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Registration and Compliance by People With Cognitive Disabilities

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Snap Shot

  • The question: Can people with intellectual disability, borderline intellectual functioning, fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD), brain injury, serious mental illness, or dementia understand and meet sex offender registration duties, and how does the law treat their failures to register?
  • What the research shows: In several state studies using official records (none recording diagnoses), failure to register was associated with broader criminal and supervision histories and housing instability, and was a weaker signal of sexual recidivism than of general noncompliance; registrants are at elevated risk of homelessness. Studies of registration’s effect on sexual recidivism are mixed. People with intellectual disability, FASD, or lower reading ability understand legal language less well than others.
  • What it does not show: No study located has measured registration compliance by diagnosis or tested how well registrants with cognitive impairments understand registration notices. Group findings cannot show whether a particular registrant knew of, or could meet, a particular duty.
  • The law: Under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and the 2021 SORNA rule, the registrant must have been aware of the specific requirement charged; the uncontrollable-circumstances defense is illustrated by external obstacles. Arizona’s offense (A.R.S. § 13-3824) is read as requiring knowledge, but Arizona generally limits mental-condition evidence offered to negate a mental state (State v. Mott; Clark v. Arizona left room for observation evidence).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can rely on notice and compliance history, but a signed form alone does not show understanding of each duty. Defense counsel can document impairment and how notice was given, but impairment alone does not show lack of knowledge, and “I forgot” is not a defense.

Sex offender registration imposes continuing duties, often for years or for life: appearing in person on fixed dates and reporting changes of residence, employment, name, vehicles, and online identifiers within short deadlines. Failing to comply can be a felony under federal and Arizona law. For a registrant with an intellectual disability, borderline intellectual functioning, FASD, a traumatic brain injury (TBI), a serious mental illness, or dementia, a failure-to-register case may also raise whether the person understood what was required and could remember and act on it.

Two premises frame the paper. First, registration laws aim at public safety and reflect the interests of victims and communities, and a cognitive impairment exempts no one from them. Second, the knowledge elements of the registration offenses make a registrant’s understanding a legitimate factual question, which evidence of impairment can bear on without answering.

Juvenile registration is addressed in “Juvenile Registration and the Research on Its Effects,” and autism, with more detail on the federal and Arizona registration statutes, in “Registration and Collateral Consequences for Autistic Adults” in the Autism and Online Sexual Offense hub.

What Registration Asks of a Registrant

Under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), registrants verify their information in person yearly, every six months, or every three months, by tier (34 U.S.C. § 20918). Under the 2021 rule, a change of residence, employment, or school generally must be reported in person within three business days (28 C.F.R. § 72.7). In Arizona, a registrant must report a move or name change to the sheriff in person and in writing within 72 hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays. A person without an address or permanent residence must register as a transient at least every 90 days, and a change from a permanent residence to a temporary residence or transient status must itself be reported within 72 hours (A.R.S. § 13-3822(A)). Registrants also report in person each year during their birth month (§ 13-3821(J)).

The registrant must understand the rules, recognize when a daily event triggers a duty, count deadlines that exclude weekends and holidays, and remember dates months ahead. Intellectual disability, FASD, TBI, and dementia can affect these abilities, to varying degrees, and serious mental illness may disrupt them during episodes. That connection is a reasoned inference, not a finding in registrants.

Who Fails to Register

A New York study found that registrants charged with failing to register tended to be younger, were more often members of racial minority groups, and had longer and more varied criminal and supervision-violation histories; the association of a failure-to-register charge with nonsexual rearrest (r = .44) was much stronger than its association with sexual rearrest (r = .09) (Levenson et al., 2012). A New Jersey study likewise found no significant predictive relationship between failure to register and sexual recidivism (Zgoba & Levenson, 2012). Among people released from Minnesota prisons, compared with a matched group, a failure-to-register offense did not significantly affect sexual or general recidivism but increased the risk of another failure-to-register offense. Registrants with at least a high school diploma or GED at release were significantly less likely to fail to register again (Duwe & Donnay, 2010). Among Florida registrants, those who were transient were more likely than others to have a history of registry violations (Levenson et al., 2015).

