Snap Shot
- The question: What does research show about harm to people depicted in child sexual abuse material (CSAM), and how do courts decide what a single defendant who possessed or shared the images must pay?
- What the research shows: Surveys of adult survivors describe persistent shame, self-blame, fear of being recognized, and a sense that the abuse continues while the images circulate; advocacy-organization surveys that were not peer reviewed also report recognition followed by harassment and an expected need for ongoing therapy.
- What it does not show: Survivor studies consistently document harm from circulation at the group level; however, the studies are small, self-selected, and uncontrolled. They cannot separate harm caused by circulation from harm caused by the original abuse, and they cannot measure the share of harm caused by any one possessor, which is a limit on measurement and does not show that the share is zero.
- The law: Paroline requires proximate cause and an award reflecting the defendant’s “relative role in the causal process”; the 2018 Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act adds a $3,000 minimum per victim for trafficking offenses. Circuits disagree on disaggregating the original abuser’s losses. Courts-martial cannot adjudge restitution. Arizona requires direct economic loss.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should build a victim-specific record of loss and relative role rather than rely on the minimum alone; defense counsel should test causation, calculation, and prior recovery without disputing that circulation harms the people depicted.
When a person is convicted of possessing, receiving, or distributing child sexual abuse material (CSAM), the children depicted are victims of that offense under federal law, even though the defendant may never have met them and the abuse may have occurred years earlier in another country. Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography,” and this paper uses that term when discussing the law; elsewhere it uses CSAM. The legal premise, stated in New York v. Ferber (1982) and reflected in Congress’s 2018 findings, is that circulation of the images compounds the harm of the abuse they record. That premise is the basis for mandatory restitution under federal law.
Restitution here poses a problem ordinary restitution law was not designed for. A single image may be possessed by thousands of people, each contributing in some small and unmeasurable way to a victim’s continuing injury, while much of the victim’s loss may flow from the original abuse. Courts must assign a dollar figure to one defendant’s part in that harm. Survivor research informs that question but cannot answer it.
This paper summarizes what survivor research shows and does not show, describes how loss evidence is presented, and reviews federal, military, and Arizona restitution law, including Paroline v. United States (2014), the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, and questions raised after Ellingburg v. United States (2026). The offenses themselves are covered in “Child Sexual Abuse Material: Federal, Arizona, and Military Law,” other sentencing factors in “Culpability and Sentencing Factors in CSAM Cases,” and victims’ procedural rights and childhood trauma in the Child Abuse Allegations resource (“Arizona Victims’ Rights and Child Witnesses”; “Trauma Impact and PTSD in Children”).
What Survivors Report
The most detailed peer-reviewed study is a 2013 anonymous online survey by University of New Hampshire researchers of 133 adults pictured in sexual images as minors, recruited through victim services and support groups; most were female, White, college educated, and 35 or older (Gewirtz-Meydan et al., 2018). Asked how often they had particular reactions, 74% said they always felt ashamed, guilty, or humiliated about the images; 51% always felt the images were their fault; 54% always worried that people would think they were willing participants; and 48% always worried about being recognized in public. About a third always refused to talk about the images, and 22% always denied that the images existed. Nearly half (47%) said the images caused problems distinct from those caused by the other abuse they experienced.
The same survey shows why those problems are hard to isolate. Ninety-three percent of respondents had also experienced contact sexual abuse, mostly long-term abuse of young children that predated the modern internet. Forty-eight percent said the images had been shared illegally and 45% did not know. Some respondents said the images had validated their account or helped the prosecution. The authors noted the absence of a comparison group and that a sample recruited through services may over-represent the most affected, help-seeking survivors.
A follow-up analysis of 107 respondents who completed a standardized symptom measure, the Trauma Symptom Checklist-40, found a mean total score of 69.30 (Gewirtz-Meydan et al., 2019). Guilt, avoidance, and embarrassment about the images were each correlated with symptoms (r = .34, .37, and .49), and as a block those reactions accounted for an additional 23% of the variance in symptoms after other factors were considered; characteristics of the crime did not add significantly. Younger respondents reported more symptoms. Without a comparison group of survivors whose abuse was not recorded, the authors noted, the study cannot show that image survivors differ from other survivors; it shows that, within this group, reactions to the images were associated with distress.
