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Online Offense

Expert Testimony in Online Sexual Offense Cases

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Snap Shot

  • The question: In online sexual offense cases, which expert testimony is routinely admitted, which is limited, and which is excluded?
  • Generally admitted: Forensic testimony describing what validated tools found; general, educational grooming testimony not tied to the defendant (Batton); explanations of CSAM-community jargon; and diagnostic testimony, including autism, describing a condition and its features.
  • Limited or excluded: Opinions that the defendant lacked knowledge, intent, or sexual interest in children have frequently been excluded under Rule 704(b) (Hofus, Stahlman, Gillis), though Diaz permits opinions about what most people in a group know or intend and Hite found error in excluding a defense expert entirely. Profile testimony offered as proof of guilt is generally inadmissible, and vouching is barred (Banks, Brooks, Mullins, Lindsey).
  • The law: At federal sentencing the evidentiary rules do not apply, and diagnosis, treatment needs, and risk are relevant under § 3553(a). In courts-martial, expert assistance requires a showing of necessity (Gonzalez, Lloyd). Arizona permits cold expert testimony (Salazar-Mercado) but bars mental-disorder evidence to negate mens rea (Mott), though such evidence may be relevant at sentencing under § 13-701.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep grooming and agent testimony general rather than profiling, without seeking complete exclusion where narrower limits would suffice; defense counsel should frame proffers around general phenomena and diagnoses rather than the defendant’s state of mind, and identify profiling and age testimony that exceeds the science.

Online sexual offense prosecutions depend heavily on specialized knowledge. Proof that a defendant knowingly possessed or distributed child sexual abuse material (CSAM) usually rests on a forensic examination of devices and accounts. Proof that images depict real minors may involve testimony about age. In solicitation cases, the meaning of chat messages, and whether a defendant intended to engage a minor or was engaged in role-play, can become the central dispute. At sentencing, courts weigh evidence about diagnosis, treatment needs, and risk. Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography”; this paper uses CSAM except when discussing the law.

Experts of several kinds appear in these cases: digital forensic examiners, witnesses who estimate age from images, psychologists and psychiatrists addressing diagnosis, autism, intellectual disability, problematic sexual behavior, grooming, and risk, and law enforcement officers offering behavioral or investigative testimony. Each stands on different ground. Some testimony is routine and rarely challenged; some is admitted only in limited form; some is consistently excluded.

This paper describes those categories of expertise and where each is on solid or contested ground, distinguishes trial testimony from sentencing testimony, and reviews the governing law: the federal and military expert-testimony rules, the limits on mental-state opinions, profile evidence, and vouching, the military standards for expert assistance, and Arizona’s rules and cases.

Digital Forensic Examiners

Forensic examiners testify about what devices contained, when files were created, accessed, or deleted, what software was installed, how peer-to-peer or cloud services operate, and what user activity can be inferred from artifacts. This testimony is usually essential to the government’s case and is on generally solid ground when it describes what the examiner found using validated tools and documented procedures. The contested questions are about inference: whether a file’s presence in unallocated space or a cache shows knowing possession, whether a download was intentional, whether another person had access to the device, and whether automated features rather than the user created an artifact. Those questions turn on the specific artifacts and are often the subject of defense experts. The hub paper “Digital Evidence and What It Can Show About the User” addresses the technical issues.

Age-Estimation Testimony

Federal law defines child pornography by reference to a minor, a person under eighteen (18 U.S.C. § 2256), and after Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) the government must prove that images depict real children. In United States v. Hilton (2004), the First Circuit held that a finding that images appeared to depict children did not establish that the children were real, and that a pediatrician’s age estimates based on Tanner staging did not resolve that question, because a person creating virtual images would mimic the same body proportions.

Age estimation from images is on firmest ground for clearly prepubescent children and least reliable near the age of majority. James Tanner, who developed the pubertal staging system, and Arlan Rosenbloom wrote that Tanner stages were not designed to estimate chronological age and should not be used that way (Rosenbloom & Tanner, 1998). Later research found that experienced examiners’ age estimates of postpubescent subjects in images were inaccurate (Rosenbloom, 2013). Many cases resolve the age question with identified-victim evidence, such as records matched through the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, which does not depend on visual estimation. The hub paper “Estimating Age from Images” discusses the research in detail.

