Snap Shot
- The question: What do polygraph-elicited disclosures by people with online offenses show about undetected contact offending, and how may that information be used?
- What the research shows: People disclose more offenses and victims when polygraph testing is part of treatment or supervision. In one investigative study of 127 suspects with no known contact history, 4.7% admitted abuse before polygraph procedures and an additional 52.8% disclosed it during them. The disclosure data support the conclusion that official records understate offending among some people convicted of online offenses.
- What it does not show: In most studies, admissions were counted but not independently verified, and the settings create pressure to admit; about 5% of men in one treatment survey reported false admissions after what they considered inaccurate deception findings. The data cannot supply a precise rate of undetected offending or show whether a particular person committed an undisclosed offense.
- The law: Scheffer upheld Mil. R. Evid. 707’s bar on polygraph results, though voluntary statements made during an examination may be admissible. Murphy, Antelope, and Lee address Fifth Amendment limits on supervision testing. Arizona excludes results absent written stipulation (Valdez, Ikirt).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can present the official-record rate as a floor and should rely on specific, corroborated admissions rather than group rates; defense counsel can scrutinize how polygraph-derived information was obtained and used, without arguing that the disclosure research shows nothing.
Polygraph examinations appear in online sexual offense cases in a way that differs from most criminal matters. They are rarely offered as trial evidence of guilt or innocence. Instead, they are used after conviction, in treatment and supervision, to elicit a full sexual history, and, in some investigations, as an interviewing tool with suspects. Those uses have produced a body of data suggesting that many people whose known offenses involve child sexual abuse material (CSAM) disclose previously unknown contact offenses during polygraph-assisted interviews. Those disclosures then reach court indirectly: in risk evaluations, in sentencing arguments about the likelihood of undetected offending, and in disputes over supervision conditions and the privilege against self-incrimination. Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography”; this paper uses CSAM except when discussing the law.
This paper is intentionally narrow. The Psychosexual Risk Evaluations resource contains a full paper, The Polygraph in Sex Offense Cases, that addresses how polygraph testing works, its accuracy, countermeasures, and its general use with people convicted of sexual offenses; that material is not repeated here. This paper addresses the disclosure research specific to online offending, the limits of that research, its relationship to the debate over undetected offending, and the legal rules that govern how polygraph-derived information may be used.
Post-Conviction Disclosure Testing
In the post-conviction setting, examiners commonly conduct sexual history disclosure examinations, in which the person is asked to complete a detailed history of sexual behavior and is then tested on whether the history is complete, and maintenance or monitoring examinations, which ask about compliance with supervision conditions and new offending. The approach is part of a broader “containment” model in which treatment, supervision, and polygraph testing are coordinated. The polygraph’s role in these settings is less as a lie detector than as a structure for interviewing: the examination, the pre-test interview, and the prospect of a deceptive result are intended to encourage disclosure.
Studies of this practice consistently report that people disclose more offenses, more victims, and a wider range of behavior when polygraph testing is part of the process. In a Colorado study of 223 incarcerated and 266 paroled men in treatment, admissions during treatment combined with polygraph testing showed far more “crossover” offending, against victims of different ages, genders, and relationships, than criminal records reflected, with smaller increases among parolees, who appeared more guarded (Heil et al., 2003). An earlier study from the same program reported similar increases in admitted victims and offenses (Ahlmeyer et al., 2000). In a United Kingdom pilot, community-supervised men in a mandatory polygraph program made more clinically relevant disclosures than a comparison group, most of them associated with the polygraph session itself, although the disclosures were not more serious on average (Gannon et al., 2014).
Disclosures by People with CSAM Offenses
Two studies are most often cited for the claim that polygraph testing reveals undisclosed contact offending among people whose known offenses involve CSAM. In one of two 2010 Dutch studies by Buschman and colleagues, the researchers studied 38 men in the Netherlands convicted of CSAM offenses with no known contact offenses, comparing what they reported in a standard clinical interview with what they disclosed in a later polygraph-assisted interview. Disclosures increased substantially in the polygraph setting, including admissions of sexual contact with children by a large minority of the sample, and none of the disclosed contact offenses had led to prosecution. Bourke and colleagues (2015) described what they called “tactical polygraph,” an investigative use of the polygraph during federal investigations. In a sample of 127 suspects with no known history of contact offending, 4.7% admitted sexually abusing a child before polygraph procedures; during the polygraph procedures, an additional 52.8% disclosed contact abuse (pp. 354, 361).
