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False Confessions

The Pre-Interrogation Interview: Behavior Analysis, Investigator Judgment, and the Polygraph

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How do investigators decide that a person they are interviewing is probably guilty and should be interrogated, how accurate are judgments of deception based on demeanor and on structured interviews such as the Behavior Analysis Interview, and what role do polygraph examinations and post-test interviews play?
  • What the research shows: In a meta-analysis of 206 documents, people judging truth and lies from behavior, without evidence or follow-up questions, averaged about 54% accuracy (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), and behavioral cues to deception are few and weak. In laboratory studies using videotapes, training in behavioral cues increased confidence but not accuracy in students, and neither training nor experience improved investigators’ accuracy in one study. A field study by authors affiliated with John E. Reid and Associates reported high agreement between evaluators’ judgments of videotaped interviews and case outcomes (Horvath et al., 1994); laboratory tests of the same interview did not find the same pattern, and the field study’s ground truth came from confessions and case outcomes. The National Research Council found specific-incident polygraph testing accurate well above chance but well below perfection.
  • What it does not show: It does not show that investigators’ judgments in a particular case were wrong, that a person judged deceptive is innocent, or that post-polygraph admissions are generally unreliable; field studies of real suspects are few and their ground truth is often uncertain.
  • The law: Courts do not require any particular basis for the decision to interrogate. Polygraph results are inadmissible in courts-martial (Mil. R. Evid. 707, upheld in United States v. Scheffer, 1998) and in Arizona absent a stipulation, but statements made during or after an examination may be admitted if voluntary (Wyrick v. Fields, 1982). Testimony that a suspect “appeared deceptive” raises vouching and human-lie-detector concerns.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can rely on interviews that obtained verifiable information and on admissions that are independently corroborated rather than on demeanor judgments; defense counsel can examine what the decision to interrogate rested on and what the suspect was told about a polygraph result.

Accusatory interrogations are often preceded by an interview. In the method most widely taught in the United States, the investigator first conducts a non-accusatory interview that gathers background and case information and asks questions designed to provoke responses that the method associates with truthfulness or deception; if the investigator concludes that the person is probably involved, an interrogation follows (Inbau et al., 2013; Buckley, 2006). Polygraph examinations serve a similar gateway function in some agencies, with a post-test interview following a result reported as deceptive. Each step depends on a judgment that the person is probably involved or deceptive.

That judgment matters because what follows differs sharply from what came before. Researchers describe the investigator’s belief in the suspect’s guilt that precedes an accusatory interrogation as a presumption of guilt, and laboratory studies suggest that such an expectation shapes how questions are asked and how answers are heard (Kassin et al., 2003; Narchet et al., 2011); the Reid authors describe it as a reasonable belief of probable involvement (Inbau et al., 2013). This paper describes the Behavior Analysis Interview and its research, the broader evidence on judging deception from behavior, investigator confidence and training, the polygraph and post-test interview, the alternatives that rely on verbal content and evidence, and the federal, military, and Arizona law. The full deception-detection literature is reviewed in Detecting Deception in the Memory in the Courtroom resource.

The Behavior Analysis Interview

The Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI) is a structured, non-accusatory interview developed by John E. Reid and Associates. Its proponents describe it as a fact-gathering session in which the investigator establishes rapport, observes the person’s normal manner, and asks investigative questions and “behavior-provoking” questions, such as what should happen to the person who committed the offense, whose answers are thought to differ between truthful and deceptive people (Buckley, 2006; Horvath et al., 2008). The method’s developers state that behavioral observations are to be interpreted in clusters and in light of the evidence, not as single signs, and that the purpose of any later interrogation is to learn the truth, which may include clearing an innocent person (Buckley, 2006; Inbau et al., 2013). Law-enforcement guidance makes the same point about clusters of behavior rather than isolated cues (Department of the Army, 2005).

