Skip to content
Search resources Open menu

Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

Command Climate, Unlawful Command Influence, and Court-Martial Members

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: How might command climate, leaders’ statements, and rank relationships affect court-martial members’ independent judgment, and how does the law of unlawful command influence protect it?
  • What the research shows: No published study has measured command influence on actual members. Civilian research shows that people defer to authority, conform to group majorities, speak up less when they hold lower status, and shift their judgments toward the known views of those to whom they are accountable. Public sequential straw polls in mock juries influenced later voters.
  • What it does not show: It does not show that members cannot decide independently, that any member was influenced, or that leadership messages change verdicts. The studies involve laboratory tasks, civilians, and aviation crews, not panels deliberating under instructions and a secret ballot.
  • The law: Article 37, UCMJ, forbids attempts to coerce or improperly influence members and bars rating members on their court-martial service; since December 20, 2019, relief requires material prejudice to the accused’s substantial rights. The courts use a burden-shifting framework (Biagase) and have found improper influence in command policy placed before members (Pope, Kirkpatrick) and a convening authority’s presence during argument (Harvey), and held in Youngblood that challenges for implied bias should have been granted where members had heard leaders’ comments. Rank may not be used to control members’ votes (R.C.M. 921(a)).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep command policy and leaders’ views out of evidence and argument, avoid relying on members’ assurances alone, and meet any claim with a full factual record; defense counsel should explore leaders’ messages in voir dire and support claims with specific facts rather than general atmosphere.

Court-martial members serve the jury’s function in military trials, but their position differs from that of civilian jurors in ways the law has long treated as distinctive. Members are officers and, on request, enlisted service members detailed by a convening authority, who is usually a commander. They serve within a chain of command, their careers depend on evaluations by superiors, and they deliberate alongside members of higher and lower rank. Commanders also speak regularly to their units about discipline, misconduct, and the values of the service. The military justice system therefore guards against “unlawful command influence,” the improper use of command authority, or the appearance of it, to affect a court-martial, which the military’s highest court has called the “mortal enemy of military justice” (United States v. Thomas, 1986).

Psychology describes general processes by which authority, group pressure, status, and anticipated evaluation affect judgment, and how deliberating groups behave, but this review identified no published study of command influence on actual members. This paper summarizes the relevant general research, its limits as applied to members, and the law of command influence as it affects members, from leaders’ statements before trial to the deliberation room. One specific source of concern, mandatory sexual assault prevention training, is addressed in “Sexual Assault Prevention Training and Court-Martial Members” in the Counterintuitive Testimony hub and is not repeated here.

The research does not show that members are unable to decide cases independently. Members are instructed on their duty of independence, vote by secret written ballot, and in many cases a general command message has no demonstrated connection to the panel; whether a particular member had a connection to the convening authority’s views is a fact to be explored in voir dire, not assumed either way. The research identifies the conditions under which influence is more likely, which is also where the law focuses its attention.

Authority and Obedience

The best-known studies of authority are Milgram’s experiments, in which participants were directed by an experimenter to give what they believed were increasingly painful electric shocks to another person. In the first published study, 26 of 40 men continued to the maximum level (Milgram, 1963). A partial replication in 2009 stopped at 150 volts, the point past which most of Milgram’s participants who reached it continued; 70% of Burger’s participants went past that level, compared with 82.5% of Milgram’s participants, and men and women did not differ (Burger, 2009). Because Burger did not run the full shock series, it is a partial replication only. Later analyses argue that Milgram’s participants went on less because they were obeying orders than because they identified with the experimenter’s scientific purpose, which suggests that influence often works through shared commitment to a leader’s goals rather than through bare command (Haslam & Reicher, 2017).

These studies concern directed action, not the evaluation of evidence. Their relevance is indirect: they show that ordinary people give substantial weight to the wishes of a legitimate authority, especially one whose goals they share, and that this tendency is a property of situations rather than a defect of particular people.