Circulation, Recognition, and Harassment
Two surveys by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection, a child-protection and survivor-advocacy organization, are often cited on circulation. Both are advocacy-organization reports that were not peer reviewed.
The first surveyed 150 adult survivors whose contact abuse had been recorded (Canadian Centre for Child Protection, 2017). Seventy percent worried about being recognized because of the images, and 30 respondents (20%) said someone who had seen the material had identified them. The abuse described was severe and early: 56% said it began before age 4 and 87% by age 11, 42% were abused for more than 10 years, 58% had more than one abuser, and 67% were threatened with physical harm. Sixty-one percent believed the material had been distributed online and 38% were unsure; 85% anticipated needing ongoing therapy. The report acknowledged reliance on self-report, possible repeat responses, and selection bias, since some respondents were already connected to the organization (Seto, 2025, Chapter 1).
Seto (2025, Chapter 1) described two findings as unusual. The 20% recognition rate assumes wide circulation and the survivor’s awareness of being recognized; it may be more understandable if recognition included family members, co-perpetrators, or investigators. Nearly half of respondents reported organized abuse by multiple perpetrators, far above the rate in child sexual abuse cases generally, which may reflect a link between recording and multiple perpetrators or greater participation by survivors of organized abuse. Seto also noted that many other findings are consistent with the peer-reviewed New Hampshire study.
A 2024 report from the same organization combined responses from 281 survivors (Canadian Centre for Child Protection, 2024). Of the 135 who answered the question, 100 worried about being recognized; 82 reported having been recognized from the imagery, and 78 of them reported further harassment or abuse, including doxing and stalking. Of 169 who answered a question about removal, 59% had not asked an online platform to take the material down. The report’s recruitment method is not described, and each figure rests on a subset of respondents.
These surveys support the general propositions that many survivors experience recorded abuse as continuing, that fear of recognition is common, and that recognition followed by harassment occurs. Their samples are weighted toward very early, long-lasting, and sometimes organized abuse, so they cannot show how typical those experiences are among all people depicted in circulating material.
Self-Generated and Technology-Assisted Abuse
The survivor surveys were designed around recorded contact abuse. The Canadian Centre’s 2017 survey excluded people who had only been photographed nude, told to pose, or had sent images of themselves (Seto, 2025, Chapter 1). A growing share of the material identified today, however, consists of images that minors produced of themselves, often under pressure or through deception, a pattern described in “Sextortion and Self-Generated Images of Minors.”
Research on those victims is mostly qualitative. Interviews with seven young Swedish women who had experienced technology-assisted abuse described lasting fear that images would resurface and strong self-blame, including where the young person had initially found the online contact exciting (Joleby et al., 2020). Minors cannot consent to producing sexual images for adult use, so initial willingness does not alter the legal character of the material, and these interviews suggest it may deepen self-blame. With seven participants, the findings indicate themes, not frequencies.
Victim Impact Statements and Loss Reports in Practice
In federal restitution proceedings, a victim’s losses are usually proved through documents rather than live testimony: a forensic psychological evaluation describing the victim’s condition and projected treatment needs, an economic report estimating future therapy costs and lost earnings, and a victim impact statement. For identified victims whose images circulate widely, these documents may be prepared once and submitted in many cases.
That practice spares victims repeated evaluations and testimony. It also means one report may support awards against many defendants who possessed different images, in different numbers, at different times. The questions in a particular hearing are therefore who prepared the report, when, by what method, whether its projections are explained, and whether it distinguishes losses that flow from the original abuse from losses attributable to ongoing circulation. Courts have treated an expert report that made no such distinction as insufficient to hold a single distributor responsible for the victim’s entire loss (United States v. Dunn, 2015), while other courts have accepted reasoned estimates of future treatment costs and productivity losses supported by expert reports and comparable cases (United States v. Rubalcava, 2025; United States v. Pelton, 2025, unpublished).
