Snap Shot
- The question: What are the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique and the related science-based interviewing methods promoted in the last fifteen years, including rapport-based questioning, the cognitive interview, cognitive credibility assessment, and the Scharff technique, and how well do they work with suspects?
- What the research shows: In laboratory experiments, withholding evidence until a suspect has given an account produced more statement–evidence inconsistencies from guilty than innocent suspects, and SUE-trained interviewers judged truth and deception more accurately of mock suspects (85% versus 56% in one study of police trainees; 65% versus 43% in one of U.S. officers); accuracy rates in such studies depend on the proportion of liars in the study and are not the probability that a given suspect is lying. Rapport and the cognitive interview increase the information obtained, and early U.S. field evaluations associate science-based techniques with cooperation and disclosure.
- What it does not show: It does not show that an inconsistency establishes deception or that any suspect lied, and it rests mostly on laboratory studies with students and simple evidence. Meta-analyses warn of small-study effects and overstated benefits, suspects who anticipate the method can blunt it, and field evidence is limited and largely funded by the program that promotes the methods.
- The law: Withholding evidence is not misrepresentation, and no rule requires a particular method; Article 31(b) still requires that a suspect be told the general nature of the accusation. Military appellate decisions have held inadmissible testimony by a witness, including an interviewing agent, that the accused was lying or that nonverbal clues showed deception (United States v. Kasper; United States v. Knapp), and Arizona bars expert opinion on whether a particular person is truthful (State v. Lindsey).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can show through a strategically structured, recorded interview whether admissions and inconsistencies arose from the suspect’s own account; defense counsel can examine whether evidence was in fact withheld, whether inconsistencies have innocent explanations such as memory error, and whether an interviewer’s credibility conclusions exceed what the science supports.
The phrase “science-based interviewing” describes a group of methods developed or tested by psychologists, largely since 2010, to obtain accurate information from suspects and sources while reducing the risks associated with accusatorial interrogation. They share an emphasis on cooperation over pressure, open questions over leading ones, verbal content over nonverbal cues, and the planned use of evidence rather than early confrontation. Their development in the United States was driven in large part by the research program of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), and they are increasingly taught to federal, military, and local investigators.
These methods reach court in two ways. Investigators may testify that they used them, and the defense or prosecution may rely on that testimony to argue that a statement was or was not reliably obtained. And the methods’ credibility-assessment components may lead an interviewer to conclude that a suspect was lying, a conclusion that raises distinct evidentiary problems. This paper describes the methods and the research on each, the training and field evidence, the limits of the research, and the governing law. The broader comparison of accusatorial and information-gathering methods appears in “Accusatorial and Information-Gathering Methods: What the Comparative Research Shows,” and the research on demeanor-based judgments in “The Pre-Interrogation Interview: Behavior Analysis, Investigator Judgment, and the Polygraph.”
Origins of the Research Program
The HIG was established in 2009 as an interagency body following a task force created by Executive Order 13491, with a mandate to study the comparative effectiveness of interrogation approaches; its unclassified research program began operating in January 2010, is administered through the FBI, and by 2019 had produced nearly 200 peer-reviewed publications (Brandon et al., 2019; Meissner et al., 2017). The program also trains investigators: by October 2017 it had trained personnel from more than 50 federal agencies (Brandon et al., 2019). In 2016 the group published a public review of the research on interrogation, which concluded, among other things, that nonverbal cues commonly taught as signs of deception are unreliable (High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, 2016). The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and several federal agencies have since revised their interviewing curricula toward these methods (Kassin et al., 2025). Much of the research summarized below was funded by the HIG, a fact that does not undermine it but is relevant to evaluating independence.
The Strategic Use of Evidence Technique
SUE rests on the idea that guilty and innocent suspects approach an interview differently. Guilty suspects tend to use avoidance and denial strategies, withholding or denying information they believe the interviewer may have, whereas innocent suspects tend to be forthcoming and to expect that the truth will be apparent (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015). If the interviewer first obtains a free account and asks questions that bear on the evidence without revealing it, a guilty suspect who does not know what the interviewer knows is more likely to give an account that contradicts the evidence. The resulting statement–evidence inconsistency is treated as a cue to deception, and the evidence is disclosed afterward so that the suspect can respond.
The early experiments supported this mechanism. When 116 observers watched interviews of 58 mock suspects, those who saw the evidence disclosed late judged truth and deception more accurately (61.7%) than those who saw it disclosed early (42.9%), with lies identified at 67.6% under late disclosure (Hartwig et al., 2005). When 82 police trainees were or were not trained in SUE and then interviewed mock suspects, trained interviewers elicited more inconsistencies from liars and reached 85.4% accuracy, compared with 56.1% for untrained interviewers (Hartwig et al., 2006). In a study of 59 U.S. law enforcement officers, SUE-trained officers reached 65% accuracy compared with 43% for untrained officers (Luke et al., 2016), a smaller advantage than with trainees.
Refinements disclose evidence gradually, moving from general to specific, rather than all at once (Granhag et al., 2013). In a study with 151 participants, gradual disclosure made deceptive interviewees find the interview most demanding, and lay observers judged veracity most accurately for gradual-disclosure interviews (Dando et al., 2015). A meta-analysis found that guilty suspects produce more statement–evidence inconsistencies than innocent suspects and that both late and gradual disclosure produce more inconsistencies from guilty suspects than early disclosure, while warning of small-study effects that call for considerable caution about the size of the benefits (Oleszkiewicz & Watson, 2021). Kassin and colleagues (2025) report the meta-analytic effect of late disclosure as substantial for guilty suspects (d = 0.70) and near zero for innocent suspects (d = −0.03).
Limits Specific to SUE
The technique depends on suspects not anticipating it. When participants in a mock terrorism study were told that investigators might have surveillance evidence, guilty suspects shifted to extreme strategies, either withholding or forthcoming (Luke et al., 2014), and a suspect who has been told what evidence exists, through counsel, discovery, or the investigation itself, may give an account that matches it. Inconsistency is also a probabilistic cue, not proof. Innocent people make memory errors, misremember times and sequences, and use their own counter-interrogation strategies, and research has examined how innocent suspects’ strategies affect statement–evidence inconsistency (Clemens & Grolig, 2019). The laboratory evidence typically involves a few clear items of evidence; in real investigations evidence is often ambiguous or contested. Alibi errors by innocent people are discussed in “Alibis and the Innocent Suspect.”
Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical theft of a laptop from an office. The interviewer knows that a parking-garage camera recorded the suspect’s car at the building after hours. She first asks for an account of the evening and whether he returned to the building; he says he went straight home. Only then does she disclose the camera footage. He says he stopped briefly to pick up a phone charger, and a coworker’s text message later confirms that he asked about the charger that night. The statement–evidence inconsistency is real, and the factfinder may weigh it, but it does not establish deception: innocent people also omit or misremember details, and here the explanation could be checked. The interviewer may describe the sequence; whether the first account was a lie is for the factfinder.
Rapport-Based Questioning and the Cognitive Interview
Rapport-based approaches aim to obtain cooperation rather than overcome resistance. In video-recorded U.K. police interviews with people suspected of terrorism, interviewers’ use of rapport-based skills drawn from motivational interviewing was associated with more useful information, while controlling or hostile behavior was associated with less (Alison et al., 2013). In U.S. field interviews, science-based techniques including rapport were associated with greater cooperation and information disclosure, and accusatorial tactics with more counter-interrogation behavior (Russano et al., 2024). Rapport is not a safeguard by itself, however. In an experiment with 188 undergraduates questioned about their own past criminal behavior, moral minimization increased the number of crime-relevant details only when combined with rapport (Vallano et al., 2022; whether humane, time-limited minimization alone produces false confessions has not been tested directly), and researchers have noted that rapport can function as a form of minimization if it leads a suspect to believe the interviewer is acting in the suspect’s interest (Catlin et al., 2024). The use of rapport with minimization is discussed in “Minimization, Maximization, and Implied Promises of Leniency.”
The cognitive interview uses principles of memory, such as context reinstatement, varied retrieval, and an uninterrupted narrative, to help a cooperative person recall more. A meta-analysis found that it substantially increased correct details compared with standard interviews (d = 1.20) with a small increase in incorrect details (d = 0.24) (Memon et al., 2010), and in one study with professional interviewers it elicited about 80% more relevant episodic information than the five-step interview taught at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Rivard et al., 2014, as described in Kassin et al., 2025). It was developed for witnesses and is studied mainly with them; its use with suspects is newer. Its use with witnesses is described in “Improving Eyewitness Memory” in the Memory in the Courtroom resource.
Cognitive Credibility Assessment
Because nonverbal cues are weak indicators of deception, researchers have tested verbal approaches that try to enlarge differences between liars and truth-tellers: imposing cognitive load, for example by asking for an account in reverse order; encouraging interviewees to say more; and asking unexpected questions or questions about verifiable details. A meta-analysis reported total accuracy of 71% with these methods compared with 56% under standard approaches (Vrij et al., 2017). A reanalysis of the same data concluded that the advantage was much smaller than claimed, that control-condition accuracy was unusually low, and that the most supportive findings came from the least reliable data (Levine et al., 2018). A later meta-analysis of human observers found average accuracy of 60%, or 55% after correction for bias; observers who were told which cues to attend to averaged about 76%, while uninformed observers averaged about 52%, and the authors noted signs of publication bias and considerable heterogeneity (Mac Giolla & Luke, 2021). These methods are promising, but they do not permit confident judgments about an individual. The broader literature is reviewed in “Detecting Deception” in the Memory in the Courtroom resource.
The Scharff Technique
The Scharff technique is named for a German interrogator of Allied airmen in World War II who obtained information through friendly conversation, by appearing already to know a great deal, and by confirming rather than asking (Granhag et al., 2016). A meta-analysis of experimental tests found that the technique, as currently operationalized, elicits more new information, leads interviewees to perceive the interviewer as more knowledgeable, and leads them to underestimate how much they have revealed, while noting unanswered questions and the need for measures closer to practical outcomes (Luke, 2021). The technique was developed for intelligence gathering from sources who are not necessarily suspects, and it has had little testing in criminal investigations. Its emphasis on leading people to reveal more than they realize also raises questions, not yet studied, about how such statements bear on voluntariness.
Training and Field Evidence
Field evidence is limited but growing. In the HIG’s training evaluation, 90 investigators from 13 agencies submitted recordings of actual suspect interviews before and after a five-day course; afterward they used more science-based techniques and fewer unproductive questions but did not use fewer accusatorial tactics, and confession rates did not change significantly (Russano et al., 2024). The Air Force Office of Special Investigations, after a training and research partnership with the HIG in 2014 and 2015, decided in 2018 to adopt the HIG framework in place of the five-step model in its basic agent course (Brandon et al., 2019). These evaluations show that investigators can learn the techniques and that the techniques are associated with cooperation and information in real interviews. They do not measure whether the information obtained was accurate, they lacked control groups, and they were conducted by the program’s own researchers.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of the research on these methods comes from laboratory studies with students or volunteers, simulated offenses, low stakes, and a small number of clear-cut items of evidence. Accuracy rates in deception studies depend heavily on the base rate of liars in the study and on how lies are constructed, and they are not the probability that a given suspect is lying. Meta-analyses in this area report publication bias, small-study effects, and substantial heterogeneity (Oleszkiewicz & Watson, 2021; Mac Giolla & Luke, 2021), and one prominent meta-analysis has been sharply disputed (Vrij et al., 2017; Levine et al., 2018). Field evaluations are few, recent, mostly funded and conducted within the HIG program, and measure information yield and cooperation rather than accuracy. The studies cited here generally did not analyze sex or gender, and none reported sex differences in the effectiveness of the techniques. Research shows what tends to happen across groups under controlled conditions; it cannot establish whether a particular suspect was truthful or whether a particular admission is true.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When Hartwig et al. (2006) is cited to show that SUE-trained interviewers detect deception 85% of the time, ask who was studied and what was at stake: police trainees interviewing mock suspects about a simulated act, with nothing at stake for the suspects; ask also why the advantage was smaller with experienced U.S. officers (Luke et al., 2016). When an interviewer testifies that inconsistencies showed a suspect was lying, ask whether the evidence was in fact withheld, whether the suspect could have known it, and whether memory error explains the inconsistency (Luke et al., 2014; Clemens & Grolig, 2019). When the cognitive approach to lie detection is cited, ask how much evidence it rests on, given the reanalysis (Levine et al., 2018) and the publication-bias findings (Mac Giolla & Luke, 2021). When training evaluations are cited to show that science-based interviews produce reliable statements, ask what was counted: techniques used and information disclosed, not accuracy (Russano et al., 2024). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Science-Based Interviewing and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
No court requires investigators to use these methods, and their use does not settle admissibility. Voluntariness is judged by the totality of the circumstances (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1973; Colorado v. Connelly, 1986). The Supreme Court has held that an affirmative misrepresentation about evidence is relevant but not alone sufficient to render a confession involuntary (Frazier v. Cupp, 1969); strategic withholding of evidence is not a misrepresentation at all. In courts-martial, Article 31(b), UCMJ, requires that a suspect be informed of the nature of the accusation before questioning; the advice need not have the particularity of a charge sheet but must orient the suspect to the general nature of the allegation and the area of suspicion (United States v. Simpson, 2000). Strategic withholding of particular evidence is therefore compatible with Article 31(b), but withholding the subject of the inquiry is not. A suspect’s statements, including accounts inconsistent with the evidence, are admissible against the suspect as the statements of a party (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)), and their weight is for the factfinder.
The credibility-assessment components of these methods meet a firm limit. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that expert testimony amounting to a statistical statement about a witness’s truthfulness is impermissible vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007), that a special agent’s testimony that she concluded the accused was lying in an interview was inadmissible “human lie detector” testimony (United States v. Kasper, 2003), and that an agent’s testimony that specific nonverbal clues showed the accused was deceptive improperly usurped the members’ role (United States v. Knapp, 2014). An interviewer may describe what was said and what the evidence showed; the conclusion that a statement was false belongs to the factfinder. The rule is discussed in “Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource. Expert testimony about the research is governed by Rule 702, Mil. R. Evid. 702, and United States v. Houser (1993).
Arizona
Arizona follows the same principles. Experts may explain general research but may not give opinions on whether a particular person is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). Jurors may consider a defendant’s statements only if they find beyond a reasonable doubt that they were voluntary and not induced by any direct or implied promise, however slight (A.R.S. § 13-3988; RAJI (Criminal) Standard 19, 2022); Arizona case law requires that the statement have been induced by the promise (State v. Blakley, 2003), and the State must present evidence from which jurors could reasonably infer that the charged crime occurred (State v. Carlson, 2015). An interview that elicits a suspect’s own account before disclosure creates a record in which the origin of each detail can be traced, which bears on both questions.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The research described above is the same whichever party relies on it. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately make. Withholding evidence until a suspect has committed to an account does not involve false statements about evidence, and in laboratory experiments it increased statement–evidence inconsistencies from guilty suspects far more than from innocent suspects, though the meta-analysts warned of small-study effects and innocent suspects also produce inconsistencies for reasons such as memory error (Oleszkiewicz & Watson, 2021; Kassin et al., 2025), and rapport-based and cognitive methods increase the information obtained (Alison et al., 2013; Memon et al., 2010; Russano et al., 2024). A recorded interview in which the suspect gave an account before disclosure, was then shown the evidence, and either explained or admitted the inconsistency allows the factfinder to see where each detail came from, which supports both voluntariness and corroboration. Several federal and military investigative agencies now train these methods (Brandon et al., 2019; Kassin et al., 2025).
The research also counsels caution. An inconsistency is evidence for the factfinder to weigh, not a measure of deception, testimony by an investigator that a suspect was lying has been held inadmissible in courts-martial (Kasper; Knapp), and Arizona bars expert opinion on a particular person’s truthfulness (Lindsey). Laboratory accuracy rates should not be presented as the accuracy of an interviewer’s judgment in a case. Training does not guarantee practice (Russano et al., 2024), and an interview described as science-based may contain accusatorial tactics that the record will show.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports examination of how the method was applied. SUE’s benefits depend on evidence actually being withheld and on the suspect not knowing it; inconsistencies arise from memory error and innocent strategies as well as deception (Luke et al., 2014; Clemens & Grolig, 2019); and the cognitive approach to lie detection and its meta-analyses have been seriously questioned (Levine et al., 2018; Mac Giolla & Luke, 2021). Defense counsel are often best positioned to establish what the suspect knew before the interview, when each item of evidence was disclosed, and whether an interviewer’s description of the suspect as deceptive rests on anything beyond the inconsistency itself. In one experiment, rapport combined with moral minimization increased the crime-relevant details reported, which the authors suggested may strengthen the influence of other tactics; whether humane, time-limited minimization used alone produces false confessions has not been tested directly (Vallano et al., 2022).
The research also counsels caution. Science-based methods were developed to elicit accurate information while reducing reliance on pressure-based tactics. In a network meta-analysis of laboratory experiments with known ground truth, accusatorial conditions produced more false confessions than information-gathering conditions (odds ratio 4.41, 95% CI 1.77 to 10.97), while the difference in true confessions between those approaches was not statistically significant (odds ratio 0.55, 95% CI 0.29 to 1.05); in a finer-grained model that the authors said should be interpreted cautiously, information-gathering produced fewer false confessions than minimization (odds ratio 0.25), and other comparisons, including those involving maximization alone, were not significant (Catlin et al., 2024). Where an interview followed these methods and the suspect volunteered details before disclosure, details that are later confirmed are the kind of independent evidence the research treats as most informative about reliability, and no research permits an expert to say that a particular admission is true or false.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Legal Authorities
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
State v. Blakley, 204 Ariz. 429, 65 P.3d 77 (2003).
State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079 (2015).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Simpson, 54 M.J. 281 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.
Exec. Order No. 13491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
Fed. R. Evid. 702, 801(d)(2).
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 19 (State Bar of Arizona 2022).
Related topic papers: Investigative Interviewing and the PEACE Model · Accusatorial and Information-Gathering Methods: What the Comparative Research Shows · Accusatorial Interrogation and the Reid Technique · The Pre-Interrogation Interview: Behavior Analysis, Investigator Judgment, and the Polygraph · Alibis and the Innocent Suspect · Contamination: Non-Public Details and Post-Admission Narratives
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Counterintuitive Testimony