Psychological and Psychiatric Testimony

Diagnosis and Sexual Interest

Clinicians may testify about whether a defendant meets criteria for a paraphilic disorder under DSM-5-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2022) or ICD-11, about the results of sexual interest measures, and about the relationship between CSAM use and sexual interest in children. In samples referred for clinical assessment, a CSAM charge has been a strong group-level indicator of sexual interest in children (Seto et al., 2006); a 2026 study of 516 men found wide variation among men convicted of CSAM offenses (Meißner et al., 2026), so the charge alone does not establish interest or a diagnosis in any individual, and evaluative measures such as penile plethysmography and viewing-time measures have known limits; the Psychosexual hub papers on those measures review them. At trial, the central legal problem is that testimony about a defendant’s sexual interest is often offered to prove or disprove intent, which raises the mental-state limits discussed below.

Autism and Intellectual Disability

Defense experts may testify that a defendant has autism spectrum disorder or an intellectual disability and explain how features such as social-communication deficits, literal thinking, restricted interests, or collecting behavior may bear on how the defendant used the internet, understood what he was viewing, or responded to online interactions. This testimony is generally admitted when it describes the diagnosis and its features, and courts have been more restrictive when the expert links the diagnosis to an opinion about the defendant’s knowledge or intent. The research on autism and online offending is limited, consists mostly of case series and small samples, and does not show that autistic people are more likely to commit these offenses. The Autism Online Offense resource addresses these issues in detail.

Problematic Sexual Behavior and Compulsivity

Testimony that a defendant’s CSAM use was part of a broader pattern of compulsive or problematic online sexual behavior is often offered in mitigation. ICD-11 includes compulsive sexual behaviour disorder (6C72); DSM-5-TR does not include a corresponding diagnosis. Whether compulsive use explains the selection of illegal content is contested, and such testimony does not ordinarily negate the knowledge element of a possession offense. It is offered most often at sentencing.

Grooming and Online Solicitation

Prosecution experts may describe grooming, the process by which offenders build trust, desensitize, and isolate a child, and may explain why minors comply with or do not report online sexual contact. Courts have generally admitted such testimony when it is general, educational, and not tied to the defendant. In United States v. Batton (2010), the Tenth Circuit, in a child sexual assault prosecution rather than a CSAM case, found no abuse of discretion in admitting, after a Daubert hearing, testimony about how child sexual abusers commonly use familiarity to groom victims, where the testimony was limited to correcting juror misconceptions and did not apply to the facts of the case or comment on credibility. The research on grooming is limited by retrospective designs and the difficulty of distinguishing grooming from ordinary adult–child interaction before abuse occurs, a point addressed in “Grooming: What the Research Shows and Its Limits.” Defense experts in solicitation cases may testify about online sexual role-play and fantasy, discussed below.

Risk

Testimony about recidivism risk based on actuarial and dynamic tools is common at sentencing and in civil commitment and is generally irrelevant at trial. Its reliability depends on using the correct tool for the offense type and communicating results accurately, issues addressed in “Risk Assessment Tools for Online Offenders.”

Law Enforcement Behavioral Testimony

Officers and investigators sometimes testify, as experts or as lay witnesses with specialized experience, about the terminology of CSAM communities, the operation of trading networks, the meaning of chat abbreviations, or common behaviors of people who seek sexual contact with minors online. Testimony explaining jargon and technical practices is generally admissible when the witness is qualified and the explanation is not within jurors’ knowledge. Testimony that the defendant’s behavior matches a “profile” of child sex offenders, offered to prove that he committed the offense, is generally inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt. The Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Banks (1992) found error in testimony used to show that the accused’s family situation fit a profile of child sexual abuse, holding it inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt, and civilian courts apply the same principle. The same decision excluded a defense expert’s opinion, based on psychological testing, that the accused did not fit a pedophile profile because its reliability had not been shown, and it did not categorically bar expert testimony on child abuse. The line between permissible explanation of offending patterns and impermissible profiling depends on whether the testimony educates jurors or invites them to infer guilt from resemblance.

Trial Versus Sentencing

The same expertise is treated very differently at trial and at sentencing. At trial, the question is whether the elements are proven, and expert testimony must be relevant to an element or a defense, meet the reliability requirements of Rule 702, and avoid the mental-state, profile, and vouching limits. Much clinical testimony, such as testimony about risk, treatment amenability, or the defendant’s character, is irrelevant to guilt.

