Snap Shot
- The question: Who is prosecuted for producing child sexual abuse material, how does live-streamed abuse fit within production law, and what can research tell a court?
- What the research shows: In federal production cases sentenced in fiscal year 2019, 60.3% of offenders were relatives or held a position of trust, sexual contact occurred in 80.9% of cases, and 11.9% involved production by live stream or webcam. Small Australian studies describe paid live streams, often arranged by a relative of the child.
- What it does not show: No peer-reviewed study reports recidivism specifically for people convicted of production, and the CPORT was developed on non-production offenders. Live-streaming samples are small and detection-driven, and the federal data reflect charging selection.
- The law: Section 2251 carries a 15-year minimum; circuits describe the purpose element differently (McCauley: at least a significant purpose) and disagree on whether filming a child as the object of sexual interest is “use” (Howard against Dawson, Osuba, Mendez). Military law treats unstored streams as visual depictions; Arizona’s § 13-3552 reaches a “live act.”
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should build purpose and use from conduct linking the recording to the abuse and avoid predicting individual risk from producer data; defense counsel should test purpose, use, and the viewer-producer line while recognizing that minors cannot consent and that coerced self-production remains production by the adult.
Production is the most heavily punished offense involving child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography,” and this paper uses that term when describing the law; elsewhere it uses CSAM. Production once meant photographing or filming a child who was physically present. It now also covers covert recording with hidden cameras, persuading or coercing a child to make images of himself or herself, and directing abuse that is transmitted live over a video connection to a viewer who may be in another country and who may never save a file.
These cases reach court with high stakes and with several legal questions unresolved. A first federal conviction under § 2251 carries a 15-year mandatory minimum; the federal circuits describe the required purpose in different terms; they disagree about whether a child who is filmed without being made to do anything sexual has been “used”; and the treatment of live, unrecorded video has developed through statutory amendment more than through appellate decisions. Mental health professionals are drawn in mainly at sentencing and in risk evaluations.
This paper summarizes what federal sentencing data and research show about people prosecuted for production and about live-streamed and commercial abuse, describes the limits of that research, and reviews federal, military, and Arizona production law. The general law of CSAM and the Dost debate are covered in the companion paper on federal, Arizona, and military law, the non-production guideline in the paper on culpability and sentencing factors, and sextortion in the paper on that topic.
Who Is Sentenced for Production: Federal Data
The most detailed description of people sentenced for production is the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s (2021) report on the 512 offenders sentenced under USSG § 2G2.1 in fiscal year 2019, a number 422% higher than in fiscal year 2005. The average sentence was 275 months, and 78.0% were convicted under a statute carrying a mandatory minimum of at least 15 years. Only 30.7% of sentences fell within the guideline range; 57.2% received a downward variance.
Six in ten offenders (60.3%) were relatives of the victim or held a position of trust; biological parents accounted for 18.2% and family friends for 17.0%. Strangers met online accounted for 35.4%, up from 14.3% in fiscal year 2010. The youngest victim was 12 or younger in 61.3% of cases and an infant or toddler in 16.8%; 41.0% of cases involved more than one victim. Sexual contact occurred in 80.9% of cases. Online or virtual communication was used in 32.8%, sextortion was involved in 8.4%, and 11.9% involved production by live stream or webcam. Some form of coercion (violence, threats, bullying, or other pressure) was used to make a minor participate in 20.1% of cases; 31.6% of offenders distributed images they had produced, 54.7% possessed other CSAM, and 70.3% were in Criminal History Category I.
Offenders with in-person access tended to have younger victims, while 61.7% of those who communicated with victims remotely had a teenage youngest victim. Seto (2025, Chapter 2) notes that the high rate of contact offending likely reflects, in part, which cases are prosecuted federally rather than in state court.
Routes to Production
Seto (2025, Chapter 2) distinguishes forms of production that may involve different people: recording contact abuse; directing a child, in person but without contact, to engage in sexual behavior or pose; inducing a child online to produce images or perform on a camera that is secretly recorded; and creating material without any interaction with a real child.
In a critical review of 66 sources published since 1970, Salter and Wong (2024) reported that family members accounted for 25% to 56% of CSAM offenders in United States law enforcement data and that material produced by parents more often involved prepubescent children and more severe abuse. In one reviewed study of 98 women convicted of online offenses, 72% had been convicted of production; of those, 71% had abused their own child and 77% had a male co-offender. The authors described the evidence base as small, non-representative, and dependent on self-report, and the review did not appraise study quality.
