Snap Shot
- The question: What does the research on online sexual offending cover, and how much weight can it bear in an individual case?
- What the research shows: The categories (CSAM possession through production, solicitation, sextortion, AI-generated material) overlap in practice, and the people charged are heterogeneous. In a meta-analysis, about 12% of online offenders had an officially known contact offense and about 55% admitted one in the six self-report samples, mostly gathered in treatment or polygraph settings; the admissions were unverified, and lifetime admission is a different measure from new detected recidivism (Seto et al., 2011). On average, CSAM-only offenders differ from contact offenders in antisociality, access to children, and barriers to offending.
- What it does not show: CyberTipline reports are not counts of offenders, victims, or distinct images and do not describe any defendant. Most typologies have not been validated, so a category label is a description, not a finding. Group research cannot establish whether a particular defendant offended, has a sexual interest in children, or will offend again.
- The law: Federal CSAM and solicitation statutes, Article 134 (with Richard on the terminal element), and A.R.S. § 13-3553 govern; Ferber, Osborne, and Free Speech Coalition frame the First Amendment, and the law on AI-generated material is unsettled (Anderegg). Expert testimony falls under amended Rule 702 and Daubert, and in Arizona Salazar-Mercado.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should cite figures with their definitions and rely on case-specific evidence rather than population statistics or labels; defense counsel should present group findings with their samples and follow-up periods, recognizing that detected recidivism is a minimum estimate that reflects only offending that was detected.
Online sexual offenses against children now make up a substantial share of the sex-offense work in federal, state, and military courts. The conduct ranges from a single download of an illegal image to the production of abuse material, the solicitation of a minor for sexual contact, and the coercion of adolescents into sending sexual images. The people charged range just as widely, from those with no prior record and no known contact offense to those who have sexually abused children for years and use the internet as one more means of doing so. Courts are therefore asked to make distinctions that the charging statutes often do not make for them: what a particular collection or chat log shows about the person, what research says about people charged with similar conduct, and how much weight that research can bear in an individual case.
Those questions bring mental health professionals into these cases, and prosecutors, defense counsel, and military justice practitioners each need a working knowledge of the research to recognize where expert testimony is strong and where it is being asked to do more than it can.
This paper is the entry point to a set of topic papers on online sexual offending. It explains current terminology, describes the main categories of offense and points to the papers that treat each in depth, summarizes what is known about the scale of the problem and about who is prosecuted, offers a critical note on offender typologies, and explains why this area generates so much expert testimony. A brief orientation to federal, Arizona, and military law follows; the statutes themselves are treated in detail in the companion paper on child sexual abuse material law.
Terminology
Federal and state statutes, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and most appellate decisions use the term “child pornography.” Researchers, clinicians, and international child-protection bodies increasingly prefer “child sexual abuse material” (CSAM) or “child sexual exploitation material” (CSEM). The shift was formalized in the Terminology Guidelines for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, adopted in Luxembourg in January 2016 by an interagency working group of child-protection organizations and law enforcement bodies (Interagency Working Group on Sexual Exploitation of Children, 2016), and carried forward in a second edition released in 2025. The rationale is that “pornography” implies a consensual adult product, whereas images of children engaged in sexual conduct are records of abuse or exploitation. The guidelines generally use CSAM for material depicting sexual abuse and CSEM for a somewhat broader category that includes sexualized material not depicting abuse in the narrow sense, while recognizing that “child pornography” remains the operative term in many legal instruments.
This paper uses “child sexual abuse material (CSAM)” as its default term and uses “child pornography” when describing statutes, guidelines, and cases that use that term. It also uses person-first language on first reference, such as “people who commit online sexual offenses,” because the research describes a heterogeneous population whose members differ greatly in history, motivation, and risk. Two other distinctions recur throughout the hub. “Pedophilia” refers to a sexual interest in prepubescent children and is not synonymous with sexual offending; many people who offend against children do not have pedophilia, and some people with pedophilia never offend (Seto, 2009). The companion paper on pedophilia, hebephilia, and the diagnostic manuals addresses that topic in detail. Second, “online” offending is better understood as technology-facilitated offending: the same device may be used to obtain CSAM, communicate with a child known offline, and record contact abuse, and the categories below overlap in practice.