The Minnesota education finding is the closest the literature comes to cognitive ability, and education is only a rough proxy. None of these studies recorded any diagnosis, and PubMed searches for this paper found no study of registration compliance among people with intellectual disability, FASD, TBI, or dementia. The research supports two general statements: failure to register often accompanies broader instability and criminal versatility, and it is a weaker signal of sexual risk than of general noncompliance. Whether a given violation reflects that pattern or a misunderstanding is a question about that registrant.

Comprehension of Notices and Legal Language

SORNA directs an official to explain the duties and have the registrant read and sign a form stating that the duty has been explained and that he or she understands it (34 U.S.C. § 20919(a)).

No study located has measured the reading level of registration forms or tested registrants’ understanding of them. An analysis of 560 Miranda warnings from across the United States found Flesch-Kincaid reading levels ranging from grade 2.8 to postgraduate (Rogers et al., 2007). Among adults with mild developmental disabilities, only 8 of 34 legal terms were understood by at least 75% of participants, and their reports of familiarity with a term did not reliably show that they understood it (Ericson & Perlman, 2001). Probationers with intellectual disability understood Miranda rights less well than probationers without it and were more likely to change answers under suggestive questioning (Everington & Fulero, 1999). In a comparison of 50 young offenders with FASD and 50 without prenatal alcohol exposure, 90% of the FASD group were impaired in at least one legal ability, significantly more often than the comparison group; variability was considerable, and IQ and reading comprehension were robust predictors (McLachlan et al., 2014).

These studies concern warnings and court procedure, not registration. Applied to registration, they suggest two points by inference, not by direct finding. A signature or “yes” is weak evidence of understanding when the person reads poorly or tends to acquiesce. A diagnosis is weak evidence of misunderstanding when the person has explained or kept the same duties before.

Conditions That Bear on Compliance

Intellectual disability and borderline functioning

In a chapter of a handbook on offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities, the authors argue that registries, notification, and residence restrictions may undermine the community stability that supervision seeks, and that people with these disabilities may receive more restrictive care than others (Wilson et al., 2020). That is the authors’ view, not a tested finding. Registrants with borderline functioning often lack a diagnosis or services that would alert a sheriff’s office or probation officer to the need for plainer instructions (see “Borderline Intellectual Functioning: Defendants Between the Categories”).

FASD and TBI

A meta-analysis estimated FASD prevalence in correctional and other special populations at 10 to 40 times the general-population rate of 7.7 per 1,000 (Popova et al., 2019). A meta-analysis of 20 studies estimated that about 60% of people in offender populations had a history of TBI, pooling studies with varied definitions of TBI (Shiroma et al., 2010). Among people released from Indiana prisons, those who screened positive for TBI were rearrested sooner than others after controls (Ray & Richardson, 2017). None of these studies examined registration. A history of either condition is a reason to ask how duties were explained and tracked, not to presume a violation was unknowing.

Serious mental illness

In five jails in Maryland and New York, current serious mental illness was found in 14.5% of men and 31.0% of women admitted (Steadman et al., 2009). Among people with serious mental illness released from North Carolina prisons, those convicted of sex offenses were admitted to violator facilities at higher rates than those convicted of other crimes, after controls that included homelessness (Cuddeback et al., 2019). Because symptoms vary, the question is the registrant’s condition when the duty arose.

Older adults and dementia

In a study of 101 incarcerated sex offenders over 59 in England and Wales, all men, 1% had dementia, a rate not different from that among older men convicted of other offenses (Fazel et al., 2002). Dementia should therefore not be assumed, but when present it can remove the capacity to remember a duty.

Homelessness and Supervision

On Delaware’s public registry, 4.6% of registrants were homeless in November 2021 and 5.5% fifteen months later (Metraux & Modeas, 2023). Among 5.9 million veterans screened for housing instability, those identified on public registries had about three times the odds of reporting homelessness (Byrne et al., 2022). In Florida, transience was more common in counties with more extensive residence restrictions and costlier housing (Levenson et al., 2015). In a four-state study, shelters were less likely to admit registrants if they were small, lacked written policies, or were near schools (Rolfe et al., 2017).