Conformity, Status, and Speaking Up

Group pressure can affect judgment even without authority. A meta-analysis of 133 studies using Asch’s line-judgment task, in which participants judge which of several lines matches a standard after hearing others give a wrong answer, found that conformity was greater when the majority was larger, when the task was more ambiguous, and in samples from more collectivist cultures, and that it had declined in the United States since the 1950s; samples with a higher proportion of women showed somewhat more conformity (Bond & Smith, 1996). That last finding describes samples, not individuals, and it says nothing about how a particular member would respond.

Status shapes who speaks and who persuades. In mock jury deliberations studied in the 1950s, jurors of higher occupational status spoke more, were more often chosen as forepersons, and were rated as more helpful, and men participated more than women (Strodtbeck et al., 1957). The study is dated, and the occupational and gender roles it reflects have changed, but later research on groups continues to find that status affects participation. In one simulated online deliberation, a male holdout who expressed anger reduced participants’ confidence in their own verdicts, while a female holdout who expressed the same opinion with the same anger increased their confidence (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2015); the study does not show how a particular member would respond.

Organizational research on “voice” examines when lower-ranking people raise concerns with superiors. In a survey of 1,751 airline crew members, respondents reported remaining silent in about half of the situations in which they had a concern; silence was most common among first officers and pursers and least common among captains, and the reasons given were mainly fear of damaging relationships, fear of punishment, and operational pressure (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012). Reviews of this research conclude that people withhold concerns when they expect speaking up to be risky or futile, and that perceived safety within a team increases candor (Edmondson, 1999; Morrison, 2014). These findings come from workplaces and teams with ongoing relationships, which members of a panel share in some cases and not others.

Accountability and Anticipated Evaluation

Research on accountability asks how people decide when they expect to justify their decisions to others. When people know the views of the audience before deciding, they tend to shift toward those views; when they do not know the audience’s views and expect to explain themselves, they tend to think more carefully and consider more perspectives (Tetlock et al., 1989; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Applied to members, the research suggests that the risk is greatest when a member believes that a superior holds a view about the outcome and that the superior will learn or care what the member decided. The law addresses both conditions: Article 37 forbids rating members on their service on a court-martial, and the secret ballot keeps individual votes from superiors and fellow members.

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has reached a similar intuition from the bench. In United States v. Youngblood (1997), three senior members had attended a staff meeting at which the commander and staff judge advocate criticized subordinate commanders for underreacting to misconduct; the court held that their challenges should have been granted, reasoning that despite their assurances it was asking too much to expect them to disregard the potential effect on their careers. That reasoning is consistent with civilian research suggesting that jurors’ self-reported ability to be impartial is an imperfect guide to later decisions, which is reviewed in the hub’s paper on voir dire.

Leadership Messages, Policy, and Publicity

Commanders communicate about misconduct for legitimate reasons, including deterrence, prevention, and unit standards. When such communication describes the guilt of a particular accused, or the appropriate outcome for a category of cases, it resembles pretrial publicity delivered by an authority figure. A meta-analysis of 44 studies found that exposure to negative pretrial publicity was associated with a greater likelihood of judging the defendant guilty (r = .16, 5,755 participants; Steblay et al., 1999), and an update of 77 effect sizes from 45 reports (11,240 participants) found effects on individual verdicts (r = .16) and on deliberating-jury verdicts (r = .35), with moderator findings that differed from the original (Hoetger et al., 2022): a modest average effect in mock-jury studies that was larger in some conditions. This review identified no published study that tested whether a leader’s statement has a larger or smaller effect than a news report, and applying this research to command messages is an inference.

Straw Polls and the Secret Ballot

Members vote on findings by secret written ballot, and conviction requires the concurrence of at least three-fourths of the members present (R.C.M. 921(c)). The secret ballot is understood as a safeguard against the influence of rank; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has described it as protecting junior members (United States v. Anderson, 2023). Research on group decisions supports the concern behind it: in mock jury experiments, public straw polls taken in sequence influenced later voters toward the positions announced before them, and the timing of the poll and the pattern of early votes affected outcomes (Davis et al., 1988). Military courts have noted that informal straw votes, which are not prohibited, can reintroduce rank into deliberations by revealing positions (United States v. Lawson, 1983). Whether secret balloting fully offsets status effects during the discussion that precedes it has not been studied.