Self-production under adult influence is now a major route. In an analysis of 687 identified children depicted in images in the United Kingdom’s records in the International Child Sexual Exploitation database from 2006 to 2015, Quayle and colleagues (2018) found that 44.3% of the images were self-taken: 34.4% in the context of a coercive relationship and 9.9% in a non-coercive one. Identified victims are likely to be older than unidentified ones, so these proportions may not describe all material. Sextortion is addressed in its own paper; for present purposes, an adult who persuades or coerces a minor to make sexually explicit images may be prosecuted for production, and the minor’s apparent agreement does not change that, because minors cannot consent to the production of sexual images.
Live-Streamed and Commercial Abuse
In live-streamed abuse, a viewer watches the abuse of a child as it happens, often paying a facilitator who has access to the child and sometimes directing what is done. Research is thin. A scoping review by Drejer and colleagues (2024) located only 14 sources, eight of them peer-reviewed. Victims were aged 7 to 17 and mostly female, most data came from the Philippines, facilitators were often female family members, and payments were typically about US$10 to US$50 per session. The reviewers noted that four included studies drew on overlapping Australian data and that samples were small.
In an Australian Institute of Criminology analysis of chat logs from seven Australian men aged 42 to 72, covering 145 offenses against 74 victims, Napier, Teunissen, and Boxall (2021a) found a median price of A$51 per session, with price not rising consistently with the severity of abuse requested. Victims were aged 7 to 17, with a median age of 14, and facilitators were involved in 35% of offenses. A companion analysis of the same sample (Napier et al., 2021b) found that, of 27 victims whose relationship to the facilitator was known, 89% were related to that facilitator, and in 13 cases the facilitator was the child’s mother; access came through online targeting or through families met during travel. A further report described four of the seven men as discussing travel or booking flights to meet children (Teunissen & Napier, 2023). Seven men cannot represent live-streaming offenders generally.
Cubitt, Napier, and Brown (2023) analyzed records for 209 Australians identified through payments to facilitators abroad. Most had limited criminal histories, but cluster analysis identified a subgroup with more frequent transactions, more criminal history, and more prior sexual offending (see also Seto, 2025, Chapter 2). The sample describes people who paid in traceable ways and were detected.
Using a nationally representative survey of United States law enforcement agencies, Mitchell and colleagues (2011) estimated 569 arrests for internet-facilitated commercial sexual exploitation of children in 2006. About a third involved selling or buying access to identified children, and about two-thirds involved buying or selling material the offender possessed but had not produced. These data predate widespread live streaming. Seto (2025, Chapter 2) concludes that commercial production occurs but appears to be a small fraction of all production, and notes a large gap between anonymous survey reports of watching live-streamed abuse and its rarity in federal prosecutions, which may reflect detection, population differences, or geography.
Producers Compared With Other CSAM Offenders
Comparative research is limited. In a national sample of 2006 arrests, Clevenger, Navarro, and Jasinski (2016) found possession-only and production-distribution groups heterogeneous; the latter more often had substance problems and prior violence. Because producers and distributors were combined, the study cannot isolate producers.
The general overlap between online and contact offending (Seto et al., 2011) is summarized in the paper comparing online and contact offenders; those samples were not divided by production status. Seto (2025, Chapter 2) proposes, as an untested hypothesis rather than a finding, that risk is likely to be highest among people who recorded contact abuse, lower among those who interacted with children in person without contact, lower again among those whose interaction was entirely online, and lowest among those who created material without any interaction with a real child. The book does not report a test of that ordering.
The most important gap is the absence of recidivism data specific to producers. No peer-reviewed study identified for this paper reports reoffense rates for people convicted of production as a separate group, and the Child Pornography Offender Risk Tool was developed on non-production offenders. When a person has recorded contact abuse, tools developed for contact offending are generally used; they are discussed in the Psychosexual Risk Evaluations resource on this site.
Limits of the Evidence
The federal data come from court documents in cases the federal government chose to prosecute, and the Commission’s coding of prior sexually abusive conduct counts allegations and admissions as well as arrests and convictions. State and military cases may differ. The live-streaming research consists largely of a few Australian studies, several sharing the same seven-person sample, and Philippine data; there is no peer-reviewed United States study of live-streaming offenders. Prevalence estimates for the Philippines come from advocacy organizations and are not summarized here. Studies of family production rely on small samples, and commercial exploitation data are nearly two decades old.
