responsivity factors, including literacy, language barriers, neuropsychological, cognitive, and learning impairments, and level of adaptive functioning (Guideline 5.02). Evaluators are to gather information from multiple sources (Guideline 2.13), select tests suited to the examinee’s developmental and intellectual functioning, and state in the report any limitations of tests not developed for that kind of client (Guideline 6.03). When a tool has not been standardized for the examinee’s population, the report should say so, explain why the tool was used, and describe the resulting cautions (Guideline 2.14).

ATSA’s code of ethics prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and other characteristics, requires members to keep personal reactions to a client’s offense from affecting their judgment, and states that evaluations should not be conducted for the primary purpose of determining guilt or innocence (Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, 2017). The 2025 guidelines refer to a 2024 version of the code; the 2017 version is the one reviewed here.

Establishing Intellectual Disability

Intellectual disability is defined by significant limitations in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, with onset during the developmental period (American Psychiatric Association, 2022). The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities defines significant intellectual limitation as a full-scale score about two standard deviations or more below the mean on an appropriate standardized test, and its 2021 manual moved the end of the developmental period from age 18 to age 22 (Schalock et al., 2021). Legal definitions may differ; Arizona’s statutes, for example, use onset before 18.

Most people with intellectual disability who come into contact with the criminal justice system function in the mild range. Many have worked, married, and lived independently, and they may not appear impaired in ordinary conversation (Salekin et al., 2010). Several measurement issues therefore matter. Every IQ score has a standard error of measurement. In a United Kingdom prison study, the prevalence of intellectual disability was 2.9% with a strict cutoff of 70, 9.4% with a cutoff of 74, and 21.7% with 79, as summarized by Salekin et al. (2010), so how a score near the line is handled can change the conclusion. IQ norms also become outdated: a meta-analysis of 285 studies found that scores rise by about 2.3 points per decade across tests and about 2.9 points per decade on modern Wechsler and Stanford-Binet tests, so a score obtained on old norms may overstate current standing relative to peers (Trahan et al., 2014). The size of the gain varies by test and era, and courts and clinicians differ on whether to adjust an individual score. Abbreviated tests, practice effects from repeated testing, and differences across tests and settings can also move scores (Salekin et al., 2010). None of these adjustments is automatic; each should be identified and explained, not applied by formula.

Adaptive functioning is the harder prong to document in a criminal case. It concerns conceptual, social, and practical skills in everyday life, and the diagnosis requires that limitations began during development. Standardized adaptive behavior scales were normed with informants who know the person well, and a retrospective assessment of an adult may require interviews with family members, teachers, or employers, along with school, special education, vocational, and benefits records. Self-report from the defendant alone is weak evidence, because people with mild intellectual disability may overstate their abilities, and because undergraduates instructed to feign were able to produce scores in the impaired range on one widely used adaptive scale (Doane & Salekin, 2009, as summarized in Salekin et al., 2010).

The clinical framework also cautions against a common error: treating particular strengths (holding a job, driving, using a phone, managing money in simple ways) as proof that a person cannot have an intellectual disability. People with mild intellectual disability often have relative strengths in concrete, practiced, everyday tasks (Salekin et al., 2010), and the diagnosis rests on deficits, not on the absence of all competence. The opposite error is equally real: a low score obtained after arrest, without developmental history or adaptive data, does not establish the condition. Borderline intellectual functioning, usually described as scores roughly in the 70s without the full diagnosis, is not intellectual disability, although it may still bear on comprehension, testing, and treatment.

Establishing ADHD in an Adult

ADHD is a neurodevelopmental condition whose symptoms must have begun in childhood and must impair functioning in more than one setting (American Psychiatric Association, 2022). In a meta-analysis of 42 studies of incarcerated people, prevalence was about 25.5% when ADHD was diagnosed by clinical interview, with no significant differences by gender or age, and estimates were higher when they rested on screening instruments or retrospective self-report of childhood symptoms (Young et al., 2015). This is a base rate for incarcerated people and does not establish a diagnosis in an individual. That pattern illustrates the methodological point: screening scores identify people who need further evaluation, not people who have the disorder.

