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Child Sexual Abuse Material: Federal, Arizona, and Military Law

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What do federal, Arizona, and military law prohibit regarding CSAM, and which definitional questions remain unsettled?
  • The framework: Ferber and Osborne allow states to ban material depicting real children, including private possession; Free Speech Coalition protects virtual images that are neither obscene nor made with real children. Federal law (18 U.S.C. chapter 110) covers production, distribution, receipt, possession, and accessing with intent to view; knowledge extends to content and minor status (X-Citement Video).
  • Arizona and military: Arizona’s sexual exploitation offense is a class 2 felony, a DCAC when the minor is under 15, and each DCAC sentence runs consecutively; Berger upheld 200 years for 20 images. A 2025 amendment reaches indistinguishable AI-generated images. Military law charges a specific Article 134 offense; C.A.A.F. decisions address possession (Navrestad), viewing (King), and separate media (Forrester).
  • Open questions: Circuits disagree on “lascivious exhibition” (Dost, Hillie); Anderegg, 189 F.4th 576 (7th Cir. 2026) (interlocutory appeal; binding only in the Seventh Circuit, not in the Ninth Circuit, Arizona, or the military) affirmed dismissal of a § 1466A(b)(1) possession count as applied to private in-home possession of obscene AI-generated images of fictional minors, while Bowersox upheld a barracks conviction; Arizona’s amendment has not been construed on appeal.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep charging within the settled core, selecting clearly explicit images and supporting knowledge circumstantially; defense counsel should ensure each image is examined against the correct definition, creation methods are established, and multiplicity is raised, recognizing that constitutional defenses for material depicting real children are foreclosed.

Few areas of criminal law have changed as quickly, or carry penalties as heavy, as the law governing child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Federal statutes, Arizona’s sexual exploitation chapter, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice all prohibit producing, distributing, receiving, possessing, and in some forms viewing sexually explicit depictions of minors. The statutes and the courts use the term “child pornography,” and this paper uses that statutory term when describing the law; elsewhere it uses CSAM, the term now preferred by researchers and child-protection professionals because it describes the material as a record of abuse rather than as a genre of adult entertainment.

These cases reach court in large numbers, and they increasingly turn on definitional questions that the statutes do not answer on their face: whether an image of a clothed or partially clothed child is a “lascivious exhibition,” whether a file the user never opened was “possessed,” whether an image created with artificial intelligence depicts a “minor,” and whether separate devices support separate convictions. Mental health professionals are drawn into these questions at sentencing, in risk evaluations, and occasionally at trial, so a working knowledge of the legal framework matters to both lawyers and evaluators.

This paper traces the constitutional foundation of CSAM law, summarizes the federal statutory scheme, reviews the unsettled law on lascivious exhibition and on computer-generated material, and then describes Arizona and military law. It closes with a brief summary of what seized collections typically contain and how researchers and sentencing bodies classify that content, a subject treated in more depth in the companion paper on digital evidence.

The Constitutional Foundation

Before the late 1970s, sexual depictions of children were prosecuted, if at all, under general obscenity law, which requires proof under Miller v. California (1973) that the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Congress enacted its first statute aimed specifically at sexual depictions of children in 1978, and in New York v. Ferber (1982) the Supreme Court held that states may prohibit the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct without satisfying the Miller test. The Court reasoned that the production of such material is intrinsically tied to the sexual abuse of the child, that its circulation compounds the harm, and that the material has negligible expressive value.

Osborne v. Ohio (1990) extended Ferber to private possession. In Stanley v. Georgia (1969), the Court had held that the government may not punish the private possession of obscene material in the home; Osborne distinguished Stanley on the ground that the state’s interest in protecting children from exploitation is far stronger than its interest in controlling what adults think, and that criminalizing possession dries up the market that drives production. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. (1994) held that the federal statute’s “knowingly” requirement extends both to the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the minor status of the performers.

Two later decisions marked the outer boundary of this reasoning. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), the Court struck down provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 that reached images that merely “appear to be” minors or are marketed as depicting minors, when no real child was used in production. Because Ferber rested on harm to actual children, the Court held that virtual images that are neither obscene nor produced with real children are protected speech, rejecting arguments based on grooming, appetite, and prosecutorial difficulty. Congress responded with the PROTECT Act of 2003, which narrowed the definitions, created an offense for obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children (18 U.S.C. § 1466A), and added a “pandering” provision criminalizing offers or solicitations of material in a manner that reflects the belief, or is intended to cause another to believe, that it depicts real minors. United States v. Williams (2008) upheld the pandering provision, holding that offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection whether or not the material exists.