For a registrant with a cognitive disability, homelessness plausibly brings more frequent reporting while removing the family or staff support, reminders, and structure that aid compliance. These findings describe general registrant populations, mostly men, and do not report results by diagnosis or sex.

Effectiveness and Relief

A meta-analysis of 18 studies (474,640 people) found no statistically significant effect of registration and notification on sexual recidivism (odds ratio 0.978). Results varied widely across studies (Zgoba & Mitchell, 2023). An economic analysis found that registration with police was associated with fewer sex offenses against victims known to the offender, and that public notification may deter first offenses (Prescott & Rockoff, 2011, pp. 161, 164). The same analysis found that notification was associated with more offending by people already registered, which the authors attributed to the social and financial costs of notification. These studies measure detected offending, which undercounts sexual offending, and they do not measure every aim of the laws, such as giving police and the public information about people living nearby. Neither line of research addressed registrants with cognitive disabilities.

Risk declines with time in the community. Across 20 samples totaling 7,225 men, the five-year sexual recidivism rate fell from 9.1% in the first five years after release to 2.0% for those offense-free for 15 to 20 years. Each offense-free year was associated with about a 12% decrease in the odds of a new sexual offense, and rates were higher for men assessed as higher risk at release (Hanson et al., 2018). Risk tools used in relief evaluations were normed mostly on people of average ability (see “Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples”).

Limits of the Evidence

The failure-to-register studies rely on official records from a few states and record no diagnoses. The comprehension studies concern Miranda warnings and court terms, not registration forms, and several are dated or small. The condition-specific studies come from correctional samples without registration outcomes. Most samples were entirely or mostly male and did not report outcomes for women, although serious mental illness was about twice as common among women admitted to jail as among men (Steadman et al., 2009). Detected violations undercount noncompliance, and some recorded violations may reflect unexamined confusion. No group finding can establish whether a particular registrant knew of a particular duty.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the New York correlations (Levenson et al., 2012) are offered to show that a failure to register signals general criminality, ask what was counted: arrests and charges, with no information on cognitive ability or on why each person failed to register. When the Miranda readability or legal-terms studies (Rogers et al., 2007; Ericson & Perlman, 2001) are offered to suggest that a registrant could not understand a notice, ask whether they apply: neither tested a registration form, and the registrant’s own reading level and compliance history matter more. When FASD or TBI prevalence figures are cited, ask whether the condition has been established in the registrant by records and testing. When the meta-analysis of registration effects (Zgoba & Mitchell, 2023) is cited on either side, ask which outcomes and laws the included studies measured and how much they disagreed. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Registration and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), a person required to register under SORNA who knowingly fails to register or update a registration faces up to 10 years in prison. The 2021 rule provides that the registrant must have been aware of the requirement he or she is charged with violating, but need not have known that SORNA imposes it (28 C.F.R. § 72.8(a)(1)(iii)). Section 2250(c) makes it an affirmative defense that uncontrollable circumstances prevented compliance, provided the person did not contribute to them in reckless disregard of the requirement and complied once they ended. The rule’s examples involve external obstacles, such as a sheriff’s office that could not schedule a timely appointment (28 C.F.R. § 72.8(a)(2)). This research located no decision treating a cognitive impairment as an uncontrollable circumstance; in this paper’s reading, impairment evidence more often bears on the knowledge element, a question for the court.

State courts have recognized that a mental condition can be relevant to similar elements while rejecting simple forgetfulness. The California Supreme Court held that an involuntary condition, physical or mental, can negate willfulness if it deprived the registrant of actual knowledge of the duty, but that only the most disabling conditions qualify, and it held that the defendant’s claimed depression did not; a partial dissent would have allowed the evidence to be considered (People v. Sorden, 2005).