Limits of the Evidence

The research reviewed here comes from laboratory tasks, mock juries of civilians, and airline crews, many studies are decades old, and Milgram’s first study included only men. None involved military members deciding a case after instructions on independence, voir dire, and challenges, and none measured whether a commander’s statement changed a vote. Court-martial deliberations are privileged, and Military Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars most testimony about them, so the questions most important to the law cannot be studied directly. Group-level findings about status, gender, and conformity describe averages and cannot show how a particular member behaved.

The research describes tendencies in groups and situations. It cannot show that a particular member was or was not influenced, that a particular command climate affected a particular verdict, or that a member’s assurance of independence was or was not accurate.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When Milgram’s 65% compliance rate (Milgram, 1963) is cited to show that members will follow a commander’s wishes, ask whether the task resembles the one members perform, since participants were directed to act and were not deciding a case after instructions on independence. When the aircrew silence findings (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012) are cited to show that junior members will not voice disagreement, ask who was studied and whether a secret ballot changes the situation. When the pretrial publicity meta-analysis (Steblay et al., 1999) is cited to estimate the effect of a commander’s message, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since this review identified no published study that measured command messages. When the absence of member studies is offered to show that command influence has no effect, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since the situations of greatest legal concern have not been studied at all. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Command Influence and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Article 37, UCMJ, forbids a convening authority or other commanding officer to censure, reprimand, or admonish members with respect to their findings or sentence, forbids any person subject to the UCMJ to attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence members in reaching findings or sentence, and forbids considering a member’s performance on a court-martial in evaluation and assignment reports (Art. 37(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)). It also lists conduct that may fall outside the prohibition, including general instructional courses on military justice, statements about criminal activity that do not advocate a particular finding or sentence or relate to a particular accused, and statements by the military judge or counsel in open court (Art. 37(a)(4)). R.C.M. 104 implements the article. For violations on or after December 20, 2019, a finding or sentence may not be held incorrect on the ground of an Article 37 violation unless the violation materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused (Art. 37(c)).

The courts distinguish actual from apparent unlawful influence. Under United States v. Biagase (1999), the accused must first present “some evidence” that, if true, would constitute unlawful influence, more than speculation or command influence “in the air”; the government must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the predicate facts do not exist, that they do not amount to unlawful influence, or that the influence did not affect the proceedings. For apparent influence, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the facts would not harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the proceeding (United States v. Boyce, 2017). In United States v. Bergdahl (2020), the court found “some evidence” of apparent influence in public statements by a senator and by the President about the accused but held that they did not place an intolerable strain on the public’s perception of the system. In United States v. Horne (2022), the majority applied the pre-amendment test and expressly did not decide how the 2019 amendment affects apparent influence; a concurring judge read the amendment to require actual prejudice. Practitioners should check later decisions on that question.

Several decisions concern members directly. Leaders’ comments to future members about leniency supported implied bias (Youngblood). A policy letter setting a “starting point” punishment for drunk driving was unlawful influence, but extensive voir dire and a curative instruction rendered it harmless (United States v. Martinez, 1995). Admission at sentencing of a commander’s letter endorsing harsh action for the type of misconduct raised the appearance of influence and required a new sentencing (United States v. Pope, 2006), and a military judge’s sentencing instruction invoking service policy against drug use was plain error (United States v. Kirkpatrick, 1991). The presence of the convening authority in the courtroom during argument, recognized by members, required the findings and sentence to be set aside when the military judge did not inquire adequately (United States v. Harvey, 2006). When a commander’s message threatened to “crush” leaders who committed misconduct, the court held that the judge should have analyzed the defense challenge to the panel as a command influence question rather than only as a challenge for cause (United States v. Stoneman, 2002). By contrast, service-wide publicity and policy statements did not require relief where no connection to the members or the trial was shown (United States v. Simpson, 2003), and a commander’s disparaging remarks at formations did not amount to unlawful influence where no members came from that command and no witnesses were deterred (United States v. Newbold, 1996). Command climate can also deter defense witnesses, which the court treated as unlawful influence pervading the trial in United States v. Gleason (1995).