At sentencing, the evidentiary rules do not apply in federal court (Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3)), and courts consider information with sufficient indicia of reliability (U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3). The sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the history and characteristics of the defendant and the need to protect the public, make diagnosis, treatment needs, and risk directly relevant. Courts retain broad discretion in weighing such evidence. In United States v. Dorvee (2010), the Second Circuit vacated a sentence partly because the district court assumed, contrary to the expert evidence, that the defendant was likely to commit a contact offense. In United States v. Morais (2012), the Eighth Circuit affirmed a within-guidelines sentence despite autism-related expert testimony, noting that the expert conceded autism did not dictate what the defendant collected. The Autism Online Offense: Sentencing resource discusses sentencing evidence in autism cases.

Limits of the Evidence

Most clinical research relevant to these cases comes from samples of convicted or treated men and may not describe people who have not been identified. Research on autism and online offending is limited to case series and small samples. Grooming research is largely retrospective. Age estimation from images has documented error near the age of majority. Digital forensic inferences depend on the artifacts actually recovered and on tool validation. No test or clinical method can establish with certainty whether a defendant knew what he possessed, intended to engage a real minor, or will reoffend; risk tools estimate relative risk for groups. Experts can describe diagnoses, research findings, and technical facts; the factfinder decides what the defendant knew and intended.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a witness cites the finding that a CSAM charge is a strong group-level indicator of sexual interest in children (Seto et al., 2006), ask whether it applies to this person, because a group finding does not establish interest or a diagnosis in an individual, and a 2026 study of 516 men found wide variation among men convicted of CSAM offenses (Meißner et al., 2026). When Rosenbloom (2013) is cited for inaccurate age estimates, ask who was studied, since the research concerned postpubescent subjects and does not reach clearly prepubescent children. When autism testimony draws on the research on autism and online offending, ask how much evidence it rests on, because that research consists of case series and small samples. When grooming testimony describes common patterns, ask compared with whom, because retrospective research has difficulty distinguishing grooming from ordinary adult–child interaction before abuse occurs. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Expert Testimony and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), trial judges must ensure that all expert testimony, including clinical and technical testimony, is relevant and reliable. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert’s testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, reflects reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of those methods to the case; the committee note cautions against treating sufficiency of basis and reliable application as questions of weight rather than admissibility.

Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars an expert in a criminal case from stating an opinion about whether the defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the crime or of a defense. In Diaz v. United States (2024), the Supreme Court held that the rule bars opinions about the particular defendant’s mental state but not opinions about what most people in a group know or intend, leaving the factfinder to draw the inference. The rule has been applied repeatedly in online enticement prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), where the government must prove intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor. In United States v. Hite (2014), the D.C. Circuit held that exclusion of all testimony from a defense psychiatrist was an abuse of discretion; on remand, general testimony distinguishing online sexual fantasy from a desire for actual contact, and diagnostic testimony that the defendant lacked a disorder associated with sexual interest in children, could be admitted, but the expert could not testify that the defendant lacked the requisite intent. In United States v. Joseph (2008), the Second Circuit, vacating on other grounds, found a defense expert on internet role-play qualified and his testimony likely to assist the jury, and urged the trial court to reconsider its exclusion on retrial. Other circuits have affirmed exclusion when the expert’s opinion addressed the defendant’s own intent: in United States v. Hofus (2010), the Ninth Circuit affirmed exclusion of testimony that the defendant’s communications were fantasy; in United States v. Stahlman (2019), the Eleventh Circuit held that a psychologist’s opinion that the defendant intended to act out a fantasy rather than have sex with a minor went too far under Rule 704(b); and in United States v. Gillis (2019) and the unpublished United States v. Herrera (2025), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed exclusion of opinions that the defendant lacked sexual interest in children, the latter in a case in which the expert was otherwise permitted to testify about the defendant’s autism. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Herrera. United States v. Gladish (2008) illustrates that the scope of a proffer matters: the Seventh Circuit, after reversing on substantial-step grounds, added that although the defense psychologist could not have testified that the defendant did not intend to have sex with the supposed minor, he could have testified that, given the defendant’s psychology, it was unlikely he would act on that intent, and Rule 704(b) would not bar that testimony; the court also noted that defense counsel had not made clear what the intended focus of the testimony would be.

