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Online Offense

Sex Offender Registration and Collateral Consequences

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How do registration duties attach after online sexual offenses, how long do they last, and does registration reduce offending or track risk?
  • What the research shows: A 2023 meta-analysis of 18 studies found no statistically significant effect of registration and notification on sexual recidivism; one study linked registration with law enforcement to fewer offenses against known victims, and one state saw fewer first-time sex-crime arrests after its law. Federal tiers tracked risk poorly in several studies.
  • What it does not show: These are group-level findings, mostly from contact-offender samples; none isolates CSAM-only registrants, and none can say whether a particular registrant is dangerous or make registration unlawful.
  • What the law requires: Under SORNA, CSAM possession alone is tier I (15 years, reducible to 10) and distribution or production is tier II (25 years, no reduction, Nazerzadeh). Court-martial convictions trigger registration through DoD rules, and for federal and UCMJ convictions § 2250 punishes a knowing failure to register without proof of interstate travel. Arizona registration is, with exceptions, life-long (Trujillo), and § 13-3826 termination is unavailable for § 13-3553 convictions.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should not equate tier with risk or claim notification reduces registrants’ recidivism; defense counsel should not claim registration has no measurable effect, and should address registration at the plea stage (Miller, Riley, Rose), where the offense chosen can fix its length.

For many people convicted of online sexual offenses, the longest-lasting consequence of the case is not the sentence but the duty to register. Registration can last fifteen years, twenty-five years, or a lifetime; it determines where and how often a person must report, whether neighbors and employers are notified, whether a passport carries an endorsement, and whether a missed update becomes a new federal felony. Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography,” and this paper uses that term when describing the law; elsewhere it uses child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

Registration reaches court in plea negotiations, where the choice of offense can fix the tier and length of registration; in the guilty plea inquiry; at sentencing; in prosecutions for failure to register; and in petitions to terminate registration. In online cases the differences among possession, receipt, distribution, production, and solicitation matter more than in most areas, because registration law sorts people by statutory category rather than by an assessment of the person.

This paper describes how registration is assigned under federal, military, and Arizona law, the research on whether registration and notification reduce offending and whether tiers track risk, the research on failure to register, and the collateral consequences of registration. Juvenile registration is addressed in the Child Abuse Allegations materials and in “Sextortion and Self-Generated Images of Minors”; time offense-free and evaluations for relief are addressed in the Psychosexual Risk Evaluations resource; and internet restrictions on registrants are discussed in “Supervision Conditions and Internet Restrictions.”

How Registration Is Assigned: Offense, Not Risk

The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), enacted in 2006, sets minimum standards for states, territories, tribes, and the District of Columbia and sorts offenders into three tiers by the offense of conviction. Tier III covers offenses comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242), abusive sexual contact against a child under 13, and kidnapping of a minor by a nonparent. Tier II covers offenses punishable by more than one year that are comparable to or more severe than sex trafficking, coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), transportation of a minor for illegal sexual activity, or abusive sexual contact against a minor, and it expressly includes use of a minor in a sexual performance and “production or distribution of child pornography.” Tier I is everyone else. SORNA’s list of specified offenses against a minor separately names possession, production, or distribution of child pornography and the use of the internet to facilitate or attempt criminal sexual conduct involving a minor (34 U.S.C. § 20911).

The result for online offenses is mechanical. Possession alone is tier I; distribution, production, and § 2422(b) enticement are tier II. Registration lasts 15 years for tier I, 25 years for tier II, and life for tier III. A tier I registrant with a 10-year “clean record” (no conviction punishable by more than a year, no new sex offense, successful supervision, and completion of a certified treatment program) may have the period reduced by five years; tier II has no reduction, and tier III may be reduced only when it rests on a juvenile adjudication (34 U.S.C. § 20915). The tier II text names production and distribution of child pornography but not receipt or possession, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission has described offenders convicted of receipt or possession as tier I offenders (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012); the research for this paper located no appellate decision squarely addressing receipt.