These figures are frequently paired with the meta-analysis by Seto, Hanson, and Babchishin (2011), which found that about 12% (about 1 in 8) of people with online sexual offenses had an officially known contact offense and that about 55% admitted a contact offense in the six studies with self-report data (523 participants), mostly gathered in treatment or polygraph settings; the admissions were unverified, and many reported offenses preceded the online offense. Lifetime admission and new detected recidivism are different measures. In nine follow-up samples (2,630 men) followed for 1.5 to 6 years, the same meta-analysis found that 2.0% were detected committing a new contact sexual offense, a minimum estimate; later studies with longer follow-up report higher rates, as described in the recidivism paper. The gap between official records and self-report is the core of the debate over the “dark figure” of undetected offending, addressed in the companion paper Undisclosed Offending, the “Dark Figure,” and the Butner Study.
What the Disclosure Data Can and Cannot Show
The disclosure studies show that, under the conditions studied, many people disclose sexual behavior not recorded in official files. That is evidence of something. Official records undercount sexual offending, because most child sexual abuse is never reported, and polygraph-assisted interviews do elicit information that evaluators and supervising officers would not otherwise have. Some of that information has been corroborated in individual cases.
What the studies do not establish is how accurate the disclosures are. In most of the research, admissions were recorded and counted but not independently verified, so it is not known how many described real events, how many exaggerated real events, and how many were untrue. Several features of the setting create pressure toward admission regardless of truth. Participants may have been told that a deceptive result could lead to sanctions, loss of privileges, or continued investigation; treatment programs often require full disclosure and treat denial as resistance; and examiners may interpret physiological responses as deception and press for explanation. In a survey of 95 men in outpatient treatment who had taken 333 polygraph examinations, about 5% reported that they had responded to what they considered inaccurate findings of deception by admitting to things they had not done (Kokish et al., 2005). The same survey found that participants agreed with examiners’ conclusions on about 90% of tests and that most viewed testing as helpful, findings that supporters of the practice cite.
The investigative studies raise additional questions. In the tactical polygraph study, the suspects were being interviewed during active investigations, a setting with strong incentives on both sides and with the procedures and interrogative pressures that research on false confessions examines. The sample was a convenience sample of suspects who agreed to testing (about 60% to 83% of those asked, depending on the agency), and one agency tested suspects on the day the search warrant was executed (p. 361). The study reported disclosure rates, not verification rates; the authors noted it is unknown whether the disclosures were complete (p. 361). Its authors were law enforcement practitioners describing their own method.
The broader accuracy literature, discussed in the Psychosexual Risk Evaluations paper, also matters. The National Research Council (2003) concluded that specific-incident polygraph testing can discriminate lying from truthfulness at rates well above chance but well below perfection, that accuracy in screening and multi-issue examinations, which resemble post-conviction testing, is likely lower and poorly studied, and that a test’s usefulness in eliciting admissions does not establish its validity as a test of deception. Critics of post-conviction testing have argued that its clinical value has been asserted more than demonstrated (Meijer et al., 2008); supporters have argued that its value lies in increasing disclosure and improving supervision even if the test itself is imperfect (Grubin, 2008).
The consistent position across this literature is that polygraph-elicited disclosures are informative but of unknown and context-dependent accuracy. They support the conclusion that official records understate offending among some people convicted of online offenses. They cannot supply a precise rate of undetected contact offending, and they cannot establish whether any particular person committed an undisclosed offense.