The military rules differ in one important respect. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in courts-martial eighteen months after their federal effective date unless the President directs otherwise. The December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 accordingly became part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025: the proponent of expert testimony in a court-martial must now show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in an expert’s basis or in the application of the method are questions of admissibility rather than of weight for the members (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). Military Rule of Evidence 704 does not contain a counterpart to Federal Rule 704(b), so the ultimate-issue limit on mental-state opinions is not codified in the same way, although relevance, helpfulness, and Rule 403 balancing still apply. Military Rule of Evidence 707 bars polygraph results and opinions, a rule upheld in United States v. Scheffer (1998). Online offenses are charged under Article 134 (child pornography), Article 120b (sexual abuse of a child, including lewd acts by communication), and Article 80 (attempts).

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that no witness may offer “human lie detector” testimony vouching for or against another witness’s truthfulness. In United States v. Kasper (2003), the court applied that rule to lay testimony; in United States v. Brooks (2007), it held that expert testimony quantifying how rarely allegations like the complainant’s prove false was the functional equivalent of vouching; and in United States v. Mullins (2010), it held that an expert may describe behaviors associated with abuse but may not testify to the complainant’s credibility or the accused’s guilt. These rules apply to online offense prosecutions in which a minor’s account, or an accused’s statement, is at issue.

An accused in a court-martial is entitled to expert assistance on a showing of necessity. Under United States v. Gonzalez (1994), the defense must show why the expert is necessary, what the expert would accomplish, and why defense counsel cannot gather and present the evidence themselves. Under United States v. Bresnahan (2005), United States v. Freeman (2008), and United States v. Lloyd (2010), the defense must show a reasonable probability that the expert would assist and that denial would result in a fundamentally unfair trial; a general wish to explore possibilities is not enough. Rule for Courts-Martial 703(d) governs requests for expert consultants and witnesses at government expense. Digital forensic and psychological experts are frequently requested under these standards in online offense courts-martial.

Arizona

Arizona amended its Rule 702 in 2012 to conform to the federal rule and Daubert. In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 702 permits “cold” expert testimony that educates the factfinder about general principles without applying them to the facts, if the testimony meets Rule 702’s reliability requirements and survives Rule 403; the court approved general testimony about the behavior of child sexual abuse victims. In State v. Lindsey (1986), the court held that an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexual abuse victims but may not opine on a particular witness’s truthfulness or the truthfulness of witnesses of that type. In State v. Cameron (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020) (mem. decision), a prosecution that included a charge of luring a minor for sexual exploitation, the court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in admitting “cold” testimony about general behaviors of child sexual abuse victims from an expert with 25 years as a police officer and extensive forensic-interviewing experience, concluding that her experience supported reliability and that her statements were sufficiently general not to be profile evidence; the convictions were affirmed and the sentences vacated on another ground. A memorandum decision may be cited only for persuasive value under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c).

Arizona does not permit psychiatric or psychological evidence of a mental disorder to negate the mental state element of an offense (State v. Mott, 1997). Testimony that a defendant’s autism, intellectual disability, or other condition prevented him from knowing what he possessed or from forming an intent to lure a minor is therefore inadmissible for that purpose, though Arizona allows expert evidence of a character trait for acting without reflection under State v. Christensen (1981), and State v. Malone (2019) held that a defendant may not corroborate such a trait with evidence of a mental defect when the State does not contest the trait. Arizona Rule 704(a) permits ultimate-issue opinions, but Rule 704(b) bars an expert in a criminal case from opining that the defendant did or did not have a mental state that is an element of the crime or defense; further limits on mental-state testimony come from Mott and its progeny. Under A.R.S. § 13-3554(B), it is not a defense to a luring charge that the other person was not a minor, and the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the dangerous-crimes-against-children sentencing provisions apply when the purported minor was fictitious (State v. Marner, 2026), a rule § 13-705(S) now states expressly for purported minors the defendant knew or had reason to know were under fifteen. At sentencing, A.R.S. § 13-701(E)(2) makes significant impairment of the capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or to conform conduct to the law a statutory mitigating circumstance, and § 13-701(E)(6) permits consideration of any other factor relevant to character or background. Expert testimony that is barred at trial under Mott may therefore be relevant at sentencing.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research and case law support forensic testimony grounded in documented, validated procedures; general educational testimony on grooming and on why minors comply with or do not report online sexual contact; and testimony explaining CSAM-community jargon and trading practices. Prosecutors are often best positioned to keep such testimony within its supported scope: grooming testimony confined to general patterns, as in Batton and Salazar-Mercado; agent testimony that explains rather than profiles; and forensic testimony that distinguishes what artifacts show from what they suggest. Rule 704(b) and Mott limit expert opinions on whether a defendant had the required mental state, whichever party offers them.