No study can tell a court whether a particular defendant’s purpose was to produce an image, whether a particular image was coerced, or whether a particular person convicted of production will reoffend.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the Commission’s finding that 80.9% of production cases involved sexual contact is offered to characterize a defendant, ask who was studied: the figure describes federal cases sentenced in fiscal year 2019, shaped by federal charging, and does not show whether this person had contact with a child. When the Australian chat-log studies (Napier et al., 2021a; Teunissen & Napier, 2023) are cited for the conclusion that live-streaming offenders travel to abuse children or that prices do not track severity, ask how much evidence the finding rests on, since the analyses drew on seven men. When the absence of producer-specific recidivism research is offered as though it shows that producers are at low risk, ask whether the conclusion follows: an absence of data is not evidence of low risk. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Production Offenses and the Law
Federal Statutes and Guidelines
Section 2251(a) of Title 18 prohibits employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, or transporting a minor for that purpose, “for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct,” with interstate-commerce elements. Section 2251(b) reaches a parent or custodian who permits such conduct, § 2251(c) conduct abroad aimed at the United States, and § 2251(d) advertisements. Under § 2251(e), a first offense carries 15 to 30 years, one qualifying prior conviction 25 to 50 years, and two or more 35 years to life; attempts and conspiracies are punished as completed offenses. Section 2251A punishes selling or buying custody of a minor for that purpose by 30 years to life, and § 2260(a) reaches production or live transmission abroad intended for importation into the United States, with § 2251(e) penalties.
The production guideline, USSG § 2G2.1, has a base offense level of 32 (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2025). It adds four levels for a minor under 12 and two for a minor aged 12 to 15; two for a sexual act or sexual contact, or four for a sexual act involving force, threats, or incapacitation of the kind described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b); two if the defendant knowingly engaged in distribution; four for material portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct or other violence, or an infant or toddler; two if the defendant was a parent, relative, or legal guardian of the minor or the minor was otherwise in the defendant’s custody, care, or supervisory control; and two if, to produce material or transmit it live, the offense involved misrepresentation of identity or use of a computer to entice a minor or solicit participation. Each minor exploited is treated as a separate count. In fiscal year 2019, the computer and misrepresentation enhancement applied in 45.7% of cases, up from 19.5% in fiscal year 2010, and the five-level pattern-of-activity enhancement under § 4B1.5(b) applied in 51.6% (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2021).
The Purpose Element
The courts describe the required purpose in different terms. In United States v. Sirois (2d Cir. 1996) and United States v. Raplinger (8th Cir. 2009), the courts held that production need not be the defendant’s sole purpose so long as it was one of the dominant purposes. In United States v. Palomino-Coronado (4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit reversed a conviction resting on a single photograph, reasoning that the evidence showed only that the defendant engaged in sexual activity and took a picture, not that he engaged in it to take a picture. United States v. Torres (D.C. Cir. 2018) found the evidence sufficient where obtaining the images was itself important to the defendant.
United States v. McCauley (4th Cir. 2020) is the most detailed recent treatment. The district court instructed the jury that production had to be “a purpose” of the sexual conduct and that the purpose could exist “at any point” during it, and the government argued in closing that one purpose in ten would suffice. The Fourth Circuit vacated the conviction. It held that the statutory phrase “the purpose” requires filming to be at least a significant purpose of the sexual conduct, not merely incidental; that the government need not prove filming was the sole purpose; that a spontaneous decision to record in the middle of sexual activity, without some pause or other evidence of purpose, does not satisfy the statute; and that the image itself may be probative of intent but cannot be the only evidence, or the offense would become one of strict liability. The court noted that it had affirmed a conviction under an instruction requiring “a significant or motivating purpose” (United States v. Thompson, 4th Cir. 2020, unpublished). No Supreme Court decision resolving the formulation was identified.
Whatever the wording, the cases look for conduct linking the recording to the sexual activity: choosing a location for its suitability for filming, bringing or setting up equipment, adjusting the camera’s position, giving instructions to the child, or making statements about recording. These are factual questions for the jury, and Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars an expert from stating whether the defendant had the required purpose.