Limits of the Evidence
The CSAM-specific disclosure studies are few and small, were conducted in settings with strong incentives to disclose, and did not verify disclosures against independent evidence. Samples were drawn from treatment programs, supervision caseloads, and active investigations, which may differ from people with online offenses generally. Definitions of “contact offense” varied and sometimes included conduct committed as a juvenile. There is no research on the accuracy of disclosure examinations specifically with people convicted of online offenses. No polygraph result, and no group disclosure rate, can establish whether a particular defendant committed an undetected offense or how likely the defendant is to do so in the future.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the tactical polygraph study is cited for the finding that an additional 52.8% of 127 suspects disclosed contact abuse (Bourke et al., 2015, p. 361), an attorney should ask what exactly was counted: disclosures made during active investigations, not offenses verified against independent evidence. When the figure of about 55% admitting a contact offense (Seto et al., 2011) is offered, the question is who was studied, because several of the six self-report studies behind it involved treatment or polygraph settings. When the finding that about 5% of men reported false admissions (Kokish et al., 2005) is offered to show that disclosures are unreliable, ask how much evidence that rests on, a self-report survey of 95 men, and note that the same survey found agreement with examiners’ conclusions on about 90% of tests. When detected contact recidivism of 2.0% (Seto et al., 2011) is offered as context, the question is again what was counted: detected offenses in nine samples (2,630 men) over follow-up periods of 1.5 to 6 years, a floor rather than a true rate, with later and longer studies reporting higher figures. Whether a group disclosure rate applies to this person depends on specific, corroborated information. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
The Polygraph and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
In United States v. Scheffer (1998), the Supreme Court upheld Military Rule of Evidence 707, which makes the results of a polygraph examination, the examiner’s opinion, and any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination inadmissible in courts-martial, against a claim that it violated the accused’s right to present a defense. The Court relied on the absence of scientific consensus on polygraph reliability and on the factfinder’s role in assessing credibility. Rule 707 does not bar otherwise admissible statements made during a polygraph examination, so admissions made in a pre-test or post-test interview may be offered if they meet ordinary requirements of voluntariness. In federal civilian courts, several circuits have held that Daubert displaced per se exclusion and requires case-by-case analysis under Rules 702 and 403 (United States v. Cordoba, 9th Cir. 1997), but in practice unstipulated polygraph results are rarely admitted.
The Fifth Amendment shapes post-conviction testing. In Minnesota v. Murphy (1984), the Supreme Court held that a probationer’s general obligation to answer questions truthfully did not make his admissions compelled, but that if the state expressly or implicitly asserts that invoking the privilege will lead to revocation, the privilege becomes self-executing and the resulting statements are compelled. In United States v. Antelope (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that revoking supervised release because the defendant refused to disclose a full sexual history, including potentially prosecutable offenses, without a grant of immunity violated the Fifth Amendment where he faced a real and appreciable danger of incrimination. In United States v. Lee (3d Cir. 2003), the Third Circuit upheld a polygraph condition for a man convicted of CSAM and enticement offenses, reasoning that he retained the right to invoke the privilege as to incriminating questions. Together, these cases mean that polygraph conditions are generally permissible, but disclosures compelled under threat of revocation may not be usable in a new prosecution, and a defendant may not be punished for a valid invocation.
Arizona
Arizona has excluded polygraph evidence absent stipulation since State v. Valdez (1962), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that polygraph results may be admitted only when the prosecutor, the defendant, and defense counsel sign a written stipulation, subject to the trial court’s discretion to exclude them if it is not satisfied with the examiner’s qualifications or the test’s conditions, with full cross-examination of the examiner, and with an instruction that the results do not prove or disprove an element of the offense. In State v. Ikirt (1989), the court reaffirmed that polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible and that reference to a test is improper, noting exceptions for stipulation and for situations in which the defense opens the door, and that a defendant’s willingness or refusal to take a test is generally inadmissible. Expert testimony that relies on polygraph-derived disclosures in a risk evaluation raises separate questions under Ariz. R. Evid. 702 and 703 about whether the underlying information is of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field and whether its use is fair.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the proposition that official records understate sexual offending, that polygraph-assisted interviews elicit substantially more disclosures than other methods, and that some people convicted of online offenses disclose contact offenses in those settings. Statements made during a polygraph interview may be admissible when voluntary even though the results are not, and polygraph conditions of supervision have been upheld. Prosecutors are well positioned to present disclosure research as evidence that the official-record base rate is a floor, not a ceiling, and to rely on specific, corroborated admissions rather than group rates.
