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Online Offense

Pretrial Release in Online Cases

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: When a person is charged with an online sexual offense, what does the law require for release or detention before trial, and what can research tell a court about risk during that period?
  • What the research shows: Federal release rates for sex-offense defendants fell from 54.6% to 40.0% between fiscal years 2008 and 2017. General pretrial tools show moderate accuracy overall (AUCs of about .67 to .71). Federal data link more conditions to more revocations without fewer rearrests, and monitoring studies are mixed.
  • What it does not show: No published study located for this paper reports pretrial misconduct, or pretrial-tool accuracy, specifically for people charged with child sexual abuse material (CSAM) or enticement offenses. Post-conviction base rates are not pretrial measures.
  • The law: Federal receipt, distribution, production, and enticement charges carry a rebuttable presumption of detention and mandatory Adam Walsh Act monitoring and curfew conditions; possession alone does not. Arizona’s supreme court struck categorical no-bail rules in Simpson and Wein, and detention now turns on an individualized dangerousness hearing. Military confinement requires that lesser restraint be inadequate (R.C.M. 305).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can rely on the statutory presumption and case-specific facts without presenting a charge as a measured risk; defense counsel can seek individualized, tailored conditions without claiming that a low tool score proves safety.

Release or detention is decided in nearly every case involving an online sexual offense, usually within days of arrest and often before the defense has seen the forensic report. Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography,” and this paper uses that term when describing the law; elsewhere it uses child sexual abuse material (CSAM). The decision carries high stakes on every side. A released defendant may have access to devices and, in some cases, to children; a detained defendant loses employment and family contact and may negotiate a plea from custody. A systematic review of 18 studies (Key et al., 2021) reported elevated suicide risk in some samples of people accused or convicted of image offenses, including around the time of investigation.

Courts make these decisions under legal frameworks that differ sharply. Federal law presumes detention for enticement charges and for CSAM charges other than simple possession and requires electronic monitoring and a curfew in any release order for listed offenses. Arizona’s constitution once barred bail outright for certain sexual offenses against minors, but the Arizona Supreme Court held those categorical bars unconstitutional, so detention now depends on an individualized showing of dangerousness. In the military, pretrial confinement is ordered by commanders and reviewed by neutral officers and military judges under Rule for Courts-Martial 305.

This paper describes what pretrial risk tools measure, the federal data on sex-offense defendants, the research on release conditions, suicide risk after arrest, and the consequences of detention, and then summarizes federal, military, and Arizona law. Post-conviction conditions, including the case law on internet bans, are discussed in the hub’s paper Supervision Conditions and Internet Restrictions.

What General Pretrial Risk Tools Measure

Federal pretrial services officers use the Pretrial Risk Assessment (PTRA), and Arizona courts have used the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) statewide for felony release since 2015 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2015-38). Both are general tools, built to predict failure to appear, new arrest, and, for the PTRA, revocation, across all offense types. In a revalidation, the PTRA predicted those outcomes with an area under the curve (AUC) of .71 (Cadigan et al., 2012); a later analysis of 243,454 federal observations reported AUCs from .675 to .713 for the current tool and proposed revisions (Valdez Hoffer & Lowenkamp, 2024). A systematic review of 11 studies of six instruments described predictive validity as typically good to excellent by its benchmarks, with lower validity for defendants of color in three comparisons (Desmarais et al., 2021), and a statewide Kentucky study of the PSA found validity within accepted ranges and recommended local validation (DeMichele et al., 2020). No Arizona-specific PSA validation was located.

Two design features matter in online cases. First, the PTRA scores a charge for a violent offense as zero, a choice its developers reported was debated (Cadigan et al., 2012), and a federal pretrial officer reported that the general tools score people charged with sex offenses very low (Muller, 2009). Second, none of these tools was designed or validated to predict sexual reoffending, contact with children, or new CSAM offending during release. Sex-offense defendants were 4.76% of the released federal sample in the 2024 analysis (5,471 people), but their outcomes were not reported separately; the authors proposed, as an option rather than an adopted revision, a dangerousness scale that counts sex-offense arrests and includes an item for a current or past child victim (AUC .74) (Valdez Hoffer & Lowenkamp, 2024).

A low general score therefore says little about the specific danger a court weighs in a CSAM or enticement case, and a charge-based presumption is not an empirical risk finding either. The Child Pornography Offender Risk Tool (CPORT) and other specialized tools were validated on post-conviction samples; they are discussed in Risk Assessment Tools for Online Offenders and in the Psychosexual Risk Evaluations resource. One CPORT item links the pretrial stage to later scoring: it counts any formal consequence for failing a condition of bail, probation, or parole, including on the current charges, and in the development sample the most common known failures were using the internet or being around children without a responsible adult when prohibited (Seto, 2025, Appendix).

Pretrial Outcomes for People Charged With Sex Offenses

The federal data describe release trends rather than outcomes for this group. From fiscal year 2008 to 2017, federal sex-offense pretrial cases rose 10% (2,544 to 2,799), while the release rate for sex-offense defendants fell from 54.6% to 40.0%, and from 70.2% to 52.2% among those with no prior felony arrest (Cohen & Austin, 2018). For all released federal defendants over that decade, 2% to 3% failed to appear and 7% to 8% were arrested for a new offense, but the report did not break outcomes out for sex-offense defendants or separate CSAM from other sex offenses. In a later sample of 114,827 released defendants, 1.64% failed to appear or absconded, 8.13% were arrested, 1.54% for a violent offense, and 10.72% had release revoked (Valdez Hoffer & Lowenkamp, 2024).

The only offense-specific federal account located is a practitioner report from the District of New Jersey, which had run a pretrial computer-monitoring program since 2001. Among 274 sex-offense defendants supervised from 2001 through 2007, the violation rate was 20%, and 82% of violations were technical; in 2008 the district released 85.1% of its 67 sex-offense defendants, against a national rate of 53.9% (Muller, 2009). The report is descriptive, from one district, with no comparison group.

Post-conviction base rates, including the detected contact reoffending reviewed in Recidivism of People Convicted of Online Sexual Offenses (for example, 2.0% over 1.5 to 6 years in Seto et al., 2011, with higher rates in later studies with longer follow-up), are often cited at release hearings. Those studies followed people for years after sentence, using official records that undercount offending, and bear on pretrial danger only by analogy.

Conditions of Release: Monitoring, Curfews, and Device Limits

Release orders in online cases commonly combine location monitoring, curfews, limits on contact with minors, and limits on internet-capable devices. The research on conditions is observational and not specific to sex-offense defendants. Among 223,260 released federal defendants, the average defendant had about nine conditions; conditions were not associated with rearrest or failure to appear, and each added condition raised the odds of revocation (odds ratio 1.07) (Cohen & Hicks, 2023). The study counted conditions and did not evaluate particular ones such as location monitoring or internet restrictions.

Monitoring studies point in different directions. In a matched District of New Jersey study (310 monitored, 310 comparison defendants), rearrest was lower with location monitoring (6.8% versus 10.6%) and failure to appear was the same (3.2%); the authors cautioned against definitive conclusions, and sex-offense defendants were 2.2% of the monitored group (Wolff et al., 2017). In a matched Santa Clara County study, electronic monitoring was associated with more revocations for technical violations (16.8% versus 4.3%), no difference in revocations for new arrests, and fewer for failure to appear (8.2% versus 22.6%) (Sainju et al., 2018). A systematic review of 34 studies found a heterogeneous pooled effect favoring monitoring, with significant reductions in recidivism for people convicted of sex offenses (Belur et al., 2020); those samples were mostly post-conviction, and the review does not establish the same effect before trial.

No study located for this paper evaluated pretrial internet or device restrictions. The absence of evidence cuts both ways: it does not show that device conditions prevent offending during release, or that they fail.

Suicide Risk After Search or Arrest

A systematic review of 18 studies, which included both accused and convicted people, reported suicide risk that in some samples exceeded the general-population rate many times over, with wide variation; reported risk factors included shame, no prior criminal justice contact, and the investigation itself, and people accused of image offenses appeared to be at particular risk (Key et al., 2021). The studies were heterogeneous and largely from the United Kingdom. Seto (2025, Chapter 6) recommends suicide risk assessment early in a police investigation, noting that becoming a suspect often means disclosure to family, the prospect of prison, and lasting notoriety, and that the effect may be greatest for people with no prior record, stable employment, and committed relationships.

This evidence does not point to a single release decision. It can support release with treatment, family support, and monitoring, or custody with observation; in either setting it supports early screening and a plan for the first days after arrest or search.

Consequences of Detention

Studies that exploit differences in the leniency of randomly assigned judges have examined what detention itself does. In Philadelphia and Miami-Dade, detention increased conviction, mainly through guilty pleas, had no net effect on future crime, and reduced formal employment (Dobbie et al., 2018). In 71 federal districts, release reduced sentence length and increased the likelihood of a below-Guidelines sentence and of avoiding a mandatory minimum (Didwania, 2020), a finding pertinent to receipt and distribution cases, which carry five-year minimums. In Kentucky data covering 1.49 million cases, detention of 24 hours or more was unrelated to failure to appear, and longer detention was associated with more new criminal activity (Holsinger et al., 2023). None of these studies is specific to sex offenses.

Limits of the Evidence

The central limit is a gap: no peer-reviewed study located for this paper reports failure to appear, new arrest, new sexual offending, or contact with minors during pretrial release for people charged with CSAM or enticement offenses, or PTRA or PSA accuracy for that group. The general tools predict appearance and general rearrest, not sexual reoffending. The monitoring and conditions studies come from single jurisdictions, use matched rather than randomized comparisons, and include few sex-offense defendants; the detention-consequence studies are not offense-specific; and the suicide literature is heterogeneous. No tool or study can tell a court whether a particular defendant will appear, offend, or harm himself during release; those questions require individualized findings.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the decline in release rates from 54.6% to 40.0% (Cohen & Austin, 2018) is offered to show either that detention is the norm or that courts have grown too restrictive, ask what exactly was counted: release decisions, with no measure of how released sex-offense defendants fared. When a low PTRA or PSA score is cited as evidence of safety, ask whether a general tool that scores a violent charge as zero (Cadigan et al., 2012) applies to the danger at issue. When the lower rearrest with monitoring (Wolff et al., 2017) or the higher technical revocations (Sainju et al., 2018) are cited, ask who was compared with whom, since both used matched samples from one jurisdiction with few sex-offense defendants. When the sex-offense finding of Belur et al. (2020) is cited, ask whether results from mostly post-conviction samples apply to a person awaiting trial. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Pretrial Release and the Law

Federal Standards

Under the Bail Reform Act, a court must release a defendant on personal recognizance or on the least restrictive conditions that will reasonably assure appearance and safety, unless no condition will do so (18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), (c), (e)). A finding that no condition will reasonably assure safety requires clear and convincing evidence (§ 3142(f)), and the court weighs the nature of the offense, including whether it involves a minor victim, the weight of the evidence, the defendant’s history and characteristics, and the seriousness of the danger (§ 3142(g)). United States v. Salerno (1987) upheld detention based on dangerousness against facial due process and Excessive Bail Clause challenges, relying on these procedures, and described liberty as the norm and detention as the carefully limited exception.

Section 3142(e)(3)(E) creates a rebuttable presumption of detention when there is probable cause of an offense involving a minor victim under listed sections, including §§ 2251 and 2251A, § 2252(a)(1)–(3) and § 2252A(a)(1)–(4) (transportation, receipt, distribution, and related offenses), § 2422 (including enticement under § 2422(b)), and § 2423. Simple possession under § 2252(a)(4) and § 2252A(a)(5) is not listed, so a possession-only charge carries no presumption. The government may still move for a detention hearing: any felony under chapter 110, the federal child pornography chapter, is defined as a “crime of violence” (§ 3156(a)(4)(C)), which brings it within § 3142(f)(1)(A), and § 3142(f)(1)(E) separately reaches other felonies involving a minor victim. Those later amendments closed the gap shown in United States v. Byrd (5th Cir. 1992), which held that receipt of child pornography was not then a crime of violence permitting a detention hearing. In United States v. Abad (8th Cir. 2003), a § 2423 case involving a 13-year-old girl, the court held that the presumption remains a factor after the defendant meets his burden of production, gave her claimed consent or willing participation essentially no weight (a 13-year-old cannot legally consent), discounted a family’s offer to supervise because the contact had occurred while he lived at home, and vacated a release order. Unpublished Tenth Circuit decisions have affirmed detention in receipt and distribution cases on records of sustained activity, communication with minors, and activity after account suspensions (United States v. Kroeker, 2022), or uncharged encounters with minors (United States v. Stickney, 2025).

Section 216 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 added a paragraph to § 3142(c)(1)(B) requiring that, in any case involving a minor victim under the same list of sections, or failure to register under § 2250, any release order contain, at a minimum, electronic monitoring and the conditions in clauses (iv) through (viii): limits on association, residence, and travel; no contact with the alleged victim and witnesses; reporting; a curfew; and no firearms. Possession-only cases are outside the mandate. Trial courts have differed on whether it applies when the “minor” was an undercover officer (United States v. Kahn, W.D. Wash. 2007, holding it inapplicable to a travel charge involving a fictitious 13-year-old; United States v. Rizzuti, E.D. Mo. 2009, a magistrate judge’s ruling applying it to attempted enticement; both as described in Dearinger, 2011).

The mandate’s constitutionality divides the trial courts; no circuit decision located for this paper has held it unconstitutional. A 2011 survey counted 17 trial-court decisions, of which seven found Eighth Amendment violations, eleven found Fifth Amendment due process violations, and three found separation-of-powers violations; its author concluded that the provision was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to most defendants (Dearinger, 2011). Examples include United States v. Torres (W.D. Tex. 2008), a failure-to-register case finding a facial due process violation and an as-applied excessive-bail violation; United States v. Polouizzi (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (unconstitutional as applied); and United States v. Karper (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (facially invalid under the Fifth Amendment and excessive as applied), while United States v. Gardner (N.D. Cal. 2007) upheld the conditions. In United States v. Stephens (8th Cir. 2010), a receipt and transportation case, the court rejected a facial challenge because the defendant could not show that no child pornography defendant warranted a curfew or monitoring, held that the judge sets the terms of those undefined conditions after an individualized determination, and left as-applied claims open. In United States v. Peeples (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), the court rejected facial and as-applied challenges and read the Act to require district courts to exercise discretion, to the extent practicable, in applying the conditions; the curfew had been adjusted to protect the defendant’s job (see also United States v. Kennedy, 9th Cir. 2009, unpublished). In United States v. Deppish (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), the court affirmed curfew and monitoring as the least restrictive conditions under ordinary § 3142(c) analysis after a magistrate judge had found the mandate unconstitutional.

Military Standards

Rule for Courts-Martial 304 defines four forms of pretrial restraint: conditions on liberty (orders to do or refrain from specified acts, which must not hinder trial preparation), restriction in lieu of arrest, arrest, and confinement. Breach is an offense, and restriction, arrest, or confinement starts the 120-day clock of R.C.M. 707. Under R.C.M. 305, confinement requires probable cause; the commander must decide within 72 hours whether it continues, a neutral officer reviews probable cause within 48 hours, and a neutral officer reviews necessity within 7 days (extendable to 10) under a preponderance standard, with the alleged victim’s right to be heard. Confinement is permitted only if it is foreseeable that the confinee will not appear or will engage in serious criminal misconduct, which includes witness intimidation and serious threats to community safety or to the command, and less severe restraint is inadequate (R.C.M. 305(i)(2)(B)). The Discussion lists factors including the offense, the evidence, ties, mental condition, and service record, and states that no one should be confined as a mere matter of convenience or expedience.

Because the Article 134 child pornography offense and offenses under Articles 120b and 120c are “covered offenses,” confinement or release of an accused charged with them must be reported immediately to a special trial counsel (R.C.M. 305(f); 10 U.S.C. § 801(17)). After referral (or in a pre-referral proceeding under R.C.M. 309), a military judge may order release, and must award day-for-day credit for confinement resulting from an abuse of discretion or procedural noncompliance, and may award more for abuse of discretion or unusually harsh circumstances (R.C.M. 305(k), (l)). Credit is also available for lawful pretrial confinement (United States v. Allen, C.M.A. 1984) and for restriction tantamount to confinement (United States v. Mason, C.M.A. 1985; United States v. King, C.A.A.F. 2003). Article 13 bars punishment before trial and conditions more rigorous than necessary to ensure presence; a proven violation earns additional credit (United States v. Mack, C.A.A.F. 2007), although the accused in United States v. Crawford (C.A.A.F. 2006) did not carry that burden. These claims are waived if not raised at trial (United States v. Chapa, C.A.A.F. 2002; United States v. Inong, C.A.A.F. 2003).

In United States v. Wardle (C.A.A.F. 2003), confinement was held authorized for an accused who was a flight risk, on a record including a suicide attempt of undetermined cause; the court did not decide whether suicide risk alone would justify confinement. No C.A.A.F. pretrial-confinement decision involving a child pornography charge was located. The rules are cited from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; Executive Order 14130 (Dec. 20, 2024) added the military judge’s pre-referral release power under R.C.M. 309 to R.C.M. 305(h) and did not otherwise change R.C.M. 304 or 305 (89 Fed. Reg. at 105346).

Arizona

Article 2, § 22 of the Arizona Constitution still lists sexual assault, sexual conduct with a minor under 15, and molestation of a child under 15 as offenses for which bail is denied when the proof is evident or the presumption great. In Simpson v. Miller (Ariz. 2017), the Arizona Supreme Court held the categorical bar for sexual conduct with a minor under 15 facially unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment because the offense, which reaches some consensual conduct between teenagers, does not inherently predict future dangerousness; detention requires an individualized hearing. In State v. Wein (Ariz. 2018), a 4–3 decision, the court held the bar for sexual assault facially unconstitutional for the same reason, while holding that no individualized review is required when the offense is allegedly committed while on bail for a separate felony; certiorari was denied (Arizona v. Goodman, No. 18-391, Jan. 14, 2019). In 2018 the legislature narrowed the statutory categories in A.R.S. § 13-3961(A) for sexual conduct with a minor and molestation to an adult defendant and a victim under 13, or a victim of 13 or 14 and a defendant at least 10 years older (Laws 2018, ch. 115). No appellate decision located for this paper resolves whether those categories, or the sexual-assault category still in the statute, can be enforced after Wein.

Detention in an online case therefore ordinarily runs through § 13-3961(D). On the State’s motion, a court may deny bail for any felony if it finds by clear and convincing evidence, after a hearing, that the person poses a substantial danger or engaged in conduct constituting a “violent offense,” that no conditions will reasonably assure safety, and that the proof is evident or the presumption great. A “violent offense” includes a dangerous crime against children, which under § 13-705 includes sexual exploitation of a minor (§ 13-3553, which reaches possession), luring, aggravated luring, and sexual extortion committed against a minor under 15, or against a person posing as one if the defendant knew or had reason to know the purported minor was under 15, and for exploitation offenses includes depictions indistinguishable from an actual minor under 15. Unlike the federal presumption, then, this provision can reach possession-only cases and stings involving a purported child under 15. On the State’s oral motion, the hearing ordinarily occurs at or within 24 hours of the initial appearance, and an indictment or information does not add to the strength of the proof (§ 13-3961(E), (F)). Whether detention resting on the charged conduct alone satisfies Simpson and Wein has not been tested in a decision located for this paper.

For bailable offenses, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 7.2(a) requires release on recognizance with only the mandatory conditions unless more are reasonably necessary, and then the least onerous conditions, considering the factors in A.R.S. § 13-3967(B). In Samiuddin v. Nothwehr (Ariz. 2017), a public sexual indecency to a minor case, the court held that a release condition may bar unsupervised contact with the defendant’s own non-victim children only after an individualized determination, supported by findings sufficient for appellate review, that it is the least onerous measure reasonable and necessary to mitigate an identifiable risk; no finding of actual harm and, generally, no evidentiary hearing is required. The conditions there were vacated for lack of an adequate record.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The federal presumption, the minor-victim factor in § 3142(g), and Arizona’s dangerous-crimes-against-children prong are legislative judgments that support detention arguments without any need for empirical overreach, and appellate courts have affirmed detention where the record showed case-specific facts such as sustained activity, direct contact or travel to meet a minor, uncharged encounters, and activity continuing after account suspensions (Abad, Kroeker, Stickney). The Adam Walsh Act conditions have survived facial review in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, and courts have reimposed the same conditions under ordinary § 3142(c) analysis (Deppish). Because the general tools were not built to measure sexual reoffending, a low score does not answer the danger question. Prosecutors are often best positioned to make the individualized record that Salerno, Simpson, Wein, Samiuddin, and R.C.M. 305(i)(2)(B) require.

The research and case law also counsel caution. A CSAM charge is not a measured risk, and the federal presumption does not reach possession alone. In Arizona, detention or no-contact conditions resting on the charge alone invite challenge under Simpson, Wein, and Samiuddin, and post-conviction base rates of detected sexual reoffending, which are minimum estimates, will be cited in response. Federal data associate added conditions with more revocations and no measured reduction in rearrest. In the military, confinement grounded in the nature of the charge without a showing that lesser restraint is inadequate invites release and credit under R.C.M. 305(k) and (l). Suicide-risk evidence can support supervised release with treatment as well as detention.

Special Issues for Defense

Possession-only federal charges carry no § 3142(e)(3)(E) presumption and fall outside the Adam Walsh Act mandate, although the government may still seek a detention hearing under § 3142(f)(1). Where the mandate applies, Stephens and Peeples leave room for individualized terms, and the district decisions in Torres, Polouizzi, and Karper support as-applied challenges. Salerno, Simpson, Wein, and Samiuddin make individualized proof and least-onerous conditions the governing standard, and R.C.M. 305 requires that less severe restraint be inadequate, with credit remedies. The research documents effects of detention on pleas, sentences, and employment (Dobbie et al., 2018; Didwania, 2020) and no measured benefit from stacking conditions (Cohen & Hicks, 2023). Defense counsel are often best positioned to propose workable alternatives, such as device monitoring, supervised family contact, and treatment, and to arrange early suicide-risk screening.

The research and case law also counsel caution. No study shows that people charged with CSAM offenses are low risk pending trial; the pretrial-specific data do not exist. Post-conviction base rates are not pretrial measures and rest on official records that undercount offending. A low general risk score does not prove safety any more than a charge proves danger. Monitoring evidence is mixed, with one matched federal study finding lower rearrest. In Arizona, the dangerous-crimes-against-children prong reaches possession of under-15 depictions and stings with a purported child under 15, and in reported federal cases facts such as contact with minors or continued activity after account suspensions have supported detention.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Belur, J., Thornton, A., Tompson, L., Manning, M., Sidebottom, A., & Bowers, K. (2020). A systematic review of the effectiveness of the electronic monitoring of offenders. Journal of Criminal Justice, 68, Article 101686. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2020.101686

Cadigan, T. P., Johnson, J. L., & Lowenkamp, C. T. (2012). The re-validation of the federal Pretrial Services Risk Assessment (PTRA). Federal Probation, 76(2). https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/76_2_1_0.pdf

Cohen, T. H., & Austin, A. (2018). Examining federal pretrial release trends over the last decade. Federal Probation, 82(2), 3–22. https://www.uscourts.gov/file/24870/download

Cohen, T. H., & Hicks, W., Jr. (2023). The imposition of pretrial conditions on released federal defendants: The overuse of conditions without providing any measurable benefits. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 50(12), 1852–1873. https://doi.org/10.1177/00938548231206829

Dearinger, B. (2011). The mandatory pretrial release provision of the Adam Walsh Act amendments: How “mandatory” is it, and is it constitutional? St. John’s Law Review, 85(4), 1343–1450.

DeMichele, M., Baumgartner, P., Wenger, M., Barrick, K., & Comfort, M. (2020). Public safety assessment: Predictive utility and differential prediction by race in Kentucky. Criminology & Public Policy, 19(2), 409–431. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12481

Desmarais, S. L., Zottola, S. A., Duhart Clarke, S. E., & Lowder, E. M. (2021). Predictive validity of pretrial risk assessments: A systematic review of the literature. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 48(4), 398–420. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854820932959

Didwania, S. H. (2020). The immediate consequences of federal pretrial detention. American Law and Economics Review, 22(1), 24–74. https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahz012

Dobbie, W., Goldin, J., & Yang, C. S. (2018). The effects of pretrial detention on conviction, future crime, and employment: Evidence from randomly assigned judges. American Economic Review, 108(2), 201–240. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161503

Holsinger, A. M., Lowenkamp, C. T., & Pratt, T. C. (2023). Is pretrial detention an effective deterrent? An analysis of failure to appear and rearrest says “no.” Federal Probation, 87(1), 3–7. https://www.uscourts.gov/file/76316/download

Key, R., Underwood, A., Farnham, F., Marzano, L., & Hawton, K. (2021). Suicidal behavior in individuals accused or convicted of child sex abuse or indecent image offenses: Systematic review of prevalence and risk factors. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 51(4), 715–728. https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12749

Muller, J. (2009). Implementing pretrial services risk assessment with a sex offense defendant population. Federal Probation, 73(2). https://www.uscourts.gov/file/22898/download

Sainju, K. D., Fahy, S., Baggaley, K., Baker, A., Minassian, T., & Filippelli, V. (2018). Electronic monitoring for pretrial release: Assessing the impact. Federal Probation, 82(3), 3–10. https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/82_3_1.pdf

Seto, M. C. (2025). Online sexual offending: Theory, practice, and policy (2nd ed.). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0000428-000

Valdez Hoffer, S. J., & Lowenkamp, C. T. (2024). Revising the Pretrial Risk Assessment (PTRA): Promising options. Federal Probation, 88(2), 26–34. https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/88_2_3.pdf

Wolff, K. T., Dozier, C. A., Muller, J. P., Mowry, M., & Hutchinson, B. (2017). The impact of location monitoring among U.S. pretrial defendants in the District of New Jersey. Federal Probation, 81(3), 8–14. https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/81_3_2_0.pdf

Legal Authorities

Arizona v. Goodman, No. 18-391 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2019) (certiorari denied).

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).

United States v. Abad, 350 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992).

United States v. Deppish, No. 13-3336 (10th Cir. Feb. 11, 2014) (unpublished).

United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).

United States v. Kroeker, No. 22-3092 (10th Cir. July 8, 2022) (unpublished).

United States v. Peeples, 630 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Stickney, No. 25-8053 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (unpublished).

United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

United States v. Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Wash. 2007).

United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).

United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).

United States v. Rizzuti, 611 F. Supp. 2d 967 (E.D. Mo. 2009).

United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591 (W.D. Tex. 2008).

United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126 (C.M.A. 1984).

United States v. Chapa, 57 M.J. 140 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

United States v. Crawford, 62 M.J. 411 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

United States v. Inong, 58 M.J. 460 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. King, 58 M.J. 110 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Mack, 65 M.J. 108 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Mason, 19 M.J. 274 (C.M.A. 1985) (summary disposition).

United States v. Wardle, 58 M.J. 156 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

Samiuddin v. Nothwehr, 404 P.3d 232 (Ariz. 2017) (No. CR-16-0422-PR, Nov. 2, 2017).

Simpson v. Miller, 241 Ariz. 341, 387 P.3d 1270 (2017).

State v. Wein, 244 Ariz. 22, 417 P.3d 787 (2018), cert. denied sub nom. Arizona v. Goodman, 139 S. Ct. 917 (2019) (No. 18-391, Jan. 14, 2019).

U.S. Const. amend. V.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

18 U.S.C. § 2252.

18 U.S.C. § 2252A.

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), (c)(1)(B), (e)(3)(E), (f), (g).

18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(C).

Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 216, 120 Stat. 587.

10 U.S.C. § 801(17) (Article 1(17), Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 813 (Article 13, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

R.C.M. 304, 305, 707 (Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 2024 ed.).

Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3961, as amended by 2018 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 115 (H.B. 2245).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3967.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7.2, 7.3.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2015-38 (May 7, 2015).

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