The Main Categories of Online Sexual Offending
CSAM offenses are the most commonly prosecuted. Federal and state law distinguish possession and accessing with intent to view, receipt, distribution or transportation, and production, and the penalties rise steeply across that sequence. Research and sentencing data show that a very large share of CSAM cases involve peer-to-peer file sharing or other online distribution networks; in one year-long measurement on a single peer-to-peer network, about 245,000 U.S. computers shared known CSAM files; more than 80% shared fewer than ten such files or did so on fewer than ten days, while a minority shared at higher levels (fewer than 1% made high contributions to the files available) (Wolak et al., 2014). The legal elements, the definitions of “sexually explicit conduct,” and the treatment of computer-generated images are addressed in the paper on child sexual abuse material law, and sentencing factors such as image counts and content enhancements are addressed in the paper on culpability and sentencing factors.
Solicitation and enticement offenses involve communicating with a minor, or with a person believed to be a minor, to arrange sexual activity or to obtain sexual images. Many prosecutions arise from undercover operations in which an officer poses as a child. “Traveler” cases are those in which the person goes to a meeting place. Research has long distinguished contact-driven solicitation, aimed at an offline meeting, from fantasy-driven solicitation, in which the sexual interaction is conducted online (Briggs et al., 2011). Those cases are treated in the papers on online solicitation of minors and on undercover stings, entrapment, and role-play defenses.
Sextortion is the use of threats, most often threats to distribute a sexual image, to coerce a person into producing more images, paying money, or engaging in sexual activity. Two broad patterns appear in reports: sexually motivated schemes that seek more images, often directed at girls, and financially motivated schemes, frequently run from outside the United States and often directed at adolescent boys. Closely related is “self-generated” material produced by minors themselves, sometimes within peer relationships and sometimes under pressure from adults. In a meta-analysis of youth surveys, about 15% of adolescents reported having sent a sext and about 27% reported having received one (Madigan et al., 2018). A more recent national U.S. survey of 3,466 adolescents aged 13 to 17 found that about 24% had sent and 32% had received a sext; among those who had sent one, 46.8% said it had been shared without their permission and 49.6% said they had been targeted for sextortion. The survey relied on self-report, and the authors noted that some teens may have counted joking threats as sextortion (Patchin & Hinduja, 2026). The paper on sextortion and self-generated images of minors addresses these issues.
AI-generated and digitally altered material is the newest category. Generative tools can produce realistic sexual images of fictional children, alter images of real children, or produce sexualized depictions of identifiable minors from ordinary photographs. The law in this area is changing rapidly and is summarized below and in the paper on child sexual abuse material law.
The Scale of the Problem
The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) operates the CyberTipline, the congressionally designated clearinghouse to which U.S.-based electronic service providers must report apparent child sexual exploitation they become aware of on their platforms. NCMEC received 36.2 million reports in 2023 and 20.5 million in 2024. NCMEC attributed part of the 2024 decline to a new “bundling” feature that allows a platform to group duplicative reports, such as many reports of the same viral file, into one, and part to reduced reporting by some providers and to end-to-end encryption, which limits detection (National Center for Missing & Exploited Children [NCMEC], 2025). For 2025, NCMEC reported 21.3 million reports containing more than 61.8 million images, videos, and other files; about 1.4 million reports concerned online enticement, a substantial increase over 2024; and more than three-quarters of reports involved users outside the United States (NCMEC, 2026a, 2026b). NCMEC also reported a large number of reports with some generative-AI connection, but noted that most of them came from a single provider and lacked actionable information.
These figures require careful handling. A CyberTipline report is a submission from a platform or member of the public, not a count of offenders, victims, or distinct images, and changes in volume can reflect changes in detection, reporting rules, and technology as much as changes in offending. The figures establish that the volume of material circulating online is very large; they do not describe any individual defendant.
Enforcement data offer a different view. The Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force Program, a network of 61 coordinated task forces representing more than 6,200 federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, reported nearly 347,000 investigations and more than 17,000 arrests in 2025 (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [OJJDP], n.d.). In the federal system, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported 1,432 people sentenced under the non-production child pornography guideline in fiscal year 2025, about 2% of all federal sentencings (U.S. Sentencing Commission [USSC], 2026).
Victimization surveys add a perspective that law enforcement data cannot. In a nationally representative survey of 2,639 young adults asked about experiences before age 18, about 15.6% reported at least one form of online childhood sexual abuse, including nonconsensual image sharing, online grooming by adults, and sextortion; most victims were 13 to 17 years old, and most identified perpetrators were people the victim knew offline, such as dating partners, friends, and acquaintances, rather than online strangers (Finkelhor et al., 2022). That finding is consistent with earlier work showing that the image of the anonymous stranger deceiving a young child describes a minority of cases (Wolak et al., 2008, p. 111).