The research on the BAI is divided by method. In a field study by authors affiliated with John E. Reid and Associates, four trained evaluators watched 60 videotaped interviews of real suspects; excluding inconclusive calls, they classified 91% of truthful and 80% of deceptive suspects correctly, and deceptive suspects showed more of the predicted behaviors (Horvath et al., 1994). Later laboratory studies reached different conclusions. When 40 students either committed a mock theft or did not and were then given the BAI, truth-tellers rather than liars showed more of the behaviors the BAI treats as signs of deception (Vrij et al., 2006), and laypeople with no training predicted the answers the BAI expects from truthful and deceptive people, suggesting that its cues largely reflect common beliefs about lying (Masip et al., 2011). The method’s developers respond that laboratory studies with low stakes and simulated crimes do not reproduce the conditions of real investigations and that the BAI is meant to focus investigative effort, not to serve as a stand-alone lie detector (Horvath et al., 2008). Critics respond that in field studies of this kind the ground truth is often established by confessions or case outcomes that may themselves be influenced by the judgments being tested, a general problem the National Research Council (2003) identified in field research on lie detection. Both positions agree that field research with independently established ground truth is scarce.

Judging Deception From Behavior

The broader literature is large. A meta-analysis of 206 documents and 24,483 judges found that people separating lies from truths in real time, without special aids, averaged 54% accuracy, correctly classifying 47% of lies and 61% of truths (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). A meta-analysis of 158 possible cues found that liars were somewhat less forthcoming and told less compelling accounts, but that many behaviors had no link, or only a weak link, to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). A lens-model analysis concluded that people do not generally rely on the wrong cues; accuracy is limited mainly because the behavioral differences between liars and truth-tellers are small (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). These findings concern average judges and average cues. They do not mean that no individual cue or interviewer is ever informative, but they leave little support for confident judgments of deception from demeanor alone.

Investigator experience and training have been tested directly. Students trained in the behavioral cues taught in the Reid method were not more accurate than untrained students in judging videotaped denials but were more confident (Kassin & Fong, 1999), and neither training nor experience improved investigators’ accuracy, although both increased the tendency to judge people deceptive (Meissner & Kassin, 2002). In a study using true and false confessions recorded by male prison inmates, students were generally more accurate than investigators, and investigators were more confident and more inclined to judge the confessions true (Kassin et al., 2005). Investigators surveyed in 2007 estimated their own accuracy at truth and lie detection at 77% (Kassin et al., 2007), well above the laboratory averages. These studies used videotapes and simulated or reconstructed statements, not live interviews in active cases; the investigators in them could not use the evidence, follow-up questions, and time that real investigations allow.

The Memory hub reports sex comparisons in the deception-detection literature where they were tested; the BAI and training studies summarized here did not report sex differences in judges’ accuracy, and the confession-judgment study used male inmates only (Kassin et al., 2005).

Why the Judgment Matters: The Presumption of Guilt

Researchers have asked what happens after an investigator concludes that a suspect is lying. In an experiment with student interrogators, those led to expect guilt asked more guilt-presumptive questions, used more persuasive techniques, and exerted more pressure, especially when the suspect was in fact innocent, and neutral observers then judged those suspects more defensive (Kassin et al., 2003). In the cheating paradigm, interrogators who expected guilt used more minimization, which increased false confessions among innocent participants without affecting guilty ones (Narchet et al., 2011). These are laboratory findings with student interrogators; they describe a risk that follows from the structure of interview-then-interrogation, not a finding about any investigator. Critics of laboratory interrogation research argue that staged exercises with students do not reproduce the pressures of serious investigations (Welner et al., 2025), and most confessions obtained after such interviews are presumed to be true, although the proportion that are false is unknown. The topic is treated in “Investigator Bias, Tunnel Vision, and Forensic Confirmation Bias.”

The Polygraph and the Post-Test Interview

A polygraph records breathing, electrodermal activity, and cardiovascular activity while the examinee answers questions. The National Research Council (2003) concluded that specific-incident polygraph tests can discriminate lying from truthfulness at rates well above chance but well below perfection, that the scientific basis of the test is weak, that accuracy in screening is likely lower, and that a test’s usefulness in eliciting admissions does not establish its validity. The polygraph is also used to obtain statements. After a result is scored as deceptive, the examiner or an investigator may tell the examinee that the test showed deception and ask for an explanation. Telling a suspect that he failed is a confrontation with evidence; when the result is reported accurately, it is a lawful tactic, and when a result is misreported or overstated, the research on false-evidence ploys applies (see False Evidence Ploys and Police Deception). A small number of case accounts, including one by a former detective, describe suspects who were told they failed when the result was inconclusive or favorable (Leo, 2008; Trainum, 2016); how often this occurs is unknown, and the research does not suggest that post-polygraph admissions are generally unreliable. Documented false confessions have followed post-polygraph questioning (Leo, 2008), including the Jeffrey Deskovic case described in “Investigator Bias, Tunnel Vision, and Forensic Confirmation Bias” (National Registry of Exonerations, n.d.). For polygraph practice in another setting, see “The Polygraph in Online Offense Cases” in the Online Sex Offense resource.

