Snap Shot
- The question: Does IPV fall into distinct types, such as coercive controlling versus situational couple violence, and can a type be assigned in a particular case?
- What the research shows: In the studies reviewed, violence embedded in control is associated with more injury, more fear, and worse outcomes than isolated conflict-driven violence, and in one Swedish study of 628 police-reported men, generally violent (antisocial) perpetrators reoffended against partners more often than family-only perpetrators (27.2% versus 12.9%). The sample a statistic comes from strongly shapes its gender distribution: shelter samples contribute severe, controlling, male-perpetrated violence; general samples, mostly situational violence.
- What it does not show: It is not settled whether the types are discrete or points on a continuum, how stable a classification is, what cutoff defines coercive control, or how types are distributed by gender outside the samples that produced them. No typology has been validated as a forensic instrument for classifying a particular relationship.
- The law: Amended A.R.S. § 25-403.03 (2026) brings coercive control into custody decisions but created no new crime. Section 13-415 judges self-defense from the perspective of a reasonable person who was a victim of the other party’s prior domestic violence. Typology testimony faces Rule 702 and the profiling limits of Ketchner and Haskie.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should not treat a single incident or a label as proof of a type in place of evidence of controlling acts; defense counsel should not assume an incident was situational because it was isolated or both parties used force, since coercive control can exist without frequent violence, and neither side should treat a typology label as a validated finding about a particular relationship.
A typology is a system for sorting cases into categories that are supposed to differ in meaningful ways. Starting in the 1990s, many researchers came to view intimate partner violence (IPV) as more than one phenomenon. They proposed that a slap during an argument between partners who are otherwise not afraid of each other, and a sustained campaign of intimidation, isolation, and assault, differ in cause, course, consequences, and risk. Several typologies followed. Some classify relationships by the role control plays in the violence. Others classify perpetrators by the breadth of their violence and their personality. Others classify women’s use of violence in relation to their partners’ violence.
Typologies matter in legal settings because courts are routinely asked to treat cases differently, whether through arrest, charging, sentencing, treatment referral, protective orders, or parenting plans, and typologies offer a framework for doing so. They are also among the most contested ideas in the IPV field. This paper describes the principal typologies, reviews how well they have held up when tested, explains the measurement and sampling problems that limit them, summarizes the research and legislative debate over coercive control, and identifies where typology evidence can and cannot assist a court.
Relationship-Based Typologies: Johnson and Kelly and Johnson
The most influential typology was developed by sociologist Michael Johnson. In his first formulation, Johnson (1995) argued that two research traditions were studying different things. Family-conflict surveys of the general population, he suggested, mostly captured occasional, low-level violence that arises from particular conflicts, which he then called “common couple violence.” Shelter and agency samples captured “patriarchal terrorism,” systematic violence used to control a partner. His later book (Johnson, 2008) refined the categories into four types defined by the pattern of control in the relationship, not by the severity of any single act. In intimate terrorism, a partner uses violence as one tactic within a general pattern of coercive control. In violent resistance, a partner uses violence in response to an intimate terrorist. In situational couple violence, violence arises from specific conflicts that escalate, without a general pattern of control by either partner. In mutual violent control, both partners are violent and controlling. Situational couple violence is described as the most common type in general-population samples.
Kelly and Johnson (2008) adapted this framework for family courts. Their article renamed intimate terrorism “coercive controlling violence” and added a further category, separation-instigated violence. That category covers violence that first appears at or after separation in a relationship with no prior history of violence or control. Kelly and Johnson argued that reliable differentiation among these patterns should guide what safeguards and parenting arrangements a court orders, and they called for better screening measures and procedures in civil, family, and criminal courts.