Arizona does not use SORNA’s tiers. A.R.S. § 13-3821(A) lists the offenses requiring registration, including sexual exploitation of a minor (§ 13-3553, Arizona’s CSAM statute), commercial sexual exploitation of a minor (§ 13-3552), luring (§ 13-3554), aggravated luring (§ 13-3560), and sexual extortion of a victim under 15 (§ 13-1428), as well as qualifying out-of-state convictions. Under § 13-3821(C), the court may also order registration for other chapter 14 and 35.1 offenses or for any offense with a sexual-motivation finding under § 13-118. Separately, § 13-3825 has local law enforcement assign each registrant a notification level, and the level determines whether neighbors, schools, employers, and the media are notified.

Court-martial convictions are assigned by regulation. The Secretary of Defense designates the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) offenses requiring sex offender notification, and SORNA incorporates them (34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(iv)). Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1325.07, reissued November 21, 2024 (Change 1, June 6, 2025; as of November 2026, verify the current text), provides that a service member convicted at a general or special court-martial of an offense in the Department’s separately published “covered offenses tables” must register where the member will reside, work, or attend school, on leaving confinement or on conviction if not confined. The tables include the Article 134 child pornography offenses: possessing, receiving, or viewing; possessing with intent to distribute; distributing; and producing. It excludes consensual conduct between adults (unless the adult was in the offender’s custodial care) and consensual conduct with a victim at least 13 by an offender no more than four years older, tracking SORNA, and requires that members be told that a jurisdiction may require registration for offenses not on the list.

In each system, registration follows the offense of conviction. None assigns the duty to register by an individualized risk assessment, although Arizona’s notification levels involve a law enforcement assessment after the duty has attached.

Does Registration or Notification Reduce Offending?

Most of this research is not specific to online offenses. The most comprehensive synthesis, a meta-analysis of 18 studies, 42 effect sizes, and 474,640 adults released after incarceration for sexual offenses, found no statistically significant effect of registration and notification on sexual recidivism (odds ratio 0.978; 17 studies) or on nonsexual recidivism (Zgoba & Mitchell, 2023). Heterogeneity was extreme, outcomes came from official records, and there were too few studies to test which features of the laws mattered.

Individual studies point in more than one direction. Agan (2011), using state arrest trends, about 9,000 people released from prison in 1994, and Washington, D.C. census blocks, found no evidence that registries reduced sex-offense arrests or recidivism. Bouffard and Askew (2019) found no effect of the original law or its expansions on sexual offending in a large Texas metropolitan area from 1977 to 2012, and Sandler, Freeman, and Socia (2008, pp. 284, 297) found no effect on sex-offense arrest rates in New York. On the other side, Prescott and Rockoff (2011, pp. 161, 164, 175), using incident data from 15 states, found registration with law enforcement associated with fewer sex offenses, concentrated among victims known to the offender, while public notification appeared to deter people not yet registered but was associated with more offending by those already registered. Letourneau and colleagues (2010) found an approximately 11% reduction in first-time sex-crime arrests in South Carolina after its 1995 law, with no comparable change for assault or robbery and no added effect when the registry went online in 1999.

Read together, these studies do not support a claim that registration and notification, as a package, reduce reoffending by people already registered. They leave room for two narrower propositions: that information held by law enforcement may have value, and that a registry may deter some first-time offending. The studies were conducted largely before or early in SORNA’s implementation, in contact-offender samples, and none isolates people convicted only of CSAM or solicitation offenses.

Do Tiers Track Risk?

Zgoba and colleagues (2016) classified 1,789 men released from prison in Minnesota, New Jersey, Florida, and South Carolina into SORNA tiers. Sexual recidivism was about 5% at five years and 10% at ten. Men in tier II had higher Static-99R scores and higher recidivism than men in tier III, an inverse relation significant in Florida; most men fell in tier III, yet more than half of them scored low or moderate-low on the Static-99R, and actuarial tools and the states’ existing systems sorted risk better. Freeman and Sandler (2010) found that New York registrants classified as tier I were rearrested more often than those in tiers II and III. Harris, Lobanov-Rostovsky, and Levenson (2010) found that reclassification in Ohio and Oklahoma moved many registrants into higher tiers, that the new top tier differed substantially from those previously designated high risk, and that juveniles and retroactively covered registrants were disproportionately placed in it.

None of these studies analyzed online offenders separately, but the federal statute places distribution in tier II and possession in tier I without regard to risk factors, and detected sexual recidivism after non-production CSAM offenses has varied by group and follow-up period and is a minimum estimate. The U.S. Sentencing Commission (2012) found sexual recidivism, defined as arrest or conviction for a sexual offense, of 7.4% over an average of about 8.5 years, and 4.3% of offenders released or placed on probation in 2015 were rearrested for a sex offense within three years (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2021); these figures are discussed in “Recidivism of People Convicted of Online Sexual Offenses.” Reviewing the CSAM follow-up research, Seto (2025, Chapter 6) concludes that people with both CSAM and contact offenses are the highest-risk group and that detected contact recidivism among CSAM-only groups has been low in the samples studied; because self-report studies find much higher rates of admitted contact offending (about 55% in six samples, mostly from treatment or polygraph settings; Seto et al., 2011) and detection undercounts, those detected figures are a floor. Hanson and colleagues (2018), pooling more than 7,000 men, found that risk declines substantially the longer a person remains offense-free, which fixed terms do not take into account. Summarizing that work, Hanson (2018) estimated that 57 of every 100 people with a sexual offense history would fall below a desistance threshold after 10 years offense-free, and 85 after 15; he set the threshold at a five-year sexual recidivism rate under 2%, about the rate at which people with nonsexual criminal records commit a first sexual offense. Lee, Brankley, and Hanson (2023) emphasized that low risk is not zero risk. Both are discussed in the Psychosexual Risk Evaluations resource.

Compliance and Failure to Register

Failure to register is a separate offense and is sometimes treated as a sign of danger. Zgoba and Levenson (2012) compared 644 New Jersey registrants who had failed to register with 481 who had not and found that failure to register did not significantly predict sexual recidivism, although those who failed to register were more likely to have had stranger and adult female victims. In a national study of law enforcement agencies, officers valued registration as an information tool while reporting concerns about data reliability, communication between systems, registrant homelessness and transience, and how the public reads registry data (Harris et al., 2018).

Collateral Consequences: Housing, Employment, Family, and Travel

In a survey of 121 Kentucky registrants, a significant minority reported stigmatization, loss of relationships, jobs, and housing, and verbal or physical assault (Tewksbury, 2005). Among 183 Florida registrants, about one third reported events such as loss of a job or home, threats or harassment, or property damage, and some reported positive effects, such as greater motivation to avoid reoffending (Levenson & Cotter, 2005); Tewksbury and Zgoba (2010) described how New Jersey registrants coped with registration and internet restrictions. These surveys rely on self-report from samples that may not be representative. Seto (2025, Chapter 6) summarizes a survey of 78 people convicted of CSAM offenses recruited from two states’ public registries, of whom 73% reported suicidal ideation and 19% a suicide attempt; fewer than 80 of more than 2,500 eligible registrants took part, and Seto discusses these findings in terms of the effects of investigation and detection rather than registration as such. Residence restrictions have been evaluated directly: a propensity-matched study in Michigan and Missouri found little evidence that they changed recidivism (Huebner et al., 2014), and a matched Florida sample of 330 found no significant relationship between sexual reoffending against children and proximity to schools or daycares (Zandbergen et al., 2010).

International travel is now regulated. After Nichols v. United States (2016) held that SORNA as then written did not require an offender who moved abroad to update registration in the state he left, Congress enacted International Megan’s Law in 2016. It added the international travel offense in 18 U.S.C. § 2250(b), and under 22 U.S.C. § 212b the Secretary of State generally may not issue a passport to a “covered sex offender” identified by the Angel Watch Center without a “unique identifier,” and may revoke one issued without it; the identifier may be dropped once the person no longer must register. Under State Department practice, the endorsement states that the bearer was convicted of a sex offense against a minor, and passport cards are not issued because they cannot carry it, a practice rather than a statutory requirement. DoDI 5525.20 requires registrants it covers to report intended international travel at least 21 days in advance. Immigration consequences often turn on categorical analysis as well; in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions (2017), the Supreme Court held that, for statutory rape offenses based solely on age, “sexual abuse of a minor” under the immigration statute requires a victim younger than 16.

Limits of the Evidence

Every study described above is a group-level evaluation of a policy or classification scheme. Outcomes are official arrests, charges, or convictions, which undercount offending, although official counts can also err in the other direction: in an Ontario follow-up of men convicted of CSAM offenses, more than a third of new contact sexual charges were for historical offenses that came to light after the index case (Seto, 2025, Chapter 6); several studies assigned tiers retrospectively; and most effect studies were conducted in the first decade of the laws, in samples dominated by contact offenses. Extreme heterogeneity means an average effect near zero may conceal practices that help and others that harm. The research for this paper found no study of registration or notification effects limited to CSAM-only or solicitation registrants, whose detected base rates, which are minimum estimates, make any effect hard to detect. No study can say whether a particular registrant will reoffend, whether a registry prevented a particular offense, or whether a particular person’s tier is “correct.” Findings that registration does not reduce recidivism also do not establish that registration is punishment; courts treat that as a legal question, as Smith v. Doe (2003) and State v. Trujillo (2020) illustrate.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the 2023 meta-analysis (Zgoba & Mitchell, 2023) is cited to argue that registration has no effect, an attorney should ask how much evidence the conclusion rests on and how it was reached: the pooled effect was not statistically significant, but heterogeneity was extreme and there were too few studies to test which features of the laws mattered. When Prescott and Rockoff (2011) or Letourneau and colleagues (2010) are cited to show that registries work, the question is whether the conclusion follows from the design, and what was counted: arrest or incident trends in particular states and periods, with the deterrence finding concerning first-time offending rather than people already registered. When a tier is described as a measure of dangerousness, ask who was studied and compared with whom, since Zgoba and colleagues (2016) found that tiers tracked actuarial risk poorly in samples of men released from prison. Finally, ask whether any of these findings applies to this person, because none isolates CSAM-only or solicitation registrants and none can say whether a particular registrant will reoffend. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Registration and the Law

Federal Standards

Smith v. Doe (2003) held Alaska’s registration law, including internet publication, civil and nonpunitive, so its retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Carr v. United States (2010) held that a state-convicted offender’s interstate travel under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 must occur after the person became subject to SORNA; Reynolds v. United States (2012) held that SORNA did not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General so specified; and Gundy v. United States (2019), by a four-justice plurality with a concurrence in the judgment, rejected a nondelegation challenge to that authority. In United States v. Kebodeaux (2013), involving an airman convicted by special court-martial in 1999 of a sexual offense against a minor, the Court held that applying SORNA’s registration requirements to him was within Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause power.

Section 2250(a) punishes by up to 10 years a knowing failure to register or update by a person required to register under SORNA who was convicted under federal law (including the UCMJ) or District of Columbia, tribal, or territorial law, or who travels in interstate or foreign commerce or enters, leaves, or resides in Indian country. For federal and UCMJ convictions, the conviction itself satisfies the jurisdictional element. Subsection (b) is the international travel offense, subsection (c) provides an affirmative defense for uncontrollable circumstances the person did not recklessly create, if the person complied once they ended, and subsection (d) adds a consecutive 5 to 30 years if the person also commits a crime of violence.

Tiering of prior convictions follows the categorical approach. United States v. White (2015) applies tier provisions categorically, with a circumstance-specific inquiry limited to the victim’s age. United States v. Berry (2016) vacated a tier III classification based on presentence-report conduct because New Jersey child endangerment could be committed without the physical contact the tier III offenses require. United States v. Walker (2019) adopted a hybrid approach, comparing elements first and considering the victim’s age only after an elements match; because Walker’s Colorado offense swept more broadly than the federal comparator, he was tier I, had no duty to register during the charged period, and his § 2250 conviction was vacated. For direct online convictions, United States v. Nazerzadeh (2023) held that each tier II subparagraph is independently sufficient, that distribution is tier II, and that because the clean-record reduction is available only to tiers I and III, the defendant must register for 25 years; it reversed an order terminating his registration.

Military Standards

The Military Sex Offender Reporting Act of 2015 (34 U.S.C. § 20931) requires the Secretary of Defense to provide registration information to the national registry and public website for people released from military corrections facilities and those convicted by court-martial without confinement. DoDI 5525.20 requires notice on DD Form 2791 to the receiving registry and the U.S. Marshals Service National Sex Offender Targeting Center on conviction without confinement, on conviction with 31 days of confinement or fewer, and 30 days before release from longer confinement. DoDI 1325.07 adds that failure to notify does not relieve the offender of the duty to register. Its registration provisions refer to general and special courts-martial and do not mention summary courts-martial. A 2014 Inspector General evaluation (DODIG-2014-103) found the Department compliant with SORNA’s registration requirements but concluded that better processes would make compliance more efficient: of 197 release notices the targeting center received in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, 55% were compliant, 20% non-compliant, and 23% pending, and the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps corrections databases did not interface, while the Air Force had no centralized database. In 2020 the Justice Department’s SMART Office stated that the Department was still developing its § 20931 system; this paper located no later official evaluation.

Under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 201(f)(2)(E), if the accused objects before arraignment, a specification may not be tried by a judge-alone special court-martial when the military judge determines that it alleges an offense requiring sex offender notification under Department of Defense regulations. The 2024 Manual’s Discussion cites DoDI 1325.07 by its former title; Executive Order 14130 (December 20, 2024; as of November 2026) did not change the rule.

In United States v. Miller (2006), the accused pleaded guilty to offenses including receiving child pornography without being told he would have to register, and was later sentenced to three years in a Texas prison for violating that state’s registration law. The court found no ineffective assistance but directed that, in cases tried more than ninety days later, defense counsel advise the accused before trial of registration for any charged offense listed in the DoD Instruction and state on the record that the advice was given; failure to do so is not per se ineffective (63 M.J. at 459). In United States v. Rose (2012), the court held that counsel’s failure to comply with the accused’s reasonable request for information about sex offender registration, which counsel knew was a key concern, was deficient performance, while cautioning that not every failure to answer a client’s question will be; because the accused would not have pleaded guilty had he known he would have to register, the finding of ineffective assistance was upheld. United States v. Riley (2013) held that “in the context of a guilty plea inquiry, sex offender registration consequences can no longer be deemed a collateral consequence of the plea,” placed the ultimate burden on the military judge to ensure the plea is knowing, and departed from Miller‘s treatment of registration as a collateral consequence of the plea (slip op. at 12, 15, 18; Miller, 63 M.J. at 457-58). The decision was 3-2.

At sentencing the rule differs. United States v. Talkington (2014) held that registration “is a collateral consequence of the conviction alone, not the sentence,” because it follows from the conviction whatever punishment is adjudged; the accused may mention it in an unsworn statement, and the military judge may instruct the members, in substance, to disregard it. Two judges concurred in the result but would have required a tailored instruction. Applying Talkington, United States v. Palacios Cueto (2022) held that defense counsel were not deficient for failing to advise the accused to mention registration in his unsworn statement, because doing so would likely have prompted an instruction to disregard it. Riley and Talkington address different stages and do not conflict. The Supreme Court has likewise listed registration among effects commonly viewed as collateral (Chaidez v. United States, 2013), while Padilla v. Kentucky (2010), on which Riley drew, requires advice about deportation.

Arizona

Arizona’s statute has no clause declaring adult registration lifelong, but the duty has no end date except as the statute provides; the Arizona Supreme Court describes registration as, “with some exceptions, a life-long requirement” (State v. Trujillo, 2020, ¶ 11). The exceptions include discretionary juvenile registration ending at 25 (§ 13-3821(D)), termination after probation for offenses committed under 18 (§ 13-3821(G)), suspension or termination after a § 13-923 hearing (§ 13-3821(H)), a 10-year term for certain first offenders convicted of unlawful imprisonment or kidnapping of a minor (§ 13-3821(M)), and the § 13-3826 petition.

Section 13-3826 permits a person who has completed probation to petition to terminate registration only on an avowal that every listed factor is met, including that the person was at least 35 when filing and under 22 at the offense, that there was one victim who was at least 15 (or a peace officer or fictitious minor presented as 15 to 17), that no prison sentence was imposed, and that there was no felony or chapter 14 or 35.1 offense for 10 years after sentencing. Subsection (A)(10) excludes convictions or attempts under listed statutes, including § 13-3553. The State must prove by a preponderance that a factor is not met, the court must deny if any is not met, and it may deny for public safety or in the interests of justice. Arizona CSAM convictions, including attempts, therefore cannot be terminated this way, and the age factors close the route to most adults convicted of luring.

In Fushek v. State (2008), the court held that when a special allegation of sexual motivation in a misdemeanor prosecution exposes the defendant to possible registration, the Arizona Constitution guarantees a jury trial, even though registration is discretionary. In Trujillo, the court held that registration is a civil regulatory requirement rather than punishment, so a judge, not a jury, could find that the victim was under 18 for mandatory registration. The majority explained that Fushek “neither addressed nor decided” whether the sexual-motivation finding itself must be made by a jury; the dissent would have treated Fushek as controlling. Civil commitment is a separate proceeding, addressed in other hub papers and the Psychosexual Risk Evaluations resource.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

Registration is set by statute and regulation and has been upheld as civil and nonpunitive (Smith, Trujillo); research on its effectiveness does not change those holdings. The literature also supports some value: Prescott and Rockoff (2011, p. 164) found registration with law enforcement associated with fewer offenses against known victims, Letourneau and colleagues (2010) found fewer first-time sex-crime arrests, and law enforcement agencies report that registry information is useful (Harris et al., 2018). In relief proceedings, Lee and colleagues (2023) support the point that low risk is not zero risk. Because the tier and termination rules are mechanical, as Nazerzadeh and § 13-3826(A)(10) show, prosecutors are well positioned to ensure that plea terms state accurately which offense, and therefore which registration consequence, the defendant is accepting.

The research counsels caution as well. The 2023 meta-analysis does not support a claim that registration and notification reduce reoffending by people already registered, and Prescott and Rockoff (2011, p. 161) found notification associated with more offending by registrants. Tiers should not be described as measures of risk; the statute does not purport to measure risk, and several studies found it tracks risk poorly. In § 2250 prosecutions, the finding that failure to register did not predict sexual recidivism (Zgoba & Levenson, 2012) is no defense to a knowing violation, but it counsels against arguing that noncompliance alone shows dangerousness.

Special Issues for Defense

The law supports attention to registration from the first plea discussion. In online cases the difference between possession (tier I, 15 years, reducible to 10) and distribution (tier II, 25 years, no reduction) is often the largest consequence on the table, and in Arizona any § 13-3553 conviction forecloses a § 13-3826 petition. Military counsel must advise of registration (Miller), failing to answer an accused’s reasonable request for information about registration, when it is a key concern, can be ineffective assistance (Rose), the military judge must confirm that advice (Riley), and R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(E) permits an objection to a judge-alone special court-martial. Tiering of prior or non-federal convictions can be tested under the categorical and hybrid approaches (White, Berry, Walker). In relief proceedings, evaluators may address time offense-free, the detected base rates after CSAM-only offenses (minimum estimates that differ by group and follow-up), and the limited fit between tiers and actuarial risk, through an individualized evaluation.

The research also limits defense arguments. It does not show that registration “does nothing”: registration-only effects and deterrence of first-time offending appear in the literature, and the meta-analysis found extreme variation rather than a uniform null. The collateral-consequence studies rely on self-report from small, selective samples. Group-level findings cannot show that a particular client is low risk, and low risk is not zero risk. At a court-martial, Talkington permits the accused to mention registration in an unsworn statement but also permits the military judge to instruct the members to disregard it.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Tewksbury, R., & Zgoba, K. M. (2010). Perceptions and coping with punishment: How registered sex offenders respond to stress, internet restrictions, and the collateral consequences of registration. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 54(4), 537–551. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X09339180

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2012). Report to the Congress: Federal child pornography offenses. https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-reports/2012-report-congress-federal-child-pornography-offenses

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2021). Federal sentencing of child pornography: Non-production offenses. https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-reports/federal-sentencing-child-pornography-non-production-offenses

Zandbergen, P. A., Levenson, J. S., & Hart, T. C. (2010). Residential proximity to schools and daycares: An empirical analysis of sex offense recidivism. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 37(5), 482–502. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854810363549

Zgoba, K. M., & Levenson, J. (2012). Failure to register as a predictor of sex offense recidivism: The big bad wolf or a red herring? Sexual Abuse, 24(4), 328–349. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063211421019

Zgoba, K. M., & Mitchell, M. M. (2023). The effectiveness of Sex Offender Registration and Notification: A meta-analysis of 25 years of findings. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 19(1), 71–96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-021-09480-z

Zgoba, K. M., Miner, M., Levenson, J., Knight, R., Letourneau, E., & Thornton, D. (2016). The Adam Walsh Act: An examination of sex offender risk classification systems. Sexual Abuse, 28(8), 722–740. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063215569543

Legal Authorities

Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010).

Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013).

Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385 (2017).

Fushek v. State, 218 Ariz. 285, 183 P.3d 536 (2008).

Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128 (2019).

Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. 104 (2016).

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012).

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).

State v. Trujillo, 248 Ariz. 473, 462 P.3d 550 (2020).

United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013).

United States v. Miller, 63 M.J. 452 (C.A.A.F. 2006), overruled in part by United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

United States v. Nazerzadeh, 73 F.4th 341 (5th Cir. 2023).

United States v. Palacios Cueto, 83 M.J. 323 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

United States v. Rose, 71 M.J. 138 (C.A.A.F. 2012).

United States v. Talkington, 73 M.J. 212 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Walker, 931 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2019).

United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2015).

Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).

Military Sex Offender Reporting Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, tit. V, § 502, 129 Stat. 227, 258 (2015).

International Megan’s Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders, Pub. L. No. 114-119, 130 Stat. 15 (2016).

18 U.S.C. § 2250.

22 U.S.C. § 212b.

34 U.S.C. § 20911.

34 U.S.C. § 20915.

34 U.S.C. § 20931.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(E) (2024 ed.).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3821.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3825.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3826.

Related topic papers: Child Sexual Abuse Material: Federal, Arizona, and Military Law · Culpability and Sentencing Factors in CSAM Cases · Recidivism of People Convicted of Online Sexual Offenses · Online Solicitation of Minors: Fantasy-Driven and Contact-Driven Offenders · Sextortion and Self-Generated Images of Minors · Supervision Conditions and Internet Restrictions · Search, Seizure, and CyberTipline Investigations

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Child Abuse Allegations · Courts-Martial