Memory Expert Testimony

Snap Shot

• The question: When may a qualified expert explain to jurors or court-martial members how memory and eyewitness identification work, and does such testimony help them evaluate the evidence?
• What the research shows: Experts agree on many eyewitness phenomena, and a 2025 survey updated that consensus, giving more weight than earlier experts did to initial confidence from a properly run lineup. Lay respondents give the expert-consistent answer about two-thirds of the time and have trouble applying what they know. In mock-jury studies, standard expert testimony more often makes jurors more skeptical across the board than better at telling strong identifications from weak ones. Testimony that explains how to apply the factors has done better in single studies.
• What it does not show: Most studies use mock jurors, written or videotaped trials, and no deliberation. No study can tell a factfinder whether a particular witness’s memory is accurate, and testimony can lower belief in reliable and unreliable identifications alike.
• The law: Admissibility runs through Fed. R. Evid. 702 (amended 2023), Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho, Mil. R. Evid. 702 and Houser, and Ariz. R. Evid. 702 (amended 2012 and 2024). Chapple is Arizona’s leading case, and Nordstrom shows its limits. Experts may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility (Lindsey, Moran, Brooks, Mil. R. Evid. 707). Perry points to cross-examination, instructions, and expert testimony as safeguards, and Arizona adds Dessureault hearings and a standard identification instruction.
• Issues for each side: Prosecutors can use the research on initial confidence and on accurate new details, and should keep experts from commenting on particular witnesses. Defense counsel should tie testimony to the factors present in the case, without asking jurors to distrust all memory evidence.

Memory evidence is central to many criminal cases and courts-martial. Complainants, accused persons, eyewitnesses, and investigators all report what they remember, and the factfinder must decide how much weight those reports deserve. Expert testimony is one of the ways that the research on memory reaches a jury or a court-martial panel.

Such testimony raises its own questions: when a court will admit it, what an expert may say, whether jurors already know what the expert would tell them, and whether hearing it makes their decisions more accurate or only more skeptical. Courts have answered these questions differently, and the research on jurors is mixed. Memory testimony is often assumed to be a defense tool, but the research it draws on also identifies conditions under which memory is accurate, and prosecutors rely on it as well.

This paper summarizes surveys of expert consensus and lay knowledge, experiments on the effects of expert testimony and jury instructions, and the limits of that research. It then reviews the federal, military, and Arizona law on admissibility, the limits on credibility opinions, and the alternatives to expert testimony: cross-examination, pretrial identification hearings, and jury instructions.

What Memory Experts Testify About

Most memory expert testimony is general, or “framework,” testimony: the expert describes research on factors that affect memory, and the factfinder decides whether and how they apply to the witness. The factors are commonly divided into estimator variables, which arise from the event and the witness (lighting, distance, duration, stress, a weapon, a cross-race identification, delay), and system variables, which arise from procedures the justice system controls (lineup composition and instructions, blind administration, recording confidence, feedback, and interview methods). Testimony may also address the misinformation effect, memory conformity among people who discuss an event, the accuracy of details first reported in later interviews, and intoxication.

Courts deciding whether research is reliable and generally accepted often rely on surveys of researchers. In a 2001 survey of 64 eyewitness experts, at least 80% agreed that 16 of 30 phenomena were reliable enough to present in court, including the effects of question wording, lineup instructions, post-event information, mug-shot exposure, weapon focus, the cross-race effect, and the malleability of confidence (Kassin et al., 2001). In a 2025 survey of 76 scientists, experts shared many of the earlier opinions but differed on two points: they recognized that initial confidence collected from a properly administered lineup can be diagnostic of accuracy, where earlier experts had viewed confidence as weakly related to accuracy, and they were divided on whether sequential lineups are preferable to simultaneous ones (Seale-Carlisle et al., 2025). About 78% of experts in the 2001 survey had endorsed the statement that confidence is a poor predictor of accuracy (Lane & Houston, 2021, p. 88). Testimony built on that statement would now overstate the science in one direction, just as testimony that confidence at trial reliably reflects accuracy would overstate it in the other.

The modern view of confidence comes largely from a 2017 review concluding that, under pristine conditions (a fair lineup, a double-blind administrator, unbiased instructions, and a confidence statement taken immediately), high-confidence initial identifications are highly accurate, while confidence expressed later or after feedback can be misleading (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Other researchers have questioned how often real cases meet those conditions (Wade et al., 2018), and some data show error rates above 20% even among witnesses who were completely confident (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 89–90). An expert who presents either side of this debate without the other gives the factfinder an incomplete account.

What Jurors Already Know

A recurring objection to memory testimony is that it tells jurors what they already know. Surveys partly support and partly contradict that objection. Jury-eligible adults, judges, and law enforcement officers each differed from eyewitness experts on a substantial number of issues in one survey (Benton et al., 2006). A meta-analysis of 23 surveys covering more than 4,600 respondents found that lay respondents gave the expert-consistent answer about two-thirds of the time, with wide variation across topics and question formats (Desmarais & Read, 2011). Lay knowledge is neither absent nor complete.

How knowledge is measured matters. Jury-eligible adults gave more expert-consistent answers to multiple-choice questions than when asked to apply the same principles to case scenarios in their own words (Houston et al., 2013), and recognizing a correct statement is easier than applying it to a particular witness. A review concluded that jurors, judges, and police officers all show limited knowledge of some eyewitness factors (Wise et al., 2014). Whether testimony on a point would help depends on the point.

Does Expert Testimony Help? Sensitivity Versus Skepticism

Researchers distinguish two possible effects. Sensitivity means that jurors become better at distinguishing identifications made under good conditions from those made under poor ones. Skepticism means that jurors believe all eyewitnesses less, whatever the conditions. Only sensitivity improves the accuracy of verdicts; skepticism moves the threshold for conviction without improving it.

The findings are mixed. In an early videotaped-trial experiment, expert testimony led mock jurors to give more weight to witnessing and identification conditions and less to confidence, without making them generally skeptical (Cutler et al., 1989). Among 800 mock jurors, jurors were sensitive to biased lineup foils on their own, and expert testimony increased sensitivity to biased lineup instructions only (Devenport et al., 2002). In two experiments, expert testimony lowered perceptions of guilt and eyewitness believability only when it followed the eyewitness evidence and preceded the judge’s reminder about it, and it did so whether the prosecution case was moderately weak or moderately strong (Leippe et al., 2004). With identifications made by participant-witnesses to a staged event, whose accuracy was known, expert evidence had no appreciable effect on jurors’ ability to tell accurate from inaccurate witnesses (Martire & Kemp, 2009). A review concluded that, in the studies it summarized, the most common effect was increased skepticism and sensitivity was the exception (Wise et al., 2014).

Later experiments asked whether delivery matters. Among 452 mock jurors, expert testimony reduced the odds of conviction regardless of the quality of the eyewitness evidence, which the authors interpreted as skepticism, and neither the expert nor New Jersey’s model instructions made jurors sensitive to witnessing conditions (Jones et al., 2017). In another study, standard expert testimony increased knowledge of eyewitness factors without changing verdicts, but testimony that walked jurors through a structured method of applying those factors (the I-I-Eye method) produced more convictions in a strong case than in a weak one (Wise & Kehn, 2020); a training aid based on the same method had earlier improved mock jurors’ discrimination between strong and weak witnesses (Pawlenko et al., 2013, as cited in Lane & Houston, 2021, p. 159). These are single studies, but they suggest that showing jurors how to use the information may matter as much as giving it to them.

Testimony That Supports Memory Evidence

Expert testimony does not only reduce belief in witnesses. Mock jurors rated a witness who recalled details at trial that were missing from a contemporaneous written note as less credible than a consistent witness; expert testimony on memory raised the credibility ratings of the witness whose account had grown, although neither the added details nor the expert changed verdicts (Lin & Paterson, 2026). That result is consistent with research showing that newly recalled details are often accurate. In three experiments, information about poor witnessing conditions reduced belief in highly confident eyewitnesses more than in moderately confident ones, and expert testimony that high-confidence identifications remain accurate under such conditions reduced, but did not eliminate, that pattern (Lebensfeld & Smalarz, 2024). The premise of that testimony is debated, but the study shows that memory testimony can move jurors toward believing a witness as well as away.

Jury Instructions and Other Safeguards

Instructions are the main alternative to expert testimony, and their research record is also mixed. Among 335 online mock jurors, an enhanced instruction modeled on New Jersey’s lowered convictions about equally for strong and weak identifications (Papailiou et al., 2015). In two experiments testing eight eyewitness factors one at a time, neither the factors nor instructions influenced jurors, and instructions helped only when many factors were combined into very good or very poor identifications (Jones et al., 2020). On the other hand, instructions focusing jurors on the initial identification led mock jurors to convict more often after an immediate high-confidence identification than after an initial lineup rejection that later became a confident identification, a difference absent under control instructions (Huang et al., 2026). Cross-examination can expose inconsistency and bias, but a sincerely mistaken witness may be confident and consistent, and jurors in one study were only minimally sensitive to some forms of lineup bias without expert help (Devenport et al., 2002).

A 2014 National Research Council report recommended that courts use scientific framework expert testimony and jury instructions to convey the research, along with procedures that reduce error at the source (National Research Council, 2014). The studies reviewed here suggest that no single safeguard reliably produces sensitivity and that the content and framing of each matter.

Limits of the Evidence

Most studies of expert testimony and instructions use students or online participants who read transcripts or watch short videotaped trials, decide individually without deliberation, and know their decisions have no consequences. Standard testimony more often produced skepticism than discrimination, and one design did better; none of the studies reviewed here tested court-martial members, which is why an expert should explain the conditions rather than urge doubt. Many manipulate several eyewitness factors at once, several foundational studies are decades old, and effects found in one design often do not replicate in another. There are no published data on court-martial members. Consensus surveys measure what researchers believe, not whether the beliefs are correct, and they change as the science develops. Eyewitness research is sometimes challenged in court because no study reproduces the conditions of a particular case; researchers answer that well-tested theory, not surface resemblance, allows predictions about untested conditions (Lane & Houston, 2021, p. 9). That answer supports testimony about general principles; it does not allow an expert to say whether a particular witness’s memory is accurate.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the finding that lay respondents gave the expert-consistent answer about two-thirds of the time (Desmarais & Read, 2011) is cited to show that eyewitness factors are common knowledge, ask what exactly was counted: agreement with a survey statement, which Houston et al. (2013) found easier than applying the principle to a case. When an expert relies on consensus surveys, ask whether the testimony reflects the current one, because experts in 2025 viewed initial confidence differently from experts in 2001 (Seale-Carlisle et al., 2025). When a party characterizes the effect of testimony on jurors, check whether the study design can support that characterization: Jones et al. (2017) found reduced convictions regardless of evidence quality, which is skepticism, while Wise and Kehn (2020) found sensitivity with a structured method in a single transcript study. And when Wixted and Wells (2017) is cited for a high-confidence identification, ask whether it applies to this identification, since the conclusion depends on pristine procedures and an initial confidence statement. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Memory Expert Testimony and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, permits expert testimony if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that the expert’s specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact, the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and the opinion reflects a reliable application of those methods to the case. The committee note explains that courts holding that the sufficiency of an expert’s basis and the application of the method go only to weight had misapplied Rules 702 and 104(a). Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) made the trial judge a gatekeeper responsible for ensuring that scientific testimony is relevant and reliable, pointing to factors such as testability, peer review, error rates, standards, and general acceptance. General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) held that admissibility rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and that a court may exclude an opinion separated from its data by too great an analytical gap. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended the gatekeeping obligation to all expert testimony, including testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge rather than science, with the Daubert factors applied flexibly. For memory testimony, the contested question is usually less whether the research is reliable than whether the specific points will help the factfinder and fit the facts.

Due process requires exclusion of an identification when police used an unnecessarily suggestive procedure that created a substantial likelihood of misidentification, judged under the totality of the circumstances (Neil v. Biggers, 1972; Manson v. Brathwaite, 1977). In Perry v. New Hampshire (2012), the Supreme Court declined to require a preliminary reliability inquiry when the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement, relying instead on other safeguards: cross-examination, eyewitness-specific jury instructions, the rules of evidence, expert testimony where permitted, and the reasonable doubt standard. An older federal model instruction on identification, associated with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Telfaire (1972), addresses the government’s burden on identity and factors bearing on reliability.

In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule. Under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, federal amendments (other than to Articles III and V) amend the military rules by operation of law after 18 months unless the President acts, and the Joint Service Committee’s 2025 compilation reflects the 2023 amendment as part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges also apply the six factors of United States v. Houser (1993): the expert’s qualifications, proper subject matter, a proper basis, relevance, reliability, and probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. In United States v. Garcia (1996), the military judge admitted a defense eyewitness expert’s testimony on stress and suggestive questioning but excluded his testimony on an “inverse” confidence–accuracy relationship and on memory transference and transposition; the Air Force Court of Military Review found an abuse of discretion but no prejudice, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed, holding that the accused was not denied his right to present a defense and that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (44 M.J. at 28–31, 33). The view of confidence presented in that era has since been refined. Military Rule of Evidence 321 makes an identification inadmissible if it resulted from a procedure so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification, or if due process requires exclusion. The Military Judges’ Benchbook contains an eyewitness identification instruction, and military practice guides, citing United States v. Thompson (1990), indicate that a cross-racial identification instruction is called for when cross-racial identification is a primary issue in the case, not merely because the witness and the accused are of different races; practitioners should consult the current Benchbook.

Experts may not tell the factfinder whether a witness is truthful or accurate. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has barred “human lie detector” testimony (United States v. Kasper, 2003) and held that an expert’s testimony implying a better than 98% probability that a complainant was truthful was the functional equivalent of vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007). Military Rule of Evidence 707 makes polygraph results, an examiner’s opinion, and any reference to taking or refusing a polygraph inadmissible, and the Supreme Court upheld that rule against a claim that it violated the accused’s right to present a defense (United States v. Scheffer, 1998).

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2012, to adopt the federal formulation and the Daubert standard, and effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). In State v. Bernstein (2015), the Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 702(d) requires the court to consider whether a method was reliably applied, but that errors in application call for exclusion only when they make the expert’s conclusions unreliable. State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits general, educational expert testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403 even when the expert has no knowledge of the case.

State v. Chapple (1983) is Arizona’s leading case on eyewitness expert testimony. The court held that excluding a qualified expert on factors affecting eyewitness reliability was an abuse of discretion in a murder case resting on identifications made more than a year after the crime by witnesses whose earlier identifications had been inconsistent, with no other evidence linking the defendant to the crime. The court stressed that the decision was limited to its facts, that admission generally remains within the trial court’s discretion, and that an expert may not testify that a particular witness is likely right or wrong. State v. Nordstrom (2001) shows the limits: the trial court allowed an eyewitness expert to explain the factors affecting reliability but barred any opinion on the accuracy of a particular eyewitness’s testimony and on the specifics of the case, and the Supreme Court held that limitation appropriate. The same principle applies outside eyewitness cases: experts may not quantify the proportion of truthful complainants or opine on a particular witness’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986; State v. Moran, 1986).

When a defendant challenges a pretrial identification, Arizona requires a hearing outside the jury’s presence, at which the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the procedure was not unduly suggestive or, if it was, that the in-court identification is not tainted by it, and the jury may be instructed on the issue (State v. Dessureault, 1969). Arizona’s standard instruction on identification tells jurors that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the in-court identification is reliable and lists factors drawn from Biggers and Manson, including the witness’s opportunity to view, degree of attention, accuracy of prior descriptions, level of certainty at the pretrial identification, and the time between the crime and that identification (Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Standard 45). Applying Perry, the Court of Appeals has held that due process did not require a Dessureault hearing where the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by the state (State v. Nottingham, 2012).

Other Jurisdictions

Some state courts have revised their approach in light of the research. After reviewing the scientific record, the New Jersey Supreme Court revised its framework for suggestive identifications and called for enhanced jury instructions on eyewitness factors (State v. Henderson, 2011). The Oregon Supreme Court moved its analysis under its evidence code, placing the initial burden of showing that challenged identification evidence is admissible on the party offering it, and discussed other trial-level tools such as expert testimony and jury instructions (State v. Lawson, 2012; 352 Or. at 747–48, 759–63). These decisions do not bind Arizona courts or courts-martial.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately present. Current expert opinion recognizes that initial confidence from a properly administered identification procedure can be diagnostic of accuracy, and Arizona’s standard instruction already directs jurors to certainty at the pretrial identification. Details first reported in later interviews are often accurate, and in one study expert testimony restored some of the credibility jurors withdrew from a witness whose account had grown. Lay respondents already understand many eyewitness principles, so testimony on points jurors know may be unhelpful. Prosecutors are well positioned to ensure that identification procedures are double-blind, that initial confidence is recorded, and that interviews are documented, which strengthens reliable evidence and supports focused instructions such as those emphasizing the initial identification.

The research also counsels caution. Jurors have difficulty applying eyewitness factors without help, and opposition to all memory testimony on the ground that it is common knowledge is not well supported where the specific factor is one that lay respondents misunderstand. Confidence expressed at trial, or after feedback or an initial hesitation, is generally much less informative than initial confidence, and testimony that equates trial confidence with accuracy overstates the science. Prosecutors are also well positioned to object when general testimony drifts into an opinion on whether a particular witness is accurate, which the law bars in either direction.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several points defense counsel can legitimately present. Jurors do not reliably understand or apply some eyewitness factors, such as the effect of biased lineup instructions, and cross-examination alone may not reveal the effect of suggestion on a sincere, confident witness. Chapple recognizes that exclusion of qualified testimony can be error when a case rests on uncorroborated, contested identifications, and in Garcia the lower military appellate court found that limiting such testimony was an abuse of discretion, although both appellate courts found the error harmless. Testimony that explains how to apply the factors to the evidence, rather than listing them, has shown more promise in research than generic testimony.

The research also counsels caution. Standard expert testimony has more often produced general skepticism than better discrimination, and a court may be reluctant to admit testimony whose main effect is to lower belief in every witness. Testimony that confidence never matters is out of step with current expert opinion, and testimony on points jurors already understand may be excluded as unhelpful. Under Nordstrom, Lindsey, and Brooks, the expert must stay with general principles and the factors present in the case and may not tell the factfinder that a particular witness is mistaken.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Benton, T. R., Ross, D. F., Bradshaw, E., Thomas, W. N., & Bradshaw, G. S. (2006). Eyewitness memory is still not common sense: Comparing jurors, judges and law enforcement to eyewitness experts. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(1), 115–129. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1171

Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Dexter, H. R. (1989). The eyewitness, the expert psychologist, and the jury. Law and Human Behavior, 13(3), 311–332. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067032

Desmarais, S. L., & Read, J. D. (2011). After 30 years, what do we know about what jurors know? A meta-analytic review of lay knowledge regarding eyewitness factors. Law and Human Behavior, 35(3), 200–210. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-010-9232-6

Devenport, J. L., Stinson, V., Cutler, B. L., & Kravitz, D. A. (2002). How effective are the cross-examination and expert testimony safeguards? Jurors’ perceptions of the suggestiveness and fairness of biased lineup procedures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(6), 1042–1054. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.6.1042

Houston, K. A., Hope, L., Memon, A., & Read, J. D. (2013). Expert testimony on eyewitness evidence: In search of common sense. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 31(5), 637–651. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2080

Huang, J., Izadshenas, M., & Wixted, J. T. (2026). Initial lineup rejections evolving into confident identifications at trial: The role of jury instructions in keeping the focus on the first test. Law and Human Behavior. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000670

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Jones, A. M., Bergold, A. N., Dillon, M. K., & Penrod, S. D. (2017). Comparing the effectiveness of Henderson instructions and expert testimony: Which safeguard improves jurors’ evaluations of eyewitness evidence? Journal of Experimental Criminology, 13(1), 29–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-016-9279-6

Jones, A. M., Bergold, A. N., & Penrod, S. (2020). Improving juror sensitivity to specific eyewitness factors: Judicial instructions fail the test. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 27(3), 366–385. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2020.1719379

Kassin, S. M., Tubb, V. A., Hosch, H. M., & Memon, A. (2001). On the “general acceptance” of eyewitness testimony research: A new survey of the experts. American Psychologist, 56(5), 405–416. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.5.405

Lane, S. M., & Houston, K. A. (2021). Understanding eyewitness memory: Theory and applications. New York University Press.

Lebensfeld, T. C., & Smalarz, L. (2024). Witnessing-condition information differentially affects evaluations of high- and moderate-confidence eyewitness identifications. Cognition, 250, Article 105841. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105841

Leippe, M. R., Eisenstadt, D., Rauch, S. M., & Seib, H. M. (2004). Timing of eyewitness expert testimony, jurors’ need for cognition, and case strength as determinants of trial verdicts. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(3), 524–541. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.89.3.524

Lin, S., & Paterson, H. M. (2026). Contemporaneous notes and juror decision-making: Do reminiscence and expert testimony play a role? Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 33(5), 1603–1625. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2025.2568400

Martire, K. A., & Kemp, R. I. (2009). The impact of eyewitness expert evidence and judicial instruction on juror ability to evaluate eyewitness testimony. Law and Human Behavior, 33(3), 225–236. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-008-9134-z

National Research Council. (2014). Identifying the culprit: Assessing eyewitness identification. The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/18891

Papailiou, A. P., Yokum, D. V., & Robertson, C. T. (2015). The novel New Jersey eyewitness instruction induces skepticism but not sensitivity. PLOS ONE, 10(12), Article e0142695. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0142695

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Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012).

State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 349 P.3d 200 (2015).

State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).

State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969).

State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 27 A.3d 872 (2011).

State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 291 P.3d 673 (2012).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 25 P.3d 717 (2001).

State v. Nottingham, 231 Ariz. 21, 289 P.3d 949 (App. 2012), abrogated in part (cautionary-instruction holding) by State v. Bigger, 492 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. 2021).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Garcia, 44 M.J. 27 (C.A.A.F. 1996).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).

United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

United States v. Thompson, 31 M.J. 125 (C.M.A. 1990).

Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 321, 702, 707, 1102.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Standard 45 (Identification) (6th ed. 2022).

Military Judges’ Benchbook, DA Pam. 27-9, para. 7-7-2 (Eyewitness Identification).

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