Case Example. In United States v. Freeman (2008), an airman agreed to a polygraph examination about an attack on a civilian woman he knew. After the first test the examiner reported the charts unreadable and retested him; after the second, he told the airman the results showed deception, and questioning continued, with breaks, for most of the day, nearly ten hours in all. The military judge found that an agent falsely said a witness had seen him out that night and that his fingerprints were at the scene, suggested cooperation might help with his commander, and warned of a longer sentence if the case went to civilian authorities. The airman later typed a statement alone. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held the confession voluntary, citing his age, education, waivers, and breaks and the absence of physical abuse or threats of it, and upheld the denial of a defense request for an interrogation expert consultant because necessity had not been shown. The case shows how a reported deceptive result can begin an interrogation and how courts weigh it; it does not show whether the result or the confession was accurate.

Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical suspect, aged 22, questioned about a hit-and-run collision, whose polygraph charts the examiner scored as inconclusive. The investigator who resumed questioning told him that he had failed. Over the next hour his answers moved from denial to “I don’t remember doing it, but if the test says so,” and his account of the collision did not match the crash reconstruction. A court would weigh what the examiner actually scored, what the suspect was told, and how the account compares with the physical evidence. Had the account instead included an undisclosed detail later confirmed, such as where the damaged vehicle had been hidden, the analysis would differ. The research on false-evidence claims gives context; it cannot say whether this admission is true.

Alternatives That Rely on Content and Evidence

Research on deception detection has moved from demeanor toward what people say and how their accounts fit the evidence. Approaches that increase cognitive load, ask unexpected questions, or encourage more detail have improved accuracy modestly in laboratory meta-analyses, though the size of the gain is debated (Vrij et al., 2017). The Strategic Use of Evidence technique, in which investigators withhold evidence and observe whether the account contradicts it, improved trained officers’ accuracy in experiments (Hartwig et al., 2006; Luke et al., 2016). A federal interagency review of interrogation research, prepared by the government’s High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, concluded that nonverbal cues commonly taught as signs of deception are unreliable and encouraged evidence- and content-based approaches (High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, 2016). These methods are described in “Strategic Use of Evidence and Other Science-Based Interview Methods.” They share a practical advantage for both sides: the basis for the investigator’s conclusion is recorded in what the suspect said and what the evidence showed, rather than in impressions of behavior.

Limits of the Evidence

Most deception studies used students telling low-stakes lies on videotape and judges who could not question them, so their accuracy figures may understate what investigators can do with evidence and time, or overstate it for high-stakes, emotional interviews in which truthful people are also anxious. The BAI field study had uncertain ground truth, and the BAI laboratory studies used simulated thefts. The polygraph literature is dominated by laboratory studies and by field studies whose criteria are themselves imperfect. Few studies examined sex differences, and the inmate-confession study used men only. None of this research can show whether a particular investigator’s judgment, or a particular polygraph result, was correct, or whether a particular admission that followed is true or false.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When Bond and DePaulo (2006) is cited for 54% accuracy, ask whether the judges in the studies had access to evidence or follow-up questions, and whether the investigator’s judgment in this case rested on demeanor, on inconsistencies with evidence, or on both. When Horvath et al. (1994) is cited for BAI accuracy, ask how ground truth was established; when Vrij et al. (2006) is cited against it, ask how a mock theft by students compares with the case. When Kassin and Fong (1999) is cited, ask whether the training studied resembles the investigator’s training. When a polygraph result is part of the record, ask what the examiner actually scored, what the suspect was told, and whether the two match. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