“Use” of a Minor and Covert Recording
Hidden-camera and “object of interest” cases turn on whether the defendant “used” a minor. In United States v. Howard (7th Cir. 2020), the Seventh Circuit held that, read with the statute’s other verbs, “uses” requires that the defendant cause the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct; recording himself masturbating beside a sleeping, clothed child was not enough, and the production convictions were vacated. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed in United States v. Dawson (2023), holding that a minor’s passive involvement as the object of the offender’s sexual desire suffices, acknowledging its split with Howard, and declining to apply the rule of lenity. In United States v. Osuba (2d Cir. 2023), the Second Circuit took an intermediate position: the minor must engage in the conduct, but may do so passively.
The Ninth Circuit has read “use” broadly. United States v. Laursen (2017) required active conduct by the defendant that resulted in production, and United States v. Mendez (2022) held that intentionally filming a minor’s sexually explicit conduct with a hidden camera is such conduct. In United States v. Hutton (2025), the court applied those decisions and United States v. Boam (2023) to a camera hidden in a bathroom; it treated lasciviousness as a factual question turning on the photographer’s exhibition and intended audience, not the child’s conduct. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 29, 2026. Covert recordings of ordinary undressing remain vulnerable in the D.C. Circuit, where United States v. Hillie (2022) vacated attempted-production counts under its narrower definition of lascivious exhibition.
Live Video and Remote Direction
Congress added the “transmitting a live visual depiction” purpose to § 2251(a) and (b), and to § 2260(a), in the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008, and it amended the definition of “visual depiction” in § 2256(5) to include data transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format. A person who directs abuse viewed over a live connection can therefore be prosecuted for production without any recording. The more difficult question is the line between a producer and a viewer. In United States v. Hartleroad (7th Cir. 2023), the defendant offered an undercover officer, posing as the stepfather of a 14-year-old, to have sexual acts of the defendant’s choosing performed on her and viewed over video, and he sent a script of the acts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an attempted production conviction, holding that the defendant need not communicate directly with the child and that the evidence showed he acted as a producer rather than merely a viewer.
Federal and Military Standards
In courts-martial, the Article 134 offense in paragraph 95 of Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial requires that the accused knowingly and wrongfully produced child pornography, plus the terminal element (prejudice to good order and discipline or service-discrediting conduct). “Producing” means creating or manufacturing material that did not previously exist, not copying it, and a “visual depiction” includes images “transmitted by any means including streaming media, even if not stored in a permanent format” (MCM, 2024 ed., pt. IV, ¶ 95). The language matters because in United States v. Miller (C.A.A.F. 2008), presence through a webcam was insufficient for attempted indecent liberties. The maximum punishment for producing is a dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and 30 years’ confinement, and under the sentencing parameters implemented by Executive Order 14103, producing is a Category 4 offense, 120 to 240 months (MCM, 2024 ed., apps. 12B, 12C). Executive Order 14130 (Dec. 20, 2024) did not change the maximum punishment or the sentencing parameters; it revised the ¶ 95 definitions, and a “visual depiction” now also includes images “made, adapted, modified, or generated by any means” (89 Fed. Reg. at 105376). Federal statutes may also be charged under clause 3, and covert recording of private areas under Article 120c.
The terminal element must be proved. In United States v. Richard (C.A.A.F. 2022), which involved filming a 16-year-old and capturing screenshots of video chats with her, the court held that prejudice to good order and discipline cannot be presumed from military status or the use of military property and set aside the child pornography specifications. United States v. Roderick (C.A.A.F. 2006) applied the Dost factors to “lascivious exhibition” in a § 2251(a) prosecution under Article 134. In United States v. Schauer (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2023), the appellant pleaded guilty, under a plea agreement, to possessing and producing child pornography, the production specification resting on a video a minor made and sent after his request; the appeal concerned victim-impact submissions and sentence severity, so the meaning of “producing” was not contested, and no military appellate decision contesting production by live stream or enticed self-production was identified.
Expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, which requires the proponent to show admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 1999). Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 amendment became part of it in 2025 under Military Rule of Evidence 1102 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). Military Rule of Evidence 704 has no counterpart to Federal Rule 704(b), although relevance, helpfulness, and Rule 403 still limit mental-state opinions.