The Federal Statutory Scheme

The principal federal offenses are in chapter 110 of Title 18. Section 2251 prohibits producing a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and carries a mandatory minimum of 15 years and a maximum of 30 years for a first offense. Sections 2252 and 2252A prohibit transporting, distributing, receiving, reproducing, and possessing such material; receipt and distribution carry a five-year mandatory minimum and a 20-year maximum, while possession carries no mandatory minimum for a first offense and a ten-year maximum, raised to 20 years when the material involves a prepubescent minor or a minor under 12. Prior qualifying convictions trigger higher minimums for each offense.

Section 2256 supplies the definitions. A “minor” is any person under 18. “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or the “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.” “Child pornography” includes a visual depiction whose production involved a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; a digital or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, an image of a minor engaging in such conduct; and an image created or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in such conduct. “Indistinguishable” means virtually indistinguishable to an ordinary person viewing the depiction, and expressly excludes drawings, cartoons, sculptures, and paintings. The definition of “visual depiction” reaches electronically stored data convertible into an image, whether or not stored in a permanent format.

The statute also reaches conduct short of saving a file. The Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007 and the Enhancing the Effective Prosecution of Child Pornography Act of 2007, enacted together as Public Law 110-358 in October 2008, made two changes that recur in litigation. The first title added “using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce” to the jurisdictional elements, reducing the need to prove that a particular file crossed state lines. The second title, in section 203, amended §§ 2252(a)(4) and 2252A(a)(5) to cover a person who “knowingly accesses with intent to view” child pornography, closing the gap that had existed for a person who viewed material online without downloading it.

Section 1466A, the obscene visual representation statute, is the government’s principal tool for material that does not depict a real child, such as drawings, animation, and fully synthetic images. Because it depends on obscenity rather than on harm to a real child, it is the provision most exposed to constitutional challenge.

Lascivious Exhibition and the Dost Factors

Many contested images involve no sexual act, and the question is whether they depict a “lascivious exhibition.” In United States v. Dost (1986), a federal district court in California proposed six considerations: whether the focal point is the child’s genitals or pubic area; whether the setting is sexually suggestive; whether the child is in an unnatural pose or inappropriate attire for the child’s age; whether the child is fully or partially clothed or nude; whether the depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; and whether it is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. The Ninth Circuit approved the approach in United States v. Wiegand (1987), and most circuits have since used the factors, though almost all describe them as neither exhaustive nor mandatory and require more than one to be present.

Criticism of the factors has grown. The sixth factor, which looks to the intended effect on the viewer, can shift the focus from the image to the defendant’s own interests; the Second Circuit in United States v. Spoor (2018) retained the Dost factors but held that the sixth factor should be considered only to the extent it is relevant to the other five: the photographer’s subjective intent can be relevant, but a jury may not find an image to be a lascivious exhibition based on that intent alone, and the court suggested that district courts consider instructing juries to that effect. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Price (2014) discouraged routine use of the factors as a jury instruction, reasoning that the jury’s common understanding of the statutory term generally suffices. The D.C. Circuit went further in United States v. Hillie (2022), declining to adopt Dost and construing “lascivious exhibition,” in light of the neighboring terms in the statute, to require a depiction in which the minor displays the anus, genitalia, or pubic area in a manner connoting that the minor, or a person or thing appearing with the minor, exhibits sexual desire or an inclination to engage in sexual activity; the court vacated several convictions under that standard. The Eighth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. McCoy (2024), affirming two production convictions that a unanimous panel had reversed, drew three dissenting opinions, in which five of the eleven participating judges joined. The Supreme Court has not resolved the disagreement, and the practical result is that the same image may be analyzed differently depending on the circuit.

Computer-Generated and AI-Generated Material

Generative artificial intelligence has made the line drawn in Free Speech Coalition far more consequential. Three categories now need to be distinguished. First, real images of identifiable children that have been altered to appear sexually explicit (“morphed” images) fall within § 2256(8)(C) and have been prosecuted successfully; in a 2023 federal case in North Carolina, for example, a defendant convicted of production, transportation, and possession received a 40-year sentence, and the government’s evidence included school photographs of clothed minors that he had altered with a web-based AI tool. Second, synthetic images that are virtually indistinguishable from real children fall within § 2256(8)(B), although that provision has not been squarely tested in the Supreme Court since Free Speech Coalition. Third, images that are not indistinguishable from real minors and did not use a real child are reachable only through obscenity law.