Johnson’s typology also offered a partial explanation for the gender-symmetry debate, which is the subject of a separate paper in this series. In his account, situational couple violence is roughly gender-symmetric, while intimate terrorism, at least in heterosexual relationships, is predominantly male-perpetrated. Using data from the National Violence Against Women Survey (4,498 respondents reporting on a first ex-spouse, plus respondents reporting on current spouses), Johnson, Leone, and Xu (2014) classified violence as intimate terrorism when it was accompanied by five or more controlling tactics. In the reports about former marriages, about 83% of the intimate terrorism so classified was male-perpetrated; about 22% of ex-husbands, as reported by their ex-wives, and about 5% of ex-wives, as reported by their ex-husbands, were classified as intimate terrorists. They also found intimate terrorism to be associated with more incidents, more injuries, and more depressive symptoms in victims than situational couple violence. They found almost no coercive controlling violence in reports about current spouses, and argued that general surveys asking about current relationships largely miss this pattern because its victims and perpetrators are unlikely to take part. The authors noted that, with reports from only one partner, converting survey data into the typology is approximate.
Perpetrator-Based Typologies: Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart, and Saunders
A parallel line of research classifies men who are violent toward partners. Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart (1994) reviewed earlier typologies and proposed three subtypes distinguished by the severity and frequency of partner violence, whether violence extended outside the family, and psychopathology. Family-only perpetrators engage in the least severe violence, rarely outside the home, and show little psychopathology. Dysphoric/borderline perpetrators engage in moderate to severe violence mostly within the family, and show emotional volatility, dependency, and fear of abandonment. Generally violent/antisocial perpetrators engage in more severe partner violence, are violent outside the family as well, and show antisocial traits and criminal histories. The authors predicted that family-only men would make up roughly half of perpetrators, with the other two types about a quarter each.
When Holtzworth-Munroe and colleagues tested the model in a community sample of maritally violent men, they found the three predicted groups and a fourth, “low-level antisocial” group that fell between the family-only and generally violent/antisocial men on antisocial behavior and violence (Holtzworth-Munroe et al., 2000). A follow-up of the same men found some instability in individual classifications over time. Even so, the family-only group continued to show the least violence and the generally violent/antisocial group the most (Holtzworth-Munroe et al., 2003). Earlier, Saunders (1992) had used cluster analysis (a statistical method that groups people with similar profiles) on 165 men assessed for a treatment program. He identified three types: family-only aggressors, generalized aggressors, and emotionally volatile aggressors. The overlap between these independently derived schemes is part of why perpetrator typologies gained acceptance.
A review of perpetrator typologies concluded that most converge on low-, moderate-, and high-risk groups. The review also concluded that most offenders do not escalate from one level to the next over time (Cavanaugh & Gelles, 2005). The practical claim most relevant to courts, that generally violent men reoffend more, has some support. In a Swedish study of 628 male perpetrators of police-reported partner violence, those classified as antisocial on the basis of general criminality (n = 327) reoffended against partners at about twice the rate of family-only perpetrators (27.2% versus 12.9%), with similar differences for physical and nonphysical violence (Petersson & Strand, 2017). That study classified men on one variable, general criminal history, in one country and one police region. It therefore shows the value of that variable in that sample rather than validating the full four-group model, and the Swedish sample consisted entirely of men.
Typologies of Women’s Use of Violence
Typologies of women who use violence developed later. Swan and Snow (2002) studied 108 women who had used physical violence against a male partner in the previous six months. Almost all of them had also been physically abused by that partner. The women used more emotional abuse and moderate physical violence than their partners, while their partners used more sexual violence, caused more injury, and used more coercive control. Swan and Snow identified relationships in which the woman was primarily a victim (34%), primarily an aggressor (12%), or in a “mixed” pattern (50%), split between relationships in which the male partner was more coercive and those in which the female partner was. The study drew on women who were already using violence, recruited largely through services, so its percentages describe that population and not women in general. Babcock, Miller, and Siard (2003) applied a perpetrator-typology approach to 52 women referred for treatment. Women who were violent only toward partners more often described reactive violence, such as fear or self-defense, than women who were generally violent, who more often described instrumental violence used to get their way. A 2026 update of the research on motives for physical IPV found that self-defense was assessed in almost every study. It found inconclusive evidence for sex differences in control as a motive. It found some support for anger, emotional dysregulation, and retaliation for emotional hurt being more often endorsed as motives by women than by men. It also found that self-defense, retaliation, control, and anger remain difficult to tell apart (Langhinrichsen-Rohling & Leisring, 2026).
