Snap Shot
- The question: When a witness testifies that trauma “shuts down” the prefrontal cortex, floods the brain with stress hormones, or stores memories in fragments, how much is supported by research, and what can it say about a particular complainant?
- What the research shows: Acute stress impairs prefrontal function and shifts behavior toward habit; its effects on memory run in both directions depending on timing; and high stress lowers eyewitness accuracy overall. A 2024 meta-analysis found a strong association between PTSD and memory incoherence, and a small imaging study found trauma memories in PTSD represented differently in the hippocampus.
- What it does not show: Much of the mechanistic evidence comes from animal work and mild laboratory stressors; cortisol response size did not predict memory effects in a large meta-analysis; experimental studies often find trauma memories as coherent as other memories; and emotion strengthens memory without guaranteeing accuracy. No neurobiological finding has been shown to distinguish a true account from a false or mistaken one, or a consensual encounter from a nonconsensual one.
- The law: Amended Rule 702 (federal 2023; Arizona 2024; military 2025 by operation of Mil. R. Evid. 1102) requires the proponent to show reliable application to the facts. No published federal, military, or Arizona decision squarely rules on the reliability of neurobiology-of-trauma testimony; courts have used qualification, lay-opinion, vouching, and harmless-error rulings (Flesher, Roberts, Haskie).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can present well-supported, group-level points through a qualified witness and avoid “shutdown,” “cocktail,” and accuracy claims; defense counsel can test the human evidence for each claim and the step from model to complainant, without arguing that trauma-informed practice or a coherent account signals fabrication.
Training for investigators, sexual assault nurse examiners, victim advocates, prosecutors, and military personnel often includes a unit on the neurobiology of trauma. The unit typically teaches that during an assault the prefrontal cortex goes offline, that a surge of stress hormones changes how the experience is recorded, that the resulting memory is stored in fragments, and that a complainant’s gaps, nonlinear account, or flat affect are therefore expected. The same content appears in the clinical literature; one nursing article states that the neurobiology of trauma explains why a person’s memory may be “fragmented or impaired” (Mathews & Blyer, 2023). It reaches court through retained experts, through nurses and advocates describing their training, and sometimes through closing argument.
The concern behind this teaching is legitimate. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported; in the National Crime Victimization Survey, about one in four rape and sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%); the estimate has varied considerably from year to year (46.0% in 2023), so no single figure should be treated as fixed (Tapp & Coen, 2025). Responses to assault vary widely, and immobility, confusion, incomplete recall, and delayed or piecemeal disclosure occur in many cases in which an assault was established or later substantiated. Each trained claim has some basis in research, although, as discussed below, several are not supported as stated. The question for a court is narrower: whether each claim, as stated in testimony, matches what the primary research shows, and whether a group-level model can properly be applied to the person whose account is at issue.
This paper takes the trained claims one at a time, then treats the testimony as a Rule 702 problem of reliability and reliable application and reviews how federal, military, Arizona, and other state courts have handled it. Freezing, the general evidence on inconsistency, and interview science have their own papers in this hub and are summarized here only briefly.
The Claims as Taught
Training presentations vary, but four claims recur. The first is that the prefrontal cortex, which supports planning and deliberate decision-making, “shuts down” under threat, leaving behavior to reflexive circuits. The second is that a “cocktail” of stress hormones released during assault alters how the brain encodes the event. The third is that traumatic memories are stored in sensory fragments rather than as a sequential narrative, while the central details that are recorded remain accurate. The fourth, which follows from the third, is that interviews should elicit sensory and emotional fragments rather than a chronological account. Freezing is addressed in the paper on freezing and tonic immobility, which concludes that brief human freezing and self-reported immobility during assault are well documented but that circuit-level accounts rest largely on animal work. Each claim compresses research into a teaching point, which is understandable where the aim is to keep professionals from reading trauma responses as deception; in a courtroom, Rule 702 asks whether the compressed statement is supported as stated.
