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Topics of Intimate Partner Violence

Sexual Assault and Intimate Partner Violence

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How does sexual assault by a current or former partner differ from other sexual assault in harm, evidence, and consent?
  • What the research shows: In the 2023/2024 CDC survey of 15,609 U.S. adults, lifetime contact sexual violence by a partner was estimated at 19.7% of women and 4.4% of men. Partner sexual violence often co-occurs with other partner abuse but is a related yet distinct experience. In one hospital-based study of women presenting for care, partner assaults were generally more violent than acquaintance assaults, and partner sexual violence is associated with substantial psychological harm in the studies reviewed.
  • What it does not show: No psychological finding can determine whether consent was given on a specific occasion, and there is no behavioral profile of victims or perpetrators. Delay, continued contact, absence of injury, and inconsistencies do not by themselves show fabrication; a consistent account does not by itself show accuracy; prior consensual sex does not show later consent.
  • The law: Arizona repealed its separate spousal offense in 2005, and Article 120 makes marriage no defense and a prior relationship not by itself consent. Rule 412 and A.R.S. § 13-1421 bar evidence of other sexual conduct except narrow categories, including prior conduct with the accused. Experts stay general (Salazar-Mercado, Haskie, Lindsey).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors may use general education to correct juror assumptions but should not characterize behaviors as typical of genuine victims; defense counsel may use the prior relationship and motive where the rules allow, but delay, contact, and inconsistency alone do not show fabrication.

Sexual violence by a current or former intimate partner is a common form of sexual assault, yet it often differs from the public image of rape as an attack by a stranger. Intimate partner sexual violence (IPSV) can occur within marriage or dating relationships, alongside physical abuse or in its absence, and it raises distinctive questions in legal proceedings: how consent is understood between people who have had consensual sex before, how a prior sexual relationship may be used as evidence, why reports are often delayed, and why physical evidence is often absent or ambiguous.

This paper reviews the prevalence of IPSV, its relationship to other forms of partner abuse, reproductive coercion, how partner sexual assault differs from assault by strangers and acquaintances in reporting and evidence, and the research on consent, memory, and delay in ongoing relationships. It closes with the legal framework, including the history of the marital-rape exemption, rape-shield rules and their exceptions for prior sexual conduct between the parties, and Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Most complainants in these cases are women, and most studies sampled women; research on male and same-sex victims is noted where it exists.

Definitions

IPSV refers to any sexual act or attempted act without consent committed by a current or former spouse, dating partner, or other intimate partner. Researchers and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS) distinguish several forms: rape (completed or attempted penetration of the victim by force, threat, or while the victim is unable to consent, including through intoxication); being “made to penetrate” another person; sexual coercion (sex obtained through non-physical pressure such as repeated demands, threats to end the relationship, or misuse of authority); and unwanted sexual contact. Reproductive coercion refers to behavior that interferes with a partner’s decisions about contraception or pregnancy, including birth-control sabotage, pressure to become or not become pregnant, and control over the outcome of a pregnancy (Grace & Anderson, 2018).

The boundaries between these categories matter. Some coerced sex meets the legal definition of a crime and some does not, and research categories do not map directly onto statutory elements.

Prevalence

The newest NISVS data (2023/2024; 15,609 U.S. adults) estimate that 19.7% of women have experienced contact sexual violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime, including 8.6% who were raped and 14.2% who experienced sexual coercion by a partner; 3.0% reported contact sexual violence by a partner in the preceding 12 months. For men, 4.4% reported lifetime contact sexual violence by a partner, including 2.9% sexual coercion and 0.8% being made to penetrate; the estimate for male rape by a partner was too unstable to report (Zhang Kudon et al., 2026). The brief cautions against comparing these estimates with earlier NISVS cycles because of methodological changes. Partner sexual violence is reported more often by bisexual women and gay men than by their heterosexual peers (Chen et al., 2020; see Intimate Partner Violence in Same-Sex Relationships).

Prevalence depends heavily on wording. Many people who have experienced acts meeting legal definitions of rape do not label them as rape; a meta-analysis of 28 studies (30 samples) of 5,917 female rape survivors estimated that about 60% (95% confidence interval 55.0% to 65.6%) did not acknowledge their experience as rape, with very high variability across studies (Wilson & Miller, 2016). This is one reason researchers ask about specific behaviors rather than using the word “rape,” and one reason a complainant may describe an event in terms that seem inconsistent with the later charge.

How IPSV Relates to Other Partner Abuse

IPSV frequently co-occurs with physical and psychological abuse, but it is not simply a subset of physical violence. In a population-based study of women in North Carolina, Smith et al. (2002) measured battering (a pattern of entrapment, vulnerability, and loss of control), physical assault, and sexual assault in the same sample. The three were only modestly correlated, often occurred separately as well as together, and had different demographic and health correlates, supporting the view that they are related but distinct experiences.

Within relationships marked by coercive control, sexual violence may function as one of several control tactics. Reviews note that research has often measured IPSV with simple yes-or-no questions, has struggled to distinguish unwanted from non-consensual sex, and has given limited attention to how sexual violence fits within a broader pattern of control (Logan et al., 2015). Qualitative work with 38 women survivors identified relationship-level factors such as co-occurring psychological abuse and large age gaps, and societal beliefs that sex is a duty within a relationship and that “real rape” is committed by strangers (Tarzia, 2021). A scale developed with 702 Australian women survivors identified three dimensions of IPSV (dominance and humiliation, emotional coercion, and what the authors termed aggressive indifference), reflecting different perpetrator motives rather than a single severity continuum (Tarzia et al., 2025). These are recent instruments and single studies; their forensic utility has not been established.

Reproductive coercion

A systematic review of 27 studies found that reproductive coercion disproportionately affects women who are also experiencing IPV and that women experiencing it present frequently for reproductive health services; variation in measurement made prevalence estimates difficult to synthesize (Grace & Anderson, 2018). Reproductive coercion is relevant in legal settings mainly as context, for example in evaluating a pattern of control or in family-court proceedings, and is not itself an element of most criminal offenses.

How Partner Sexual Assault Differs From Other Sexual Assault

Violence, injury, and reporting

A common assumption is that sexual assault by a spouse or partner is less violent or less harmful than assault by a stranger. The studies reviewed here do not support that assumption. In a study of women presenting to a hospital-based sexual-assault center, assaults by spouses (n = 97) and boyfriends (n = 256) were generally more physically violent and produced more injury than assaults by acquaintances (n = 194); women assaulted by spouses also presented for treatment sooner and were more likely to call police (Stermac et al., 2001). That finding concerns women who presented for care, a group that likely overrepresents more violent assaults, and the comparison group was acquaintances rather than strangers; many partner sexual assaults involve no physical force beyond the act itself and are not reported.

Psychological impact

In a sample of 835 low-income, ethnically diverse women, sexual assault by a current partner was the strongest predictor of post-traumatic stress, stress, and dissociation, compared with assault by a former partner or a non-partner (Temple et al., 2007). A meta-analysis of 168 articles found that the strongest mental-health correlates of sexual IPV victimization were suicidal ideation, post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and depression; no significant sex differences emerged, but only five correlates could be compared between men and women (Spencer et al., 2026). These are correlational findings; they show that IPSV is associated with substantial harm but do not establish that symptoms in a particular person were caused by a particular event.

Evidence

Partner cases differ evidentially in predictable ways. Because the parties have often had consensual sex before, the presence of the defendant’s DNA may not resolve the case; the dispute is often about consent, not identity or whether sex occurred. Injuries may be absent, and when present may be attributed by the parties to other causes. Reports are often delayed, sometimes until after separation, and the report may arise during a custody or divorce dispute. Communications between the parties, such as texts, messages, and recorded calls, are often more important than in stranger cases. Each of these features cuts in more than one direction: the absence of injury does not show consent, the timing of a report during a dispute does not by itself show fabrication, and prior consensual sex does not show consent on a later occasion.

Consent Within Ongoing Relationships

Consent research in relationships highlights several features. Partners often rely on implicit and non-verbal cues rather than explicit agreement, and established patterns can lead one partner to assume consent from routine or prior conduct. Sexual coercion that falls short of force, such as persistent pressure, threats to end the relationship, or guilt, is common and can be experienced as non-consensual even when no force is used (Logan et al., 2015). Societal beliefs that sex is owed within a relationship can affect both whether a victim recognizes an act as non-consensual and whether the partner believes consent was given (Tarzia, 2021).

These findings help explain why complainants and defendants may describe the same encounter differently, and why legal consent definitions now emphasize agreement to the specific act at the specific time. They do not provide a method for determining, after the fact, whether consent was present on a particular occasion.

Memory, Delay, and Post-Assault Behavior

Memory for sexual assault follows the same principles as memory for other stressful events. Details may be incomplete, central and peripheral details may be remembered differently, and accounts may change across retellings; these features are common in accurate memories and are poor indicators of accuracy on their own (Hohl & Conway, 2017). Analysis of rape complaints in London found that perceived inconsistencies in the complainant’s account were among the factors associated with cases dropping out of the justice process (Hohl & Stanko, 2015). The memory research cautions against treating inconsistency as proof of fabrication; it equally cautions against treating a detailed, consistent account as proof of accuracy. Memory and delayed disclosure are treated in more depth in Memory in the Courtroom on this site.

Delay in reporting partner sexual assault is common for reasons that overlap with those for delayed reporting of other partner abuse: ongoing dependence, shared children, fear, self-blame, uncertainty whether the act “counts,” and reluctance to see the partner prosecuted (see Self-Blame and Why Victims Stay). Delay is consistent with assault but does not by itself show that it occurred.

Post-assault behavior varies widely. Some survivors avoid sexual activity; others report increases. In one study of women who had been sexually assaulted, compared with motor-vehicle-accident survivors, a significant percentage of the assaulted women reported increased sexual activity afterward, and increases in post-traumatic alcohol use predicted increases in sexual activity in both groups, suggesting alcohol-related coping rather than a feature unique to sexual assault (Deliramich & Gray, 2008). This single study supports only the narrow point that changes in sexual behavior after an assault occur in both directions and do not indicate whether an assault occurred; such evidence is subject to rape-shield rules, which in partner cases include an exception for sexual behavior with the accused.

Limits of the Evidence

Most IPSV research samples women victimized by male partners; the 2023/2024 NISVS estimate for male rape by a partner was too unstable to report, and data on male victims and same-sex relationships are limited. Many studies use convenience, clinical, or help-seeking samples, rely on retrospective self-report, and use varied definitions. The research reliably establishes that IPSV is common, often co-occurs with other abuse, and is associated with significant harm. It does not establish a behavioral profile of IPSV victims or perpetrators, and no psychological finding can determine whether consent was given on a specific occasion. These limits apply to any expert, whichever side calls the expert.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the NISVS figures of 19.7% of women and 4.4% of men (Zhang Kudon et al., 2026) are cited, ask what exactly was counted: the figures combine rape, coercion, and unwanted contact, rest on self-reported lifetime experience, and the brief cautions against comparison with earlier cycles. When the hospital study of 97 spousal and 256 boyfriend assaults (Stermac et al., 2001) is cited to show that partner assaults are more violent, ask who was studied, since all were women who presented for care, a group that likely overrepresents more violent assaults. When the finding that about 60% of rape survivors did not acknowledge the experience as rape (Wilson & Miller, 2016) is offered to explain a complainant’s wording, ask whether it applies to this person, since the estimate varied widely across 28 studies and describes a group. When delay, continued contact, or a change in sexual behavior is offered as evidence that an assault did or did not occur, ask what the research says: none of these has been shown to distinguish accurate from inaccurate reports. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Partner Sexual Assault and the Law

The marital exemption and its repeal

At common law a husband could not be convicted of raping his wife. States abolished or narrowed this “marital exemption” through legislation and court decisions beginning in the 1970s, and by the early 1990s every state had eliminated or limited it, though many retained distinctions such as lesser penalties, force requirements, or shorter reporting periods for spousal cases (Bennice & Resick, 2003). Some states still treat spousal cases differently in particular respects.

Arizona previously maintained a separate offense of sexual assault of a spouse, A.R.S. § 13-1406.01, which was punished less severely than sexual assault and required force or threatened force. In 2005 the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1040 (47th Legislature, First Regular Session; 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 185), which repealed § 13-1406.01, preserved the former offense only for conduct committed before the change took effect, and stated the Legislature’s intent that, except as otherwise provided by law, marital status is no longer relevant in determining whether a sexual act is criminal. The general sexual-assault statute, A.R.S. § 13-1406, prohibits intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without that person’s consent, and contains no spousal exception.

Military law is explicit. Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. § 920) provides that marriage is not a defense to any conduct prosecuted under the article (§ 920(f)). Consent is defined as a freely given agreement to the conduct at issue by a competent person, and a current or previous dating or social or sexual relationship by itself does not constitute consent (§ 920(g)(7)(A)); whether consent was given is determined from all the surrounding circumstances. Sexual offenses against a spouse or intimate partner may also implicate Article 128b (10 U.S.C. § 928b) when charged as domestic violence. In Arizona, sexual assault under § 13-1406 is among the offenses listed in A.R.S. § 13-3601(A) that constitute domestic violence when the relationship requirement is met, including a current or former romantic or sexual relationship.

Rape-shield rules and prior sexual conduct between the parties

Rape-shield rules generally bar evidence of a complainant’s other sexual behavior or sexual predisposition, with narrow exceptions. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and Military Rule of Evidence 412 exclude such evidence in criminal cases except (1) specific instances offered to show that someone other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; (2) specific instances of sexual behavior with the accused, offered by the accused to prove consent or offered by the prosecution; and (3) evidence whose exclusion would violate the accused’s constitutional rights. The proponent must file a motion in advance and the court must hold a closed hearing; admitted evidence remains subject to Rule 403.

Arizona’s rape-shield statute, A.R.S. § 13-1421, makes evidence of a victim’s reputation for chastity and opinion evidence about chastity inadmissible. It permits evidence of specific instances of the victim’s prior sexual conduct only if a judge finds it relevant and material to a fact in issue and not outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature, and only within five categories: past sexual conduct with the defendant; specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or physical injury; evidence supporting a claim that the victim has a motive in accusing the defendant; impeachment evidence when the prosecutor puts the victim’s prior sexual conduct in issue; and evidence of false allegations of sexual misconduct made by the victim against others. Admissibility must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and the evidence may not be referred to before the jury without a court order after a hearing on written motions.

In partner cases the exception for prior sexual conduct with the accused is often central. The research reviewed above supports both halves of the legal rule: prior consensual sex is part of the relationship context relevant to how the parties communicated, and prior consent does not establish consent on a later occasion. Evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual offenses against the complainant or others is governed separately (for example, Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 413).

Expert testimony

Expert testimony on IPSV, delayed reporting, and memory is evaluated under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, and Military Rule of Evidence 702, into which the 2023 federal amendment took effect in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) govern gatekeeping, and Kumho extends it to all expert testimony. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended in 2012 to follow Daubert and again effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004) to conform to the 2023 federal amendment; confirm current text. In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 702 does not bar “cold” expert testimony educating jurors about behaviors seen in child sexual-abuse victims, and in State v. Haskie (2017) it applied the same framework to IPV victim behavior, requiring careful screening under Rules 403 and 702, a limiting instruction on request under Rule 105, and no testimony that functions as a profile of the defendant. State v. Lindsey (1986) forbids an expert from opining on whether a complainant is truthful. Those limits apply fully in partner sexual-assault cases: an expert may explain that delayed reporting, continued contact, or non-acknowledgment of rape are documented among survivors, but may not suggest that these features show that an assault occurred.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

Prosecutors in partner sexual-assault cases may confront juror assumptions that the studies reviewed here do not support, for example that partner rape is less serious than stranger rape, that a complainant who stayed or continued sexual contact consented, or that a delayed report is suspect. The research on injury, psychological impact, non-acknowledgment, and delay can legitimately address those assumptions through general expert education, within the limits of Haskie and Lindsey. Because identity and intercourse are often not disputed, the case often turns on consent, and contemporaneous communications are often more probative than any psychological testimony.

The same research has limits that matter from this vantage point. Non-acknowledgment, delay, and post-assault behavior are consistent with assault but do not establish it. Experts who characterize such behaviors as typical of genuine victims, or who rely on recent scales not validated for forensic use, risk exceeding what the science supports. Evidence of prior sexual conduct between the parties may be offered by either side under Rule 412(b)(1)(B) and § 13-1421, and it is subject to the same limits regardless of which party offers it.

Special Issues for Defense

Defense counsel in partner sexual-assault cases most often rely on the parties’ prior sexual relationship, the timing of the report, the complainant’s continued contact, and inconsistencies in the account. Rule 412(b)(1)(B) and A.R.S. § 13-1421 permit evidence of prior sexual conduct with the accused when properly noticed and found relevant, and the research confirms that partners commonly rely on established patterns and implicit cues, which bears on how both parties may have understood an encounter. Article 120 and Arizona law nonetheless make clear that prior consent does not establish consent on a later occasion.

The research also bounds arguments from this vantage point. Delayed reporting, continued contact, and absence of injury are common among people who were assaulted by partners, so they do not by themselves show fabrication; inconsistencies are common in accurate memories, so they do not by themselves show falsity. A report made during a custody or divorce dispute warrants scrutiny of motive, which § 13-1421 expressly allows, but timing alone is not evidence. Expert testimony offered by either side should remain general education rather than an opinion on whether consent was given, and the same limits apply to any expert the defense may call.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bennice, J. A., & Resick, P. A. (2003). Marital rape: History, research, and practice. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 4(3), 228–246. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838003004003003

Chen, J., Walters, M. L., Gilbert, L. K., & Patel, N. (2020). Sexual violence, stalking, and intimate partner violence by sexual orientation, United States. Psychology of Violence, 10(1), 110–119. https://doi.org/10.1037/vio0000252

Deliramich, A. N., & Gray, M. J. (2008). Changes in women’s sexual behavior following sexual assault. Behavior Modification, 32(5), 611–621. https://doi.org/10.1177/0145445508314642

Grace, K. T., & Anderson, J. C. (2018). Reproductive coercion: A systematic review. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 19(4), 371–390. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838016663935

Hohl, K., & Conway, M. A. (2017). Memory as evidence: How normal features of victim memory lead to the attrition of rape complaints. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 17(3), 248–265. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748895816668937

Hohl, K., & Stanko, E. A. (2015). Complaints of rape and the criminal justice system: Fresh evidence on the attrition problem in England and Wales. European Journal of Criminology, 12(3), 324–341. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370815571949

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Logan, T. K., Walker, R., & Cole, J. (2015). Silenced suffering: The need for a better understanding of partner sexual violence. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 16(2), 111–135. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838013517560

Smith, P. H., Thornton, G. E., DeVellis, R., Earp, J., & Coker, A. L. (2002). A population-based study of the prevalence and distinctiveness of battering, physical assault, and sexual assault in intimate relationships. Violence Against Women, 8(10), 1208–1232. https://doi.org/10.1177/107780102320562691

Spencer, C. M., Renken, N. D., & Zehr, P. (2026). Mental and physical health correlates for sexual intimate partner violence perpetration and victimization: A meta-analysis. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 27(4), 1952–1966. https://doi.org/10.1177/15248380251366258

Stermac, L., Del Bove, G., & Addison, M. (2001). Violence, injury, and presentation patterns in spousal sexual assaults. Violence Against Women, 7(11), 1218–1233. https://doi.org/10.1177/10778010122183838

Tarzia, L. (2021). Toward an ecological understanding of intimate partner sexual violence. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 36(23–24), 11704–11727. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260519900298

Tarzia, L., Brown, C., McLindon, E., & Hegarty, K. (2025). Development and validation of the Intimate Partner Sexual Violence Scale (IPSVS): A multi-dimensional scale to measure sexual violence in intimate relationships. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 40(17–18), 4082–4103. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605241287803

Temple, J. R., Weston, R., Rodriguez, B. F., & Marshall, L. L. (2007). Differing effects of partner and nonpartner sexual assault on women’s mental health. Violence Against Women, 13(3), 285–297. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801206297437

Wilson, L. C., & Miller, K. E. (2016). Meta-analysis of the prevalence of unacknowledged rape. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 17(2), 149–159. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838015576391

Zhang Kudon, H., Zhu, S., Chen, B., Breiding, M. J., Leemis, R. W., Zhang, X., Schwank, A., & Basile, K. C. (2026). The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2023/2024 intimate partner violence data brief. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://cdc.gov/nisvs/media/pdfs/intimatepartnerviolence-brief.pdf

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

10 U.S.C. § 920 (Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 120).

10 U.S.C. § 928b (Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 128b, Domestic Violence).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1406.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1406.01 (repealed 2005).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1421.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (2023) (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

S.B. 1040, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005) (2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 185).

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 412, 413; Mil. R. Evid. 412.

Fed. R. Evid. 702; Mil. R. Evid. 702; Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Related topic papers: Self-Blame and Why Victims Stay · Expert Testimony on Intimate Partner Violence · Typologies of Intimate Partner Violence · Intimate Partner Violence in Same-Sex Relationships