Self-report is the weakest link. When 31 undergraduates were paid and coached with information available on the internet, they readily produced ADHD-consistent profiles on standard symptom checklists, and a computerized attention test appeared to reflect motivation more than diagnosis; performance validity tests, by contrast, showed very high specificity in students with genuine ADHD and moderate sensitivity to feigning (Sollman et al., 2010). A review reached a similar conclusion that no single measure reliably detects feigned ADHD (Musso & Gouvier, 2014). These studies involved college students, not defendants, but the incentive to appear impaired in a criminal case may be at least as strong. A credible adult diagnosis therefore rests on evidence of childhood onset from records or informants, current impairment documented across settings, consideration of conditions that mimic or accompany ADHD (substance use, trauma, mood disorders, and intellectual disability), and validity testing. ADHD frequently co-occurs with intellectual disability; in a Swedish register cohort of more than 1.2 million people, about one in five men with mild intellectual disability also had ADHD (Latvala et al., 2023).

Effort, Feigning, and Response Style

The incentive to appear impaired is real in criminal cases, and assessment of effort is standard practice. The research on doing so with people of low ability cuts both ways. When 25 volunteers instructed to feign mild intellectual disability were compared with 26 adults who had it, the volunteers lowered their IQ scores to about the genuine group’s level; indicators drawn from the intelligence test itself and from psychiatric feigning measures did not separate the groups well, and neurocognitive validity tests performed better but, at their published cutoffs, misclassified many genuine examinees (Graue et al., 2007). Salekin et al. (2010) reported that 69% of the genuine group in that study fell below a recommended cutoff on at least one such measure. Other work found that several performance validity tests produced few false positives among people with IQs of 60 to 75 who were motivated to do well (Chafetz & Biondolillo, 2012).

The research supports three practical conclusions. Validity testing is appropriate and expected. Cutoffs developed in people of average ability must be interpreted in light of measured ability and history, and a single failed measure is not proof of malingering. Conversely, passing validity tests supports the credibility of the results but does not by itself establish a diagnosis.

Response style can also distort an evaluation toward apparent competence. People with intellectual disability may rely on cues from others, seek approval, and acquiesce (Salekin et al., 2010). An examinee who answers “yes” to “Do you understand?” or repeats back rehearsed phrases may appear to understand more than he does. Evaluators should ask open questions, request explanations in the examinee’s own words, and check understanding in more than one way.

Collateral Sources and Records

Because both conditions begin in childhood, records created before any legal incentive existed are the most persuasive evidence: school and special education files, earlier psychological testing, pediatric and psychiatric records, medication history, disability benefit determinations, and juvenile records. Salekin et al. (2010) noted that a person claiming intellectual disability in a criminal case would ordinarily have such documentation, collateral informants, or both. Their absence is not conclusive, since records are lost and some people were never identified, particularly in under-resourced schools, but it should be addressed.

ATSA’s guidelines call for collateral interviews with professionals, formal supports, and family members, with consent, attention to each informant’s limitations (such as lack of recent contact or a family member’s distorted perceptions), and the client’s confidentiality (Association for the Treatment and Prevention of Sexual Abuse, 2025, Guideline 6.06). They also state that the person the client sexually abused should not be interviewed as a collateral source; relevant information should come from police reports, transcripts, and other records. Informants can err in both directions: relatives may emphasize impairment to help a defendant or minimize it out of loyalty or stigma, and informants for the prosecution may describe functioning in a single, structured setting.

Testing Adaptations, Culture, and Language

Many standardized self-report instruments assume a reading level some examinees lack. Reading items aloud, simplifying instructions, or allowing extra time may be necessary, but each departure from standard administration should be reported, with its likely effect on the norms. ATSA’s guidelines direct evaluators to choose tests in light of the examinee’s age, gender, ethnocultural background, language, and developmental and intellectual functioning, and to identify any limitations or biases of tests not developed for that kind of client (Association for the Treatment and Prevention of Sexual Abuse, 2025, Guideline 6.03).

Culture and language affect every prong. Tests normed in one language or culture may underestimate the ability of people educated elsewhere; adaptive expectations differ across communities; and prison prevalence estimates of intellectual disability vary widely with the screening method and cutoff used, with typically 0.5% to 1.5% in interview-based psychiatric surveys of unselected prisoners (Fazel et al., 2008) and 7% to 10% across international studies that used varied screening measures (Hellenbach et al., 2017). An interpreter, translated tests, or locally normed instruments may be needed, and their limits should be stated. Sex and gender also bear on identification: both intellectual disability and ADHD are diagnosed more often in males, and diagnostic manuals note that ADHD in girls and women more often presents with inattention and may go unrecognized (American Psychiatric Association, 2022). Because both conditions are diagnosed less often in girls and women, a woman with a developmental condition may have fewer records documenting it; this is an inference from general diagnostic patterns, not a finding about women who sexually offend, and records and informants should still be sought. Risk instruments raise additional population questions, discussed in “Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples.”