Training sometimes also addresses physiological sexual arousal during assault, to counter the belief that arousal implies consent. The research is limited. In qualitative interviews with 12 women who reported unwanted arousal during rape, participants described it as a distinct source of distress, shame, and fear of disclosure (Ramakrishnan et al., 2026). Among 1,057 Dutch patients with PTSD and a history of sexual abuse referred for treatment (84.7% female), 34.4% reported genital responses linked to abuse memories, reporting did not differ significantly by gender, and 91.8% of those reporting them described shame (Bicanic et al., 2026); the published summary does not say how many were abused as children rather than as adults. These studies show that such responses occur and can be distressing. They rely on self-report from selected samples, the larger study concerns responses during later recall rather than during the assault, and neither bears on whether a particular encounter was consensual.
Stress and the Prefrontal Cortex: Impairment, Habit, and the Limits of “Shutdown”
The claim about the prefrontal cortex has a substantial scientific basis. A widely cited review concluded that “even quite mild acute uncontrollable stress can cause a rapid and dramatic loss of prefrontal cognitive abilities,” and described evidence for that impairment in both humans and animals (Arnsten, 2009). The intracellular signaling mechanisms the review describes, however, were worked out mainly in studies of rats and monkeys, and the review speaks of impaired function, not of the region switching off; a later review by the same author describes stress as weakening prefrontal networks (Arnsten, 2015). A separate review of animal and human studies concluded that stress shifts control of behavior from flexible, “cognitive” memory systems toward more rigid, “habit” systems (Schwabe & Wolf, 2013).
These findings support a limited educational point: under acute threat, deliberate planning and flexible problem-solving are impaired, and behavior may become more automatic or habitual. That helps explain why a person might not resist or take steps that seem obvious in hindsight. The findings do not support the word “shutdown,” do not specify how much impairment occurs in a given person, and come largely from laboratory stressors far milder than assault. Researchers have also cautioned that translation of threat-response circuitry from animals to humans is limited by differences in definitions and methods (Hagenaars et al., 2014). Nor do they speak to consent: the research cannot tell a factfinder whether a person who did not resist was immobilized by fear or was willing.
Stress Hormones, Timing, and Memory
Stress hormones do affect memory, but not in a single direction. A meta-analysis of 113 human studies with 6,216 participants found that stress before or during encoding generally impaired memory, unless the stressor came very shortly before encoding and the material was directly related to it, in which case stress improved encoding; stress after encoding generally improved memory; and stress at retrieval impaired it, more so for emotional material (Shields et al., 2017). Of particular relevance to “hormone cocktail” testimony, stress reliably increased cortisol, but “the magnitude of the cortisol response was not related to the effects of stress on memory” (Shields et al., 2017). In the same meta-analysis, studies with a higher proportion of men showed larger cortisol responses, and the proportion of men moderated one encoding effect but not the effects of stress after encoding (Shields et al., 2017); a sex difference in hormone response therefore does not translate into a predictable sex difference in memory. The laboratory stressors were far milder than assault, a limit that applies to both sides’ use of these findings. A 2025 brief report applying this literature to sexual assault litigation argued that recalling a trauma under duress, as in testimony, activates the stress-hormone system and inhibits hippocampal retrieval, while acknowledging that the research is “somewhat nascent” (Dixon, 2025). The report reviews earlier work rather than presenting new data. Its retrieval point is consistent with the meta-analytic finding that stress at retrieval impairs memory, but neither source shows how much a particular witness’s recall is affected.
A temporal-dynamics model proposes that strong emotion briefly enhances plasticity in the hippocampus and amygdala and then suppresses it, and that the hippocampus shifts into a mode that produces long-lasting “but fragmented” traumatic memories (Diamond et al., 2007). The model, a source of encoding-window arguments in court, is a theoretical synthesis built largely on studies of synaptic plasticity in rats, not a tested description of human memory for assault.
Research on eyewitnesses addresses accuracy directly. A meta-analysis of 27 tests of identification and 36 tests of recall found that high stress impaired both, with an overall effect size of −.31 for each, and larger effects in staged-crime studies (Deffenbacher et al., 2004). An earlier review called the simple view that stress impairs memory “overly simplistic,” because effects depend on the event, the detail, the time of test, and the retrieval cues (Christianson, 1992). This research supports testimony that stress changes memory in ways that depend on timing and content. It does not support testimony that a hormone surge produces a predictable memory pattern in a particular person or explains a particular gap.