Arizona
Under A.R.S. § 13-3553(A)(1), sexual exploitation of a minor includes knowingly recording, filming, photographing, developing, or duplicating a visual depiction in which a minor is engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct; it is a class 2 felony and a dangerous crime against children (DCAC) when the minor is under 15, with a first-offense range of 10 to 24 years and a presumptive 17 under § 13-705(F). A 2025 amendment added observing a nude minor for sexual gratification, with an exception for consensual conduct between minors who are at least fifteen (2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 23). Under § 13-3552, commercial sexual exploitation of a minor includes knowingly using, employing, persuading, enticing, inducing, or coercing a minor to engage in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction “or live act” of that conduct, and a custodian’s permitting such conduct (A.R.S. § 13-3552(A)(1), (3)). It is a class 2 felony. When the minor is under 15, it is sentenced as a dangerous crime against children under § 13-705(E), with a first-offense range of 13 to 27 years and a presumptive 20; when the minor is 15, 16, or 17, § 13-3552(C) itself prescribes the same first-offense range (13 to 27 years, presumptive 20), without eligibility for suspension of sentence, probation, or release before the sentence is served except as the statute provides. DCAC sentences generally run consecutively under § 13-705(P). No published Arizona decision construing the “live act” language for webcam or streaming conduct was identified.
Arizona’s definition differs from the narrower federal approach in Hillie. In State v. Chandler (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017), the court held that the phrase “for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer” in the definition of exploitive exhibition refers to the viewer’s purpose rather than the minor’s (the defendant there both made and viewed the recordings; a later unpublished memorandum decision, State v. Linville (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018), citable only for persuasive value under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c), reasoned that where the defendant did not create the depiction the inquiry turns on the creator’s purpose); the minor need not be engaged in sexual conduct or know of the recording, and a father’s hidden recordings of his daughters in a bathroom qualified. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 follows the federal rule; Arizona Rule 704 has no counterpart to Federal Rule 704(b), and limits on mental-state testimony come from State v. Mott (1997).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately make. Federal production cases differ from possession cases: most involve a relative or a person in a position of trust, most involve sexual contact, and many involve children 12 or younger. The live-streaming studies describe paid abuse committed to order, often arranged by a relative, and support investigating travel, contact abuse, and saved copies. The 2008 amendments and the Manual’s streaming definition reach unrecorded live video, Hartleroad supports attempt liability for directing abuse through an intermediary, several circuits read “use” to reach covert recording, and Arizona’s Chandler focuses on the purpose of the person making or viewing the depiction, and § 13-3552 reaches live acts. Prosecutors are often best positioned to present evidence linking the recording to the abuse, such as planning, equipment, camera placement, and instructions, rather than relying on the image alone.
The research and case law also counsel caution. Where a circuit requires a dominant or significant purpose, a single image taken during sexual activity may not suffice (Palomino-Coronado), and instructions or arguments that any purpose arising at any moment is enough led to reversal in McCauley. Object-of-interest theories fail in the Seventh Circuit under Howard, and covert recordings of ordinary activity are vulnerable in the D.C. Circuit under Hillie. In courts-martial, the terminal element must be proved with evidence (Richard). The live-streaming research is small, and no study shows that a particular person convicted of production will reoffend; arguments about dangerousness should rest on a case-specific evaluation.
Special Issues for Defense
The research and case law give defense counsel genuine questions to test. The purpose element is a real jury question; where circuit law allows, counsel may seek a significant- or dominant-purpose instruction and examine whether the evidence shows planning or direction or instead a spontaneous recording (McCauley). Howard, Osuba, and Hillie provide principled grounds to challenge object-of-interest and covert-recording theories in their circuits, and in live-streaming cases the line between directing and viewing can determine whether production is charged. At sentencing, Commission data show that 57.2% of production offenders received downward variances and that 78.0% were convicted under a statute carrying a minimum of at least 15 years; both facts are relevant to arguments under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and neither speaks to an individual’s risk. The heterogeneity of producers also counsels against treating the offense label as a risk assessment.