Inside the deliberation room, superiority in rank may not be used in any manner to control the independence of members (R.C.M. 921(a)). Military Rule of Evidence 606(b)(2)(B) permits members to testify about whether unlawful command influence or any other outside influence was improperly brought to bear, an exception that, unlike the federal civilian rule, names command influence expressly. Allegations that a member reminded others that the convening authority would review their sentence required further factfinding (United States v. Dugan, 2003), and an allegation that a senior member used rank to cut off junior members required inquiry (United States v. Accordino, 1985). Passing references to sexual assault policy during deliberations were held not to be “some evidence” of unlawful influence in United States v. Rosario-Martinez, 85 M.J. 535 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2024), a case discussed in the prevention-training paper. Trial counsel may not convey the views of the convening authority to members (R.C.M. 502(d)(4) Discussion), and in sentencing argument may not purport to speak for the convening authority or refer to any policy directive relative to punishment (R.C.M. 1001(h)).

Recent structural changes reduce some occasions for influence. Since December 27, 2023, special trial counsel independent of the chain of command hold disposition authority over covered offenses, including most sexual offenses; for offenses committed after that date the military judge, not members, sentences in non-capital cases; and since December 23, 2024, members are to be selected at random, to the maximum extent practicable, from a pool the convening authority details under Article 25 (Exec. Order No. 14130). The convening authority still details the pool, and intentional selection to achieve a result remains unlawful court stacking (United States v. Riesbeck, 2018), as discussed in the hub’s paper on court-martial panel selection.

Arizona

Arizona jurors generally have no command relationship with the parties, and Arizona has no counterpart to the doctrine of unlawful command influence, although jurors who are military or public employees may be subject to supervisors’ views. The closest analogues are rules addressing outside influence on jurors. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1(c)(3) permits a new trial when jurors committed specified misconduct, such as receiving evidence not admitted at trial or conversing with an interested party about the outcome, and Rule 24.1(c)(5) when, for any other reason not the defendant’s fault, the trial was not fair and impartial. Under Rule 24.1(d), the court may hear testimony from jurors about the conduct of a juror, court official, or third person, but not about the subjective motives or mental processes that led a juror to a verdict. Arizona law protects jurors from adverse employment action because of jury service (A.R.S. § 21-236), and the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct limit prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements that heighten public condemnation of the accused (Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER 3.8(f)). Jurors who are service members, civilian employees of the military, or employees of public agencies whose leaders have commented on a case or type of case can be questioned in voir dire, and Arizona’s abolition of peremptory challenges (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020) means that any such concern must be addressed by a challenge for cause under Rule 18.4(b).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research and case law are relevant to how command views are kept out of the proceeding and how the record is made. Command policy, leaders’ views, and references to the convening authority in evidence and argument were the errors found in Pope, Kirkpatrick, and Harvey; commanders’ attendance at trial or comments on pending cases bear on both the risk and the appearance of influence; and when a leadership message comes to light, a clarifying statement, full disclosure, and individual voir dire of members have allowed the government to meet its burden in several cases. Because the government bears the burden beyond a reasonable doubt once some evidence is shown, the factual record made at trial is central to how courts assess the issue.

The research also counsels caution about relying on members’ assurances. Youngblood shows that a senior member’s statement that he or she can disregard a superior’s views may not suffice, and the accountability research explains why: people who know a superior’s views tend to move toward them. Under the liberal grant mandate, a challenge to a member who heard a commander’s comments about a category of cases is evaluated with that history in mind, and denial of such a challenge has been found to be error (Youngblood). The research does not show that members as a class are susceptible to influence, and the absence of any connection between a general message and the panel has been relevant in cases such as Simpson and Newbold.

Special Issues for Defense

The research and case law are relevant to specific inquiry. Either side may find it useful to ask members what they have heard from commanders and senior enlisted leaders about the type of offense, whether they attended meetings or briefings at which misconduct or court-martial outcomes were discussed, and whether they believe their service on the panel will be known to or evaluated by superiors. Either side may seek individual voir dire or curative instructions and ask the military judge to rule on implied bias and unlawful influence separately, as Stoneman suggests. Military Rule of Evidence 606(b)(2)(B) permits post-trial inquiry into command influence in deliberations.