The third category produced the most significant recent decision. In United States v. Anderegg, 189 F.4th 576 (7th Cir. 2026) (decided Aug. 25, 2026), the Seventh Circuit, on the government’s interlocutory appeal, affirmed the dismissal of a § 1466A(b)(1) count charging private, in-home possession of obscene AI-generated images, holding the statute unconstitutional as applied under Stanley: because no actual child was depicted, Ferber and Osborne did not control, and Free Speech Coalition foreclosed the government’s harm-based justifications. The production, distribution, and transfer-to-a-minor counts in the same case were not before the court and remain pending. A concurrence by Judge Lee, joined by Judge Kolar, observed that researchers have found real CSAM in at least one major dataset used to train image generators and that a market for AI-generated material may affect demand for real CSAM, said the record was insufficient to evaluate those issues, and stated that the courts would benefit from additional guidance from the Supreme Court if an appropriate case arises. The decision binds only the Seventh Circuit and is not binding in the Ninth Circuit, Arizona, or the military; the government petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on Oct. 8, 2026, and the docket as retrieved on Nov. 11, 2026 (latest entry Oct. 20, 2026) showed no ruling on that petition, a response due Nov. 23, 2026, and no certiorari petition, so its current status should be confirmed before it is cited. It should be read alongside United States v. Bowersox (C.A.A.F. 2013), in which the military’s highest court upheld a § 1466A(b)(1) conviction for possession in a shared barracks room, emphasizing the diminished privacy interest there.

Congress also enacted the TAKE IT DOWN Act, Pub. L. No. 119-12, 139 Stat. 55, signed May 19, 2025, which adds 47 U.S.C. § 223(h) to criminalize the knowing publication of nonconsensual intimate depictions, including AI-created “digital forgeries” of identifiable persons, and threats to publish them. For depictions of minors, the offense requires intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade the minor or to arouse or gratify sexual desire, and carries up to three years’ imprisonment. Covered online platforms were given until May 19, 2026, to establish a process for removing such depictions within 48 hours of a valid request, enforced by the Federal Trade Commission. The Act supplements rather than replaces the child pornography statutes.

Arizona Law

Arizona’s offenses are in chapter 35.1 of Title 13. Under A.R.S. § 13-3553, a person commits sexual exploitation of a minor by knowingly recording, filming, photographing, developing, or duplicating a visual depiction in which a minor is engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct, or by knowingly distributing, transporting, exhibiting, receiving, selling, purchasing, electronically transmitting, possessing, or exchanging such a depiction. The statute also reaches child sex dolls resembling a real minor under 12 and, in a recent addition, observing a nude minor for sexual gratification. The offense is a class 2 felony, and when the minor is under 15 it is a dangerous crime against children (DCAC) sentenced under § 13-705. Section 13-3552 separately addresses commercial sexual exploitation. Under § 13-3556, the trier of fact may infer that a participant is a minor if the depiction, through its title, text, or visual representation, depicts the participant as a minor.

The definitions in § 13-3551 differ from federal law in ways that matter. “Exploitive exhibition” means the actual or simulated exhibition of the genitals or pubic or rectal areas of any person for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer, a formulation that builds the purpose element into the definition. In 2025, the Legislature enacted HB 2678 (Laws 2025, ch. 174, effective September 26, 2025), which expanded “minor” to include a visual depiction that is indistinguishable from an actual minor, defined “indistinguishable” as a depiction that a viewer would reasonably conclude is of an actual minor, and provided that a visual depiction includes images created or modified by computer software, artificial intelligence, or other digital editing tools. The same act made indistinguishable depictions of minors under 15 eligible for DCAC sentencing (now § 13-705(T)(1)(b), which applies to sexual exploitation and commercial sexual exploitation). Fabricated sexual images of identifiable people that fall outside these definitions, including images of adults, may instead be reached by A.R.S. § 13-1425, which treats disclosure of a “realistic pictorial representation” as a class 1 misdemeanor. Arizona’s indistinguishable standard tracks the federal definition, so the constitutional analysis in Free Speech Coalition and Anderegg (a Seventh Circuit decision) may inform challenges to it; no reported Arizona appellate decision had construed the amendment as of this writing.

