Snap Shot
- The question: What does research show about defendants who score roughly 70 to 85 on intelligence tests, below average but above the range of intellectual disability, and how does that bear on waiver, competency, pleas, mitigation, and risk?
- What the research shows: About one adult in eight scores roughly between 70 and 85, and the proportion is higher among prisoners and police suspects; one English prison study (140 prisoners, 2007) found 23.6% scoring 70 to 79. People in this range show more social disadvantage. Studies of legal understanding have mostly involved people with mild intellectual disability or IQs near 60 to 75, and plea-comprehension studies did not analyze IQ, so how far they apply to borderline defendants is uncertain. Lower IQ is associated with offending in large cohorts, partly because of family and socioeconomic factors.
- What it does not show: Borderline intellectual functioning is not a diagnosis of intellectual disability or of any mental disorder, and research has rarely studied it as a separate group. No study shows that a score in this range establishes an invalid waiver, incompetency, reduced culpability, or a particular level of risk for any individual.
- The law: Atkins, Hall, Brumfield, and Moore bar execution of people with intellectual disability and require courts to account for measurement error, so a score in the low to mid 70s may still be consistent with the diagnosis; people who do not meet it receive no categorical protection. Their limitations remain relevant under the ordinary standards for waiver, competency, guilty pleas, and sentencing, including 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), R.C.M. 706 and 1001, A.R.S. § 13-4501, and A.R.S. § 13-701(E).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors may ask whether claimed limitations are documented across time and settings and whether a defendant’s actual performance on the tasks at issue was adequate; defense counsel may show how specific limitations affected specific decisions without presenting a score in the 70s as if it were a diagnosis.
Many people charged with sexual offenses score below average on intelligence tests without meeting the criteria for intellectual disability. A defendant who scores 76, had some special-education help, and cannot read his plea agreement receives none of the categorical protections reserved for intellectual disability, yet he may share some of the practical limitations those protections address; whether he does is a question of evidence, not of the score.
Two premises frame this paper. First, sexual offenses harm real victims, and a below-average IQ is neither a defense nor evidence that an offense did not occur. Second, the limitations associated with borderline intellectual functioning are real and can affect whether a waiver was knowing, a plea understood, or probation conditions followed. Both points can be true of the same defendant.
This paper covers definition, frequency, functional limitations, measurement, and offending. Evaluation standards, competency and Miranda law, and the Atkins line are covered in “Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods,” “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations,” and “Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation.”
What Borderline Intellectual Functioning Is and Is Not
Borderline intellectual functioning describes ability below average but above the range of intellectual disability, commonly scores of about 70 to 85 on tests with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. Earlier editions of the diagnostic manual gave numerical boundaries (an IQ of 71 to 84); the current edition removed them, leaving the concept without a precise definition (Wieland & Zitman, 2016). The DSM-5-TR does not classify it as a mental disorder; it lists it among other conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention and calls for assessment of both intellectual and adaptive functioning to distinguish it from intellectual disability (American Psychiatric Association, 2022).
Because it is not a disorder, it lacks the diagnostic weight statutes often require. A systematic review of 49 studies found that adults with borderline functioning faced neurocognitive, social, and mental health difficulties and held lower-skilled, lower-paid jobs, yet were almost invisible in research (Peltopuro et al., 2014).
The boundary is not a single score. Intellectual disability requires deficits in both intellectual and adaptive functioning beginning in the developmental period, so a person scoring 72 with significant adaptive deficits may meet the diagnosis while a person scoring 68 with intact adaptive functioning may not. “Borderline” describes measured ability; it does not answer whether a person has intellectual disability.
How Common It Is in Justice Settings
By the normal distribution, roughly one person in eight would be expected to score between 70 and 85. In a U.K. household survey of 8,450 adults, 12.3% had borderline intelligence and, compared with adults of average intelligence, showed more social disadvantage, neurotic and personality disorders, substance misuse, and service use (Hassiotis et al., 2008).
The proportion is higher in justice settings. In a random sample of 140 prisoners in one English prison, 7.1% scored below 70 on a full Wechsler test and a further 23.6% scored from 70 to 79; on an adaptive behavior interview, 10.1% scored below 70 and 33.3% fell in the borderline range (Hayes et al., 2007). In one English study of police suspects, about a third scored 75 or below (summarized in Gudjonsson, 2018, pp. 88–89). Among people with intellectual and developmental disabilities referred to the criminal justice system, one handbook chapter estimated that about 10% are in the mild range of intellectual disability and 25% to 30% in the borderline range (Rice et al., 2020).