The Pre-Interrogation Interview and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The Constitution does not regulate the basis for deciding to interrogate; the law addresses instead whether warnings were given and waived and whether the resulting statement was voluntary. A statement made after a polygraph is evaluated like any other. In Wyrick v. Fields (1982), a suspect who had asked for a polygraph and waived counsel for it was told after the test that his answers indicated deception and then made admissions; the Supreme Court held that his waiver covered the post-test questioning and that new warnings were not required. A misrepresentation of the result is weighed in the totality under Frazier v. Cupp (1969). The federal circuits differ on polygraph results: some exclude them per se, while others leave admissibility to the trial court’s discretion, and the Supreme Court has noted that there is no scientific consensus that the evidence is reliable (United States v. Scheffer, 1998). In courts-martial, Mil. R. Evid. 707(a) makes inadmissible the result of a polygraph examination, the examiner’s opinion, and any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of an examination, and the Supreme Court upheld the rule against a claim that it violated the accused’s right to present a defense (Scheffer). Mil. R. Evid. 707(b) provides that the rule does not bar an otherwise admissible statement made during an examination. Investigator testimony that a suspect’s demeanor showed deception raises the concerns addressed in “Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource; expert testimony is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 702 as amended Dec. 1, 2023, and Kumho Tire extends gatekeeping to all expert testimony, including testimony about interview methods. The 2023 federal amendment to Rule 702 applies to the military rule from June 1, 2025, 18 months after its December 1, 2023 effective date, under Mil. R. Evid. 1102(a) unless the President acts otherwise (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025).

Arizona

Arizona admits polygraph results only by written stipulation of the parties, and even then subject to the trial court’s discretion (State v. Valdez, 1962), a rule the Arizona Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed (Hyder v. Superior Court, 1980). Witnesses, including investigators and experts, may not offer opinions on whether a particular person is telling the truth (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986), which bears on testimony describing a suspect’s demeanor in the pre-interrogation interview as deceptive. Statements following a polygraph are evaluated under the voluntariness standard and, at trial, the A.R.S. § 13-3988 instruction (RAJI (Criminal) Standard 19), under which a reported test result accompanied by an express or implied promise or threat may bear on the jury’s finding. Expert testimony is governed by Ariz. R. Evid. 702, amended effective Jan. 1, 2024.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The research described above is the same whichever party relies on it. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points. A decision to interrogate often rests on evidence as well as demeanor, and the deception studies tested judges who lacked case evidence and follow-up questions. The BAI’s developers describe it as a fact-gathering interview whose observations are read in clusters with the evidence (Buckley, 2006; Horvath et al., 2008), and an interview that obtained an account later shown to conflict with independent evidence supplies a basis for suspicion that does not depend on demeanor. Statements after a polygraph examination are admissible when voluntary (Wyrick; Mil. R. Evid. 707(b)), and an admission that includes accurate, non-public details or leads to new evidence rests on more than the test.

The research also counsels caution. Demeanor-based judgments of deception are only slightly better than chance on average, training in behavioral cues increased confidence but not accuracy in laboratory studies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Kassin & Fong, 1999; Meissner & Kassin, 2002), and an expectation of guilt can shape the interrogation that follows (Kassin et al., 2003). Testimony that a suspect “acted deceptive” may be excluded as an opinion on credibility, particularly in Arizona (Lindsey). Where a suspect was told he failed a polygraph, the record of what the examiner actually scored is important, because a misreported result is a false-evidence claim.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports close examination of the decision to interrogate. Defense counsel are often best positioned to identify what the investigator relied on in concluding that the suspect was lying, whether that basis was behavioral or evidentiary, and how questioning changed afterward. The meta-analytic findings on demeanor (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig & Bond, 2011), the laboratory tests of the BAI (Vrij et al., 2006; Masip et al., 2011), and the training studies (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Meissner & Kassin, 2002) give context for that inquiry, and the National Research Council (2003) found polygraph accuracy well below perfection. Where a suspect was told he failed, counsel can compare what he was told with the examiner’s charts and scoring.

The research also counsels caution. The deception studies used students and videotapes, and the BAI’s developers dispute their relevance to field interviews (Horvath et al., 2008). Polygraph results and references to them are inadmissible in courts-martial and in Arizona without a stipulation, which limits how the examination can be discussed at trial. A judgment of deception that was weakly founded does not make the suspect’s later admission false, and courts have admitted post-test admissions (Wyrick; Freeman). No research permits an expert to say that a particular investigator misjudged a suspect or that a particular confession is false.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214–234. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2

Buckley, J. P. (2006). The Reid Technique of interviewing and interrogation. In T. Williamson (Ed.), Investigative interviewing: Rights, research, regulation (Chapter 10). Willan.