Limits of the Evidence

The methodological research summarized here has gaps. Many feigning studies used college students or community volunteers told to fake, not defendants with real stakes; samples with genuine intellectual disability are small; and studies of adaptive behavior feigning are few. The prison prevalence studies vary in definitions and methods, and few focus on people charged with sexual offenses. Professional guidelines represent consensus rather than tested findings, and ATSA’s guidelines do not address women or adolescents. Most critically, establishing that a defendant has a condition says nothing by itself about whether he understood a warning, can assist counsel, was less culpable, or poses a particular risk. Those are separate questions that require separate, function-based assessment.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a score of 72 is offered as proof that a defendant does not have an intellectual disability, or a score of 68 as proof that he does, ask about measurement error, the test’s norm date (Trahan et al., 2014), and whether adaptive functioning and developmental onset were documented. When an evaluator relies on an ADHD symptom checklist, ask whether the result could be feigned and how childhood onset was established, because coached students produced ADHD profiles on such checklists (Sollman et al., 2010). When a failed validity test is offered as proof of malingering, ask whether the cutoff was validated in people of the examinee’s ability, given the misclassification rates reported by Graue et al. (2007). When a lack of records is offered to defeat a claim, ask whether records were sought and whether their absence has another explanation. When a 25% prevalence of ADHD in prisons (Young et al., 2015) is cited, ask whether the figure says anything about this defendant: it does not. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Developmental and Cognitive Evaluations and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony on these conditions is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, to require the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the opinion rests on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of those methods to the case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extend the court’s gatekeeping role to all expert testimony, including clinical opinion. The application prong is where most challenges to these evaluations arise: whether records and informants were obtained, whether effort was assessed, and whether tests were appropriate for the examinee.

The Supreme Court’s intellectual disability decisions govern capital eligibility but describe clinical principles that are also relevant outside the capital context. Atkins v. Virginia (2002) held that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of people with intellectual disability (the opinion used the then-current term “mental retardation”). Hall v. Florida (2014) held that a state may not treat an IQ score above 70 as conclusive evidence that a person does not have intellectual disability, without accounting for the standard error of measurement and allowing other evidence such as adaptive deficits. Moore v. Texas (2017) held that courts must be informed by current medical diagnostic standards and faulted reliance on a person’s adaptive strengths and on lay stereotypes rather than on adaptive deficits.

Federal competency is governed by Dusky v. United States (1960) and 18 U.S.C. § 4241; under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b), a court-ordered examination is conducted by a licensed or certified psychiatrist or psychologist. In courts-martial, inquiry into mental capacity or responsibility is ordinarily conducted by a board under R.C.M. 706, and Military Rule of Evidence 302 limits use of the accused’s statements to the board. The 2023 federal amendment took effect in Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm the current text.

Arizona

Under A.R.S. § 13-4501, a mental illness, defect, or disability includes developmental disabilities as defined in A.R.S. § 36-551, which lists cognitive (intellectual) disability with onset before 18; the presence of such a condition alone is not grounds for finding a defendant incompetent. When intellectual disability is at issue, the clinical liaison must be an expert in intellectual disabilities. Competency proceedings are governed by Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and A.R.S. §§ 13-4501 to 13-4517.

In capital cases, A.R.S. § 13-753 defines intellectual disability by significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, significant impairment in adaptive behavior, and onset before 18; places the burden on the defendant to prove it by clear and convincing evidence; and directs the court to take into account the margin of error of the test administered; the current published text does not itself refer to Hall v. Florida. The Arizona Supreme Court has read that provision to require consideration of the margin of error for each IQ score, in light of Hall (State v. Escalante-Orozco, 2017). Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports asking how a claimed condition was established. A diagnosis made after arrest should be tested against records predating the charges, informants who knew the defendant during development, adaptive functioning data, and validity testing. ADHD diagnosed from a self-report checklist alone, or intellectual disability inferred from a single IQ score, is open to challenge under Rule 702 on sufficiency of data and reliable application. Prosecutors are often best positioned to obtain records of the defendant’s functioning in work, school, military service, and online activity, and to ask whether an evaluator considered them. Where a condition is established, documented accommodations and plain-language procedures protect the integrity of a plea, a waiver, or a verdict.