Attention, Central Detail, and Accuracy
A common teaching point holds that attention narrows under threat, that the attended central details are encoded accurately, and that those details resist fading and distortion. The first half has empirical support; the paper on inconsistent and incomplete accounts reviews the evidence that emotional arousal tends to favor central gist over peripheral detail, with effects that depend on what counts as central and when memory is tested. The second half is contested.
A 2024 narrative review argued that emotion and trauma tend to amplify the strength of encoding, “as distinct from the accuracy,” and that what is encoded is largely the gist of a person’s interpretation of the experience, which attention and emotion can bias (Davis et al., 2024). Applying this to disputed-consent cases, the authors noted that consent-related communications often precede any traumatic phase, that the accused’s emotions also shape what he remembers, and that they knew of no studies of how negative emotions affect consent judgments. A review of the false-memory literature found that negatively valenced content tends to increase distortion, while negative mood tends to protect against it, and explained the difference by emotion’s stronger effect on gist than on verbatim memory (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).
These sources do not show that traumatic memories are generally inaccurate; the paper on inconsistent and incomplete accounts reviews field studies in which core memories of real threatening events were detailed and durable. They show that strength, vividness, and confidence do not guarantee accuracy. Davis et al. (2024) is a narrative review, written in response to testimony its authors describe as typical of prosecution witnesses; it reports no new data, and its predictions about consent judgments are untested, as its authors acknowledge.
Is Trauma Recorded Differently? The Fragmentation Debate
Whether traumatic memories are fragmented is a live dispute among leading memory researchers. The paper on inconsistent and incomplete accounts summarizes the earlier evidence: people with PTSD often rate their trauma memories as fragmented, but associations are weaker or absent when trained raters or computers code the narratives. Recent work has sharpened both positions.
On one side, a 2024 meta-analysis responding to experimental critics reported “a strong positive association between PTSD and memory incoherence/disorganization,” moderated by the method used to assess disorganization (Brewin & Field, 2024). An imaging study of 28 patients with PTSD listening to narratives of their own memories found that hippocampal patterns distinguished traumatic from sad autobiographical memories, and the authors suggested that traumatic memories in PTSD are “an alternative cognitive entity” (Perl et al., 2023). A 2025 review by a leading proponent of the clinical view distinguishes involuntary memories such as flashbacks from voluntary recall, a distinction training often blurs (Brewin, 2025).
On the other side, an experimental study using distressing films found that memories of traumatic and nontraumatic films were “statistically equivalent” on coherence (Taylor et al., 2022), and a follow-up found that repeated recall preserved coherence for both kinds of memory, with “little evidence of incoherent traumatic memories” or of a link between coherence and PTSD symptoms (Taylor et al., 2025). A peer-reviewed critique reviewed the research bearing on the fragmentation, tonic immobility, and alcohol claims taught to university administrators (McNally, 2022), and a published discussion, moderated by McNally, set out the contrasting positions of Brewin and of Rubin and Berntsen (McNally et al., 2022).
The fair summary is that the evidence for fragmentation is strongest for people with PTSD, measured by methods that capture their experience of the memory, and weakest in objective and experimental measures. The supportive studies concern a clinical condition that many complainants do not have, the imaging study is small and says nothing about accuracy, and the experimental studies use film analogues without PTSD groups. Women are more likely than men to meet criteria for PTSD after potentially traumatic events overall, although in the leading meta-analysis the female excess was established for trauma types other than sexual assault or abuse (Tolin & Foa, 2006); PTSD data for men are reviewed in the paper on male complainants and sexual assault in military settings. None of this research supports testimony that trauma as such makes memories disorganized, that a particular complainant’s inconsistencies were caused by trauma, or the reverse claim that a coherent account indicates rehearsal or fabrication.
A related claim holds that trauma can be stored out of awareness and later recovered through special dissociative mechanisms. A 2026 systematic review of 42 studies published after 2000 found reported rates of recovered memories ranging from 1% to 3% in legally documented childhood sexual abuse cases to 22% to 39% in samples of self-reported childhood sexual abuse survivors, with the spread driven largely by definitions and sampling. It found no cognitive mechanism unique to recovered memories; recovery experiences often reflected deliberate suppression, failure to notice that one remembered, or environmental cues (Carey et al., 2026). The studies mostly concern childhood abuse. The review supports a reconstructive account of memory; it does not show that recovered memories are false, only that they need not be explained by a special trauma mechanism.
Trauma-Informed Interviewing as a Question of Method
Trauma-informed interviewing applies the fragmentation model in practice. One widely taught protocol, the Forensic Experiential Trauma Interview (FETI), directs attention toward sensory and emotional fragments as a route to recall. The paper on memory contamination reviews the interview science: many trauma-informed practices overlap with the well-supported cognitive interview, and the published evaluation of trauma-informed training measured officers’ knowledge, not complainants’ accuracy. No published peer-reviewed study was located that tests whether FETI improves accuracy. Davis et al. (2024) argued that a protocol premised on vague, fragmented trauma memories could, by its own premise, leave more room for retrieval cues to shape what is recalled, and that some trauma-informed strategies could promote false memories through priming; that argument is theoretical and has not been tested against FETI interviews.
Two questions should be kept apart. A witness who testifies that a protocol yields more complete or accurate accounts is making a claim about a method’s validity that Rule 702 asks the proponent to support. Whether a particular interview was suggestive is answered by the recording: whether questions were open or leading, and whether information reached the complainant before it appeared in the account. The protocol’s label answers neither question.
Limits of the Evidence
The research behind the trained claims is uneven. Mechanistic findings about the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala come largely from animal studies; human laboratory stressors are mild and brief; eyewitness studies use staged events and stranger identifications; imaging studies are small and limited to patients with PTSD; and experimental coherence studies use films with healthy volunteers. Clinical samples of sexual assault survivors are mostly women, and laboratory stress effects on hormones differ by sex (Shields et al., 2017); neither fact shows that a particular complainant’s or accused’s memory is more or less accurate because of sex. The critique literature consists largely of narrative reviews rather than new data, and supportive evidence exists. Field data on memory for sexual assault are scarce because the truth is rarely known independently.
Most fundamentally, every finding reviewed here is a group-level average with substantial individual variation. None measures what happened in a particular person’s brain during a particular event, and no later test can. The research can explain why gaps, confusion, or a nonlinear account do not by themselves indicate fabrication; it cannot establish that a particular complainant’s gaps were caused by trauma rather than by alcohol, ordinary forgetting, reluctance, or post-event information. The same limits apply to a defense memory expert, and to any expert: group research on stress, alcohol, and discussion shows how memory can be affected; it cannot show that a particular complainant’s memory was. No neurobiological marker, coherence measure, or pattern of fragmentation has been shown to distinguish a true account from a false or mistaken one, or a nonconsensual encounter from a consensual one.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a witness cites Arnsten (2009) for the claim that the prefrontal cortex shuts down during assault, ask who was studied: the review describes impairment, not shutdown, with mechanistic studies largely in rats and monkeys. When hormone effects are offered to explain a complainant’s memory, ask what exactly was counted in Shields et al. (2017): 113 laboratory studies with 6,216 participants, in which the size of the cortisol response did not predict memory effects. When Brewin and Field (2024) or Perl et al. (2023) is cited to show that trauma memories are fragmented, ask whether it applies to this person, since both concern people diagnosed with PTSD and the imaging study included 28 patients. When Taylor et al. (2022, 2025) is cited to show that trauma memories are coherent, the parallel question is how closely film memories in healthy volunteers resemble memory for an assault. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
The Neurobiology of Trauma and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), the trial judge screens all expert testimony, scientific or experience-based, for relevance and reliability; General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) permits exclusion of opinion connected to the data only by the expert’s say-so. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that each requirement is met, including that the opinion reflects “a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” The committee note states that “each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded” from a reliable application of the expert’s basis and methodology, and it describes as incorrect the rulings that treated sufficiency of basis and application of method as questions of weight rather than admissibility. Neurobiology-of-trauma testimony raises these issues at two points: whether a mechanism stated as established is supported in humans as stated, and whether a group-level model may be applied to the complainant at all.