The research also counsels caution. The general findings on obedience, conformity, and status come from settings very different from a panel deliberating under instructions and a secret ballot, and they cannot establish that a particular member was influenced; testimony applying them to a particular member would raise questions of fit under Military Rule of Evidence 702. Courts require specific facts linking a message or circumstance to the members or the trial, and general claims of command climate “in the air” do not meet the threshold. Since the 2019 amendment, relief for violations requires material prejudice, so a record connecting the influence to the proceedings carries more weight than before.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bienefeld, N., & Grote, G. (2012). Silence that may kill: When aircrew members don’t speak up and why. Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors, 2(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1027/2192-0923/a000021

Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 111–137. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.111

Burger, J. M. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? American Psychologist, 64(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0010932

Davis, J. H., Stasson, M. F., Ono, K., & Zimmerman, S. (1988). Effects of straw polls on group decision making: Sequential voting pattern, timing, and local majorities. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(6), 918–926. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.918

Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 350–383. https://doi.org/10.2307/2666999

Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. D. (2017). 50 years of “obedience to authority”: From blind conformity to engaged followership. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13, 59–78. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113710

Hoetger, L. A., Devine, D. J., Brank, E. M., Drew, R. M., & Rees, R. (2022). The impact of pretrial publicity on mock juror and jury verdicts: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 46(2), 121–139. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000473

Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological Bulletin, 125(2), 255–275. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.255

Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(4), 371–378. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040525

Morrison, E. W. (2014). Employee voice and silence. Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 1, 173–197. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-031413-091328

Salerno, J. M., & Peter-Hagene, L. C. (2015). One angry woman: Anger expression increases influence for men, but decreases influence for women, during group deliberation. Law and Human Behavior, 39(6), 581–592. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000147

Steblay, N. M., Besirevic, J., Fulero, S. M., & Jimenez-Lorente, B. (1999). The effects of pretrial publicity on juror verdicts: A meta-analytic review. Law and Human Behavior, 23(2), 219–235. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022325019080

Strodtbeck, F. L., James, R. M., & Hawkins, C. (1957). Social status in jury deliberations. American Sociological Review, 22(6), 713–719. https://doi.org/10.2307/2089202

Tetlock, P. E., Skitka, L., & Boettger, R. (1989). Social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability: Conformity, complexity, and bolstering. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(4), 632–640. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.4.632

Legal Authorities

United States v. Accordino, 20 M.J. 102 (C.M.A. 1985).

United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-437 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024).

United States v. Bergdahl, 80 M.J. 230 (C.A.A.F. 2020).

United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

United States v. Dugan, 58 M.J. 253 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Gleason, 43 M.J. 69 (C.A.A.F. 1995).

United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

United States v. Horne, 82 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

United States v. Kirkpatrick, 33 M.J. 132 (C.M.A. 1991).

United States v. Lawson, 16 M.J. 38 (C.M.A. 1983).

United States v. Martinez, 42 M.J. 327 (C.A.A.F. 1995).

United States v. Newbold, 45 M.J. 109 (C.A.A.F. 1996).

United States v. Pope, 63 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

United States v. Riesbeck, 77 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

United States v. Rosario-Martinez, 85 M.J. 535 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2024) (No. 202300154, Dec. 18, 2024), aff’d, No. 25-0102/MC (C.A.A.F. June 2, 2026).

United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Stoneman, 57 M.J. 35 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388 (C.M.A. 1986).

United States v. Youngblood, 47 M.J. 338 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, UCMJ).

10 U.S.C. § 837 (Article 37, UCMJ), as amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 532 (2019).

Exec. Order No. 14130, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-236.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2022).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b), 24.1(c)–(d).

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER 3.8(f).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 104, 502(d)(4), 921, 1001(h).

Mil. R. Evid. 606(b).

Related topic papers: Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges · Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts · Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias · Pretrial Publicity, Social Media, and Juror Misconduct

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Counterintuitive Testimony