Because each image can support a separate count and DCAC sentences run consecutively, Arizona possession cases can produce very long aggregate sentences. For a first-degree DCAC offense of sexual exploitation by a person with no prior predicate felony, § 13-705(F) prescribes a minimum of 10, a presumptive of 17, and a maximum of 24 years, and § 13-705(P) provides that each DCAC sentence runs consecutively to any other sentence. Because each image can support a separate count, a possession case involving many images can yield an aggregate sentence measured in centuries. In State v. Berger (2006), the Arizona Supreme Court upheld 20 consecutive ten-year sentences, totaling 200 years, for possession of 20 images. The majority held that Eighth Amendment proportionality review examines the sentence for each offense rather than the cumulative term, and found no threshold inference of gross disproportionality for a ten-year sentence for each image; a separate opinion would have found such an inference. The United States Supreme Court denied review. Berger remains controlling in Arizona and is discussed further in the companion paper on culpability and sentencing.

Military Law

Before 2012, child pornography offenses in the military were charged under the general provisions of Article 134, which produced a long series of appellate decisions on fair notice, extraterritoriality, and maximum punishments. The President then added a specific Article 134 offense, now found at paragraph 95 of Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial, which covers possessing, receiving, viewing, possessing with intent to distribute, distributing, and producing child pornography. The offense defines child pornography as material containing either an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct or a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and it reaches images that resemble minors or are staged to appear as minors when the obscenity requirement is met. Each specification also requires the terminal element: that the conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. The Manual’s explanation provides that an accused may not be convicted without awareness that the images were of minors, or what appeared to be minors, and that such awareness may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as file names, search terms, and the number of images. The maximum punishments are 10 years’ confinement for possessing, receiving, or viewing; 15 for possessing with intent to distribute; 20 for distributing; and 30 for producing.

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) has addressed the main recurring issues. In United States v. Navrestad (2008), the court held that sending a hyperlink is not distribution and that viewing images on a public computer without dominion or control is not possession. United States v. Warner (2013) held that possessing sexually suggestive images of minors without nudity or sexually explicit conduct could not be punished under the general article because no source of law gave fair notice that it was criminal, and United States v. Moon (2014) set aside a guilty plea to possessing nude images of minors that were neither obscene nor child pornography. United States v. Forrester (2017) held that each distinct material possessed, such as a separate laptop, hard drive, or e-mail account, may be charged as a separate specification without violating multiplicity principles. United States v. King (2019) held that viewing does not require proof of dominion or control and that circumstantial evidence can prove viewing even when the files are found only in unallocated space or browser cache. United States v. Barker (2018), a plea case involving possession and viewing of child pornography under Article 134, addressed victim-impact statements under R.C.M. 1001A and found the error harmless, and United States v. Rice (2020) held that the military could not reprosecute, under Article 134, possession already tried in federal district court.

Related offenses include Article 120b (sexual abuse of a child, whose definition of a lewd act includes intentionally exposing a child to obscene material and indecent communications with a child), Article 120c (indecent viewing, recording, and broadcasting of the private areas of another person without consent), Article 117a (wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images), and attempts under Article 80, which are common when the “minor” in a sting was an undercover agent. For offenses committed after December 27, 2023, sentencing is governed by the sentencing parameters implemented by Executive Order 14103. Under the Offense Category Chart, possessing, receiving, or viewing child pornography is a Category 2 offense (1 to 36 months); possessing with intent to distribute and distributing are Category 3 offenses (30 to 120 months); and producing is a Category 4 offense (120 to 240 months) (MCM (2024 ed.), App. 12B/12C). Category 4 is reserved for a small number of the most serious offenses (Reyes, 2024).

What Seized Collections Contain

Although the law treats every qualifying image as an offense, the content of collections varies widely, and researchers and sentencing bodies have developed systems to describe it. The COPINE typology (Taylor et al., 2001), developed by researchers at University College Cork from images circulating on the internet, arranged images in ten levels from non-sexualized “indicative” images through posing, explicit erotic posing, sexual activity between children, adult-child contact, and sadism or bestiality. In England and Wales, the Sentencing Council’s guideline for indecent images, effective April 1, 2014, collapsed that range into three categories: Category A (penetrative sexual activity, or sexual activity with an animal or sadism), Category B (non-penetrative sexual activity), and Category C (other indecent images).