A victim, the victim’s attorney, and a prospective expert may have reasonable access to material depicting the victim at a government facility or court, but it may not be copied (18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(3)).
Apportioning Harm Among Many Offenders
The central difficulty is causal. A psychologist can describe a survivor’s symptoms, likely course, and treatment costs. No clinical method can determine what fraction of those symptoms results from knowing that strangers view the images, as distinct from the abuse itself, still less from one person’s possession of some of them; that is a limit on measurement and does not show that the contribution is zero. Paroline answered with guideposts rather than a formula, which later courts call “rough guideposts” (United States v. Rothenberg, 2019).
This limitation cuts both ways. A defendant’s share cannot be measured, which supports scrutiny of any figure presented as exact. But the absence of a measurement is not evidence that the contribution was zero, and Paroline rejected the view that a possessor whose individual effect cannot be traced owes nothing. The research supports circulation harm at the group level; the law allocates responsibility by judgment rather than measurement.
Limits of the Evidence
The survivor research is a handful of studies: one peer-reviewed survey of 133 help-seeking adults, two advocacy surveys of 150 and 281 that were not peer reviewed, and qualitative work with seven participants. None used a comparison group of survivors whose abuse was not recorded, all were retrospective and cross-sectional, and respondents were largely White, female, educated, and abused before current platforms. The findings may not generalize to younger survivors, to boys, to victims of self-generated or sextortion images, or to people who have not sought help. No study has measured the harm caused by any one viewer, and no study shows whether a particular victim knows of, or is affected by, a particular defendant’s conduct. No peer-reviewed empirical study was located that examines how sentencing judges weigh victim-harm evidence in CSAM cases or that describes award amounts since the 2018 Act.
These limits do not make the research unreliable for what it addresses; the reactions it documents are consistent across studies. They mean that it describes survivors as a group and that individual loss must be proved with individual evidence.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a figure such as “74% always felt ashamed” is offered, ask who was surveyed: Gewirtz-Meydan et al. (2018) recruited 133 help-seeking adults, 93% of whom also experienced contact abuse, with no comparison group. When the Canadian Centre figures are cited, ask how the sample was assembled, since both reports were not peer reviewed and Seto (2025) called the recognition rate unusual. When a loss report attributes future therapy costs to circulation, ask whether it separates costs caused by the original abuse and whether it was prepared for this case. When it is argued that one possessor’s contribution cannot be shown, ask what follows, since the research does not show that the contribution is zero. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Restitution and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Restitution for federal child exploitation offenses is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 2259. In Paroline v. United States (2014), a 5–4 decision, the victim known as “Amy” sought about $3.4 million from a defendant convicted of possession. The Court held that restitution runs only to losses the defendant’s offense proximately caused, and it rejected both a strict but-for test, which would leave most victims with nothing, and a rule making every possessor liable for the victim’s entire loss. A court must instead order an amount that reflects the defendant’s “relative role in the causal process” underlying the victim’s losses; for a possessor like Paroline, who had two of Amy’s images, the Court said that amount would not be severe but also would not be “a token or nominal amount,” and that setting it “cannot be a precise mathematical inquiry.” Its guideposts include the number of past defendants found to have contributed to the losses, reasonable predictions of future offenders, the broader number of offenders, whether the defendant reproduced or distributed the images, any connection to production, and how many of the victim’s images the defendant possessed. Three dissenters would have held that the statute as written allowed no recovery, because the government could not prove the share of Amy’s losses that Paroline’s offense caused, and Justice Sotomayor would have imposed full losses with payment schedules.