In courts-martial, the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial prints the pre-2023 text of Military Rule of Evidence 702, under which subsection (d) asks whether the expert “has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Military Rule of Evidence 1102(a) provides that amendments to the Federal Rules amend the parallel military rules “by operation of law 18 months after the effective date,” unless the President acts to the contrary, so the 2023 amendment became part of Military Rule 702 in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). Executive Order 14130 (December 20, 2024) did not amend Military Rule 702. Military judges also apply the six factors of United States v. Houser (1993): qualifications, subject matter, basis, legal relevance, reliability, and probative value.
United States v. Flesher (2014) is the closest military analogue to training-based testimony. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that the military judge abused his discretion in admitting a former sexual assault response coordinator as an expert: he made no Daubert or Houser findings on the record, the prosecution had conceded that she was not qualified to explain why victims behave as they do, she testified on that subject anyway, and in a contested consent case her testimony bolstered the complainant’s explanation of her own conduct. The court set aside the aggravated sexual assault finding and the sentence. In United States v. Henning (2016), a DNA case decided under the older rule text, the court upheld exclusion of a laboratory’s modified statistical method that the prosecution had not shown to be accepted or peer reviewed outside the laboratory that used it; the proponent bears the reliability burden even for methods endorsed by their own users. Henning does not concern trauma testimony and is cited only for the Daubert framework. United States v. Brooks (2007) and United States v. Mullins (2010), both child-complainant cases, bar testimony that vouches for a complainant’s credibility, directly or through statistics.
In United States v. Roberts (8th Cir. 2023), a rebuttal expert described four trauma responses (fight, flight, freezing, and fawning) and attributed one to each of three witnesses. The Eighth Circuit noted that “a wall of precedent” permits testimony about responses to sexual assault so long as the expert does not diagnose a person as a victim or opine that abuse occurred, said the testimony “came close to the line” of improper vouching, and held any error harmless: “At most, her vouching was indirect.” The court noted that on cross-examination the expert agreed that almost any behavior could be consistent with having been abused. No military appellate decision located rules on the admissibility of neurobiology-of-trauma, prefrontal-cortex, or FETI testimony, and none applies the amended Military Rule 702 to it.
Arizona
Arizona amended Rule 702 effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment. In State v. Bernstein (2015), a blood-alcohol testing case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 702(d) requires trial courts to consider whether a methodology was correctly applied, but that errors in application warrant exclusion only when they make the results unreliable; otherwise they go to weight for the jury. Bernstein does not address trauma, memory, or victim-behavior testimony and is cited only for the general Rule 702 gatekeeping standard. State v. Lindsey (1986), a child case, bars expert opinion on the truthfulness of a witness or class of witnesses (149 Ariz. at 475). State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), a child case, permits cold educational testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403, and State v. Haskie (2017), an adult domestic violence case, directs trial courts to confine experts to their expertise and to avoid categorical statements about what is common without empirical support. Haskie‘s caution applies directly to neurobiological claims stated as universal. No Arizona appellate decision mentioning the neurobiology of trauma was located.
Other Jurisdictions: Lay Opinion, Application, and Vouching
State decisions show how this content usually reaches juries without a reliability ruling. In State v. Belle (Ohio Ct. App. 2019), a sexual assault nurse examiner described her training on the neurobiology of trauma and its effect on memory; the court held that describing her training was not error and that her experience-based answers were admissible lay opinion. In State v. Cleavenger (Ohio Ct. App. 2022), the majority followed Belle in treating a nurse’s testimony about trauma and memory as lay testimony, while the dissent would have held that it rested on specialized knowledge within Rule 702, so that its admission was error. In State v. Lee (N.C. Ct. App. 2022) (unpublished), a case involving two college-student complainants, the court held that a prosecution expert’s testimony about trauma and memory should not have been admitted under North Carolina’s Rule 702 because she did not apply her principles and methods to the facts of the case, but found the error not prejudicial given the other evidence.
Courts have thus classified the content as lay opinion or resolved challenges on prejudice. Whether the testimony is expert testimony, and if so whether it is reliably applied, is where these cases turn, and the amended rules make both questions harder to leave unaddressed.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several educational points: acute stress impairs deliberate, flexible thinking and shifts behavior toward habit (Arnsten, 2009; Schwabe & Wolf, 2013); stress affects memory in ways that depend on timing and content, so gaps in peripheral detail are not by themselves signs of fabrication (Shields et al., 2017; Christianson, 1992); and people with PTSD often experience trauma memories as fragmented, with meta-analytic and imaging evidence supporting a difference in PTSD (Brewin & Field, 2024; Perl et al., 2023). Testimony most likely to survive challenge and appeal comes from a witness qualified in the underlying science rather than by training alone, identifies which findings are animal, laboratory, or clinical, and stays at the level of a group model. Prosecutors can keep the testimony from attributing a mechanism to the complainant (“her prefrontal cortex shut down,” “she fawned”), the step Roberts described as close to the line.
The research also counsels caution. “Shutdown,” “hormone cocktail,” and statements that central details of traumatic memories are accurate or do not fade are not supported as stated, and some are in tension with findings in the literature (Davis et al., 2024; Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016; Deffenbacher et al., 2004), and a statement that cortisol levels predict memory effects runs against a large meta-analysis of 113 studies (Shields et al., 2017). Objective and experimental studies often find trauma memories coherent (Taylor et al., 2022, 2025), and I located no published study that tests FETI for accuracy. Presenting this content as lay opinion through nurses or advocates may be challenged; the Cleavenger dissent would have treated it as expert testimony under Rule 702, although the majority in Cleavenger and the court in Belle admitted similar testimony as lay opinion.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several grounds for challenging overstatement. Under amended Rule 702 and Houser, the proponent must show the human, peer-reviewed basis for each mechanism claim, and much of that basis is animal or mild-laboratory research (Arnsten, 2009; Diamond et al., 2007; Hagenaars et al., 2014). High stress lowers eyewitness accuracy overall (Deffenbacher et al., 2004), emotional content can increase gist-based distortion (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016), encoding strength is not accuracy (Davis et al., 2024), and fragmentation evidence concerns PTSD and is contested in objective measures (Taylor et al., 2022, 2025; McNally, 2022). Defense counsel can request a hearing, to make a specific objection that separates qualification, basis, and application, to obtain findings on the record (Flesher), and to evaluate an interview by its recording rather than its protocol’s label.
The research also counsels caution about the defense’s own inferences. Group research on stress, alcohol, and discussion shows how memory can be affected; it cannot show that a particular complainant’s memory was. A defense memory expert, like any expert, is bound by the same limits on application. Much of the critique literature is narrative review, and supportive evidence exists (Brewin & Field, 2024; Perl et al., 2023), so an argument that the neurobiology of trauma has no scientific basis is inaccurate and invites rebuttal. Trauma-informed practice is not a sign of a false report, and a coherent, consistent account is not evidence of rehearsal or fabrication; that inference rests on the same non-specificity the defense identifies in the prosecution’s use of fragmentation.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Tolin, D. F., & Foa, E. B. (2006). Sex differences in trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder: A quantitative review of 25 years of research. Psychological Bulletin, 132(6), 959–992. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.959
Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Belle, 2019-Ohio-787 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Mar. 7, 2019).
State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 349 P.3d 200 (2015).
State v. Cleavenger, 2022-Ohio-2942 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. Aug. 24, 2022).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Lee, No. COA21-665, 2022-NCCOA-823 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2022) (unpublished).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Henning, 75 M.J. 187 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Roberts, 86 F.4th 1183 (8th Cir. 2023).
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
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