Case Example: In Commonwealth v. Corbett (2022), a level three registrant in Massachusetts with a prior conviction for failing to register told police he was homeless and living under a bridge. He signed a form describing his duties and received a receipt stating that homeless registrants must reregister every 30 days, with the next date written on it. He did not return, and did not respond to later e-mail messages from police asking him to register. He offered a psychologist’s report describing diagnoses including ADHD, bipolar II disorder, PTSD, borderline personality disorder, and substance use disorder, with a history of memory deficits, and opining that untreated illness and homelessness impaired his ability to remember his obligations. The trial judge excluded the report as irrelevant. The Appeals Court vacated the conviction. It held that a knowing failure requires the ability to perceive and remember the duty at the time of the offense, so the evidence was relevant and could not be excluded categorically without further inquiry, such as a voir dire of the expert. It added that proof of notice ordinarily supports an inference of knowledge and that mere forgetfulness is not a defense. The case concerned only admissibility; it shows how impairment evidence can bear on knowledge, not how a jury would weigh it.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12132; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)) is the usual basis for asking registering agencies for reasonable modifications such as plain-language instructions or a support person; it does not change the duty or its deadlines (see “The ADA in Criminal Proceedings, Treatment, and Corrections”). Expert testimony on these questions is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, and to Military Rule of Evidence 702, which adopted that amendment in 2025 (as of November 2026; confirm current text).

Court-martial convictions for covered offenses trigger registration under DoD Instruction 1325.07, which provides that a failure to notify the service member does not relieve the duty to register (Department of Defense, 2024). Registration is not a merely collateral consequence in a guilty plea inquiry (United States v. Riley, 2013, slip op. at 15), so the plea inquiry can confirm an accused’s understanding in his or her own words.

Arizona

As of November 2026, under A.R.S. § 13-3824, a violation of the registration article is generally a class 4 felony, and missing the annual in-person report under § 13-3821(J) is a class 6 felony carrying a mandatory $250 assessment. As summarized in the comment to the Revised Arizona Jury Instructions, State v. Garcia (1987) required proof of actual knowledge of the duty or of the probability of such knowledge, and the instructions direct the court to instruct on “knowingly” (State Bar of Arizona, 2022). Garcia concerned initial registration under § 13-3821. A later court of appeals opinion distinguished it in a failure-to-update case under § 13-3822, reasoning that a person who has already registered ordinarily has been given notice of the update duties, but the Arizona Supreme Court later vacated that opinion on other grounds without addressing Garcia (State v. Burbey, 2016, vacated, 2017). State v. Mott (1997) held that Arizona generally does not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mens rea element of a crime. Clark v. Arizona (2006) held that this rule does not violate due process, in a case where the charge required intent or knowledge, and noted that the rule does not restrict observation evidence of what the defendant did and said. How those decisions apply to a particular registrant is a question for counsel and the court and should be verified before testimony. This research located no Arizona decision applying Mott to the knowledge element of § 13-3824. In this paper’s reading, a Corbett-style expert opinion on a registrant’s capacity to know of a duty may be limited in Arizona, while evidence of what the registrant was told, in what form, and what he or she said and did may still bear on knowledge; application to a particular charge is for the court. At sentencing, significantly impaired capacity that does not amount to a defense is a statutory mitigating circumstance (A.R.S. § 13-701(E)).

Arizona’s petition to terminate registration is limited to defendants who completed probation, were under 22 at the offense, are at least 35, and meet the other listed factors, none of which refers to disability; the court may deny a petition in the interests of justice or public safety (A.R.S. § 13-3826(A), (C), (D)). Colorado, by contrast, permits a registrant whose severe physical or intellectual disability leaves him or her permanently incapacitated, and who does not present an unreasonable risk, to petition to discontinue registration, and the Colorado Court of Appeals has held that lifetime registrants may use this provision (People v. Warren, 2024, ¶¶ 17, 22). Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to match the federal rule (Order R-23-0004).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the view that failure to register often accompanies broader noncompliance and that a diagnosis alone does not show a lack of knowledge. Prosecutors are often best positioned to assemble the registrant’s history: prior registrations, the forms and receipts given, reminders, prior compliance with the same duty, and statements showing awareness. Under Corbett, notice ordinarily supports an inference of knowledge, and under both Corbett and Sorden simple forgetfulness is not a defense. Plain-language notice and documented accommodations also create a clearer record of what a registrant was told and understood. Registration serves public-safety interests that the mixed effectiveness research does not settle either way.

