Snap Shot
- The question: When a person convicted of an online sexual offense is placed on probation, supervised release, parole, or mandatory supervised release, which limits on computers, the internet, and devices does the law allow, and what does research show about them?
- What the research shows: Federal data show that 2.6% of people supervised for child pornography offenses were rearrested for a sexual offense within 3 years and about 5% within 5 years; these are arrest-based figures that undercount undetected offending. In CSAM-only samples, recorded new sexual offending is mostly further CSAM offending. Risk declines with time offense-free.
- What it does not show: No controlled study has tested whether internet bans, monitoring software, or device searches reduce reoffending. The gap runs both ways: the research cannot show that these measures work or that they fail.
- Where courts agree and disagree: Since Packingham, several circuits have vacated total or near-total internet bans lacking individualized support, especially where the internet played no part in the offense. Approval-based, monitoring, and search conditions are more often upheld. Arizona’s 2026 amendment to A.R.S. § 13-901(B) requires conditions that are individually determined, narrowly tailored, risk-informed, and, for special conditions, supported by the record.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should build a record tying device conditions to the offense and assessed risk without claiming proven effectiveness; defense counsel can challenge untailored bans without arguing that monitoring has no value.
Most sentences of community supervision for an online sexual offense include conditions governing computers, phones, and the internet. Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography,” and this paper uses that term when describing the law; elsewhere it uses child sexual abuse material (CSAM). For people convicted of CSAM, enticement, or solicitation offenses, conditions range from a complete prohibition on internet use, through use only with an officer’s or court’s approval, to permitted use subject to monitoring software and device searches. These conditions affect work, housing, treatment, and family contact, and they define much of what counts as a violation.
The conditions reach court at sentencing, at modification hearings, at revocation, and on appeal. Since the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Packingham v. North Carolina, which emphasized the importance of internet and social media access to First Amendment activity, federal circuits have reviewed internet and computer conditions more closely, and Arizona amended its probation statute in 2026 to require individually tailored conditions supported by the record. Military practice differs: post-confinement supervision is set by service clemency and parole boards rather than by the military judge.
This paper describes the conditions in use, the supervision outcome data, the limited research on monitoring and bans, risk-matched conditions, and collateral effects, and then summarizes federal, military, and Arizona law. Polygraph conditions are addressed briefly. Release conditions imposed before trial, including the federal Adam Walsh Act’s monitoring and curfew requirements, are discussed in the hub’s paper Pretrial Release in Online Cases.
What Conditions Courts Impose and How Often
Practitioner literature describes three basic approaches to supervising people whose offenses involved computers: total prohibition, restricted access, and permitted access with monitoring through installed software or hardware and through inspections and searches (Bowker & Gray, 2004). That framework was practice guidance without outcome data. Current federal forms combine the approaches. One district’s 2025 sex-offender conditions, for example, require disclosure of all devices, accounts, and passwords; permit officer-installed monitoring software at the person’s expense with unannounced searches; prohibit encryption and efforts to defeat monitoring; and authorize reasonable-suspicion searches of phones and computers. Such forms illustrate practice; they are not law.
Monitoring conditions are now the norm in the federal system. Federal probation staff reported that about 57% of people on post-conviction supervision for a sex offense had used a computer or the internet in the offense and that, over the preceding three years, 70% to 80% of people with sex offenses on pretrial or post-conviction supervision carried an internet and computer monitoring condition (Spidell et al., 2021). Those figures are descriptive, not outcome data.
State practice varies by court and county. Arizona’s statewide uniform conditions of probation contain no sex-offender, computer, or internet terms; such terms are added as special conditions, often from county forms. One county’s sex-offender terms, for example, bar any internet-capable device without the probation officer’s prior written permission and provide for polygraph assessment and, depending on risk level, GPS monitoring. In the military, conditions for released prisoners are set by service boards and can include computer examinations and monitoring software.
Supervision Outcomes for People Convicted of Online Offenses
The most directly relevant outcome data come from the federal probation system. Cohen and Spidell (2016) followed 7,416 men placed on federal post-conviction supervision for sex offenses in fiscal years 2007 through 2013. Over three years, 17.5% were arrested for any offense, compared with 31.4% of people supervised for other offenses. Among people supervised for child pornography offenses, 13.0% were arrested for any offense and 2.6% for a sexual offense, and about a quarter had an official record of contact sexual behavior. The data are arrests over three years, and the study did not record which conditions people were under.
Cohen (2023) followed 5,768 men supervised for child sexual exploitation material offenses in fiscal years 2010 through 2016; about 5% were rearrested for a sexual offense within 60 months. No tool tested reached an area under the curve of .70 for sexual rearrest; the CPORT’s was .62. In fiscal years 2017 through 2021, officers overrode the federal general risk tool for 96% of these supervisees, mostly to place them at higher supervision levels. The study does not show whether the overrides reflected risk the tool did not measure or excess caution, or whether the higher intensity prevented offenses.
Two further findings bear on what conditions should target. In Canadian samples, the dynamic tools ACUTE-2007 and STABLE-2007 predicted recidivism for men adjudicated for CSAM-only offenses as well as or better than for men with contact offenses, and nearly all sexual recidivism in the CSAM-only group was further CSAM offending (Babchishin et al., 2023). In an aggregated sample of 7,740 men from 21 samples, largely people with contact offenses, sexual recidivism risk was highest in the first years after release and fell the longer people remained offense-free; for the high static-risk group, the five-year rate fell from 22% at release to 4.2% after 10 offense-free years in the community (Hanson et al., 2014). Base rates for online offenders, including the roughly 2% detected contact recidivism found by Seto et al. (2011), are reviewed in the hub’s recidivism paper.
All of these figures rest on official records, which undercount sexual offending. Disclosure research, discussed in the hub’s polygraph and undisclosed-offending papers, indicates that some offending never appears in arrest data. Measured rates are therefore a floor, not a complete count. The group finding that many online offenders have undisclosed past offenses does not by itself change the risk estimate for a particular person, but credible, specific evidence of past contact offending in a given case is a relevant risk factor, and all detected-offense rates are minimum estimates. Supervision can also lower measured rates by a different route. In a sample of 196,468 male releases studied by researchers at the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, the 29,420 people with sex offenses were less likely than others to be reconvicted of a general crime, more likely to be reconvicted of a sex offense, and more likely to be returned to prison by revocation without a new sentence; accounting for revocations narrowed, but did not eliminate, the gap in general reconviction risk (Kowalski et al., 2025). The authors read this as evidence that differences in supervision contribute to the lower general recidivism of people with sex offenses, because revocation can return people to prison before they commit a new crime. The study used administrative records from one correctional system, was not specific to online offenses, and its abstract does not describe the conduct behind the revocations. It suggests that a measured rate under strict supervision may partly reflect time removed from the community, not only an absence of offending.
What Is Known About Monitoring, Bans, and Searches
The research on whether internet conditions reduce reoffending is very thin. Searches for this paper of PubMed, Crossref, the journal Federal Probation, and an English sentencing-research bulletin on prevention orders located no published controlled or quasi-experimental evaluation of monitoring software, internet bans, or device-search conditions as recidivism-reduction measures for people convicted of online sexual offenses, and programs do not systematically publish how many violations monitoring detects. This absence of evidence cuts both ways: claims that monitoring deters and detects offending, or that bans prevent reoffending, are not established empirically, and neither are claims that monitoring is ineffective.
What exists is indirect. A qualitative study of 595 anonymous, unverifiable posts by 212 usernames on one forum used by people with a sexual interest in children found that individuals who had been prosecuted for their offending were returning to the forum; the authors suggested that release conditions consider restricting internet and anonymizing-network access (Ball et al., 2024). In England, a study of a random sample of 188 people suspected of indecent-image offenses in one police force found that 102 were placed on the sex offender register, 86 of whom received a Sexual Harm Prevention Order; 56 of the 102 were later accused of further sexual offenses, and the authors concluded that registration and orders did not prevent recidivism (Wainwright et al., 2025). The sample was drawn from suspects, the outcome was accusation rather than conviction, and there was no comparison group, so the study cannot show that orders performed worse than no orders. A London study pointing the other way found that Sexual Risk Orders, which can be imposed without a conviction, were associated with an 84.5% reduction in arrest-measured sexual harm, in before-after analyses and comparisons with a group for whom orders were considered but not obtained (Whitten et al., 2025). That study was not specific to online offending, its comparison group was not randomly formed, and the authors called for a randomized trial. In a diversion study reviewed by Seto (2025, Chapter 7), men with limited CSAM offending and no prior sexual offense who were diverted to treatment and probation supervision and later reoffended typically did so after treatment and supervision ended, a pattern Seto notes is consistent with supervision suppressing reoffending while it lasted, with an adverse effect of unneeded treatment, or with differences between the diverted and comparison groups.
Together, these studies show that some people continue online sexual activity under orders or after release and that court-imposed prohibitions may be associated with reduced harm in some settings. They do not show whether any particular internet condition changes reoffending by people convicted of online offenses.
Matching Conditions to Assessed Risk
The risk principle, a core finding of correctional research, holds that supervision and treatment intensity should match assessed risk, with the most intensive services directed at those at highest risk. In a study of 133 people on probation for sexual offenses, greater adherence to the risk principle in supervision level and treatment dosage was associated with significantly better compliance, and non-adherence with worse outcomes (Miller et al., 2025). The sample was small, came from one jurisdiction, and measured compliance rather than recidivism. Seto (2025, Chapter 7) applies the risk principle to online offending, reserving the most intensive responses, including prolonged community supervision, for people at higher assessed risk and suggesting that those at the lowest risk may need minimal intervention beyond prosecution and sentencing. He also cautions that a low static score does not end the inquiry, because people at low static risk may still warrant added support and monitoring when dynamic risk factors are elevated (Seto, 2025, Chapter 6).
Seto (2025, Chapter 7) offers one evaluation as a possible example of treatment more intensive than risk warranted. The evaluation of the prison-based Core Sex Offender Treatment Programme in England and Wales, a cognitive-behavioral group program of about 180 hours, used propensity-score matching to compare 2,562 men who began the program between 2000 and 2012 with similar men who did not take it (Mews et al., 2017). Over an average follow-up of 8.2 years, 10.0% of treated men and 8.0% of comparison men had a proven sexual reoffense, and 4.4% and 2.9%, respectively, had a proven child-image reoffense; both differences were statistically significant. Treated men had more proven child-image reoffending than matched comparison men, and Seto considers treatment mismatched to risk one possible explanation for the pattern among men with CSAM offenses. The evaluation was not a study of online offenders: the 4.4% and 2.9% figures describe further image offending across the full treated and comparison groups, only 116 treated men (4.5%, before matching) had an image index offense, and the report did not analyze that group separately. The design was not randomized, the outcome was proven reoffending, and the authors acknowledged possible unmeasured differences between the groups and recommended a randomized trial. The study bears on the intensity of treatment ordered as a condition; it does not address internet conditions, and it does not show that treatment is ineffective for any particular person.
For people convicted of CSAM offenses, the dynamic-risk research supports tailoring conditions to the problems a particular person presents. Because further offending in CSAM-only samples is mostly further CSAM offending, device-focused conditions are more closely tied to the documented risk in those cases than conditions modeled on contact offending, although an individual history may justify either. In Seto’s motivation–facilitation model, internet access and online opportunities are situational factors that affect access and opportunity to offend, and he lists probation or parole conditions on internet access among the ways interventions address situational factors, alongside measures directed at motivation and at facilitating factors such as offense-supportive cognitions (Seto, 2025, Chapter 5). Drawing on Babchishin et al. (2023), he suggests that situational factors may matter relatively more in CSAM offending than in contact offending because fewer steps separate interest from behavior. On this view, internet conditions reduce opportunity rather than change the underlying motivation; the book describes this role but reports no outcome data for such conditions. Tools suitable for men convicted of CSAM offenses (Helmus et al., 2025) are discussed in the Psychosexual Risk Evaluations resource. The decline in risk with time offense-free supports periodic review of lifetime or very long conditions. For autistic supervisees, the Autism Online Offense resource discusses writing conditions as explicit, concrete rules.
Treatment delivered during supervision is also being studied in online form. The @myTabu trial in Germany is a placebo-controlled randomized trial of a clinician-guided, web-based program added to supervision as usual for adults under community supervision for child sexual abuse or CSAM offenses. It planned to enroll 582 participants, and its primary outcomes are change in self-reported dynamic risk factors and officially recorded reoffending, the latter assessed five years after the last participant finishes (Fromberger et al., 2021). Seto (2025, Chapter 8) describes the trial’s design and an early analysis of participants’ acceptance of the program but reports no outcome results. Searches for this paper of PubMed, Crossref, and the web in October 2026 located no published efficacy results. Interim analyses of the first 113 participants address acceptance and engagement; in one, 81% logged in within eight weeks of receiving access and 15% completed all requested sessions within the first five weeks (Schröder et al., 2025). Those analyses do not show whether the program reduces reoffending.