Who Is Prosecuted
The National Juvenile Online Victimization (N-JOV) studies, which sampled U.S. law enforcement agencies, remain the most detailed source on early trends. Estimated arrests for CSAM possession roughly doubled between 2000 and 2006, from about 1,700 to about 3,700; nearly all arrested possessors were male and the large majority were non-Hispanic White; and the share of possessors who were also found to have sexually abused a child or solicited a minor fell from 55% to 41%, a decline the authors attributed largely to more cases beginning as CSAM investigations rather than as abuse investigations (Wolak et al., 2011). A third wave found that CSAM possession arrests rose by about half again between 2006 and 2009 (Wolak et al., 2012). These data predate smartphones, encrypted messaging, and generative AI and should be cited as historical.
More recent federal data show a similar demographic pattern. In fiscal year 2025, 98% of those sentenced under the non-production guideline were men, 73% were White, their average age was 41, and 74% fell in the lowest criminal history category; the average sentence was 118 months, and 99% were sentenced to prison (USSC, 2026). The Commission’s 2021 study of non-production offenses found a median of more than 4,000 images per case in fiscal year 2019, near-universal application of the computer-use and under-12 enhancements, and that 48% of offenders had engaged in what the Commission termed aggravating sexual conduct, meaning sexually abusive or exploitative conduct before or concurrent with the offense (USSC, 2021). That last measure is broader than prior conviction for contact abuse and should be described with its definition when cited.
Meta-analyses comparing people convicted only of CSAM offenses with people convicted of contact offenses against children have found consistent group differences. CSAM-only offenders, on average, had less access to children, scored lower on indicators of antisociality, and showed more psychological barriers to offending, such as greater victim empathy; offenders with both CSAM and contact offenses scored highest on indicators of pedophilic interest (Babchishin et al., 2011, 2015). Regarding the overlap between online and contact offending, a meta-analysis found that about 12% of online offenders had an officially known contact sexual offense at the time of the index offense, while in the six self-report samples, mostly gathered in treatment or polygraph settings, about 55% admitted one (the admissions were unverified, and many reported offenses preceded the online offense); lifetime admission and new detected recidivism are different measures. Over follow-up periods of about 1.5 to 6 years, 2.0% were detected committing a new contact sexual offense and 3.4% a new CSAM offense (Seto et al., 2011; nine samples, 2,630 men, detection by official records, a minimum estimate; later and longer studies report higher rates, as described in the recidivism paper). Those figures, their definitions, and the debate over undetected offending are addressed in the papers on recidivism and on the “dark figure.”
Offender Typologies: Many Proposed, Few Validated
Researchers have proposed many typologies of people who commit online sexual offenses. Early schemes classified CSAM users by apparent purpose, such as curiosity, private fantasy, collecting, trading, grooming, or commercial distribution (Krone, 2004); others proposed a few broad groups ranging from sporadic, impulsive access to use of online material as part of contact offending (Elliott & Beech, 2009); still others grouped offenders by psychological test profiles into apparently normal, inadequate, and deviant clusters (Henry et al., 2010).
Most of these typologies were derived from small clinical or criminal justice samples, rely on information that is often unavailable or disputed in a pending case, and have not been shown to predict reoffending or to be reliably applied by different evaluators. Assigning a defendant to a typology category is therefore a description, not a validated finding, and it should not be presented as more than that. The distinction with the most empirical support and practical use is between contact-driven and fantasy-driven conduct: whether a person’s online activity appears directed toward offline sexual contact or is confined to online fantasy, images, and conversation (Briggs et al., 2011; Merdian et al., 2013). Even that distinction is drawn from behavior that may be incomplete in the record, and a person’s conduct can shift over time. The current frameworks that attempt to explain why online offending occurs, rather than merely sorting offenders, are discussed in the companion paper on explanatory models and reviewed comprehensively in Seto (2025).
Why the Area Generates Expert Testimony
Several features of these cases draw experts in. The legal categories are broad: one possession statute may cover a person with a handful of images and a person with a large, curated collection of severe material. Many questions turn on characteristics not visible in the record, such as sexual interest in children, whether online conduct reflected fantasy or intention, and the likelihood of future offending. The tools used to address those questions, including actuarial instruments, phallometry, viewing-time measures, and the polygraph, have specific validation samples and limits. Digital evidence often requires interpretation, both as to what a device shows about its user and as to the age of persons depicted. And the field contains popular claims, such as that viewing CSAM inevitably leads to contact abuse or that heavy pornography use is an addiction that explains illegal viewing, whose empirical status is contested; these are addressed in the papers on arousal and escalation and on problematic online sexual behavior.
