Snap Shot
- The question: Can people, professionals, structured interview methods, or instruments tell from a person’s demeanor, words, or physiology whether that person is lying?
- What the research shows: Unaided observers average about 54% accuracy in separating lies from truths, and professionals do little better. Behavioral cues to deception are few and weak. Some verbal and interview-based methods, such as content analysis, the strategic use of evidence, and the verifiability approach, discriminate above chance at the group level in laboratory studies, and focusing on the amount of detail in an account improves lay judgments.
- What it does not show: The research has not identified any person, cue, or method that can determine whether a particular witness is lying with the accuracy a courtroom requires. Credibility methods measure differences between accounts, not lies, and an honest but mistaken memory is not a lie and is not what most of these methods are designed to detect.
- The law: Mil. R. Evid. 707 bars polygraph evidence in courts-martial (Scheffer), and Arizona admits polygraph results only by written stipulation (Valdez). No witness may act as a “human lie detector” (Kasper, Brooks; Lindsey, Moran), and newer technologies such as fMRI must meet Rule 702 (Semrau).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should not rest credibility on a suspect’s or a witness’s demeanor and can use the research to explain that a complainant’s flat or anxious presentation is not evidence of lying; defense counsel can use the same research to rebut demeanor-based impressions of an accused, but cannot use it to show that any witness is lying or to convert memory error into deception.
The legal system asks factfinders to judge credibility in nearly every contested case, and it has long assumed that watching and listening to a witness helps them do so. Investigators make the same judgment earlier, often in an interview room, and their impression that a suspect “seemed deceptive” or that a complainant “seemed credible” can shape an entire investigation. Deception research tests those assumptions directly. It asks how accurately people distinguish lies from truths, which behaviors actually differ between liars and truth tellers, and whether structured methods or instruments do better than unaided judgment.
The question reaches court in argument about demeanor, in investigators’ testimony about a suspect’s interview behavior, in offers of polygraph or brain-imaging results, and in requests for expert testimony that common indicators of lying are unreliable. It must also be separated from a different problem: a witness who reports an event inaccurately in good faith is mistaken, not lying.
This paper distinguishes deception from memory error, summarizes the research on human lie-detection accuracy and cues to deception, reviews verbal and interview-based methods, the polygraph, and newer technologies, and describes the limits of the evidence and the governing federal, military, and Arizona law.
Lies, Mistakes, and What Credibility Methods Measure
Researchers generally define a lie as a deliberate attempt to mislead another person (DePaulo et al., 2003). Griesel and Yuille (2007) sort eyewitness statements into three kinds: an account that is largely accurate even if imperfect; a deliberate attempt to deceive; and a mistaken memory, an account that is false in fact but sincerely believed by the person giving it. Simply failing to remember is not lying either, since no decision to mislead is involved. A mistaken memory can arise from suggestion, misinformation, or ordinary reconstruction, and the person reporting it may be confident and sincere.
The distinction matters because most deception methods assume that lying produces detectable cognitive or emotional consequences, such as added mental effort, attempts to control behavior, or fear of being caught. A person who sincerely believes a mistaken memory has no such reason to behave differently. Griesel and Yuille (2007) emphasize that credibility techniques register changes in behavior or differences between accounts rather than lies themselves, and that the hardest step is identifying what caused a change, since anxiety, personality, or the situation can produce the same change. A mistaken account may also contain the features content-based methods treat as signs of experience: in one study, content criteria scored true accounts higher than suggested ones overall, but the difference was not significant when participants had come to report a suggested event as a full memory (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2009; Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 95–96). Griesel and Yuille (2007) list this as a possible weakness of content analysis, while noting an earlier study in which several criteria did separate true accounts from induced false memories. Content-based criteria performed less well on suggested memories than on invented accounts, and findings differ across studies. Evidence that an account is inaccurate is not evidence that the witness is lying.
How Accurately People Detect Lies
The most comprehensive estimate comes from a meta-analysis of 206 documents and 24,483 judges who tried to classify statements as lies or truths in real time without special aids or training. Average accuracy was 54%, compared with 50% expected by chance; observers correctly classified 61% of truths but only 47% of lies, reflecting a tendency to judge others as honest (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Accuracy varied little across studies, and listening helped more than watching. A later meta-analysis found that people differ far more in how often they judge others to be truthful than in their ability to detect lies; reliable differences in ability were very small (Bond & DePaulo, 2008).
Professional experience does not substantially change the picture. In the 2006 meta-analysis, police officers, judges, customs officials, and other experts averaged about 54% to 55% correct; where experts and laypeople judged the same messages there was no meaningful difference, although experts were somewhat more inclined to judge statements as lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Experience and training may increase confidence and suspicion more than accuracy. In one study, students trained in a widely taught set of behavioral cues were less accurate than untrained students but more confident (Kassin & Fong, 1999), and in another, investigators were no more accurate than students but more confident and more inclined to judge statements deceptive (Meissner & Kassin, 2002). A mistaken judgment that a suspect is lying can lead to accusatory questioning, a link addressed in the False Confessions resources on this site.
Secret Service agents in one early study outperformed other groups (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991), and later work described a few highly accurate “wizards” found by screening many people (O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004). A statistical critique argued that such results could arise by chance when many people are tested and the top scorers selected (Bond & Uysal, 2007). The research has not identified a group of professionals or a type of person who can reliably detect deception from demeanor.
Cues to Deception
Two problems limit accuracy. The first is mistaken belief. A survey conducted in dozens of countries found that the belief that liars avert their gaze was the most commonly reported belief about lying worldwide (Global Deception Research Team, 2006), and laypeople and police officers in one study held similar, largely inaccurate beliefs about how liars behave (Akehurst et al., 1996). Gaze aversion, fidgeting, and posture shifts are not reliable signs of deception.
The second and larger problem is that valid cues are weak. Across 158 behaviors examined in one meta-analysis, liars were, on average, less forthcoming, told less compelling stories, made a more negative impression, appeared more tense, and included fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents than truth tellers, but most behaviors were unrelated or only weakly related to lying (DePaulo et al., 2003). Cues were somewhat stronger when liars were highly motivated, particularly when the motivation was tied to their identity rather than to material reward, and when the lie concerned a transgression. Observers fail mainly because the available cues carry little information, not because they rely on the wrong ones (Hartwig & Bond, 2011), and some cues reported with large effects may be inflated by small samples and publication bias (Luke, 2019). Griesel and Yuille (2007) draw the practical conclusion: no single behavior reliably marks a lie, people differ in how they behave when lying, and a behavioral change is a reason to ask what caused it rather than proof of a lie.
Verbal and Interview-Based Methods
Research over the past two decades has shifted from body language to what people say and to interviews designed to make lying harder (Vrij et al., 2022).
Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), the core of Statement Validity Assessment (SVA), rates an account on criteria such as logical structure, quantity of detail, contextual embedding, and reproduced conversation, on the theory that accounts of experienced events differ from invented ones. Meta-analyses support that premise at the group level. One combined 56 studies and found a large average difference between experience-based and fabricated statements, with no significant difference between CBCA and Reality Monitoring, an approach based on the sensory and contextual detail typical of experienced events (Oberlader et al., 2016). Another, limited to adults, found a moderate average effect for the total CBCA score, larger effects in field studies of sexual offenses and intimate partner violence, and variation in which criteria worked; its authors cautioned that false positives could remain substantial even under good conditions (Amado et al., 2016; see also Amado et al., 2015). Griesel and Yuille (2007) describe CBCA as a search for signs of truthfulness rather than a lie detector: criteria that are present add to credibility, absent criteria do not show deception, and scores vary with a witness’s age, verbal ability, and the quality of the interview. Child witnesses are addressed in the Suggestibility of Children’s Memory paper.
Interview-based methods take a more active approach. In the Strategic Use of Evidence technique, the interviewer withholds known evidence, obtains the suspect’s account, and then introduces the evidence, exposing inconsistencies in a guilty suspect’s account; police trainees taught the technique reached 85.4% accuracy in a mock-crime study, compared with 56.1% for untrained trainees (Hartwig et al., 2006). The Verifiability Approach asks for details that could be checked, such as named witnesses or receipts, which liars tend to avoid; truth tellers reported more verifiable details than liars, especially when told their statements might be checked (Palena et al., 2021). Cognitive-load methods, such as reverse-order recall or unexpected questions, aim to make lying more demanding than truth telling; a meta-analysis reported 71% accuracy, compared with 56% for standard interviews (Vrij et al., 2017), and a re-examination argued that the gain was smaller and less consistent than reported (Levine et al., 2018).
A meta-analysis of 30 training studies found small-to-medium gains in detecting lies, though not truths, with training on verbal content working better than training on nonverbal cues (Hauch et al., 2016). In nine studies, participants who judged statements intuitively performed at chance, but participants told to rely on a single cue, the amount of detail, consistently distinguished lies from truths (Verschuere et al., 2023). These laboratory gains show that structured, content-focused judgments can outperform intuition; they do not supply a test that classifies a particular statement with known accuracy in the field.
Polygraph, Brain Imaging, and Automated Methods
The polygraph records respiration, electrodermal activity, and cardiovascular activity. Its most common format, the comparison question test, assumes that a deceptive examinee will react more to questions about the matter at issue than to comparison questions designed to concern a truthful examinee. The National Research Council (2003) concluded that specific-incident testing discriminates lying from truthfulness at rates well above chance but well below perfection, that its theoretical basis is weak, that countermeasures may defeat it, and that its usefulness in eliciting admissions does not establish its validity. Griesel and Yuille (2007), who use the older name control question test, identify false positives (truthful examinees classified as deceptive) as that format’s principal weakness, and contrast it with the concealed information (guilty knowledge) test, which asks whether an examinee recognizes details only the perpetrator would know and depends on those details not having become public. Researchers disagree about how useful the concealed information test and verbal methods may be as investigative aids, as distinct from evidence of guilt (Ben-Shakhar & Verschuere, 2024; Brennen & Magnussen, 2023).
A review of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) lie detection found that studies usually involve instructed, low-stakes lies by young volunteers, that many designs confound lying with attention and memory, that simple countermeasures sharply reduced accuracy in one study, and that few studies report accuracy for individuals; the authors did not consider the method ready for real-world use (Farah et al., 2014). A language model trained to classify written statements reached about 79% accuracy on statements like those it was trained on, but accuracy fell to about chance on a type of statement it had not seen (Loconte et al., 2023). In an experiment in which participants could consult an algorithm that outperformed human judges, few chose to use it, but those who did largely followed its predictions in accusing others of lying (von Schenk et al., 2024). A 2023 review concluded that nonverbal judgment performs poorly, that verbal analysis and physiological and neuroscientific techniques perform better, but that none approaches the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (Brennen & Magnussen, 2023).
Limits of the Evidence
Most deception studies use student participants instructed to lie or tell the truth about a staged event, a film, or an opinion, for small incentives. Real suspects and witnesses face far higher stakes, may have rehearsed their accounts, and may be anxious whether or not they are lying. In the laboratory the truth is known; in field studies it is often established by confessions or case outcomes that may be incomplete or influenced by the method being tested (Griesel & Yuille, 2007; National Research Council, 2003). Most designs use equal numbers of lies and truths, while real base rates are unknown, so an accuracy figure obtained at a 50% base rate does not translate into the probability that a particular person is lying.
Effect sizes for verbal methods vary widely, much of the research comes from a few laboratories, and cross-cultural testing is limited (Vrij et al., 2022). Above all, group differences do not classify individuals. A method that draws more detail on average from truth tellers will still misclassify many truthful people who give sparse accounts and many liars who give rich ones. No method reviewed here can say whether a particular witness lied, or reliably distinguish a sincere but mistaken account from an accurate one; an expert analyzes the process (questions, repetition, exposure), not the truth of the account.
Questions to Ask About This Research
If an expert relies on the figure of about 54% from Bond and DePaulo (2006), counsel should ask what exactly was counted: real-time judgments without training or aids, with accuracy for truths (61%) and lies (47%) reported separately. When an investigator’s experience is offered as a basis for judging a suspect deceptive, counsel should ask whether the evidence supports that inference, since experts in the same meta-analysis were no more accurate than laypeople. When figures such as 85.4% for the Strategic Use of Evidence (Hartwig et al., 2006) or 71% for cognitive-load methods (Vrij et al., 2017) are cited, counsel should ask whether they apply to this setting, given that they come from laboratory studies with mock suspects and that Levine et al. (2018) disputed the size of the cognitive-load effect. When content criteria are offered to show that an account is truthful or fabricated, counsel should ask whether the method was built for that question, because CBCA was designed to separate experienced from invented accounts, not accurate from mistaken ones (Griesel & Yuille, 2007). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Detecting Deception and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
In United States v. Scheffer (1998), the Supreme Court upheld Military Rule of Evidence 707 against a claim that it violated an accused’s right to present a defense, relying on the absence of scientific consensus about polygraph reliability. Rule 707 makes inadmissible the result of a polygraph examination, the examiner’s opinion, and any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of an examination, but does not bar an otherwise admissible statement made during one; evidence of the circumstances of the procedure offered to explain why an accused confessed is not barred, though its admission is discretionary (United States v. Kohlbek, 2019). Some federal circuits apply Rules 702 and 403 case by case rather than a per se bar (United States v. Cordoba, 9th Cir. 1997), but unstipulated results are rarely admitted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of fMRI lie-detection evidence under Rules 702 and 403, emphasizing that laboratory accuracy had not been shown to carry over to real-world use (United States v. Semrau, 6th Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and reflects a reliable application of reliable methods; through Military Rule of Evidence 1102, that amendment has become part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and practitioners should confirm current text.
The same principle limits testimony about credibility. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that “human lie detector” testimony, an opinion that a person was or was not truthful, is inadmissible from lay and expert witnesses alike, and that when it comes in on a central issue, failing to give a cautionary instruction can be plain error even without a defense request (United States v. Kasper, 2003); the testimony in Kasper was an investigator’s opinion that the accused was untruthful, and the court later treated an investigator’s interpretation of an accused’s nonverbal cues during an interview the same way (United States v. Knapp, 2014). Expert testimony that a complainant was very probably truthful, conveyed through false-allegation statistics, was the functional equivalent of such an opinion (United States v. Brooks, 2007). Rule 608(a) permits opinion or reputation testimony only about a witness’s character for truthfulness, and only after it has been attacked. General expert testimony that demeanor and confidence are weak indicators of truthfulness is evaluated under Rules 702 and 403.
Arizona
Arizona admits polygraph results only on a written stipulation signed by the prosecutor, the defendant, and defense counsel, subject to the trial court’s discretion to exclude them, cross-examination of the examiner, and an instruction that the results do not prove or disprove an element of the offense (State v. Valdez, 1962). Absent stipulation, polygraph evidence and a defendant’s willingness or refusal to take a test are generally inadmissible (State v. Ikirt, 1989). Experts may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular witness or quantify the proportion of witnesses of a given type who tell the truth (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475–76), directly or indirectly (State v. Moran, 1986). Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004), governs any offer of a newer lie-detection technology and any general testimony about the research.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately make. A complainant who appears flat, anxious, hesitant, or inconsistent is not shown by that presentation to be lying, because demeanor is a weak guide to truthfulness in either direction, and that point can help factfinders who might misread a truthful witness. Strategic disclosure of evidence and open-ended interviews have research support as investigative tools, and an account tested against independent evidence is more informative than any impression of the person giving it. The rules against human lie detector testimony and polygraph evidence also bar defense witnesses from opining that a complainant is lying.
The research also counsels caution. An investigator’s impression that a suspect seemed deceptive or evasive is a fragile basis for a charging decision or an argument, and testimony describing it risks human lie detector error (Kasper). In some studies, training in behavioral cues raised confidence and suspicion without raising accuracy, which bears on the reliability of interrogations and confessions. Content-analysis results and laboratory accuracy rates do not establish that a particular complainant is truthful, and testimony suggesting otherwise invites reversal (Brooks; Lindsey).
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several points defense counsel can legitimately make. An accused’s nervousness, gaze aversion, or shifting account in an interview is not a reliable indicator of deception, and professional experience does not substantially improve lie-detection accuracy; accusatory interviews built on a mistaken judgment of deception raise concerns addressed in the False Confessions resources. Expert testimony that demeanor and confidence are weak guides to honesty may assist the factfinder where it satisfies Rule 702.
The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. A complainant’s demeanor does not by itself show lying, and no defense expert may testify that a witness is untruthful. Content-analysis methods cannot show that a sparse or inconsistent account was fabricated, since scores vary with age, verbal ability, and interview quality. Evidence that an account contains errors supports an argument about accuracy, not honesty. Polygraph results favorable to an accused are excluded in courts-martial and, absent stipulation, in Arizona. The research has not identified anyone who can reliably detect truthfulness from demeanor; its legitimate use is to keep credibility judgments from resting on cues that do not work, not to substitute another form of lie detection.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Legal Authorities
State v. Ikirt, 160 Ariz. 113, 770 P.2d 1159 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Kohlbek, 78 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
Fed. R. Evid. 608.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Mil. R. Evid. 608.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 707.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Related topic papers: Memory Expert Testimony · Confidence and Accuracy · False Memory · Source Monitoring · Remembering Changes Memory · Suggestibility of Children’s Memory
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: False Confessions · False Confessions: Suggestibility · Courts-Martial