The research also counsels caution. A signed acknowledgment shows that notice was given, not that a person with limited reading ability or a tendency to acquiesce understood each duty, especially a duty triggered by an event such as becoming transient. Records of homelessness, dementia, or psychiatric decompensation near the time of the violation deserve examination before a missed deadline is treated as defiance, and the research does not show that a particular violation predicts sexual reoffending.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports examining how a cognitively impaired registrant was given notice and whether it was understood. Defense counsel are often best positioned to gather school and special-education records, prior testing, medical records of memory impairment or dementia, evidence of homelessness and lost supports, and the actual forms used, to ask an evaluator to assess reading level, memory, and the person’s ability to explain each duty, and to request accommodations before a violation occurs.

The research also counsels caution. No study shows that registrants with these conditions fail to register because of them. A diagnosis without evidence of how it affected the specific duty may be contradicted by the registrant’s own compliance record, and the research on registration’s effects does not bear on whether a particular registrant knew of a duty. Corbett involved serious, documented conditions and held only that the evidence was relevant; Sorden held that depression was not disabling enough. In Arizona, Mott generally limits mental-condition evidence offered to negate knowledge, with room under Clark for observation evidence. The research supports treating impairment as evidence bearing on knowledge and on accommodations, not as an excuse for a duty the registrant understood.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Byrne, T., Cashy, J., Metraux, S., Blosnich, J. R., Cusack, M., Culhane, D. P., McInnes, D. K., Culhane, E., & Montgomery, A. E. (2022). Association between registered sex offender status and risk of housing instability and homelessness among veterans. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 37(7–8), NP5818–NP5829. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260520959646

Cuddeback, G. S., Grady, M., Blank Wilson, A., Van Deinse, T., & Morrissey, J. P. (2019). Persons with severe mental illnesses and sex offenses: Recidivism after prison release. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 63(12), 2157–2170. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X19842994

Department of Defense. (2024, November 21; Change 1, June 6, 2025). Administration of military correctional facilities and clemency and parole programs (DoD Instruction 1325.07). https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/

Duwe, G., & Donnay, W. (2010). The effects of failure to register on sex offender recidivism. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 37(5), 520–536. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854810364106

Ericson, K. I., & Perlman, N. B. (2001). Knowledge of legal terminology and court proceedings in adults with developmental disabilities. Law and Human Behavior, 25(5), 529–545. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012896916825

Everington, C., & Fulero, S. M. (1999). Competence to confess: Measuring understanding and suggestibility of defendants with mental retardation. Mental Retardation, 37(3), 212–220. https://doi.org/10.1352/0047-6765(1999)037<0212:CTCMUA>2.0.CO;2

Fazel, S., Hope, T., O’Donnell, I., & Jacoby, R. (2002). Psychiatric, demographic and personality characteristics of elderly sex offenders. Psychological Medicine, 32(2), 219–226. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291701005153

Hanson, R. K., Harris, A. J. R., Letourneau, E., Helmus, L. M., & Thornton, D. (2018). Reductions in risk based on time offense-free in the community: Once a sexual offender, not always a sexual offender. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 24(1), 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000135

Levenson, J. S., Ackerman, A. R., Socia, K. M., & Harris, A. J. (2015). Where for art thou? Transient sex offenders and residence restrictions. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 26(4), 319–344. https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403413512326

Levenson, J. S., Sandler, J. C., & Freeman, N. J. (2012). Failure-to-register laws and public safety: An examination of risk factors and sex offense recidivism. Law and Human Behavior, 36(6), 555–565. https://doi.org/10.1037/b0000002