Limits of the Evidence
Most research on online sexual offending is based on people who have been arrested or convicted, which means it describes those who were detected and prosecuted rather than all people who engage in the conduct. Detection depends on platform reporting, law enforcement priorities, and the technology in use, all of which have changed rapidly; findings from the peer-to-peer era may not describe offenders who use encrypted applications or anonymity networks. Self-report data on undetected offending come from settings, such as treatment or polygraph examinations, with their own incentives, and anonymous online surveys cannot verify who responded. Many studies are Canadian, British, or European, with charging and sentencing practices that differ from those in U.S. courts.
Above all, group research describes base rates and average differences. It cannot establish whether a particular defendant committed an offense, whether he has a sexual interest in children, or whether he will offend again. Research that most CSAM-only offenders are not detected committing contact offenses over a few years does not establish that any particular defendant has not offended or will not offend, and research that some CSAM users have committed contact offenses does not establish that any particular defendant has.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a witness cites the 36.2 million CyberTipline reports in 2023 or the 20.5 million in 2024 (NCMEC, 2025), counsel should ask what exactly was counted: a report is a submission from a platform, not a count of offenders, victims, or distinct images, and part of the 2024 decline reflected the bundling of duplicative reports. When testimony relies on the finding that 48% of federal non-production offenders had engaged in aggravating sexual conduct (USSC, 2021), the same question applies, because that measure is broader than prior conviction for contact abuse. When either side cites the overlap figures from Seto et al. (2011), counsel should ask who was studied: the 12% rests on officially known offenses, while the 55% comes from six samples typically gathered in treatment or polygraph settings. When the defense cites the 2.0% of online offenders detected committing a new contact sexual offense, about 2 of every 100, counsel should ask what was counted and over what period, since the figure reflects detection over about 1.5 to 6 years, and whether a group rate says anything about this defendant. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Online Sexual Offending and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The principal federal CSAM statutes are 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (production), § 2252 and § 2252A (transportation, distribution, receipt, possession, and knowingly accessing with intent to view), and § 2256 (definitions, including “minor” as a person under 18 and “sexually explicit conduct”). The “accessing with intent to view” language was added in 2008 by Public Law 110-358, in a title of that law entitled the Enhancing the Effective Prosecution of Child Pornography Act of 2007. Section 1466A separately reaches obscene visual representations of minors, including drawings and computer-generated images. The principal federal solicitation statutes are 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (using a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, which carries a ten-year mandatory minimum) and § 2423(b) (travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct). Sextortion is prosecuted under these provisions and under general extortion and stalking statutes, and the TAKE IT DOWN Act of 2025 added federal crimes for knowingly publishing nonconsensual intimate images, including AI-generated “digital forgeries” of minors.
New York v. Ferber (1982) held that child pornography involving real children is outside First Amendment protection, Osborne v. Ohio (1990) upheld criminalizing private possession, and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) struck down provisions banning virtual images that merely appear to depict minors. In United States v. Anderegg, 189 F.4th 576 (7th Cir. 2026) (decided Aug. 25, 2026), the Seventh Circuit, on the government’s interlocutory appeal, affirmed the dismissal of a § 1466A(b)(1) possession count as applied to private, in-home possession of obscene AI-generated images of fictional minors, relying on Stanley v. Georgia (1969) and Free Speech Coalition, while noting concern about the line those precedents draw. The decision binds only the Seventh Circuit and is not binding in the Ninth Circuit, Arizona, or the military; the government petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on Oct. 8, 2026, and the docket as retrieved on Nov. 11, 2026 showed no ruling on that petition and no certiorari petition. Because the law on AI-generated material is unsettled, practitioners should confirm its current status.
Expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended effective December 1, 2023, to make explicit that the proponent must establish each requirement by a preponderance of the evidence, and by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999); Rule 704(b) bars opinions on whether a criminal defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the offense.