These figures come mostly from outside the United States, depend on the test and cutoff, and include all offense types. No study located reports the prevalence of borderline functioning among U.S. adults charged with sexual offenses.
Functional Limitations That Matter in Court
Legal language is demanding. An analysis of 560 U.S. Miranda warnings found reading levels from about grade 3 to postgraduate (Rogers et al., 2007). In a Canadian study, 40 adults with mild developmental disabilities understood far fewer legal terms than 40 comparison adults, and their reported familiarity with a term was not a reliable sign that they understood it (Ericson & Perlman, 2001). In English research, IQ correlated strongly with understanding of the police caution, and participants with IQs of about 60 to 75 more often believed that an innocent suspect does not need a lawyer, that a person can go home after confessing, and that a later retraction will be believed (summarized in Gudjonsson, 2018, p. 87).
Among 99 adult defendants interviewed just after pleading guilty, almost all showed few competency deficits and said they understood their plea, yet two-thirds answered fewer than 60% of plea-comprehension questions correctly (Redlich & Summers, 2012). A national review of 208 written plea forms found that most exceeded the reading comprehension of most defendants (Redlich & Bonventre, 2015). Neither study analyzed IQ, but both suggest that the margin is smaller for a defendant reading several grades below the forms. Written probation conditions raise similar concerns and are discussed in “Plea Comprehension, Probation Conditions, and Supervision for Defendants With Cognitive Impairments.”
Gudjonsson’s model treats low intellectual ability as one of several factors, with poor memory, anxiety, and low self-esteem, that can increase susceptibility to leading questions and pressure (Gudjonsson, 2018, p. 50). IQ is not a reliable proxy for suggestibility, however, and it was not associated with the overall rate of confession in English police-station studies (Gudjonsson, 2018, p. 87). Among English appellants whose convictions were overturned after disputed confessions, the mean IQ of those tested was 89; only one scored below 70, while about 31% scored below 80 (Gudjonsson, 2018, p. 89). Interrogation is covered in depth in the False Confessions: Suggestibility resource.
Case Example: In Dassey v. Dittmann (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc), a 16-year-old confessed on videotape to participating in a rape and murder and mutilation of the victim’s body. The state trial judge noted his age, his IQ “in the low average to borderline range,” and school records showing regular classes with some special-education help, and found the confession voluntary. By a 4–3 vote, the en banc court held under the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) that this finding was not unreasonable, citing his Miranda waivers, the absence of physical coercion, details he supplied in response to open-ended questions, and occasions on which he resisted suggestions. The dissents emphasized his age, limitations, and suggestibility. The case illustrates that borderline functioning is weighed in the totality of the circumstances; it does not decide voluntariness either way.
Measurement Near the Line: Standard Error and the Flynn Effect
Because the line between borderline functioning and intellectual disability falls on a continuous scale, measurement matters. Every score has a standard error of measurement; in Moore v. Texas (2017), the Supreme Court noted that a score of 74, adjusted for measurement error, yields a range of 69 to 79. Different tests and examiners also yield different scores, so lifetime scores may straddle the line.
The Flynn effect is the rise in average test performance across the twentieth century. A meta-analysis of 285 studies estimated gains of about 2.3 points per decade overall and about 2.9 on modern Wechsler and Stanford-Binet tests, so a person tested years after norming may score higher than their current standing among peers; the authors found no sign that the effect was diminishing on those tests (Trahan et al., 2014). Some researchers argue that scores should be corrected for the effect in high-stakes decisions (Fletcher et al., 2010); others argue that adjustment is not consistent with the standard of practice and should not be applied in capital cases (Hagan et al., 2008, 2010). The effect may also be changing: among 394,378 U.S. adults tested online from 2006 to 2018, composite scores and several reasoning domains declined across age, education, and gender groups, while three-dimensional rotation scores rose (Dworak et al., 2023). The data came from an open online test, not a clinical instrument, but they caution against assuming that any single rate applies to recent norms.
Both issues cut both ways. Measurement error means that a score of 72 does not rule out intellectual disability and that a score of 68 does not establish it. An evaluation explaining which scores were obtained, on which tests and norms, and with what evidence of effort is more useful than any single number.