McLachlan, K., Roesch, R., Viljoen, J. L., & Douglas, K. S. (2014). Evaluating the psycholegal abilities of young offenders with fetal alcohol spectrum disorder. Law and Human Behavior, 38(1), 10–22. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000037

Metraux, S., & Modeas, A. C. (2023). Homelessness among persons on Delaware’s sex offender registry. Delaware Journal of Public Health, 9(2), 34–38. https://doi.org/10.32481/djph.2023.06.008

Popova, S., Lange, S., Shield, K., Burd, L., & Rehm, J. (2019). Prevalence of fetal alcohol spectrum disorder among special subpopulations: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Addiction, 114(7), 1150–1172. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.14598

Prescott, J. J., & Rockoff, J. E. (2011). Do sex offender registration and notification laws affect criminal behavior? The Journal of Law and Economics, 54(1), 161–206. https://doi.org/10.1086/658485

Ray, B., & Richardson, N. (2017). Traumatic brain injury and recidivism among returning inmates. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 44(3), 472–486. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854816686631

Rogers, R., Harrison, K. S., Shuman, D. W., Sewell, K. W., & Hazelwood, L. L. (2007). An analysis of Miranda warnings and waivers: Comprehension and coverage. Law and Human Behavior, 31(2), 177–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9054-8

Rolfe, S. M., Tewksbury, R., & Schroeder, R. D. (2017). Homeless shelters’ policies on sex offenders: Is this another collateral consequence? International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 61(16), 1833–1849. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X16638463

Shiroma, E. J., Ferguson, P. L., & Pickelsimer, E. E. (2010). Prevalence of traumatic brain injury in an offender population: A meta-analysis. Journal of Correctional Health Care, 16(2), 147–159. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078345809356538

State Bar of Arizona. (2022). Revised Arizona jury instructions: Criminal (6th ed.). State Bar of Arizona.

Steadman, H. J., Osher, F. C., Robbins, P. C., Case, B., & Samuels, S. (2009). Prevalence of serious mental illness among jail inmates. Psychiatric Services, 60(6), 761–765. https://doi.org/10.1176/ps.2009.60.6.761

Wilson, R. J., Ioannou, S., & Thomson, K. (2020). Using a multicomponent model in the assessment of persons with intellectual disabilities and problems in sexual behaviour. In W. R. Lindsay, L. A. Craig, & D. Griffiths (Eds.), The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities: An evidence-based approach to theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 239–260). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268.ch12

Zgoba, K. M., & Levenson, J. (2012). Failure to register as a predictor of sex offense recidivism: The big bad wolf or a red herring? Sexual Abuse, 24(4), 328–349. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063211421019

Zgoba, K. M., & Mitchell, M. M. (2023). The effectiveness of Sex Offender Registration and Notification: A meta-analysis of 25 years of findings. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 19(1), 71–96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-021-09480-z

Legal Authorities

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).

Commonwealth v. Corbett, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 355 (2022).

People v. Sorden, 36 Cal. 4th 65 (2005).

People v. Warren, 2024 COA 60 (Colo. App. May 30, 2024) (published).

State v. Burbey, 240 Ariz. 496, 381 P.3d 290 (App. 2016), vacated, 403 P.3d 145 (Ariz. 2017).

State v. Garcia, 156 Ariz. 381, 752 P.2d 34 (App. 1987).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

18 U.S.C. § 2250.

34 U.S.C. §§ 20918, 20919.

42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act).

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).

28 C.F.R. §§ 72.7, 72.8.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-701(E), 13-3821, 13-3822, 13-3824, 13-3826.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-22-113(2.5).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Related topic papers: Juvenile Registration and the Research on Its Effects · Plea Comprehension, Probation Conditions, and Supervision for Defendants With Cognitive Impairments · Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability · Older Adults, Dementia, and Neurocognitive Disorders in Sex Offense Cases · Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples · The ADA in Criminal Proceedings, Treatment, and Corrections

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Online Sex Offense · Courts-Martial