Collateral Effects: Employment, Treatment, and Reintegration
In a mail survey of New Jersey registrants after that state’s 2007 internet-restriction law, the most significant loss respondents reported was difficulty searching for employment (Tewksbury & Zgoba, 2010); only 107 of 1,000 sampled registrants responded. An earlier survey of 138 registrants, which addressed notification and residence-restriction laws rather than internet rules, found that a high percentage perceived those laws as harming employment, housing, and social relationships (Mercado et al., 2008).
These findings matter because reintegration is related to outcome: in New Zealand samples composed mostly of men with contact offenses against children, the quality of reintegration planning, including accommodation, employment, and social support, predicted sexual recidivism (Willis & Grace, 2008, 2009). The research does not show that internet restrictions increase reoffending, but it supports drafting conditions that do not foreclose the employment, education, treatment, and housing searches that now take place online.
Polygraph Conditions in Brief
Polygraph testing is a common condition of sex-offense supervision. A systematic review of 19 studies, none randomized, found that post-conviction polygraph testing increased disclosures, while effects on reoffending were significant for violent but not sexual reoffending (Elliott & Vollm, 2018). The disclosure research and the Fifth Amendment limits on compelled disclosures under Minnesota v. Murphy, United States v. Antelope, and United States v. Lee are discussed in the hub’s paper The Polygraph in Online Offense Cases.
Limits of the Evidence
The supervision outcome studies rely on arrests over limited follow-up and did not record conditions, so they cannot attribute outcomes to any condition. The order studies come from England, use accusations or arrests as outcomes, and lack equivalent comparison groups. The collateral-effects surveys rely on low-response self-report, and much of the dynamic-risk, reintegration, and time-free research comes from Canada and New Zealand or from men with contact offenses. Smartphones, encryption, cloud accounts, and generative tools are not addressed in outcome research. No study can tell a court whether a specific condition will prevent a specific person from reoffending, and group base rates cannot establish that a particular person is or is not dangerous.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the measured sexual rearrest figure, 2.6% over three years (Cohen & Spidell, 2016) or about 5% within 60 months (Cohen, 2023), is offered to support narrowing conditions, counsel can ask what exactly was counted: arrests over a limited follow-up, a floor rather than a complete count, in studies that did not record conditions. When the 84.5% reduction in arrest-measured sexual harm associated with Sexual Risk Orders (Whitten et al., 2025) is offered for restrictive conditions, the questions are who was compared with whom, since the comparison group was not randomly formed, and whether a study not specific to online offending applies to this person. When the finding that 56 of 102 registered suspects were later accused of further sexual offenses (Wainwright et al., 2025) is cited to show that orders do not work, it is fair to ask whether that conclusion follows from a design with no comparison group and accusation as the outcome. When the risk-principle study (Miller et al., 2025) is cited, counsel can ask how much evidence it rests on: 133 people in one jurisdiction, measured on compliance rather than recidivism. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Supervision Conditions and the Law
Federal Standards
For many federal sex offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2245, 2250–2252A, and 2421–2423, § 3583(k) authorizes supervised release of five years to life. Under § 3583(d), a discretionary condition must be reasonably related to the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, and the needs for deterrence, public protection, and treatment; must involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary; and must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. For a person required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, §§ 3563(b)(23) and 3583(d) authorize a condition requiring submission to search of person, property, residence, vehicle, papers, computers, and other electronic devices or media, by law enforcement or probation officers on reasonable suspicion, or by a probation officer in the lawful discharge of supervision functions.
The Guidelines were restructured effective November 1, 2025 (amendment 835). Section 5D1.3(b)(1) now directs an individualized assessment of which discretionary conditions are warranted, and new § 5D1.4 governs modification and early termination on the same basis. When the offense of conviction is a sex offense, § 5D1.3(b)(3)(G) recommends treatment and monitoring in a probation-approved program; “a condition limiting the use of a computer or an interactive computer service in cases in which the defendant used such items”; a reasonable-suspicion search condition covering computers and electronic devices; and no contact with victims. The computer condition is thus keyed to the defendant’s use of such items, and the commentary’s definition of “sex offense” excludes failure to register under § 2250.
Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) held that a North Carolina law barring registered sex offenders from commercial social networking sites violated the First Amendment. The law applied to people who had completed their sentences. The Court assumed the law was content neutral and applied intermediate scrutiny, held that it was not narrowly tailored, and noted that narrowly tailored laws remain available; three Justices concurred only in the judgment and criticized parts of the majority’s reasoning. The decision does not bar all supervision conditions that limit internet use. Courts disagree about how far its reasoning reaches supervision conditions.
Several circuits have vacated total or near-total bans. In United States v. Voelker (3d Cir. 2007), a receipt case, the court vacated a lifetime computer and internet ban with no employment or education exception and directed consideration of filtering or monitoring software. In United States v. Holena (3d Cir. 2018), it vacated internally inconsistent lifetime conditions banning computer and internet use without officer approval, said blanket internet bans will rarely be tailored enough and lifetime blanket bans are presumptively excessive, discussed the First Amendment concerns raised by Packingham, and required consideration of monitoring and filtering as less restrictive alternatives. In United States v. Perazza-Mercado (1st Cir. 2009), where the internet was not an instrumentality of the contact offense, a 15-year ban on home internet use was an abuse of discretion; on plain-error review the court also vacated an unexplained ban on possessing any pornography. In United States v. Ramos (1st Cir. 2014), a case of aiding and abetting the production of child pornography, the court affirmed the conviction and prison sentence but, applying Perazza-Mercado, vacated the supervised release conditions that generally barred computer and internet use without approval of the probation officer or the court, and the condition barring “pornographic material,” because they were not reasonably related to the defendant’s characteristics and history; narrower restrictions he had not challenged remained. In United States v. Eaglin (2d Cir. 2019; slip op. at 15-23) and United States v. Ellis (4th Cir. 2021) (Ellis I), both failure-to-register cases, the courts vacated internet bans and bans on legal adult pornography that the record did not tie to the offense or to the defendant’s own internet conduct; Ellis I added that § 3583(d) does not authorize a condition to be used as a “stick” to encourage desired behavior. In an unpublished, nonprecedential 2021 opinion in United States v. Becerra, the Fifth Circuit held on plain-error review that absolute ten-year computer, internet, and device bans were not narrowly tailored in scope or duration, even though the defendant had used computers in his child pornography offenses; that opinion replaced an earlier published one, which should not be cited.
Other decisions uphold narrower or case-specific conditions. In United States v. Ellis (4th Cir. 2024) (Ellis II), the court affirmed a bar on internet-capable devices without probation-officer approval except as required for employment, with six months of location monitoring, holding that the condition was not a complete ban, that the approval requirement did not delegate a core judicial function, and that repeated unauthorized devices justified it; a dissent would have treated it as a de facto personal-use ban. In United States v. Hamilton (4th Cir. 2021), a child pornography possession case, a lifetime restriction allowing internet access only with the probation officer’s prior approval was upheld because it was tied to the defendant’s use of the internet in his offense, where he had used it to meet the victim and contact her afterward; the court noted that the condition could later be modified. In the same case, the court vacated a separate condition barring any employment without the officer’s prior approval, holding that it lacked a nexus to the offense and gave the officer unguided discretion. In United States v. Bobal (11th Cir. 2020), the defendant was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) through text messages and of committing a felony involving a minor while required to register, and he had a prior Florida conviction for using a computer to solicit a child. His lifetime supervised release barred any computer use except, with the court’s prior approval, for authorized employment. Reviewing for plain error because he had not objected, the court found Packingham distinguishable because the restriction did not outlast supervised release, was tailored to the offense, and allowed court approval for permissible uses, and it affirmed. An unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, United States v. Washington (2019), similarly affirmed a court-approval computer condition on plain-error review. Search conditions have generally been upheld; in United States v. Hathorn (5th Cir. 2019), the court upheld a reasonable-suspicion search condition covering computers and phones in a drug case. Across circuits, conditions must be clear enough to give notice of what is prohibited, officers may implement details but may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment, and conditions that contradict one another invite reversal, as in Holena.
Military Standards
Courts-martial do not impose supervised release. Post-confinement supervision comes through parole or mandatory supervised release under DoD Instruction 1325.07 (Nov. 21, 2024, Change 1, June 6, 2025). A prisoner whose confinement exceeds one year must be reviewed by the service clemency and parole board for mandatory supervised release, and the board reviews all prisoners with confinement of three years or more. The prisoner must submit a plan stating where and with whom the person will live and showing employment, effective employment assistance, or a valid educational or vocational program. The board may add reasonable conditions that would further the transition to civilian life or better protect the community, and its chair, at the chair’s discretion or at the supervising U.S. probation officer’s request, may modify any condition or terminate supervision. Supervision runs up to the full term of the sentence, and violations may lead to revocation. Because the board sets these conditions after confinement, sentencing advocacy affects them only indirectly.
In United States v. Pena (C.A.A.F. 2007), an airman released on mandatory supervised release for the last 72 days of his term was subject to 25 conditions, including sex-offender treatment for at least 24 months at his own expense and consent to periodic computer examinations and installation of monitoring hardware or software at his expense. The court held that none of the conditions constituted cruel or unusual punishment, that he had not made a clear record that they increased his punishment beyond the adjudged confinement, and that his plea was not improvident because chief reliance rests on defense counsel, not the military judge, to advise about such collateral consequences. Article 107a, UCMJ, makes violating parole conditions an offense for a person subject to the Code, and R.C.M. 1107(c) and (d) require that conditions of a suspended sentence be in writing and served on the probationer and that the suspension period not be unreasonably long. These rules are cited from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; Executive Order 14130 (Dec. 20, 2024), which postdates it, did not amend R.C.M. 1107.
Arizona
After a felony conviction for an offense in chapter 14 or chapter 35.1 of Title 13, which includes sexual exploitation of a minor under A.R.S. § 13-3553, probation may extend to life where probation is available (§ 13-902(E)). For a person convicted on or after November 1, 2006, of a dangerous crime against children who is placed on probation, must register, and is classified as level three, the court must require GPS or electronic monitoring for the whole term (§ 13-902(G)). Under Rule 27.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court may impose conditions that promote rehabilitation and protect any victim, the probation officer may impose regulations implementing and consistent with them, and the probationer must receive both in writing. The statewide uniform conditions (Ariz. Code of Judicial Admin. § 6-207) contain no sex-offender, computer, or internet terms, so those terms appear as special conditions.
As of November 10, 2026, the current codified text of § 13-901(B), as amended by S.B. 1662 (2026 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 186, approved June 19, 2026), provides the following; the enacted text reviewed contains no emergency clause, so the general effective date of September 12, 2026 would apply, and the act has no applicability, retroactivity, or transition section, so its text does not say whether it reaches people already on probation; that question is for the court. Unless otherwise required by law, the court or probation officer must impose only conditions that are reasonably necessary, individually determined, and narrowly tailored to help the defendant lead a law-abiding life, protect public safety, and promote rehabilitation, informed by the defendant’s criminogenic risk and needs as established by a validated risk assessment tool. The court or officer must consider waiving unnecessary standard conditions; before imposing a special condition, must determine whether it is more restrictive than reasonably necessary; and may not impose it unless it is supported by the record. Conditions must also be informed by the findings of any presentence report prepared under § 13-701. The codified text does not mention internet terms, and no appellate decision applying it to a sex-offense internet condition was located. It bears directly on blanket device terms and makes a validated risk assessment and a developed record part of drafting conditions.
In State v. Campo (Ariz. App. 2026), a published opinion in which the court treated the probationer’s appeal as a special action and granted partial relief, the Court of Appeals reviewed modified conditions for a person on lifetime probation for offenses that did not involve the internet. It upheld bans on filming in court facilities, including probation offices, and in therapy, with a related takedown requirement, but vacated a ban on recording probation officers because the record did not show that it served officer safety. It treated the recordings as protected speech under the Arizona Constitution, applied the rule that conditions restricting constitutional rights receive special scrutiny and require a reasonable nexus to the goals of probation (State v. Davis, 1978), and cited Packingham on the importance of social media; the research for this paper did not verify whether a petition for review was filed or when the mandate issued, so its finality should be confirmed on the court’s docket before it is cited. Campo did not decide the validity of an internet-access term, and the research for this paper located no published Arizona appellate decision squarely addressing a computer or internet ban for a sex-offense probationer.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The case law supports device and internet conditions tied to the record, such as internet use in the offense, a prior computer-facilitated offense, and repeated unauthorized devices, and the forum research suggests that anonymizing-network activity may also bear on the record. Approval-based conditions (some with an employment exception), location monitoring, and reasonable-suspicion searches have survived review (Ellis II, Hamilton, Bobal, Hathorn), and the registrant search condition is authorized by statute. The finding that recorded further sexual offending in CSAM-only samples is mostly further CSAM offending supports device-focused conditions in those cases. Prosecutors are often best positioned to make the record that § 3583(d), § 5D1.3(b), and amended A.R.S. § 13-901(B) require, to avoid internally inconsistent conditions, and to propose the least restrictive condition that addresses the documented risk.
The research and case law also counsel caution. Total or lifetime bans without individualized findings have repeatedly been vacated, particularly where the internet played no part in the offense, and bans on legal adult material need their own record support. Several upholding decisions, including Bobal and Washington, were plain-error affirmances, and Bobal’s restriction required the court’s approval, not an officer’s. No outcome study shows that bans or monitoring reduce reoffending, so effectiveness should not be presented as an empirical fact; the English data showing reoffending while under orders come from a suspect sample with no comparison group.
Special Issues for Defense
The circuit decisions requiring individualized findings, consideration of less restrictive alternatives, and attention to employment and education support challenges to untailored bans, especially where the offense had no internet nexus (Perazza-Mercado, Eaglin, Ellis I), and the Guidelines recommend a computer limitation only where the defendant used such items. The outcome data support proportionality arguments: measured sexual rearrest among federal CSAM supervisees of 2.6% over three years and about 5% over five years (arrest-based minimum estimates), routine upward overrides of supervision level, and declining risk with time offense-free, which supports periodic review and early-termination requests. In Arizona, amended § 13-901(B) supports challenges to boilerplate special terms not supported by the record or informed by a validated risk assessment, and Campo requires a nexus for speech-restrictive conditions. Defense counsel are often best positioned to propose workable alternatives, such as monitored use or approval under defined criteria, and in military cases to advise clients about board-imposed conditions, a responsibility Pena places chiefly on defense counsel rather than the military judge.
The research and case law also counsel caution. The absence of outcome studies does not show that monitoring is ineffective, and arguing that it has no value overstates the evidence. Approval-based restrictions, including lifetime restrictions, have been upheld in some circuits, and search conditions for registrants are authorized by statute. Measured base rates rest on official records that undercount offending, and a client’s own history, such as prior computer-facilitated offenses or unauthorized devices, may justify restrictive conditions. Becerra is unpublished, and the precedential vacating decisions should be relied on instead.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Legal Authorities
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017).
United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Becerra, No. 19-50447 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished).
United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2020).
United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2019).
United States v. Ellis, 984 F.3d 1092 (4th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Ellis, 112 F.4th 240 (4th Cir. 2024).
United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Hathorn, 920 F.3d 982 (5th Cir. 2019).
United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2018).
United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2003).
United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2009).
United States v. Ramos, 763 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2014).
United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007).
United States v. Washington, No. 18-11021 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished).
United States v. Pena, 64 M.J. 259 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
State v. Campo, No. 1 CA-CR 25-0241 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2026) (published; P.3d and Ariz. Reports citations not yet assigned in the sources reviewed).
State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 140, 579 P.2d 1110 (App. 1978).
U.S. Const. amend. I.
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(23).
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), (k).
10 U.S.C. § 907a (Article 107a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 5D1.3, 5D1.4 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2025).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 835 (eff. Nov. 1, 2025).
U.S. Department of Defense, Instruction 1325.07, Administration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Programs (Nov. 21, 2024, incorporating Change 1, June 6, 2025).
R.C.M. 1107, 1108 (Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 2024 ed.).
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 6.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-701.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-901(B) (as amended by 2026 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 186 (S.B. 1662); the act is silent on application to people already on probation).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(E), (G).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.1.
Ariz. Code of Judicial Admin. § 6-207 (as amended through Admin. Order No. 2026-151, eff. Sept. 12, 2026).
Related topic papers: The Polygraph in Online Offense Cases · Recidivism of People Convicted of Online Sexual Offenses · Risk Assessment Tools for Online Offenders · Undisclosed Offending, the “Dark Figure,” and the Butner Study · Culpability and Sentencing Factors in CSAM Cases · Sex Offender Registration and Collateral Consequences · Search, Seizure, and CyberTipline Investigations · Pretrial Release in Online Cases
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Autism Online Offense: Sentencing · Courts-Martial