United States data describe collections that are large and that commonly include the most serious content. In the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s study of fiscal year 2019 non-production cases, the median collection contained 4,265 images, 99.4 percent of cases involved prepubescent victims, and 52.2 percent included images of infants or toddlers (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2021). Collections are not static: in an analysis of more than 61,000 images seized from 40 convicted possessors in Canada, Fortin and Proulx (2019) identified four patterns over time, the most common of which involved a gradual decrease in the age of the children depicted and an increase in the severity of acts, though other patterns were also observed; this describes how some collections changed, not a pathway to contact offending, and the research does not support a universal sequence and does not rule out change in an individual. Some collection features, particularly a greater proportion of images of boys, are associated with sexual interest in children and with recidivism and appear in structured risk tools (Seto & Eke, 2015). What collection features can and cannot show about a particular user is discussed in the companion paper on digital evidence, and age determination is addressed in the paper on estimating age from images.

Limits of the Evidence

The legal framework described here is in motion, and several points are unsettled. The circuits disagree about the meaning of lascivious exhibition; the constitutional status of purely synthetic images rests on a 2002 decision written before generative AI existed; and Arizona’s 2025 amendment has not yet been construed on appeal. Any summary of this area should be checked against current authority.

The empirical material is also limited. Content classifications such as COPINE were developed from police holdings in particular countries and periods, and classification itself involves judgment; studies of coder agreement have found both substantial agreement and meaningful disagreement, especially for images near the boundary of indecency or near the age of majority (Kloess et al., 2019). Sentencing Commission data describe federal cases that reached sentencing, not all offending, and state and military caseloads may differ. Collection characteristics describe what was found, not why it was acquired or what the person will do. Collection features are group-level correlates; some are items in published risk tools (for example, the CPORT and the CASIC), and none alone establishes intent, a past contact offense, or dangerousness.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a witness cites the U.S. Sentencing Commission (2021) figures that the median collection held 4,265 images and that 52.2 percent of cases included infants or toddlers, ask what exactly was counted and who was studied: the figures describe federal non-production cases that reached sentencing in fiscal year 2019, not all offending or state and military caseloads. When Fortin and Proulx (2019) are cited for a gradual decrease in the age of children depicted, ask how much evidence the finding rests on, since it drew on 40 people and other patterns were also observed, and whether it applies to this person. When coder disagreement (Kloess et al., 2019) is offered to suggest that any classification of an image is uncertain, ask what the study actually found, because it reported substantial agreement as well as disagreement especially for images near the boundary of indecency or near the age of majority. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Child Sexual Abuse Material and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony in CSAM cases arises most often on age, digital forensics, and sentencing-related risk, and it is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as amended December 1, 2023, which requires the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable methods, and reflects a reliable application of those methods to the case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) make the trial judge the gatekeeper for all expert testimony. Rule 704(b) bars an expert from stating an opinion on whether a criminal defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the offense, which matters in cases where knowledge of content or of file-sharing is disputed. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and under Military Rule of Evidence 1102 amendments to the Federal Rules generally apply in courts-martial 18 months after their effective date unless the President directs otherwise. The December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 accordingly became part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025: the proponent of expert testimony in a court-martial must now show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in an expert’s basis or in the application of the method are questions of admissibility rather than of weight for the members (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). In federal sentencing, the Guidelines’ child pornography provision, USSG § 2G2.2, and the Sentencing Commission’s critiques of it are discussed in the companion paper on culpability and sentencing.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2012, to conform to the federal rule and Daubert. Arizona’s anti-vouching and cold-expert decisions, discussed in other papers in this series, apply in CSAM prosecutions as in other sexual offense cases. The statutory definitions in § 13-3551, the inference in § 13-3556, and the DCAC provisions of § 13-705 frame what must be proved and what is at stake, and Berger governs Eighth Amendment challenges to consecutive sentences.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The law gives prosecutors substantial tools. Ferber, Osborne, and Williams place material depicting real children, and offers to trade it, outside First Amendment protection; the 2008 “access with intent to view” amendment reaches online viewing; Forrester permits separate specifications for separate media; King permits proof of viewing by circumstantial evidence; and morphed images of identifiable children have supported long sentences. Arizona’s 2025 amendment and the federal indistinguishable definition reach realistic AI-generated images. Prosecutors are often best positioned to keep charging within the settled core of these authorities, selecting images whose status as sexually explicit conduct is clear and supporting knowledge with file names, search terms, and other circumstantial evidence the Manual and the case law recognize.

The law also counsels caution. The meaning of lascivious exhibition is contested, and an image that satisfies Dost in one circuit may not satisfy Hillie in another; a conviction resting on borderline images is vulnerable on appeal, as Warner, Moon, and the general-verdict cases illustrate. Charges based on purely synthetic material that is not indistinguishable from a real child may face a constitutional challenge, as Anderegg (7th Cir. 2026) illustrates, and prosecutors may need evidence about how an image was created. Collection statistics describe content, not the defendant’s future conduct, and arguments about dangerousness are strongest when they rest on case-specific evidence rather than on content alone.