The research and law also counsel caution about the limits of these arguments. Most circuits read “use” broadly, attempt liability reaches sting cases, and the 15-year minimum and Category 4 parameter leave limited room at sentencing. Minors cannot consent to the production of sexual images, and coerced or enticed self-production remains production by the adult; Quayle and colleagues (2018) found that, of the self-taken images of identified children (44.3% of all images in the sample), about three quarters (34.4% of all images) were made in a coercive relationship. Describing a minor’s participation as voluntary misstates the law and the research. In Arizona, Chandler forecloses the argument that the child must be sexually posed or aware of the recording, and an absence of producer-specific recidivism data is not evidence that a particular person is at low risk.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Clevenger, S. L., Navarro, J. N., & Jasinski, J. L. (2016). A matter of low self-control? Exploring differences between child pornography possessors and child pornography producers/distributers using self-control theory. Sexual Abuse, 28(6), 555–571. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063214557173
Cubitt, T. I. C., Napier, S., & Brown, R. (2023). Understanding the offline criminal behavior of individuals who live stream child sexual abuse. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 38(9–10), 6624–6649. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605221137712
Drejer, C., Riegler, M. A., Halvorsen, P., Johnson, M. S., & Baugerud, G. A. (2024). Livestreaming technology and online child sexual exploitation and abuse: A scoping review. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 25(1), 260–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/15248380221147564
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Mitchell, K. J., Jones, L. M., Finkelhor, D., & Wolak, J. (2011). Internet-facilitated commercial sexual exploitation of children: Findings from a nationally representative sample of law enforcement agencies in the United States. Sexual Abuse, 23(1), 43–71. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063210374347
Napier, S., Teunissen, C., & Boxall, H. (2021a). Live streaming of child sexual abuse: An analysis of offender chat logs (Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 639). Australian Institute of Criminology. https://doi.org/10.52922/ti78375
Napier, S., Teunissen, C., & Boxall, H. (2021b). How do child sexual abuse live streaming offenders access victims? (Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 642). Australian Institute of Criminology. https://doi.org/10.52922/ti78474
Quayle, E., Jonsson, L. S., Cooper, K., Traynor, J., & Svedin, C. G. (2018). Children in identified sexual images – Who are they? Self- and non-self-taken images in the International Child Sexual Exploitation Image Database 2006–2015. Child Abuse Review, 27(3), 223–238. https://doi.org/10.1002/car.2507
Salter, M., & Wong, T. (2024). Parental production of child sexual abuse material: A critical review. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 25(3), 1826–1837. https://doi.org/10.1177/15248380231195891
Seto, M. C. (2025). Online sexual offending: Theory, practice, and policy (2nd ed.). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0000428-000
Seto, M. C., Hanson, R. K., & Babchishin, K. M. (2011). Contact sexual offending by men with online sexual offenses. Sexual Abuse, 23(1), 124–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063210369013
Teunissen, C., & Napier, S. (2023). The overlap between child sexual abuse live streaming, contact abuse and other forms of child exploitation (Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 671). Australian Institute of Criminology. https://doi.org/10.52922/ti78993
U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2021). Federal sentencing of child pornography: Production offenses. https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-reports/federal-sentencing-child-pornography-production-offenses
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Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
United States v. Boam, 69 F.4th 601 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1345 (2024).
United States v. Dawson, 64 F.4th 1227 (11th Cir. 2023).
United States v. Hartleroad, No. 22-1156 (7th Cir. July 11, 2023).
United States v. Hillie, 39 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
United States v. Howard, 968 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2020).
United States v. Hutton, 159 F.4th 636 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-971 (U.S. June 29, 2026).
United States v. Laursen, 847 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2017).
United States v. McCauley, 983 F.3d 690 (4th Cir. 2020).
United States v. Mendez, 35 F.4th 1219 (9th Cir. 2022).
United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2023).
United States v. Palomino-Coronado, 805 F.3d 127 (4th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Raplinger, 555 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
United States v. Thompson, 807 F. App’x 251 (4th Cir. 2020) (unpublished).
United States v. Torres, 894 F.3d 305 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 87 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
United States v. Richard, 83 M.J. 112 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (No. 22-0091/AF, Sept. 7, 2022).
United States v. Roderick, 62 M.J. 425 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
United States v. Schauer, No. ACM 40203 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2023) (published opinion; M.J. citation not located).
State v. Chandler, 244 Ariz. 336, 418 P.3d 1109 (App. 2017) (No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0079, Dec. 13, 2017).
State v. Linville, No. 1 CA-CR 17-0429 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 24, 2018) (mem. decision) (citable only for persuasive value under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
18 U.S.C. § 2251.
18 U.S.C. § 2251A.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(5).
18 U.S.C. § 2260.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-401, tit. III, 122 Stat. 4229.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2G2.1, 4B1.5 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2025).
10 U.S.C. § 920c (Article 120c, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, ¶ 95 (2024 ed.).
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, apps. 12B, 12C (2024 ed.).
Exec. Order No. 14103 (July 28, 2023).
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3551.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3552.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.
2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 23 (H.B. 2115).
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 704.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 704.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
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