The research also counsels caution. Ordinary competencies such as holding a job, driving, or using a computer do not rule out mild intellectual disability, and Moore rejected reliance on adaptive strengths in place of an assessment of deficits. Validity tests can misclassify people with genuine intellectual disability, so a single failed measure should not be presented as proof of malingering. An apparently articulate defendant may be acquiescing rather than understanding.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports insisting on an evaluation adapted to the client: reading level assessed, instructions simplified where needed and departures reported, understanding checked in the client’s own words, and tests chosen with their norms and limitations in mind. Defense counsel are often best positioned to gather school, special education, medical, and benefits records and to identify informants who knew the client as a child, and these sources carry the most weight because they predate any incentive. Measurement error, outdated norms, and co-occurring conditions such as ADHD with intellectual disability are legitimate considerations when they are documented.

The research also counsels caution. Evaluations that rest on post-arrest self-report, omit validity testing, or report an IQ score without adaptive data invite exclusion or impeachment, and coached examinees can produce convincing ADHD profiles on checklists. Establishing a condition does not establish incompetency, an invalid waiver, reduced culpability, or low risk; each requires its own assessment, and none diminishes the harm to the person victimized.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

American Psychiatric Association. (2022). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed., text rev.). https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425787

American Psychological Association. (2013). Specialty guidelines for forensic psychology. American Psychologist, 68(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029889

Association for the Treatment and Prevention of Sexual Abuse. (2025). Best practice guidelines for the assessment, treatment, risk management, and risk reduction of men who have committed sexually abusive behaviors (6th ed.). https://www.atsa.com

Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers. (2017). ATSA professional code of ethics (rev. ed.).

Chafetz, M. D., & Biondolillo, A. (2012). Validity issues in Atkins death cases. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 26(8), 1358–1376. https://doi.org/10.1080/13854046.2012.730674

Doane, B. M., & Salekin, K. L. (2009). Susceptibility of current adaptive behavior measures to feigned deficits. Law and Human Behavior, 33(4), 329–343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-008-9157-5

Fazel, S., Xenitidis, K., & Powell, J. (2008). The prevalence of intellectual disabilities among 12000 prisoners: A systematic review. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 31(4), 369–373. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2008.06.001

Graue, L. O., Berry, D. T. R., Clark, J. A., Sollman, M. J., Cardi, M., Hopkins, J., & Werline, D. (2007). Identification of feigned mental retardation using the new generation of malingering detection instruments: Preliminary findings. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 21(6), 929–942. https://doi.org/10.1080/13854040600932137

Hellenbach, M., Karatzias, T., & Brown, M. (2017). Intellectual disabilities among prisoners: Prevalence and mental and physical health comorbidities. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 30(2), 230–241. https://doi.org/10.1111/jar.12234

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Latvala, A., Tideman, M., Søndenaa, E., Larsson, H., Butwicka, A., Fazel, S., & Lichtenstein, P. (2023). Association of intellectual disability with violent and sexual crime and victimization: A population-based cohort study. Psychological Medicine, 53(9), 3817–3825. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291722000460

Murrie, D. C., Boccaccini, M. T., Guarnera, L. A., & Rufino, K. A. (2013). Are forensic experts biased by the side that retained them? Psychological Science, 24(10), 1889–1897. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613481812

Musso, M. W., & Gouvier, W. D. (2014). “Why is this so hard?” A review of detection of malingered ADHD in college students. Journal of Attention Disorders, 18(3), 186–201. https://doi.org/10.1177/1087054712441970

Salekin, K. L., Olley, J. G., & Hedge, K. A. (2010). Offenders with intellectual disability: Characteristics, prevalence, and issues in forensic assessment. Journal of Mental Health Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 3(2), 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/19315861003695769

Schalock, R. L., Luckasson, R., & Tassé, M. J. (2021). Intellectual disability: Definition, diagnosis, classification, and systems of supports (12th ed.). American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.

Sollman, M. J., Ranseen, J. D., & Berry, D. T. R. (2010). Detection of feigned ADHD in college students. Psychological Assessment, 22(2), 325–335. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018857

Trahan, L. H., Stuebing, K. K., Fletcher, J. M., & Hiscock, M. (2014). The Flynn effect: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 140(5), 1332–1360. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037173

Young, S., Moss, D., Sedgwick, O., Fridman, M., & Hodgkins, P. (2015). A meta-analysis of the prevalence of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in incarcerated populations. Psychological Medicine, 45(2), 247–258. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291714000762

Legal Authorities

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017).

State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, 386 P.3d 798 (2017).

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4247(b).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-753, 13-4501 to 13-4517, 36-551.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 302, 702.

Rule for Courts-Martial 706.

Related topic papers: Special Populations in Sex Offense Cases: Who They Are and What the Research Shows · Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples · Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation · Recidivism and Risk Assessment for Women Who Sexually Offend

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · False Confessions: Suggestibility · Courts-Martial