Special Issues for Defense

The law gives defense counsel genuine questions to test. Knowledge of both content and age is an element under X-Citement Video and the Manual; possession requires dominion or control under Navrestad; borderline images may fall outside the definition of sexually explicit conduct, and the circuit split over Dost gives counsel a principled basis to seek a narrower instruction; and the constitutional status of synthetic images is unsettled. Defense counsel are often best positioned to ensure that each charged image is individually examined against the correct statutory definition, that the method by which an image was created is established rather than assumed, and that multiplicity and unit-of-prosecution questions are raised before trial.

The law also counsels caution about the limits of these arguments. Ferber and Osborne foreclose constitutional defenses for material depicting real children, Williams forecloses defenses to pandering based on the nonexistence of the material, and Berger forecloses cumulative-sentence proportionality challenges in Arizona. Anderegg addressed only private possession of obscene synthetic material, binds only the Seventh Circuit, and left the production and distribution counts intact, while the military court in Bowersox upheld 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1) as applied to possession of obscene depictions in a shared barracks room. Arguments that minimize the seriousness of content depicting real children are inconsistent with the law’s premise that each image records the abuse of a child and are unlikely to persuade.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Fortin, F., & Proulx, J. (2019). Sexual interests of child sexual exploitation material (CSEM) consumers: Four patterns of severity over time. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 63(1), 55–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X18794135

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kloess, J. A., Woodhams, J., Whittle, H., Grant, T., & Hamilton-Giachritsis, C. E. (2019). The challenges of identifying and classifying child sexual abuse material. Sexual Abuse, 31(2), 173–196. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063217724768

Reyes, S. C. (2024). Military sentencing parameters and criteria offenses: A first step to reducing “noise” in court-martial sentencing. Naval Law Review, 70, 1–38.

Sentencing Council for England and Wales. (2014). Possession of indecent photograph of child: Sentencing guideline. https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/offences/crown-court/item/possession-of-indecent-photograph-of-child/

Seto, M. C., & Eke, A. W. (2015). Predicting recidivism among adult male child pornography offenders: Development of the Child Pornography Offender Risk Tool (CPORT). Law and Human Behavior, 39(4), 416–429. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000128

Taylor, M., Holland, G., & Quayle, E. (2001). Typology of paedophile picture collections. The Police Journal, 74(2), 97–107. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032258X0107400202

U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of North Carolina. (2023, November 8). Charlotte child psychiatrist sentenced to 40 years in prison for sexual exploitation of a minor and using artificial intelligence to create child pornography images of minors [Press release]. https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdnc/pr/charlotte-child-psychiatrist-sentenced-40-years-prison-sexual-exploitation-minor-and

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2021). Federal sentencing of child pornography: Non-production offenses. https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-reports/federal-sentencing-child-pornography-non-production-offenses

Legal Authorities

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).

Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).

United States v. Anderegg, 189 F.4th 576 (7th Cir. 2026) (No. 25-1354, decided Aug. 25, 2026).

United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987).

United States v. Hillie, 39 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

United States v. McCoy, 108 F.4th 639 (8th Cir. 2024) (en banc).

United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Spoor, 904 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2018).

United States v. Barker, 77 M.J. 377 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

United States v. Bowersox, 72 M.J. 71 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

United States v. Forrester, 76 M.J. 479 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

United States v. Moon, 73 M.J. 382 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Navrestad, 66 M.J. 262 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

United States v. Rice, 80 M.J. 36 (C.A.A.F. 2020).

United States v. Warner, 73 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 134 P.3d 378 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252 (2007).

U.S. Const. amend. I.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

18 U.S.C. § 1466A.

18 U.S.C. § 2251.

18 U.S.C. § 2252.

18 U.S.C. § 2252A.

18 U.S.C. § 2256.

47 U.S.C. § 223(h) (as added by the TAKE IT DOWN Act, Pub. L. No. 119-12, 139 Stat. 55 (2025)).

Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007 and Enhancing the Effective Prosecution of Child Pornography Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358 (2008).

PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).

10 U.S.C. § 880 (Article 80, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 917a (Article 117a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 920c (Article 120c, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, ¶ 95 (2024 ed.).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, apps. 12B, 12C (2024 ed.).

Exec. Order No. 14103 (July 28, 2023).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1425.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3551.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3552.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3556.

2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 174 (H.B. 2678).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

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