Congress responded with the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-299, enacted December 7, 2018). Its findings cite Paroline and state that victims should be compensated by every perpetrator who contributed to their harm. For “trafficking in child pornography,” which the statute defines to include possession, receipt, distribution, and related conduct but not production, § 2259(b)(2) sets a three-step method: the court determines the full amount of the victim’s losses, past and reasonably projected, from all trafficking of images of the victim; it orders restitution reflecting the defendant’s relative role in the causal process; and the amount may be no less than $3,000. The victim’s total recovery may not exceed the full amount of demonstrated losses, a defendant’s liability ends once the victim has recovered the greatest loss amount found in any final order, and the court may require the victim to disclose amounts already paid in other cases for the same losses. Covered losses include medical services for physical, psychiatric, or psychological care, physical and occupational therapy, lost income, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, among others.
The Act also created a one-time alternative. A victim may elect “defined monetary assistance” from the Child Pornography Victims Reserve, set at $35,000 and adjusted for inflation; the U.S. Department of Justice (n.d.) lists the 2026 amount as $45,969. It is deducted from later restitution, is unavailable to a victim who has already recovered more, and attorneys may take no more than 15% of it. The Reserve is funded by new assessments under § 2259A of up to $17,000 for possession, $35,000 for other trafficking offenses, and $50,000 for production, adjusted for inflation, which the court sets considering the factors in §§ 3553(a) and 3572. A 2024 Department of Justice rule implementing the Reserve provides that courts determine eligibility and bars submission of images (U.S. Department of Justice, 2024). In a sense-of-Congress provision, the Act stated that people who offended before its enactment but are sentenced afterward should be subject to the scheme in effect when the offense was committed (§ 2259B(d)).
Calculation in the Circuits
The Eighth Circuit affirmed a $3,000 award over arguments that most losses predated the offense and that disaggregation was required, noting that the Paroline factors remain relevant to awards above $3,000 (United States v. Clemens, 2021). The Fifth Circuit held that every person depicted on a device the defendant possessed is a victim, whether or not the indictment named those images (United States v. Bopp, 2023), and affirmed awards of $5,000 per victim based on a counselor’s projection of future therapy costs, holding that future losses require only some reasonable certainty (United States v. Rubalcava, 2025).
The minimum applies only to trafficking. The Eighth Circuit held that receipt qualifies but production under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) does not, and, on plain-error review where the government conceded error, vacated awards to seven victims for whom no loss evidence had been presented (United States v. Nesdahl, 2025). In a production case, the Fifth Circuit’s substituted opinion vacated a $6,000 order on plain-error review because there was no proximate-cause analysis and no loss figure, holding that such an order exceeds the statutory maximum, so the appeal waiver did not bar the challenge (United States v. West, 2025). By contrast, an unpublished Eighth Circuit decision, also on plain-error review, left in place a $3,000 award made without loss evidence, where the defendant had agreed in his plea to pay at least $3,000 per victim, reasoning that Congress had set $3,000 as the minimum reasonable amount (United States v. Remigio, 2026, unpublished). In unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions, awards made without loss-causation analysis were vacated (United States v. Rodriguez, 2024), and restitution appeal waivers were not enforced where the plea agreement gave no reasonably accurate estimate of exposure (Rodriguez; United States v. Pelton, 2025).
The sharpest disagreement concerns losses caused by the original abuser. The Ninth Circuit held that those losses should be disaggregated from losses caused by later distribution and possession “to the extent possible,” so that the defendant pays only for losses his own conduct caused (United States v. Galan, 2015). The Tenth Circuit vacated an award that held a distributor jointly and severally liable for a victim’s entire unpaid loss, including losses caused by the abuser, where the supporting report did not separate abuse-related harm from harm caused by dissemination (Dunn, 2015); Dunn is often grouped with Galan, but other circuits read it as limited to joint and several liability. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a $7,500 award against a possessor of one image, holding that formal disaggregation is not required, that unknowable past- and future-offender factors may be set aside, that the number of images possessed and the number of distribution acts “would generally seem to be indispensable,” and that restitution is “not an exercise in long division” (United States v. Monzel, 2019, applying the pre-2018 statute). The Eleventh Circuit likewise held that a court need not calculate the original abuser’s share if it considered that the defendant was only a possessor (Rothenberg, 2019; United States v. Kluge, 2025), while cautioning in Rothenberg that simple division by the number of defendants generally will not satisfy Paroline. Whether Galan survives the 2018 Act’s “relative role” language remains unresolved (Clemens; United States v. Lenorovitz, 2026, unpublished).
Constitutional Questions
In Ellingburg v. United States (2026), the Supreme Court unanimously held that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is criminal punishment for Ex Post Facto purposes, while stating that its ruling does not mean a restitution statute can never be civil. The Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and remanded. Although it concerned a different statute, its reasoning may support Ex Post Facto challenges to applying the $3,000 minimum and § 2259A assessments to offenses committed before December 7, 2018, consistent with § 2259B(d). On remand, the Eighth Circuit held that applying the MVRA’s longer liability period (20 years after release rather than 20 years after judgment) to a defendant whose offense predated the MVRA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, because the longer period was itself an increase in punishment and its practical effect risked increasing what he would actually pay; the court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded, left open whether the MVRA’s mandatory interest separately violates the Clause, and noted that five other circuits had held the opposite and only the Third Circuit agreed (United States v. Ellingburg, 8th Cir. Aug. 20, 2026, slip op. Part II.B). No appellate decision applying Ellingburg to § 2259 was located.
Defendants have also argued that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the facts supporting a § 2259 award, including the minimum. Neither Apprendi (facts that raise the statutory maximum) nor Alleyne (facts that raise a mandatory minimum) itself decided restitution, and the Supreme Court has not squarely held that Apprendi applies to restitution. Before Ellingburg, the Eleventh Circuit held that Apprendi does not apply because § 2259 sets no statutory maximum, and rejected the Alleyne argument under circuit precedent treating restitution as a civil rather than criminal penalty for that purpose (Kluge, 2025); no circuit decision accepting the argument was located for this paper. The Fifth Circuit has noted the question without deciding it where the argument was waived (United States v. Caudillo, 2024). The status of any certiorari petition pressing the issue after Ellingburg should be checked before the point is relied on.
Courts-Martial
Article 6b, UCMJ, gives a victim the right to receive restitution “as provided in law,” but a court-martial may adjudge only the punishments listed in R.C.M. 1003(b), and restitution is not among them. Restitution in military cases therefore arises only through a plea-agreement promise to provide it (R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(C)) and through clemency. Army Regulation 27-10 directs convening authorities to consider restitution as a plea-agreement term and to consider whether restitution was made when taking post-trial action (The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2025). At presentencing, a victim may describe financial, social, psychological, or medical impact relating to or arising from the offense (R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(B)). Precise terms matter: in United States v. Williams (C.A.A.F. 2004), a term requiring reimbursement once the victims and amounts were “ascertained” left the parties disagreeing about when payment was due, and the court held that the government could withdraw because the military judge’s inquiry disclosed a disagreement on a material term. In 2023 the Military Justice Review Panel declined to endorse a recommendation for mandatory restitution orders in courts-martial, citing the changes required to sentencing and enforcement (Military Justice Review Panel, 2023). These provisions come from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; Executive Order 14130 (December 20, 2024), which postdates it, did not amend R.C.M. 705, 1001, or 1003 or add restitution as a punishment, and the 2025 Army deskbook, which discusses that order, still treats restitution only as a plea-agreement and clemency matter.
Arizona
Arizona requires restitution “in the full amount of the economic loss” suffered by the victim (A.R.S. § 13-603(C)), and the victim has a constitutional right to prompt restitution (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8)). The court must consider all losses caused by the offenses of conviction and may not consider the defendant’s economic circumstances in setting the amount (A.R.S. § 13-804(B), (C)). “Economic loss” includes lost earnings and other losses that would not have been incurred but for the offense, and excludes damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages, and consequential damages (A.R.S. § 13-105). Under State v. Wilkinson (2002), a loss is recoverable only if it is economic, would not have occurred but for the conduct, and was directly caused by the criminal conduct rather than by an intervening cause. In State v. Reed (2022), a voyeurism case involving a non-contact, image-based offense, the Arizona Supreme Court allowed the victim’s therapy costs as directly caused by the offense but disallowed most of her private attorney fees as consequential, rejecting a looser “nexus” test.
No published Arizona appellate decision was located on restitution to a child depicted in images a defendant possessed under A.R.S. § 13-3553 but did not produce, or on whether such a child is a “victim” for this purpose. Reed shows that therapy costs flowing directly from an image-based offense can be recovered; whether Wilkinson‘s direct-cause requirement reaches diffuse circulation harm shared among many possessors is open. Arizona has no statutory minimum comparable to the federal $3,000 floor, so any award must rest on proved economic loss.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research and the law support treating circulation harm as real and compensable: Paroline, the 2018 Act’s findings, and the survivor studies describe continuing shame, self-blame, and fear of recognition, and courts have affirmed awards for projected future treatment and, in one unpublished decision, productivity losses supported by expert reports (Rubalcava; Pelton). The $3,000 minimum is mandatory for trafficking offenses, and the Fifth Circuit treats every person depicted on a device the defendant possessed as a victim (Bopp). Prosecutors are often best positioned to assemble, for each victim, current loss evidence and an explanation of relative role addressing the Paroline factors the record supports, such as the number of images possessed and any distribution, and, in the Ninth Circuit, separating abuse-related from circulation-related losses as far as possible.
The research also counsels caution. The survivor studies describe help-seeking groups without comparison samples; presenting them as proof of a particular defendant’s contribution overstates them, and the Canadian Centre figures should be identified as advocacy surveys that were not peer reviewed. Awards made without loss evidence or a proximate-cause analysis have been vacated (Nesdahl; West), and the minimum does not apply to production counts. Offense dates should be checked before applying the minimum or a § 2259A assessment after Ellingburg. In courts-martial, restitution must be negotiated as a defined term with a stated amount and deadline (Williams), and in Arizona each award must be tied to direct economic loss.
Special Issues for Defense
The law supports close scrutiny of calculation: Paroline rejected full-loss liability for each possessor, and the 2018 Act caps total recovery and permits disclosure orders for amounts already received. Defense counsel are often best positioned to examine when and for what case a loss report was prepared, what method it used, whether it distinguishes harm from the original abuse (Galan; Dunn), whether the victim has elected defined monetary assistance or already recovered substantial sums, and whether the count of conviction is one to which the minimum applies. Objections should be made at sentencing, because unpreserved challenges face plain-error review and may fail (Remigio); Ex Post Facto and jury-right issues should be preserved where offense dates or developing law make them available; and a restitution appeal waiver may not bar review where the defendant had no reasonable estimate of exposure or the order lacked a proximate-cause analysis (Rodriguez; Pelton; West).
The research also counsels caution about the limits of these arguments. The inability to measure one possessor’s contribution does not show that the contribution is zero, and Paroline forecloses token or nominal awards. Arguments that viewing causes no harm contradict Paroline, the 2018 Act’s findings, and the survivor research, and are unlikely to persuade. No circuit is known to have accepted the jury-right argument, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected it in a published opinion, the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits do not require formal disaggregation, and in Arizona the defendant’s financial circumstances are irrelevant to the amount.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Canadian Centre for Child Protection. (2017). Survivors’ survey: Full report 2017 [Advocacy-organization survey; not peer reviewed]. https://protectchildren.ca/pdfs/C3P_SurvivorsSurveyFullReport2017.pdf
Canadian Centre for Child Protection. (2024). Experiences of child sexual abuse material survivors: How technology companies’ inaction leads to fear, stalking, and harassment [Advocacy-organization report; not peer reviewed]. https://www.protectchildren.ca/en/resources-research/experiences-of-child-sexual-abuse-material-survivors-report/
Gewirtz-Meydan, A., Lahav, Y., Walsh, W., & Finkelhor, D. (2019). Psychopathology among adult survivors of child pornography. Child Abuse & Neglect, 98, Article 104189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2019.104189
Gewirtz-Meydan, A., Walsh, W., Wolak, J., & Finkelhor, D. (2018). The complex experience of child pornography survivors. Child Abuse & Neglect, 80, 238–248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2018.03.031
Joleby, M., Lunde, C., Landström, S., & Jonsson, L. S. (2020). “All of me is completely different”: Experiences and consequences among victims of technology-assisted child sexual abuse. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, Article 606218. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.606218
Military Justice Review Panel. (2023). Restitution as an authorized portion of a court-martial sentence [Memorandum to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense]. U.S. Department of Defense.
Seto, M. C. (2025). Online sexual offending: Theory, practice, and policy (2nd ed.). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0000428-000
The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. (2025). Criminal law deskbook. U.S. Army.
U.S. Department of Justice. (2024). Implementing the Child Pornography Victims Reserve. Federal Register, 89(227), 92794–92804. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-25/pdf/2024-26679.pdf
U.S. Department of Justice. (n.d.). Defined Monetary Assistance Victims Reserve. Retrieved October 2026, from https://www.justice.gov/DMAVR
Legal Authorities
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. 163, 146 S. Ct. 564 (Jan. 20, 2026) (reversing and remanding).
United States v. Ellingburg, No. 23-3129, ___ F.4th ___ (8th Cir. Aug. 20, 2026) (vacating and remanding on remand from Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. 163 (2026)).
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014).
United States v. Bopp, 79 F.4th 567 (5th Cir. 2023) (No. 22-10267, Aug. 23, 2023).
United States v. Caudillo, 110 F.4th 808 (5th Cir. 2024).
United States v. Clemens, 990 F.3d 1127 (8th Cir. 2021) (No. 20-1180, Mar. 12, 2021).
United States v. Dunn, 777 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Galan, 804 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2025).
United States v. Lenorovitz, No. 25-7024 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2026) (unpublished).
United States v. Monzel, 930 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
United States v. Nesdahl, 140 F.4th 474 (8th Cir. 2025) (Nos. 24-2404/2406, June 10, 2025).
United States v. Pelton, No. 23-3242 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2025) (unpublished).
United States v. Remigio, No. 25-1607 (8th Cir. Aug. 20, 2026) (unpublished) (per curiam).
United States v. Rodriguez, No. 23-50024 (9th Cir. July 9, 2024) (unpublished).
United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2019).
United States v. Rubalcava, No. 24-40463 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025) (reporter citation not located).
United States v. West, 137 F.4th 395 (5th Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (No. 22-11001, May 21, 2025) (substituted opinion; withdrawing 99 F.4th 775).
United States v. Williams, 60 M.J. 360 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
State v. Reed, 502 P.3d 979 (Ariz. 2022).
State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, 39 P.3d 1131 (2002).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (Ex Post Facto Clause).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8).
Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299, 132 Stat. 4383.
18 U.S.C. § 2251.
18 U.S.C. § 2259.
18 U.S.C. § 2259A.
18 U.S.C. § 2259B.
18 U.S.C. § 3509(m).
18 U.S.C. § 3663A (Mandatory Victims Restitution Act).
28 C.F.R. pt. 81, subpt. C.
10 U.S.C. § 806b (Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
R.C.M. 705(c)(2)(C).
R.C.M. 1001(c).
R.C.M. 1003(b).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-105.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-603(C).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-804.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.
Related topic papers: Child Sexual Abuse Material: Federal, Arizona, and Military Law · Culpability and Sentencing Factors in CSAM Cases · Production and Live-Streamed Abuse · Sextortion and Self-Generated Images of Minors · Digital Evidence and What It Can Show About the User · Expert Testimony in Online Sexual Offense Cases
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Child Abuse Allegations · Courts-Martial