Testing the Typologies: Measurement and Sampling
Typologies rest on how their categories are measured, and the measurement choices are not neutral. Johnson’s types depend on a threshold of controlling behavior. Different studies use different control scales, different numbers of items, and different cutoffs, sometimes derived from cluster analysis of the very sample being classified. When the cutoff changes, the share of cases called intimate terrorism, and its gender distribution, can change with it. Johnson and colleagues have acknowledged that converting survey data into the typology is approximate when only one partner reports (Johnson et al., 2014).
The sampling frame is a second major issue. A sampling frame is the population from which a study draws its participants. Graham-Kevan and Archer studied British samples drawn from women’s shelters, students, men in treatment programs, and male prisoners. They found broad support for Johnson’s distinction between intimate terrorism and common couple violence (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003a). In a related study of students, shelter residents, and male prisoners, measures of aggression, control, fear, and injury distinguished the groups in a way the authors read as consistent with Johnson’s distinct patterns, and the study’s central point was that the pattern found depends on where the sample comes from (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003b). Shelter samples contribute severe, controlling, male-perpetrated violence, and general samples contribute mostly situational violence. Researchers on different sides of the debate have acknowledged that point (Johnson et al., 2014; Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2003b). They disagree about what follows from it. Johnson and colleagues argue that general surveys under-capture intimate terrorism and so cannot test claims about it (Johnson et al., 2014). Critics in the family-conflict tradition argue that agency samples were built to find highly victimized women and contain no comparable route for finding highly victimized men. In a student sample of 1,104, Bates, Graham-Kevan, and Archer (2014) found no substantial sex difference in controlling behavior and found women more likely than men to be classified as intimate terrorists. In two samples of men recruited as IPV victims, Hines and Douglas (2019) found that intimate terrorism was mostly female-perpetrated. Those samples were selected for male victimization, which is the mirror image of the shelter problem. Using a large nationally representative crime survey with expanded measures of control, Myhill (2015) found that situational violence was fairly symmetric while coercive controlling abuse was strongly gendered, with women overwhelmingly the victims. In a sample of 172 men and women, Robertson and Murachver (2011) found that coercive control was largely reciprocal and better predicted by the presence of violence than by gender.
A meta-analysis of 149 studies offers a way of reconciling some of these findings. Markers associated with intimate terrorism, namely control, power, jealousy, and patriarchal beliefs, were stronger predictors of IPV in clinical samples than in general-population samples (Love et al., 2020). The authors suggested that Johnson’s categories may describe points on a continuum of severity and control rather than separate kinds of relationship. Capaldi and Kim (2007) made a related critique of typologies generally. Fixed categories, they argued, can obscure how violence develops over time and how both partners contribute to it, and they proposed a dynamic, developmental approach instead.
What is reasonably well supported in the studies reviewed is this. IPV is heterogeneous. Violence embedded in a pattern of control is associated with more injury, more fear, and worse outcomes than isolated conflict-driven violence. In one Swedish sample of 628 men, generally violent perpetrators reoffended against partners more often than family-only perpetrators. And the sample from which a statistic comes strongly shapes its gender distribution. What is not settled is whether the types are discrete or points on a continuum, how stable a person’s classification is over time, what cutoff defines coercive control, and how the types are distributed by gender outside the samples in which they were developed. No typology has been validated as a forensic instrument for classifying a particular relationship in litigation.
Coercive Control: Research and Criminalization
The concept of coercive control, as developed by Stark (2007), shifts the focus from discrete assaults to an ongoing pattern of intimidation, isolation, degradation, and regulation of everyday life. Stark described this as a crime against liberty. Stark framed it as primarily a strategy men use against women. A review of the research described substantial variation in how coercive control is defined and measured, which complicates comparison across studies (Hamberger et al., 2017). The CDC counts coercive control as a component of psychological aggression, and its 2023/2024 survey estimated lifetime coercive control and entrapment by a partner at 27.2% for women and 19.5% for men (Zhang Kudon et al., 2026). Those figures count exposure to controlling behaviors. They do not establish the sustained pattern that Stark’s concept, or a statute, requires.