In the military, the child pornography offense is charged under Article 134, UCMJ, as enumerated in Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial (para. 95), covering possessing, receiving, viewing, distributing, and producing; it requires proof of a terminal element, and United States v. Richard (C.A.A.F. 2022) reversed convictions where the government charged prejudice to good order and discipline but the evidence was legally insufficient to prove it. Solicitation of a child is typically charged as an attempt under Article 80 or as sexual abuse of a child under Article 120b, which includes lewd communications. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and Military Rule of Evidence 1102 generally makes amendments to the Federal Rules applicable eighteen months after their effective date unless the President directs otherwise. The December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 accordingly became part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025: the proponent of expert testimony in a court-martial must now show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in an expert’s basis or in the application of the method are questions of admissibility rather than of weight for the members (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025).
Arizona
Arizona’s principal statute is A.R.S. § 13-3553, which defines sexual exploitation of a minor to include recording, distributing, receiving, possessing, and exchanging visual depictions of a minor engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct; it is a class 2 felony and, when the depicted minor is under fifteen, is sentenced as a dangerous crime against children under A.R.S. § 13-705. Luring a minor for sexual exploitation (§ 13-3554) and aggravated luring (§ 13-3560) cover solicitation, and both provide that it is not a defense that the other person was not actually a minor. A.R.S. § 13-3556 permits the factfinder to infer that a participant is a minor from the depiction’s title, text, or visual content. In 2025, the Legislature amended the definitions in § 13-3551 to include visual depictions indistinguishable from an actual minor and images created or modified by artificial intelligence or digital editing (H.B. 2678, 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 174). Because Arizona treats each image as a separate count and generally requires consecutive sentences for dangerous crimes against children, aggregate sentences can be very long; State v. Berger (2006) upheld twenty consecutive ten-year sentences for possession against an Eighth Amendment challenge. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 follows the federal rule, and State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits “cold” educational expert testimony that satisfies the rule.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several propositions that prosecutors can legitimately present: the volume of CSAM circulating online is very large; every image of a real child records abuse and its circulation compounds the harm to the child depicted; a meaningful minority of people prosecuted for CSAM offenses have also committed contact offenses, and self-report studies suggest that official records undercount that history; and CSAM offending is associated, at the group level, with sexual interest in children. Prosecutors are often best positioned to keep that evidence within its supported scope by citing figures with their definitions, such as distinguishing official records from self-report and CyberTipline reports from offenders, and by relying on the specific evidence in the case rather than on population statistics.
The research also counsels caution. National report counts describe the scale of the problem, not the defendant, and typologies have little validation, so describing a defendant as belonging to a category such as “collector” or “groomer” adds a label rather than evidence. The group-level finding that some CSAM offenders have contact histories does not establish that this defendant does, and claims that viewing inevitably leads to contact offending go beyond what the research shows.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several propositions that defense counsel can legitimately present: people prosecuted for CSAM-only offenses differ, on average, from contact offenders in antisociality, access to children, and psychological barriers to offending; detected contact reoffending among online-only offenders was 2.0% in the nine samples of Seto et al. (2011; 2,630 men followed 1.5 to 6 years), and detection is incomplete, so the figure is a minimum estimate (see the recidivism paper); and the population charged under a single statute is heterogeneous, so the specific features of a collection and a history matter. Defense counsel are often best positioned to ensure that those findings are presented with their definitions, follow-up periods, and samples, and that a defendant is evaluated on the facts of his case rather than on the most severe cases in the category.
The research also counsels caution. Detected recidivism rates are minimum estimates and are partly a product of short follow-up periods and incomplete detection, and self-report studies indicate substantial undetected contact offending in some samples. Group findings do not establish that a particular defendant is low risk or lacks sexual interest in children, and favorable typology labels carry no more validation than unfavorable ones. The harm to children depicted in CSAM is real regardless of the defendant’s risk level, and testimony that appears to minimize it is neither accurate nor persuasive.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Legal Authorities
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 134 P.3d 378 (2006).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Anderegg, 189 F.4th 576 (7th Cir. 2026) (No. 25-1354, decided Aug. 25, 2026).
United States v. Richard, 83 M.J. 112 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
U.S. Const. amend. I.
10 U.S.C. § 880 (Article 80, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. § 1466A.
18 U.S.C. § 2251.
18 U.S.C. § 2252.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A.
18 U.S.C. § 2256.
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).
Enhancing the Effective Prosecution of Child Pornography Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, tit. II, 122 Stat. 4001 (2008).
TAKE IT DOWN Act, Pub. L. No. 119-12, 139 Stat. 55 (2025).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3551.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3554.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3556.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3560.
H.B. 2678, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 174.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, ¶ 95 (2024 ed.).
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
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