Department of the Army. (2005). Law enforcement investigations (Field Manual No. 3-19.13). Headquarters, Department of the Army.

DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 74–118. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74

Hartwig, M., & Bond, C. F., Jr. (2011). Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie judgments. Psychological Bulletin, 137(4), 643–659. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023589

Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Kronkvist, O. (2006). Strategic use of evidence during police interviews: When training to detect deception works. Law and Human Behavior, 30(5), 603–619. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9053-9

High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group. (2016). Interrogation: A review of the science. Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Horvath, F., Blair, J. P., & Buckley, J. P. (2008). The Behavioural Analysis Interview: Clarifying the practice, theory and understanding of its use and effectiveness. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 10(1), 101–118. https://doi.org/10.1350/ijps.2008.10.1.101

Horvath, F., Jayne, B., & Buckley, J. (1994). Differentiation of truthful and deceptive criminal suspects in behavior analysis interviews. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 39(3), 793–807. https://doi.org/10.1520/JFS13657J

Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. C. (2013). Criminal interrogation and confessions (5th ed.). Jones & Bartlett Learning.

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kassin, S. M., & Fong, C. T. (1999). “I’m innocent!”: Effects of training on judgments of truth and deception in the interrogation room. Law and Human Behavior, 23(5), 499–516. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022330011811

Kassin, S. M., Goldstein, C. C., & Savitsky, K. (2003). Behavioral confirmation in the interrogation room: On the dangers of presuming guilt. Law and Human Behavior, 27(2), 187–203. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022599230598

Kassin, S. M., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Richman, K. D., Colwell, L. H., Leach, A.-M., & La Fon, D. (2007). Police interviewing and interrogation: A self-report survey of police practices and beliefs. Law and Human Behavior, 31(4), 381–400. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9073-5

Kassin, S. M., Meissner, C. A., & Norwick, R. J. (2005). “I’d know a false confession if I saw one”: A comparative study of college students and police investigators. Law and Human Behavior, 29(2), 211–227. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-005-2416-9

Leo, R. A. (2008). Police interrogation and American justice. Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674033702

Luke, T. J., Hartwig, M., Joseph, E., Brimbal, L., Chan, G., Dawson, E., Jordan, S., Donovan, P., & Granhag, P. A. (2016). Training in the Strategic Use of Evidence technique: Improving deception detection accuracy of American law enforcement officers. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 31(4), 270–278. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-015-9187-0

Masip, J., Herrero, C., Garrido, E., & Barba, A. (2011). Is the behaviour analysis interview just common sense? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(4), 593–604. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1728

Meissner, C. A., & Kassin, S. M. (2002). “He’s guilty!”: Investigator bias in judgments of truth and deception. Law and Human Behavior, 26(5), 469–480. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020278620751

Narchet, F. M., Meissner, C. A., & Russano, M. B. (2011). Modeling the influence of investigator bias on the elicitation of true and false confessions. Law and Human Behavior, 35(6), 452–465. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-010-9257-x

National Research Council. (2003). The polygraph and lie detection. The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/10420

National Registry of Exonerations. (n.d.). Jeffrey Deskovic. Retrieved November 5, 2026, from https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/10405

Trainum, J. L. (2016). How the police generate false confessions: An inside look at the interrogation room. Rowman & Littlefield.

Vrij, A., Fisher, R. P., & Blank, H. (2017). A cognitive approach to lie detection: A meta-analysis. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 22(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12088

Vrij, A., Mann, S., & Fisher, R. P. (2006). An empirical test of the behaviour analysis interview. Law and Human Behavior, 30(3), 329–345. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9014-3

Welner, M., DeLisi, M., & Janusewski, T. (2025). False confessions: An integrative review of the phenomenon. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 43(2), 185–202. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2707

Legal Authorities

Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Hyder v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 36, 617 P.2d 1152 (1980).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).

United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).

Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 707 (2024 ed.).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 19 (State Bar of Arizona 2022).

Related topic papers: Accusatorial Interrogation and the Reid Technique · Strategic Use of Evidence and Other Science-Based Interview Methods · False Evidence Ploys and Police Deception · Investigator Bias, Tunnel Vision, and Forensic Confirmation Bias · Confessions in Courts-Martial: Article 31(b), Mil. R. Evid. 304 and 305, and Expert Assistance

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Online Sex Offense · Counterintuitive Testimony