England and Wales created a criminal offense of controlling or coercive behavior in an intimate or family relationship in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, in force December 2015. The offense requires behavior that is repeated or continuous, that has a serious effect on the victim (fear of violence on at least two occasions, or serious alarm or distress with a substantial adverse effect on day-to-day activities), and that the defendant knew or ought to have known would have that effect. The maximum penalty is five years’ imprisonment. Section 68 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, in force April 5, 2023, broadened the definition of “personally connected” so that the offense reaches former partners and family members who no longer live together. Scotland enacted its own offense in the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, in force in 2019.
Scholars have debated whether criminalization works and whom it reaches. Tolmie (2018) argued that a coercive-control offense requires a kind of pattern analysis that criminal justice systems are not well equipped to perform, and that a poorly implemented offense could even be used against primary victims. Walklate, Fitz-Gibbon, and McCulloch (2018) questioned whether creating new offenses is the best route to justice for IPV victims. Studying implementation in one English police force, Barlow et al. (2020) found some reason for optimism. They also found that the offense needed more resources and training, and they argued the gender-neutral drafting required revision. Whether such a statute should be drafted in gender-neutral terms, as the English offense is, or should address gendered patterns of control is itself disputed.
In the United States, coercive control has entered the law mainly through civil and family-law definitions, and the provisions differ. Hawaii made coercive control of a family or household member a petty misdemeanor within its abuse-of-family-or-household-members statute (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906), as part of a pilot program; it is the only U.S. criminal provision of its kind this review located. The statutory text available for this review still carried a June 30, 2026 repeal-and-reenactment note, and a 2026 act reportedly extended the provision to 2031, so counsel should confirm its current status. California’s Family Code § 6320 lists coercive control, defined as a pattern of behavior that unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty, among conduct that can disturb the peace of another party and be enjoined by order. Connecticut’s definition of domestic violence in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-1(b) includes coercive control, defined in similar terms, and lists examples such as isolation, monitoring, and control of finances. Washington’s civil protection-order statute defines coercive control in Wash. Rev. Code § 7.105.010. Arizona’s H.B. 2995, the “Alec and Lydia Act” (Laws 2026, ch. 263), amended A.R.S. § 25-403.03 to define coercive control and include it in the definition of domestic violence for legal decision-making and parenting time. The Arizona act did not change the criminal definition in A.R.S. § 13-3601 and created no new criminal offense. Other states have pending or recently enacted measures. Statutory definitions differ from one another and from research definitions, so counsel should work from the text of the statute that governs the case.
Typologies and the Law
Typology evidence arises in four recurring settings. The first is custody. Arizona’s amended § 25-403.03 defines coercive control as a pattern of violent, threatening, coercive, or emotionally abusive conduct by one parent against the other without consent or justification, and treats it as domestic violence for custody purposes. If the court determines that a parent has committed domestic violence, the statute creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption that awarding that parent legal decision-making or parenting time is contrary to the child’s best interests. The court may not describe the violence as mutual, or apply the presumption to both parents, unless both parents lacked justification to a similar degree and inflicted similar injury. These provisions require courts to make many of the distinctions typology research describes: one-sided control versus reciprocal conflict, and violent resistance versus initiated violence. They do so through legal standards, not research categories. Kelly and Johnson (2008) argued that type should guide parenting plans. The research supports that general proposition, but it does not provide a validated tool for assigning a family to a type.