The research also counsels caution. Group disclosure rates from small, high-pressure samples have not been verified and cannot be applied to a particular defendant. A minority of examinees report making false admissions under pressure. Results are inadmissible in courts-martial under Rule 707 and in Arizona absent stipulation, and disclosures compelled under threat of revocation may be inadmissible under Murphy and Antelope. Arguments that treat polygraph-era disclosure rates as established rates of hidden contact offending go beyond what the data show.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports testimony that polygraph-elicited disclosures have not been independently verified, that the settings in which they were obtained create incentives to admit, that some examinees report false admissions, and that the accuracy of multi-issue and screening examinations is lower and less studied than that of specific-incident tests. Detected contact recidivism over follow-up periods of 1.5 to 6 years was 2.0% in one meta-analysis (Seto et al., 2011); because detection undercounts reoffending, this is a floor, not the true rate, and the follow-up was short. Defense counsel are well positioned to scrutinize whether a risk evaluation relied on polygraph-derived information, how it was obtained, and whether the client’s Fifth Amendment rights were respected.
The research also counsels caution. Disclosure studies, although imperfect, consistently show more offending than records reflect, and the underreporting of child sexual abuse is well documented. The absence of a known contact offense does not establish that none occurred. Specific admissions a defendant made during a polygraph interview may be admissible and may be corroborated. Arguing that disclosure research shows nothing overstates its weaknesses as much as treating it as precise overstates its strengths.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Ahlmeyer, S., Heil, P., McKee, B., & English, K. (2000). The impact of polygraphy on admissions of victims and offenses in adult sexual offenders. Sexual Abuse, 12(2), 123–138. https://doi.org/10.1177/107906320001200204
Bourke, M. L., Fragomeli, L., Detar, P. J., Sullivan, M. A., Meyle, E., & O’Riordan, M. (2015). The use of tactical polygraph with sex offenders. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 21(3), 354–367. https://doi.org/10.1080/13552600.2014.886729
Buschman, J., Wilcox, D., Krapohl, D., Oelrich, M., & Hackett, S. (2010). Cybersex offender risk assessment. An explorative study. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 16(2), 197–209. https://doi.org/10.1080/13552601003690518
Gannon, T. A., Wood, J. L., Pina, A., Tyler, N., Barnoux, M. F., & Vasquez, E. A. (2014). An evaluation of mandatory polygraph testing for sexual offenders in the United Kingdom. Sexual Abuse, 26(2), 178–203. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063213486836
Grubin, D. (2008). The case for polygraph testing of sex offenders. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 13(2), 177–189. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532508X295165
Heil, P., Ahlmeyer, S., & Simons, D. (2003). Crossover sexual offenses. Sexual Abuse, 15(4), 221–236. https://doi.org/10.1177/107906320301500401
Kokish, R., Levenson, J. S., & Blasingame, G. D. (2005). Post-conviction sex offender polygraph examination: Client-reported perceptions of utility and accuracy. Sexual Abuse, 17(2), 211–221. https://doi.org/10.1177/107906320501700210
Meijer, E. H., Verschuere, B., Merckelbach, H. L. G. J., & Crombez, G. (2008). Sex offender management using the polygraph: A critical review. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 31(5), 423–429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2008.08.007
National Research Council. (2003). The polygraph and lie detection. The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/10420
Seto, M. C., Hanson, R. K., & Babchishin, K. M. (2011). Contact sexual offending by men with online sexual offenses. Sexual Abuse, 23(1), 124–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063210369013
Legal Authorities
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
State v. Ikirt, 160 Ariz. 113, 770 P.2d 1159 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2003).
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
U.S. Const. amend. V.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 703.
Mil. R. Evid. 707.
Related topic papers: Undisclosed Offending, the “Dark Figure,” and the Butner Study · Online and Contact Offenders Compared · Recidivism of People Convicted of Online Sexual Offenses · Risk Assessment Tools for Online Offenders
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · False Confessions · Courts-Martial