The research also counsels caution. Age estimates based on Tanner staging are unreliable near the age of majority and do not establish that images depict real children. Testimony comparing the defendant to a profile of offenders creates appellate risk under Banks, and testimony suggesting that a minor’s account is credible creates it under Brooks, Mullins, and Lindsey. Courts in Hite and Joseph found error in excluding defense experts entirely, so a motion seeking complete exclusion of general testimony about online fantasy or a defendant’s diagnosis may not succeed where narrower limits would suffice.

Special Issues for Defense

The research and case law support defense testimony about digital artifacts that are consistent with inadvertent or automated downloading, shared device access, or limited user interaction; about the limits of age estimation; about a defendant’s diagnosis, including autism or intellectual disability, and its features; and, in some circuits, about online sexual role-play and fantasy as a general phenomenon. Defense counsel are often best positioned to identify agent testimony that crosses into profiling, age testimony that exceeds the science, and forensic conclusions that rest on assumptions about who used a device. At sentencing, diagnostic and risk evidence is directly relevant under § 3553(a) and A.R.S. § 13-701.

The research also counsels caution. An expert’s opinion that the defendant lacked knowledge, intent, or sexual interest in children has frequently been excluded under Rule 704(b), and in Arizona mental-disorder evidence cannot be used to negate mens rea. Research on autism and online offending is limited and does not establish that a diagnosis explains particular conduct. Risk evidence must use the correct tool and be stated precisely. Proffers framed around general phenomena and diagnoses, rather than conclusions about the defendant’s state of mind, are both more accurate and more likely to be admitted, and military counsel requesting expert assistance must articulate a specific theory under Gonzalez and Lloyd.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

American Psychiatric Association. (2022). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed., text rev.). https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425787

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Meißner, L., Domany, S., Rathgeber, F., Schmidt, A. F., Banse, R., & Eher, R. (2026). Sexual interests of men with different child sexual offenses as assessed by direct and indirect measures: Do users of child sexual abuse material differ? Sexual Abuse, 38(6), 677–706. https://doi.org/10.1177/10790632261454316

Rosenbloom, A. L. (2013). Inaccuracy of age assessment from images of postpubescent subjects in cases of alleged child pornography. International Journal of Legal Medicine, 127(2), 467–471. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00414-012-0765-8

Rosenbloom, A. L., & Tanner, J. M. (1998). Misuse of Tanner puberty stages to estimate chronologic age. Pediatrics, 102(6), 1494. https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.102.6.1494

Seto, M. C., Cantor, J. M., & Blanchard, R. (2006). Child pornography offenses are a valid diagnostic indicator of pedophilia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(3), 610–615. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.115.3.610

World Health Organization. (2019). International classification of diseases for mortality and morbidity statistics (11th rev.). https://icd.who.int/

Legal Authorities

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Cameron, No. 1 CA-CR 19-0513 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2020, amended Nov. 8, 2021) (mem. decision) (persuasive value only, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)).

State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580 (1981).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Malone, 247 Ariz. 29, 444 P.3d 733 (2019).

State v. Marner (Haniffa), No. CR-24-0300-PR (Ariz. Jan. 30, 2026).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Banks, 36 M.J. 150 (C.M.A. 1992).

United States v. Batton, 602 F.3d 1191, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Bresnahan, 62 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2005).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010).

United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Gonzalez, 39 M.J. 459 (C.M.A. 1994).

United States v. Herrera, No. 23-13706, 2025 WL 40265 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025) (unpublished), cert. denied, No. 24-991 (U.S. June 23, 2025).

United States v. Hilton, 386 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2004).

United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

United States v. Hofus, 598 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2008).

United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Lloyd, 69 M.J. 95 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

United States v. Morais, 670 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).

United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).

United States v. Stahlman, 934 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2019).

10 U.S.C. § 880 (Article 80, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 2256.

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-701.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3554.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).

Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3).

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 704.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 704.

Mil. R. Evid. 707.

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

Rule for Courts-Martial 703(d).

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3.

Related topic papers: Digital Evidence and What It Can Show About the User · Estimating Age from Images · Grooming: What the Research Shows and Its Limits · Undercover Stings, Entrapment, and Role-Play Defenses · Risk Assessment Tools for Online Offenders · The Polygraph in Online Offense Cases

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Autism Online Offense · Autism Online Offense: Sentencing · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial