False Memory

Snap Shot

• The question: Can a person sincerely remember a detail or an entire event that did not happen, and can anyone tell such a memory from a true one?
• What the research shows: Word-list, misinformation, and implantation studies show that people can come to report false details, and sometimes whole false events, with confidence and emotion. Across implantation studies, estimates of the share of participants who form a false memory commonly run from about 15% to 35%, and lower under the strictest reanalyses, depending heavily on how a “memory” is defined and coded; fewer participants themselves say they remember the suggested event.
• What it does not show: It does not show that any particular memory is false, that memories of significant events are generally unreliable, or that anyone is especially prone to false memory as a stable trait. No test, whether confidence, detail, demeanor, content analysis, or brain imaging, reliably sorts an individual’s true memories from false ones.
• The law: Expert testimony on false memory is governed by Rule 702 (as amended in 2023) and, in courts-martial, Houser; it is general and educational and may not declare that a witness’s memory is false or true (Brooks; Lindsey; Moran). Arizona permits such general testimony (Chapple; Salazar-Mercado).
• Issues for each side: Prosecutors can point to the accuracy of gist memory for significant events and the lower rates found under strict criteria, without treating vividness or confidence as proof; defense counsel can show how suggestion, imagination, and repetition create false memories, tying the argument to documented exposure rather than to the existence of the phenomenon.

A false memory is a recollection of an event, or a detail of an event, that did not occur as remembered. It is not a lie. The person who holds a false memory believes it, may describe it in detail, and may feel the same confidence and emotion that accompany genuine recollection. Researchers have produced false memories in the laboratory for single words, for details of a witnessed event, and, in a minority of participants, for entire childhood events suggested by an interviewer.

The topic reaches court because many cases turn on what one or two people remember and on how those memories were elicited. A complainant’s account of abuse, a witness’s description of an assault, and an accused person’s account of an interrogation or of their own conduct all depend on memory, and each can be shaped by suggestion, imagination, and repeated questioning. The same research is also misused. It is sometimes offered as though it showed that memories of abuse or assault are generally suspect, which it does not.

This paper describes the main laboratory methods, the current debate over how often implanted memories form, individual differences in susceptibility, the absence of a reliable marker of true versus false memory, where memory is robust, and the federal, military, and Arizona law governing expert testimony on the subject.

What Researchers Mean by False Memory

Memory errors fall into two broad kinds. Errors of omission are failures to remember something that happened; errors of commission are reports of something that did not happen. False memories are errors of commission, ranging from an altered detail (a blue car remembered as green) to an added detail to a wholly false event (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 59–60). The term describes an outcome, not a cause, and in everyday memory there is no bright line between a memory that is entirely accurate and one that contains some error.

Most researchers regard false memories as a by-product of a memory system that works well for its ordinary purposes. Memory tends to retain what an experience meant, its gist, longer than its precise particulars, and recollection is a reconstruction that draws on stored traces, general knowledge, expectations, and inference (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 60–61). Memories carry no built-in label of their origin; under the source-monitoring framework, a person infers whether a mental experience reflects a real event from its qualities, such as perceptual detail, context, and emotion (Johnson et al., 1993). When a suggested, imagined, or overheard event comes to carry those qualities, it can be experienced as a memory of something that happened.

Word-List False Memories: The DRM Paradigm

The most widely used laboratory method is the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this procedure, people hear or read a series of words linked by association to one word that is never presented, such as bed, rest, awake, tired, and dream for the unpresented word sleep. On a later test, many recall or recognize the unpresented word, often at rates close to those for words that were studied, and frequently report a specific recollection of having seen or heard it rather than a mere sense of familiarity (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).

The DRM effect is reliable and shows how readily memory fills in information consistent with gist, but its forensic reach is limited: the materials are word lists and participants have no stake in the outcome. Lane and Houston (2021, pp. 71–73) note that laboratory and autobiographical tasks may draw on partly different processes, so the useful question is which features a task shares with the situation in a case. DRM errors show that false recognition is a normal property of memory; they do not show that a person who makes DRM errors is likely to form a false memory of a personal event.

Misleading Details: The Misinformation Effect

In the misinformation paradigm, participants witness an event, receive misleading information about it, and are later tested. Decades of studies show that people often report the suggested detail rather than the one they saw, sometimes with confidence (Loftus, 2005). Misinformation usually alters details of an event that did happen rather than creating a new event, and peripheral details are generally more vulnerable than central ones. The research on misleading questions, co-witness discussion, and post-event information is covered in the separate paper on the misinformation effect.

Implanted Memories of Whole Events

In the best-known implantation study, adults were given short descriptions of four childhood events, said to have been supplied by a relative, of which one, being lost in a shopping mall, was false. Across interviews, about a quarter of the 24 participants came to remember the false event wholly or in part (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Similar procedures produced false memories in about a fifth to a quarter of participants for events such as spilling a punch bowl at a wedding (Hyman et al., 1995), and a doctored photograph of a childhood hot-air-balloon ride, combined with imagery instructions over three interviews, led half of 20 participants to report complete or partial memories of the ride (Wade et al., 2002). Imagining an event can by itself raise confidence that it occurred, a finding discussed in the paper on imagination inflation (Garry et al., 1996).

Rates across individual studies have ranged widely, partly because studies defined a false memory differently. A mega-analysis applied a single coding system to 423 participants’ transcripts from eight implantation studies, using criteria such as acceptance of the suggestion, elaboration beyond it, imagery, coherence, emotion, and memory statements. It classified 30.4% of cases as false memories and another 23% as having accepted the event to some degree; the rate was higher (46.1%) when the suggestion included self-relevant information and imagination and no photograph (Scoboria et al., 2017). A review summarizing this literature for legal audiences reached a similar overall figure of about 30% and noted that implantation studies have produced false memories of negative events and of events said to have occurred more than once (Otgaar et al., 2022).

Other researchers read the same literature as showing more limited susceptibility. A systematic review distinguished belief that an event occurred, the experience of recollecting it, and confidence in the memory. It found that imagination and false-feedback procedures raised belief only modestly, so that suggested events were still judged unlikely, and that implantation studies induced some recollective experience in an average of 47% of participants but experiences likely to qualify as full memories in about 15% (Brewin & Andrews, 2017). The authors cautioned that investigators’ ratings do not necessarily match what participants themselves report.

A preregistered replication of the lost-in-the-mall study with 123 participants coded 35% as having a false memory of being lost, compared with 25% in the original, and mock jurors who read the transcripts often believed the participants genuinely remembered the event (Murphy et al., 2023). In their own reports, 14% of participants said they remembered the fabricated event and 52% said they believed it had happened (Murphy & Greene, 2025). Other researchers reanalyzed the transcripts, focusing on recall of six core details of the suggested event. Participants coded as having a false memory explicitly recalled fewer than two of those details on average; 20% of those with full and 58% of those with partial false memories did not recall being lost; and about half described possibly true experiences that could be distinguished from the suggested event. The reanalysts concluded that investigator ratings may not capture how participants themselves decide whether they remember (Andrews & Brewin, 2024). The replication’s authors replied that the reanalysis, which they read as implying a rate of about 4%, rested on a single narrow coding scheme; they agreed it raised useful questions about judging memory from a recorded conversation, urged the use of multiple measures, and argued that even a rate that low would carry theoretical and legal significance (Murphy & Greene, 2025).

The debate concerns magnitude and measurement, not existence. Both sides agree that suggestion can lead some people to believe in, and some to recollect, events that did not happen, and that the rate depends on how a memory is defined and who judges it. Any single percentage from this literature should therefore be accompanied by its coding method.

False Memories of Committing a Crime

One study reported that after three suggestive interviews describing an adolescent crime said to be confirmed by a parent, 70% of participants assigned to the crime condition developed a false memory of committing it (Shaw & Porter, 2015). A commentary reanalyzed the transcripts using stricter, more conventional criteria and concluded that a substantially smaller share, roughly 26% to 30% depending on the coding scheme, met the criteria for a false memory, with others showing false belief without recollection (Wade et al., 2018). The original author replied that existing coding approaches are imperfect and that a substantial share of participants came to believe they had committed a crime under any accepted scheme (Shaw, 2018), and a corrigendum corrected statistical reporting errors (Shaw & Porter, 2018). The findings bear on whether suggestive questioning can lead an innocent person to believe or remember involvement in an offense (see the False Confessions resources), but they come from undergraduates told the event was confirmed by family and do not show that any particular confession or admission reflects a false memory.

Who Is Susceptible

Laboratory studies have looked for individual differences in false memory. In early implantation work, higher scores on measures of dissociative experiences and of vivid imagery were associated with greater false memory creation (Hyman & Billings, 1998). Later studies that gave the same participants several false memory tasks found that susceptibility in one task did not reliably predict susceptibility in another, and that personality and cognitive measures predicted little: in one study a person’s DRM, misinformation, and imagination-inflation scores were largely uncorrelated (Nichols & Loftus, 2019), and in another no individual-difference measure consistently predicted distortion across tasks and experiments (Patihis et al., 2018). People with highly superior autobiographical memory make DRM and misinformation errors at rates similar to others (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 72–73).

These results cut both ways. They do not support testimony that a particular witness is the kind of person who forms false memories, nor a claim that a witness is immune; conditions such as plausibility, repetition, imagination, and the authority of the source appear to matter more than a stable trait.

Telling True From False Memories

Because a false memory can be held sincerely, cues used to judge honesty do not distinguish true from false memories, and confidence expressed after suggestion or repeated retelling is an unreliable guide (confidence recorded at a fair initial identification is treated in “Confidence and Accuracy”). False memories in the DRM and misinformation paradigms can carry “remember” judgments, and some false memories are as vivid as true ones. On average, however, true memories tend to contain more sensory and spatial detail, and suggested memories tend to describe more thoughts; Lane and Houston (2021, pp. 77–81) conclude that these are average differences and that no single feature reliably separates true from false memories.

People judging someone else’s memory rely on the same cues, such as perceptual and contextual detail, and do only modestly better than chance; more detail, even peripheral detail, raises belief whether or not the memory is accurate. Content-based methods such as Criteria-Based Content Analysis have separated true from fabricated accounts in some studies but performed poorly when the account was a partial false memory, which the speaker believes (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 94–96). Mock jurors in the lost-in-the-mall replication often judged false memories to be genuine (Murphy et al., 2023).

Neuroscience has not changed this conclusion. Imaging studies have found greater reactivation of sensory regions for true than for false memories on average (Slotnick & Schacter, 2004), but these findings are group averages from simple laboratory stimuli, and brain imaging cannot presently classify a particular witness’s memory of a particular event as true or false (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 91–94).

Where Memory Is Robust

The false memory literature sits alongside substantial evidence that memory for significant personal events is often accurate in its gist. Former concentration camp prisoners, interviewed decades later, retained accurate memories of the core features of their imprisonment while forgetting or confusing some specific details (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990). In a prospective study of adults whose childhood sexual abuse had been documented 12 to 21 years earlier, individuals who identified the abuse as their most traumatic life event had relatively accurate memories of it (Alexander et al., 2005). One influential review argued that memory is generally reliable on an initial, uncontaminated test conducted with proper procedures, and that many errors arise from contamination introduced after the event (Wixted et al., 2018).

Implanted memories of whole events have typically required a credible source asserting the event, plausibility, repeated sessions, and encouragement to imagine it. The research therefore informs how an account emerged; it does not supply a general reason to doubt a memory that was continuously held, reported early, and obtained without suggestion. The related question of memories recovered after a period of reported amnesia is addressed in the paper on recovered and repressed memory.

Limits of the Evidence

Most studies use student or community volunteers, plausible and usually mildly negative events, and suggestions presented as information from a relative, whereas real allegations involve personal stakes, emotional events, and often a continuous memory. Rates vary with the coding method by a factor of two or more, investigator ratings exceed self-reports, and preregistered replications with open data are recent. The DRM paradigm establishes reliable associative errors but has a weak and inconsistent link to autobiographical false memory. Finally, all of this is group research. It can describe how often, and under what conditions, false memories form; it cannot establish that a particular person’s memory is false or true.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When an implantation rate such as 30%, 35%, or 70% is cited, counsel should ask what was counted as a false memory, who judged it, and how it compares with participants’ own reports, given Brewin and Andrews’s (2017) estimate of about 15% full memories and the dispute over the 35% replication figure (Andrews & Brewin, 2024; Murphy & Greene, 2025). When Shaw and Porter (2015) is cited, counsel should ask whether the 70% figure or the substantially lower reanalyzed figure (Wade et al., 2018) is being used and whether the suggestive procedure resembles anything that occurred in the case. When DRM findings are cited, counsel should ask whether the study design supports the inference drawn, given that word-list errors do not reliably predict other false memories (Nichols & Loftus, 2019).

Counsel should also ask whether the research applies to this person: whether the memory was reported before or after any suggestive exposure, whether implantation conditions (a credible source, repetition, imagination exercises) were present, and whether there is a record of what the witness was told. When detail, confidence, or emotion is offered as a sign that a memory is true or false, counsel should ask how much evidence supports that use for an individual, given that no single feature reliably separates the two (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 81, 93–94). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

False Memory and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony on false memory is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which as amended December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of those methods to the case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) assigned trial judges a gatekeeping role, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended that obligation to all expert testimony, including non-scientific technical or specialized knowledge. The implantation debate described above is relevant to the “reliable application” requirement: an expert who cites a single rate should be able to explain how it was measured and why it fits the facts.

In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and under Military Rule of Evidence 1102 the 2023 federal amendment became part of the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. United States v. Houser (1993) requires the proponent to establish the expert’s qualifications, the subject matter, the basis, legal relevance, reliability, and that probative value outweighs other considerations. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that an expert may not vouch for a witness’s credibility, including through statistics bearing on the likelihood that the witness is truthful (United States v. Brooks, 2007). The same principle bars an expert from telling members that a particular memory is false.

Arizona

Arizona amended Rule 702 in 2012 to adopt the federal standard and again, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment. The Arizona Supreme Court held in State v. Chapple (1983) that exclusion of expert testimony on factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness memory was an abuse of discretion in that case, and State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits general, educational (“cold”) expert testimony that satisfies Rule 702 and Rule 403. Experts may describe general characteristics and research findings but may not opine on the truthfulness or accuracy of a particular witness (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). False memory testimony is therefore confined to general principles, leaving the assessment of a particular memory to the jury.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. Memory for the gist of significant personal events is often accurate, including in prospective studies of documented abuse. In the research, implanting a false memory of a whole event has typically involved a credible source, repetition, and imagination or reconstruction. Estimates of how often it succeeds fall to about 15% when full memories are required, and participants’ own reports of remembering are generally lower than investigators’ ratings. Laboratory scores do not reliably predict autobiographical false memories and do not show that a witness is prone to them. Prosecutors are well positioned to strengthen an account’s evidentiary value by recording early statements and documenting what information a witness received before each interview.

The research also counsels caution. Even under strict criteria, some participants come to believe, and some to recollect, events that did not happen, and both investigators and mock jurors have difficulty telling those memories from true ones. Vividness, detail, emotion, and growing confidence are not proof that a memory is accurate, and testimony or argument presenting them that way goes beyond the research. Where a memory first appeared or expanded after suggestive questioning, imagination exercises, or exposure to another person’s account, the factfinder is entitled to consider that history, and the same principles apply to an accused person’s admissions.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. People can sincerely remember details, and sometimes whole events, that did not happen, and those memories can be confident, detailed, and emotional. Suggestion from a trusted source, repetition, and imagination increase the risk, and no method reliably distinguishes true from false memories in an individual. Expert testimony explaining these principles, combined with evidence of how and when a particular account emerged, is a legitimate way to help the factfinder evaluate it.

The research also counsels caution about its limits. The existence of false memory does not show that a particular memory is false, and an expert may not tell the factfinder that it is. Implantation rates depend on coding, are lower under strict criteria and in self-reports, and come from conditions that may not resemble the case; citing the highest figure without that context invites effective cross-examination. Memories of significant events are often accurate in gist, and a memory that was continuously held and reported early without suggestion is not placed in doubt by this literature alone. The same research applies to the accused’s own account and to any confession or admission obtained through suggestive questioning.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Alexander, K. W., Quas, J. A., Goodman, G. S., Ghetti, S., Edelstein, R. S., Redlich, A. D., Cordon, I. M., & Jones, D. P. H. (2005). Traumatic impact predicts long-term memory for documented child sexual abuse. Psychological Science, 16(1), 33–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.00777.x

Andrews, B., & Brewin, C. R. (2024). Lost in the mall? Interrogating judgements of false memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 38(6), Article e70012. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.70012

Brewin, C. R., & Andrews, B. (2017). Creating memories for false autobiographical events in childhood: A systematic review. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 31(1), 2–23. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3220

Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58(1), 17–22. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0046671

Garry, M., Manning, C. G., Loftus, E. F., & Sherman, S. J. (1996). Imagination inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3(2), 208–214. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03212420

Hyman, I. E., Jr., & Billings, F. J. (1998). Individual differences and the creation of false childhood memories. Memory, 6(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/741941598

Hyman, I. E., Jr., Husband, T. H., & Billings, F. J. (1995). False memories of childhood experiences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9(3), 181–197. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2350090302

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Lane, S. M., & Houston, K. A. (2021). Understanding eyewitness memory: Theory and applications. New York University Press.

Loftus, E. F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory. Learning & Memory, 12(4), 361–366. https://doi.org/10.1101/lm.94705

Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25(12), 720–725. https://doi.org/10.3928/0048-5713-19951201-07

Murphy, G., Dawson, C. A., Huston, C., Ballantyne, L., Barrett, E., Cowman, C. S., Fitzsimons, C., Maher, J., Ryan, K. M., & Greene, C. M. (2023). Lost in the mall again: A preregistered replication and extension of Loftus & Pickrell (1995). Memory, 31(6), 818–830. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2023.2198327

Murphy, G., & Greene, C. M. (2025). Who got lost in the mall? Challenges in counting and classifying false memories. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 39(2), Article e70044. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.70044

Nichols, R. M., & Loftus, E. F. (2019). Who is susceptible in three false memory tasks? Memory, 27(7), 962–984. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2019.1611862

Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., & Patihis, L. (2022). What science tells us about false and repressed memories. Memory, 30(1), 16–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2020.1870699

Patihis, L., Frenda, S. J., & Loftus, E. F. (2018). False memory tasks do not reliably predict other false memories. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 5(2), 140–160. https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000147

Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21(4), 803–814. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.21.4.803

Scoboria, A., Wade, K. A., Lindsay, D. S., Azad, T., Strange, D., Ost, J., & Hyman, I. E. (2017). A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies. Memory, 25(2), 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2016.1260747

Shaw, J. (2018). How can researchers tell whether someone has a false memory? Coding strategies in autobiographical false-memory research: A reply to Wade, Garry, and Pezdek (2018). Psychological Science, 29(3), 477–480. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797618759552

Shaw, J., & Porter, S. (2015). Constructing rich false memories of committing crime. Psychological Science, 26(3), 291–301. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614562862

Shaw, J., & Porter, S. (2018). Corrigendum: Constructing rich false memories of committing crime. Psychological Science, 29(4), 673–674. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797618762341

Slotnick, S. D., & Schacter, D. L. (2004). A sensory signature that distinguishes true from false memories. Nature Neuroscience, 7(6), 664–672. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1252

Wade, K. A., Garry, M., & Pezdek, K. (2018). Deconstructing rich false memories of committing crime: Commentary on Shaw and Porter (2015). Psychological Science, 29(3), 471–476. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617703667

Wade, K. A., Garry, M., Read, J. D., & Lindsay, D. S. (2002). A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(3), 597–603. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196318

Wagenaar, W. A., & Groeneweg, J. (1990). The memory of concentration camp survivors. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4(2), 77–87. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2350040202

Wixted, J. T., Mickes, L., & Fisher, R. P. (2018). Rethinking the reliability of eyewitness memory. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13(3), 324–335. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617734878

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

Related topic papers: The Misinformation Effect · Imagination Inflation · Source Monitoring · Recovered and Repressed Memory · Suggestibility of Children’s Memory · Memory Expert Testimony

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: False Confessions · False Confessions: Suggestibility