Offending and Recidivism
Large studies associate lower measured intelligence with offending, but not simply. Among 700,514 Swedish men tested at conscription, lower cognitive ability predicted violent-crime convictions after controlling for childhood socioeconomic factors; the association was smaller, though still present, between full brothers, suggesting that family-level factors account for part of it (Frisell et al., 2012). In a U.S. national youth survey, the IQ-offending relation was curvilinear and confounded by socioeconomic factors (Mears & Cochran, 2013). One handbook chapter reports that people in the range of intellectual disability appear less likely to offend than people in the borderline range (Rice et al., 2020); the comparison rests on a review chapter and is not specific to sexual offending.
For sexual offending, a reanalysis of 236 samples (25,146 sexual offenders and controls) confirmed an association between lower IQ and sexual offending and suggested that earlier inconsistencies reflected how many pedophilic men each sample included (Cantor et al., 2005). The analysis compared group averages across the full IQ range; it does not show that ability level explains any individual’s offense.
Recidivism research seldom separates borderline functioning from intellectual disability. A meta-analysis of 15 samples (923 men with low intellectual ability and a history of sexual offending) found that age predicted recidivism with moderate to large effects and that existing risk tools showed moderate accuracy, similar to other samples, and larger effects with staff reports than with official records (Hanson et al., 2026). In a New Jersey archival study of 459 men with intellectual disability or borderline functioning and 459 without, reincarceration was low (an overall base rate of about 4% over an average of 5.7 years); the Static-99 and Static-99R predicted well for men without ID/BIF but not significantly for the lower-ability group, while the MnSOST-R did (Callahan et al., 2025; one archival sample of men released from New Jersey prisons between 1996 and 2007; the outcome was reincarceration, and the abstract does not state whether it was for any offense or only a sexual offense). Findings for men with intellectual disability or borderline functioning are therefore mixed and come mostly from small samples. Both studies involved men only; see “Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples.”
Hypothetical Example: Consider a hypothetical man of 24 whose current full-scale score is 77, with earlier school scores of 74 and 80. He pleads guilty to a sexual offense against a 14-year-old and signs probation terms barring direct or indirect contact with minors and unapproved internet use. Months later he is found messaging a 15-year-old through a game platform. An evaluation finds that he reads at about a fourth-grade level, could not explain “indirect contact” or “internet-capable device,” and believed games were not “the internet,” but that he plainly understood he was not to contact minors. The findings bear on how terms should be explained and monitored; they do not show that the violation was unknowing or that he poses no risk.
Limits of the Evidence
Borderline intellectual functioning is understudied, and most findings here come from samples defined in other ways: prisoners of all offense types, people below 80 or 85 grouped with people with intellectual disability, or general population cohorts. Prevalence figures depend on the test and cutoff and come mostly from outside the United States. The legal-understanding studies include people with intellectual disability, and the plea studies did not analyze IQ. The IQ-crime cohorts measure convictions or self-report and show that family and socioeconomic factors account for part of the association. The recidivism studies rely on official records, which undercount offending, and on men; women with borderline functioning who have offended sexually have not been studied as a group. Group findings cannot establish whether a particular defendant understood a warning or plea, was suggestible in a particular interview, or will reoffend.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the 23.6% borderline figure from Hayes et al. (2007) is offered, ask who was studied: 140 prisoners of all offense types in one English prison, not U.S. defendants charged with sexual offenses. When Redlich and Summers (2012) is cited to suggest that a defendant did not understand his plea, ask whether the conclusion follows: the study did not measure IQ or examine that defendant. When a Flynn-adjusted score is offered, ask which norms and adjustment rate were used and whether recent evidence of reversal was considered; for an unadjusted score, ask how old the norms were. When the appellant data in Gudjonsson (2018) are cited, ask what was counted: a selected group of English appeals, not a random sample of confessions. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Borderline Intellectual Functioning and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Atkins v. Virginia (2002) barred execution of people with intellectual disability. Hall v. Florida (2014) held that a state may not treat a score above 70 as conclusive without accounting for measurement error; Brumfield v. Cain (2015) held that a state court unreasonably treated a score of 75 as inconsistent with intellectual disability; and Moore v. Texas (2017) held that a score of 74 required consideration of adaptive functioning and that courts must follow current clinical standards rather than lay stereotypes or adaptive strengths shown in prison. A score in the low 70s therefore does not by itself place a defendant outside the diagnosis, but these decisions protect only people who meet it, and only from execution.
Otherwise, borderline functioning is weighed under general standards. Federal competency is governed by Dusky v. United States (1960) and 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which asks whether a mental disease or defect renders the defendant unable to understand the proceedings or assist properly in the defense; the same standard applies to pleading guilty, although the plea must also be knowing and voluntary (Godinez v. Moran, 1993). A Miranda waiver’s validity is judged on the totality of the circumstances, including intelligence (Fare v. Michael C., 1979), while a confession is involuntary under due process only if police coercion was present (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986). At sentencing, Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025) moved most departures, including the Chapter 5H specific-offender-characteristic policy statements, to Appendix B; the Commission described the change as outcome neutral, and the same facts may be considered for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Expert testimony is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), which extends gatekeeping to all expert testimony.
In courts-martial, an R.C.M. 706 board makes separate findings on whether the accused had a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, a term the rule defines to exclude minor disorders, and on present capacity. R.C.M. 909 bars trial of an accused whose mental disease or defect leaves him or her unable to understand the proceedings or cooperate intelligently in the defense. Whether borderline functioning, alone or with other conditions, meets either threshold is decided on the facts. R.C.M. 1001(d)(1)(B) permits the defense to present matters in mitigation to lessen the sentence. Military Rule of Evidence 702 incorporated the 2023 federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text.
Arizona
Arizona’s capital statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, defines intellectual disability as significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (a full-scale IQ of 70 or lower, taking into account the test’s margin of error) with significant impairment in adaptive behavior and onset before 18. If a prescreening score is above 75 (subsection C), or if all of the experts’ scores are above 70 (subsection F), the notice of intent to seek death is not dismissed on that ground, although the defendant may still present evidence of intellectual disability or diminished capacity at the penalty phase. How these thresholds operate after Hall is discussed in “Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods” and should be confirmed against current Arizona authority.
Under A.R.S. § 13-4501, mental disability for competency purposes includes developmental disabilities as defined in A.R.S. § 36-551, which requires a cognitive (intellectual) disability or another listed condition, and the presence of a condition alone is not grounds for incompetence. Borderline functioning alone may not meet the § 36-551 definition, and whether it otherwise qualifies is decided on the facts; either way, competency turns on actual abilities under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. At sentencing, A.R.S. § 13-701(E) lists significantly impaired capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct to the law, short of a defense, and any other factor relevant to character or background. Arizona generally does not permit expert evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate the mental state element of an offense (State v. Mott, 1997; Clark v. Arizona, 2006, left room for observation evidence); how those decisions apply to a particular case is a question for counsel and the court and should be verified before testimony. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports asking whether a reported limitation is documented across time and settings (school records, earlier testing, employment, informants), with effort testing and the defendant’s actual performance on the tasks at issue. Borderline functioning is not a mental disorder or intellectual disability, and a score in the 70s obtained after arrest without adaptive data establishes neither. Explaining warnings, plea terms, and probation conditions in plain language, and checking understanding by asking the defendant to restate them, produces a clearer record of what the defendant understood.
The research also counsels caution. Plea comprehension is weak even among competent defendants, so a signed form or a series of yes answers may not show understanding. Measurement error and outdated norms mean that a single score above 70 does not rule out intellectual disability where adaptive deficits are documented, and Moore cautions against relying on adaptive strengths such as holding a simple job in place of clinical standards.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports presenting specific evidence of how limitations affected specific decisions: reading level compared with the warnings and forms used, the defendant’s ability to restate his rights or plea terms, and suggestibility measured in the individual case. Defense counsel are often best positioned to gather school and special-education records, earlier scores with their norms and dates, and informants who knew the defendant before the charges. Where scores straddle 70, a full adaptive evaluation may establish intellectual disability, with different legal consequences.
The research also counsels caution. Borderline functioning is not a disorder, and presenting a score in the 70s as if it were a diagnosis goes beyond what the research supports and may not satisfy Rule 702. Low IQ does not itself establish suggestibility, an invalid waiver, or incompetency, and courts weigh it with the other circumstances, as Dassey illustrates. Lower IQ is associated with offending, including sexual offending, in large studies, and recidivism research on this group is limited and male, so arguments that limited ability reduces risk need individual support. Flynn adjustments remain disputed.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
American Psychiatric Association. (2022). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed., text rev.). https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425787
Callahan, P. A., Jeglic, E. L., & Calkins, C. (2025). Intellectual ability and sexual recidivism risk assessment: Comparing predictive accuracy in an incarcerated U.S. sample. Sexual Abuse, 37(2), 181–214. https://doi.org/10.1177/10790632241268471
Cantor, J. M., Blanchard, R., Robichaud, L. K., & Christensen, B. K. (2005). Quantitative reanalysis of aggregate data on IQ in sexual offenders. Psychological Bulletin, 131(4), 555–568. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.4.555
Dworak, E. M., Revelle, W., & Condon, D. M. (2023). Looking for Flynn effects in a recent online U.S. adult sample: Examining shifts within the SAPA Project. Intelligence, 98, Article 101734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2023.101734
Ericson, K. I., & Perlman, N. B. (2001). Knowledge of legal terminology and court proceedings in adults with developmental disabilities. Law and Human Behavior, 25(5), 529–545. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012896916825
Fletcher, J. M., Stuebing, K. K., & Hughes, L. C. (2010). IQ scores should be corrected for the Flynn effect in high-stakes decisions. Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 28(5), 469–473. https://doi.org/10.1177/0734282910373341
Frisell, T., Pawitan, Y., & Långström, N. (2012). Is the association between general cognitive ability and violent crime caused by family-level confounders? PLoS ONE, 7(7), Article e41783. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0041783
Gudjonsson, G. H. (2018). The psychology of false confessions: Forty years of science and practice. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119315636
Hagan, L. D., Drogin, E. Y., & Guilmette, T. J. (2008). Adjusting IQ scores for the Flynn effect: Consistent with the standard of practice? Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 39(6), 619–625. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012693
Hagan, L. D., Drogin, E. Y., & Guilmette, T. J. (2010). IQ scores should not be adjusted for the Flynn effect in capital punishment cases. Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 28(5), 474–476. https://doi.org/10.1177/0734282910373343
Hanson, R. K., Babchishin, K. M., May, K., Reid, B., & Wilson, R. J. (2026). Risk tools predict recidivism for men with low intellectual ability and a history of sexual offending. Sexual Abuse, 38(4), 386–419. https://doi.org/10.1177/10790632261429124
Hassiotis, A., Strydom, A., Hall, I., Ali, A., Lawrence-Smith, G., Meltzer, H., Head, J., & Bebbington, P. (2008). Psychiatric morbidity and social functioning among adults with borderline intelligence living in private households. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 52(2), 95–106. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2788.2007.01001.x
Hayes, S., Shackell, P., Mottram, P., & Lancaster, R. (2007). The prevalence of intellectual disability in a major UK prison. British Journal of Learning Disabilities, 35(3), 162–167. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-3156.2007.00461.x
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Mears, D. P., & Cochran, J. C. (2013). What is the effect of IQ on offending? Criminal Justice and Behavior, 40(11), 1280–1300. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854813485736
Peltopuro, M., Ahonen, T., Kaartinen, J., Seppälä, H., & Närhi, V. (2014). Borderline intellectual functioning: A systematic literature review. Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 52(6), 419–443. https://doi.org/10.1352/1934-9556-52.6.419
Redlich, A. D., & Bonventre, C. L. (2015). Content and comprehensibility of juvenile and adult tender-of-plea forms: Implications for knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty pleas. Law and Human Behavior, 39(2), 162–176. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000118
Redlich, A. D., & Summers, A. (2012). Voluntary, knowing, and intelligent pleas: Understanding the plea inquiry. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 18(4), 626–643. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026066
Rice, L. J., Einfeld, S. L., & Howlin, P. (2020). Behavioural and cognitive phenotypes in genetic disorders associated with offending. In W. R. Lindsay, L. A. Craig, & D. Griffiths (Eds.), The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities: An evidence-based approach to theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 67–96). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268.ch4
Rogers, R., Harrison, K. S., Shuman, D. W., Sewell, K. W., & Hazelwood, L. L. (2007). An analysis of Miranda warnings and waivers: Comprehension and coverage. Law and Human Behavior, 31(2), 177–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9054-8
Trahan, L. H., Stuebing, K. K., Fletcher, J. M., & Hiscock, M. (2014). The Flynn effect: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 140(5), 1332–1360. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037173
Wieland, J., & Zitman, F. G. (2016). It is time to bring borderline intellectual functioning back into the main fold of classification systems. BJPsych Bulletin, 40(4), 204–206. https://doi.org/10.1192/pb.bp.115.051490
Legal Authorities
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015).
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
U.S. Const. amends. V, VIII, XIV.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
18 U.S.C. § 4241.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-701(E), 13-753, 13-4501, 36-551.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Rule for Courts-Martial 706, 909, 1001.
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025).
Related topic papers: Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods · Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation · Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples · Intellectual Disability and Sexual Offending: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Pathways · Plea Comprehension, Probation Conditions, and Supervision for Defendants With Cognitive Impairments
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: False Confessions: Suggestibility · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial