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Expert Testimony on Intimate Partner Violence

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What may an expert tell a jury about behavior in abusive relationships, whether a complainant’s recantation or a defendant’s fear?
  • What the research shows: Critics have argued that the original battered woman syndrome constructs, a universal three-phase cycle and learned helplessness, lack strong empirical support, a view their originator disputes. Better supported: people experiencing IPV are documented to delay disclosure, minimize, recant, or return for identifiable reasons, and may perceive danger differently because of prior violence. Mock-jury studies, using simulated trials and online or student samples, show modest, conditional effects of such testimony.
  • What it does not show: A behavior documented among victims is not diagnostic; recantation and delay also occur when an allegation was inaccurate. No validated test determines whether a person was abused, whether a recantation is true, or whether a defendant’s fear was genuine.
  • The law: Cold experts may explain general patterns (Salazar-Mercado, Haskie) but may not vouch for or quantify truthfulness (Lindsey, Moran, Brooks, Mullins) or offer profile evidence. Arizona does not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate mens rea (Mott), while A.R.S. § 13-415 judges reasonableness from the perspective of a prior domestic-violence victim. Smith v. Arizona bars using an expert to relay an absent declarant’s testimonial statements.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep testimony educational, qualified, and away from abuser characteristics or implicit endorsement of the complainant; defense counsel should ground testimony in the “battering and its effects” framework fitted to the record, recognizing Mott, Rule 704(b), and the anti-vouching rules.

Intimate partner violence (IPV) cases often turn on behavior that jurors find puzzling. A complainant may recant, decline to cooperate, return to the relationship, delay reporting, or describe events inconsistently. A defendant who killed or injured a partner may claim to have acted in fear even though the partner was not attacking at the moment of the act. Both prosecutors and defense counsel have turned to mental health experts to explain such behavior, and courts have spent four decades deciding what those experts may and may not say.

This paper traces the development of expert testimony on IPV from the “battered woman syndrome” of the late 1970s through the scientific critiques that followed and the broader “battering and its effects” formulation adopted by the 1996 federal report and other researchers. It distinguishes the forms such testimony can take, summarizes research on how jurors respond to it, and identifies the uses each side makes of it. It then reviews the legal framework: the federal and military expert-testimony rules, Arizona’s cold-expert and anti-vouching cases, military decisions on “human lie detector” testimony, and the Confrontation Clause cases that shape prosecutions proceeding without a testifying complainant.

Battered Woman Syndrome: Origins

Psychologist Lenore Walker introduced the battered woman syndrome (BWS) in The Battered Woman (Walker, 1979) and later expanded it, most recently in a fourth edition (Walker, 2016). The model combined two elements. The first was a “cycle of violence” with three phases: tension building, an acute battering incident, and a period of contrition or calm. The second was “learned helplessness,” a concept borrowed from animal research, which Walker used to explain why some battered women do not leave: repeated, unpredictable abuse was said to erode the belief that escape is possible. Walker later described BWS as a subcategory of posttraumatic stress disorder with additional features (Walker, 2006).

BWS quickly became the vehicle for expert testimony in cases of battered women who killed their abusers. In State v. Kelly (1984), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, on the record before it, expert testimony on BWS was an appropriate subject for expert evidence and relevant to the honesty and reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that she faced imminent death or serious injury. The court said the expert could explain the syndrome and relate its characteristics to the defendant, but could not opine that her belief on the day of the killing was reasonable, and it reversed and remanded for a new trial at which admissibility would be reconsidered after the State had a full opportunity to challenge the evidence’s reliability. Kelly became one of the most widely cited decisions admitting such testimony.

Scientific Critiques and Reformulation

BWS drew substantial scientific criticism. Faigman (1986) argued that Walker’s research did not support the model: the data did not establish the cycle of violence or learned helplessness, interview methods risked suggesting the expected answers, and the model lacked a comparison group. Later critics added that “learned helplessness” sits uneasily with the active, often repeated efforts many battered women make to seek help, resist, or leave, and that a single “syndrome” cannot capture the diverse responses of people experiencing abuse. Walker has continued to maintain that her empirical findings support the model (Walker, 2006, 2016), so the question remains disputed in the literature.

Mary Ann Dutton proposed a reformulation that later reports and researchers adopted. Rather than a syndrome with a fixed set of features, Dutton (1993) argued for describing the range of psychological reactions to battering, the strategies abused persons use to cope and resist, and the contextual factors (economic dependence, children, threats, prior help-seeking outcomes) that shape their choices. A 1996 report to Congress prepared under the Violence Against Women Act reached a similar conclusion, recommending that the term BWS be replaced with “battering and its effects” because no single syndrome describes the effects of abuse and the term implied pathology (U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). The reformulation also has the advantage of being gender-neutral: the same framework can describe a male victim of a female partner or a victim in a same-sex relationship, populations for which the original BWS model was not developed.

In the sources reviewed here, the specific BWS constructs of a universal three-phase cycle and learned helplessness are the contested parts of the model. Better supported is a narrower set of propositions: people experiencing IPV are documented to delay disclosure, minimize abuse, recant, stay in or return to relationships for identifiable reasons, and may perceive danger differently because of a history of violence (see Self-Blame and Why Victims Stay). Testimony limited to those propositions rests on a firmer foundation than testimony framed around the syndrome.

Forms of Expert Testimony

It is useful to distinguish three forms of testimony. Social-framework testimony, a term coined by Walker and Monahan (1987), presents general research findings to give the factfinder context for evaluating case-specific facts, without the expert applying the research to the parties. A “cold” or educational expert is the courtroom embodiment of this approach: the expert typically has not met the parties, has not reviewed the case file, and testifies only to general patterns. Case-specific testimony, by contrast, involves an expert who has evaluated a party and offers opinions about that person, such as whether a defendant’s history of victimization is consistent with the fear she reported.

Each form carries distinct risks. Cold testimony avoids direct comment on the parties but can invite jurors to match general patterns to the facts in ways the expert never examined, which is the concern underlying the rule against profile evidence. Case-specific testimony draws on actual data about the person but comes closer to the ultimate issues of credibility and mental state, which the law reserves for the factfinder.

How Jurors Respond

Mock-jury research shows that expert testimony on battering has modest and conditional effects. In a study of 200 mock jurors considering a battered woman who killed her abuser, BWS testimony increased verdict leniency only when jurors received an instruction freeing them from a strict application of the law (Schuller & Rzepa, 2002). In a study of 312 mock jurors, the type of expert testimony (BWS, a “social agency” framework emphasizing the victim’s active efforts and the system’s failure to respond, or none) was associated with differences in guilt ratings, and the differences involved juror gender (Plumm & Terrance, 2009). A 2025 study of 370 jury-eligible participants recruited online and from a student pool found that jurors exposed to BWS testimony perceived the defendant as more fearful, but this did not translate into more lenient verdicts or sentences; in the BWS condition, jurors rated the defendant as more guilty and imposed harsher sentences when an 8-year-old child testified than when no child testified (Chae & McWilliams, 2025).

Juror attitudes about gender also matter. In a 2023 online study of 513 community members reviewing an intimate partner homicide trial, mock jurors were more likely to convict, and imposed longer sentences on, a male defendant than an otherwise identical female defendant, and gave the male defendant higher anger ratings; the authors examined juror anger as a mediating factor (Ruva et al., 2023). In a study of 1,162 mock jurors evaluating a case involving a child witness to IPV, guilt ratings varied with juror gender, defendant gender, and the type of abuse, with physical abuse rated more severely than sexual or emotional abuse (Pica et al., 2019). These findings suggest that jurors bring gendered expectations to IPV cases that expert testimony may either correct or reinforce, and that its effects are not uniform.

Uses of IPV Testimony

The defense uses of IPV expertise center on the defendant’s perceptions and choices. In self-defense cases, testimony may address why a person with a history of abuse might perceive imminent danger from cues others would miss, and why the person did not leave. In duress cases, testimony may address why a defendant complied with an abusive partner’s demands to commit a crime. Similar testimony is sometimes offered to explain why a person subject to a partner’s coercion made an inculpatory statement, although courts evaluate such testimony under the same reliability and fit requirements as any other expert evidence. In Arizona, however, evidence of a mental condition short of insanity, including BWS, cannot be used to negate the mental state element of an offense (State v. Mott, 1997), so the defense uses are channeled through justification defenses rather than diminished capacity.

The prosecution uses center on the complainant’s behavior. When a complainant recants, minimizes, delays reporting, or returns to the defendant, an expert may explain that these behaviors are documented among people experiencing IPV and therefore do not by themselves indicate fabrication. Research on recantation supports this explanation in part: in a qualitative study of recorded jail telephone calls between 25 detained male defendants and their female victims, recantation intentions developed after defendants appealed to victims’ sympathy and minimized the abuse, and couples then jointly constructed recantation plans (Bonomi et al., 2011). This study is small and drew on a specific population, it describes one sequence in which recantation unfolded in cases in which abuse had been charged, and it cannot establish whether the original allegations were accurate. It does not establish that any particular recantation is false; recantations also occur when an initial report was inaccurate.

Limits on Expert Testimony

Under the federal, military, and Arizona authorities discussed below, three limits recur, and they apply to any expert, whichever side calls the expert. First, an expert may not vouch for a witness’s credibility, either directly or by stating what percentage of people in the complainant’s situation tell the truth. Second, an expert may not offer profile evidence, meaning testimony that the defendant shares characteristics of abusers, as substantive proof of guilt. Third, in a criminal case, an expert may not state an opinion about whether the defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the crime or of a defense; Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) reserves that determination to the trier of fact, though Diaz v. United States (2024) held that the rule reaches only opinions about the defendant himself, so testimony about what most members of a group know or intend does not violate it. Within these limits, an expert may explain general patterns and, where the rules permit, relate them to a party’s documented history.

Limits of the Evidence

Most research on victim behavior comes from samples of women recruited through shelters, courts, or hospitals, which overrepresent severe, coercive violence; findings may not generalize to situational couple violence, male victims, or same-sex relationships, and the original BWS model was developed with women. No validated test determines whether a particular person was abused, whether a recantation is true, or whether a defendant’s fear was genuine. Mock-jury studies use simulated trials and student or online samples, and the studies reviewed here that tested defendant or juror gender found effects that varied by study. The well-supported claim that a behavior is documented among victims does not mean it is diagnostic: behaviors such as recantation and delayed reporting also occur in cases where the allegation was inaccurate.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a mock-jury finding is cited to predict how jurors will respond to expert testimony, ask about the sample and design: the studies of 200 (Schuller & Rzepa, 2002), 312 (Plumm & Terrance, 2009), and 370 (Chae & McWilliams, 2025) participants used simulated trials, and their results were conditional on instructions, juror gender, or the presence of a child witness. When the criticism or defense of the original BWS constructs is cited, ask which constructs are at issue and by whom: the cycle and learned helplessness were criticized by Faigman (1986) and defended by Walker (2006, 2016). When the jail-call study of 25 couples (Bonomi et al., 2011) is cited to explain a recantation, ask whether it applies to this case, since every couple in it had a recantation and the study cannot estimate how often recantations reflect pressure or accurate correction. When a behavior is described as “common” among victims, ask whether the source estimated how often it occurs when allegations are inaccurate; the research reviewed here did not. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Expert Testimony on IPV and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the Federal Rules of Evidence displaced the Frye general-acceptance test, and trial judges must ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable, considering such factors as testability, peer review, error rate, standards, and general acceptance. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended this gatekeeping duty to all expert testimony, including non-scientific specialized knowledge such as clinical and behavioral expertise. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to state expressly that the proponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony meets each requirement, and that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s principles and methods to the facts. The amendment’s committee note cautions against treating the sufficiency of an expert’s basis and the application of the methodology as questions of weight rather than admissibility. The 2023 federal amendment took effect in Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text.

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has developed a detailed body of law on “human lie detector” testimony. The court has held that no witness, lay or expert, may opine that a person is or is not telling the truth, because such testimony cannot assist the factfinder under Rule 702, exceeds the limits Military Rule of Evidence 608 places on character evidence for truthfulness, and usurps the members’ exclusive role in determining credibility. In United States v. Brooks (2007), the court applied that rule to expert testimony that, by quantifying how rarely allegations like the complainant’s prove false, was the functional equivalent of vouching for her. In United States v. Mullins (2010), a child sexual assault case, the court stated that an expert may describe symptoms found among abused children and whether the complainant exhibits them, but may not testify about the complainant’s credibility or the accused’s guilt; it held that expert statistical testimony implying a 1-in-200 chance that the allegations were false was error, though not prejudicial on that record because of timely instructions and corroborating evidence. United States v. Kasper (2003) applied the prohibition to lay witnesses, and United States v. Knapp (2014) held that testimony interpreting an accused’s nonverbal cues as deceptive was impermissible. As Brooks illustrates, the prohibition reaches testimony that conveys a view of truthfulness indirectly as well as directly. These decisions apply with full force to IPV testimony in prosecutions under Article 128b, UCMJ.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended in 2012 to follow Daubert and again effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004) to conform to the 2023 federal amendment; confirm current text. In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 702(d) does not bar “cold” expert testimony that educates the factfinder about general principles without applying them to the facts, provided the testimony satisfies Rule 702(a) through (c) and survives Rule 403; the court approved general testimony about the behavior of child sexual-abuse victims. In State v. Haskie (2017), the court extended that reasoning to adult domestic-violence victims, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting cold expert testimony explaining why a victim who had given police a written statement and later recanted might remain in an abusive relationship and recant. The court held that profile evidence may not be used as substantive proof of guilt, but that testimony primarily explaining victim behavior is not inadmissible merely because it touches on abuser characteristics. It directed trial courts to exercise great caution in screening, admitting, and limiting such evidence, to give a Rule 105 limiting instruction to which a defendant is entitled when it is admitted, to confine experts to matters within their expertise, and not to allow experts to speak in broad, categorical terms about what is “common” or “usual” without empirical support.

Arizona’s anti-vouching line predates Daubert. In State v. Lindsey (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court held that an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexual-abuse victims, such as recantation and inconsistent accounts, but may not opine on the accuracy, reliability, or truthfulness of a particular witness or of witnesses of that type, and may not quantify the proportion of such victims who tell the truth; admission of such testimony was reversible error. In State v. Moran (1986), a child sexual-abuse case, the court applied the same rule, holding that an expert may not give an opinion on a particular complainant’s credibility, directly or indirectly, and may not testify that a particular complainant’s behavior is consistent with the abuse having occurred. In State v. Mott (1997), the court held that Arizona does not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity, including evidence of BWS offered in that case, to negate mens rea, while expressly leaving open the admissibility of such evidence in self-defense cases. Arizona’s justification statute specific to domestic violence, A.R.S. § 13-415, provides that when the victim has committed past acts of domestic violence against the defendant, the reasonableness of the defendant’s state of mind under the self-defense, defense-of-third-persons, and related justification statutes (A.R.S. §§ 13-404, 13-405, and 13-406) is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of those acts, which gives expert explanation of the effects of prior abuse a direct statutory hook in self-defense cases.

Confrontation and evidence-based prosecution

Because many IPV complainants do not testify, prosecutors often proceed on other evidence: 911 recordings, statements to responding officers, medical records, photographs, and jail calls. The Confrontation Clause limits that approach. Crawford v. Washington (2004) held that testimonial hearsay from a non-testifying witness is inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Davis v. Washington (2006), decided with Hammon v. Indiana, held that statements made to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial, as in a 911 call made during an assault, whereas statements describing past events to officers investigating after the emergency has ended, as in Hammon’s statements and affidavit, are testimonial. Michigan v. Bryant (2011) applied the primary-purpose test objectively and held that a mortally wounded victim’s statements to police about an armed assailant at large were nontestimonial. Ohio v. Clark (2015) held that a young child’s statements to preschool teachers identifying his abuser were nontestimonial. Giles v. California (2008) held that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applies only when the defendant intended to prevent the witness from testifying, while observing that a history of abuse aimed at isolating the victim from police and courts may be highly relevant to that intent. Most recently, Smith v. Arizona (2024) held that when an expert relays an absent analyst’s statements as the basis for an opinion and the opinion depends on their truth, those statements are offered for their truth and are subject to the Confrontation Clause if testimonial. That holding bears on whether an IPV expert may serve as a conduit for testimonial statements of an absent complainant.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports educational testimony explaining that recantation, delayed reporting, minimization, and returning to an abusive partner are documented among people experiencing IPV, and Arizona and federal law permit such testimony when it is reliable and confined. Prosecutors are often best positioned to keep that testimony within its supported scope: general patterns stated with appropriate qualification, tied to the specific behavior at issue, and grounded in research rather than in the original BWS constructs that critics have challenged. Haskie and the military human-lie-detector cases make clear that testimony drifting into abuser characteristics, categorical claims, or implicit endorsement of the complainant’s account creates appellate risk.

The research also counsels caution about what such testimony proves. That a behavior is documented among abuse victims does not make it diagnostic, because recantation and delay also occur when an allegation was inaccurate. When a case proceeds without the complainant, the Confrontation Clause cases govern which statements may be admitted, and Smith v. Arizona bears on using an expert to relay testimonial statements indirectly. Testimony framed as education rather than corroboration is the use most consistent with the research and the limits described above.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports expert testimony explaining how a history of abuse can shape a person’s perception of danger, choices about leaving, and responses to coercion, and Arizona’s § 13-415 expressly adopts the perspective of a reasonable person who has experienced the victim’s prior domestic violence. Defense counsel are often best positioned to ensure that such testimony is grounded in a reliable framework, the broader “battering and its effects” approach rather than the contested syndrome constructs, and that it fits the documented history. The same framework applies regardless of the defendant’s gender, which matters given mock-jury evidence that jurors responded differently to male and female defendants in the studies reviewed.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to defense experts. Mott bars using such evidence to negate mens rea in Arizona, Rule 704(b) bars opinions on whether the defendant actually held the required mental state, and the anti-vouching rules apply equally to testimony bolstering a defendant’s account. Mock-jury research shows that expert testimony on battering has modest, conditional effects and may not produce the expected result. Testimony confined to well-supported general findings, carefully linked to the record, is the use most consistent with the research and the limits described above.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bonomi, A. E., Gangamma, R., Locke, C. R., Katafiasz, H., & Martin, D. (2011). “Meet me at the hill where we used to park”: Interpersonal processes associated with victim recantation. Social Science & Medicine, 73(7), 1054–1061. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.07.005

Chae, H., & McWilliams, K. (2025). When a battered victim kills their abuser: The impact of child and expert testimony on mock jurors’ decision-making. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 40(17–18), 4010–4032. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605241284662

Dutton, M. A. (1993). Understanding women’s responses to domestic violence: A redefinition of battered woman syndrome. Hofstra Law Review, 21(4), 1191. https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss4/2

Faigman, D. L. (1986). The battered woman syndrome and self-defense: A legal and empirical dissent. Virginia Law Review, 72(3), 619. https://doi.org/10.2307/1072974

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Pica, E., Sheahan, C. L., & Pozzulo, J. (2019). Examining mock jurors’ perceptions of intimate partner violence factors. Partner Abuse, 10(4), 391–408. https://doi.org/10.1891/1946-6560.10.4.391

Plumm, K. M., & Terrance, C. A. (2009). Battered women who kill: The impact of expert testimony and empathy induction in the courtroom. Violence Against Women, 15(2), 186–205. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801208329145

Ruva, C. L., Smith, K. D., & Sykes, E. C. (2023). Gender, generations, and guilt: Defendant gender and age affect jurors’ decisions and perceptions in an intimate partner homicide trial. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 38(23–24), 12089–12112. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605231191227

Schuller, R. A., & Rzepa, S. (2002). Expert testimony pertaining to battered woman syndrome: Its impact on jurors’ decisions. Law and Human Behavior, 26(6), 655–673. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020933618221

U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1996). The validity and use of evidence concerning battering and its effects in criminal trials: Report responding to Section 40507 of the Violence Against Women Act. National Institute of Justice.

Walker, L. E. (1979). The battered woman. Harper & Row.

Walker, L. E. A. (2006). Battered woman syndrome: Empirical findings. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1087(1), 142–157. https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1385.023

Walker, L. E. A. (2016). The battered woman syndrome (4th ed.). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1891/9780826170996

Walker, L., & Monahan, J. (1987). Social frameworks: A new use of social science in law. Virginia Law Review, 73(3), 559. https://doi.org/10.2307/1072923

Legal Authorities

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (decided with Hammon v. Indiana).

Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024).

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).

Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).

Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024).

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

10 U.S.C. § 928b (Article 128b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-404, 13-405, 13-406.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-415.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (2023) (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Fed. R. Evid. 702; Mil. R. Evid. 702; Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).

Mil. R. Evid. 608.

Related topic papers: Self-Blame and Why Victims Stay · Typologies of Intimate Partner Violence · Intimate Partner Violence Against Men · Predominant-Aggressor Determinations and Arrest · Sexual Assault and Intimate Partner Violence