The second setting is arrest and the predominant-aggressor question. Many states direct officers to identify a predominant or primary aggressor when both parties have used force. Arizona’s § 13-3601(B) contains no predominant-aggressor provision. It permits arrest of both parties only on probable cause that each independently committed domestic violence, and it excludes justified self-defense from the definition of domestic violence. Under A.R.S. § 13-415, when the victim has committed past acts of domestic violence against the defendant, the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of those acts. Typology research is relevant to these determinations. The category of violent resistance, in particular, describes conduct the law may treat as justified. The separate series paper on predominant-aggressor determinations addresses these issues in depth.
The third setting is risk and sentencing. Typology research supports the view that the breadth of a person’s violence, especially violence outside the family and general criminal history, is associated with recidivism (Petersson & Strand, 2017). Validated risk instruments already capture much of that information, and they are discussed in the series paper on risk assessment instruments. Typology labels are not themselves validated risk tools.
The fourth setting is expert testimony. An expert may explain to a factfinder that IPV takes different forms and that researchers distinguish patterns by the role of control. Such testimony is subject to Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, amended effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004), and to Federal Rule of Evidence and Military Rule of Evidence 702 under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). Those rules require that the testimony rest on reliable methods reliably applied to the facts. Classifying a particular relationship as “intimate terrorism” or “situational couple violence” is an application that the research has not validated as a forensic method. Arizona’s Supreme Court has also warned against expert testimony that operates as offender profiling. In State v. Ketchner (2014) the court reversed felony-murder and burglary convictions where cold expert testimony about separation violence, lethality factors, and abuser characteristics was held to be inadmissible profile evidence. In State v. Haskie (2017) the court permitted general testimony about victim behavior, but only if it is screened under the rules of evidence, is not offered to show that the defendant fits a type, and stays within the expert’s field and empirical support.
Limits of the Evidence
The typology literature rests on samples that differ sharply by source (shelters, treatment programs, students, general surveys, men recruited as victims), and each source favors the pattern its recruitment method finds. Control measures and cutoffs differ across studies. Many perpetrator typologies were built on men only, and the evidence on women’s typologies comes mostly from small samples of women already using violence. Few studies follow the same people long enough to show whether a classification remains stable. The Swedish recidivism study classified men on a single variable and counted police-recorded reoffending, which captures only part of any person’s behavior. Group findings of this kind describe populations and do not show what occurred in any one relationship.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a witness assigns a relationship to a type, ask whether the type was derived from a validated instrument for individuals or from a study of groups, and which cutoff for controlling behavior was used (Johnson et al., 2014 used five or more tactics, and other studies differ). When the percentage of intimate terrorism that is male-perpetrated is cited, ask which sample it came from, since the figure of about 83% in Johnson et al. (2014) describes reports about former marriages, and studies of men recruited as victims reach different distributions (Hines & Douglas, 2019). When the recidivism difference of 27.2% versus 12.9% is cited (Petersson & Strand, 2017), ask about the sample of 628 Swedish men, a single classifying variable, and the follow-up measure. When the Swan and Snow (2002) percentages for women are cited, ask whether the audience understands they describe 108 women already using violence. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
Prosecutors are most likely to encounter typology research when a defense argues that an incident was “only” situational couple violence, or when the prosecution seeks to show that an assault was part of a broader pattern of control. The research supports the proposition that violence embedded in coercive control is associated with greater injury, fear, and harm, and it supports evidence of the pattern where the rules permit, for example under Rule 404(b) or a coercive-control statute. The research does not support treating a single incident as proof of a type, or treating a label such as “intimate terrorist” as a substitute for evidence of the specific controlling acts.
Typology testimony that describes the defendant rather than the research risks the profiling problem identified in Ketchner. Prosecutors should also recognize that control measures and cutoffs vary across studies, that many statistics about the gender distribution of coercive control depend on which sample generated them, and that a typology classification has not been validated for use on one relationship, whichever party offers it.
Special Issues for Defense
Defense counsel are most likely to encounter typology research when the evidence suggests mutual conflict, violent resistance by the client, or separation-related violence without a prior history. The research supports the proposition that IPV is heterogeneous and that much violence in general populations is situational and often reciprocal. It also supports the proposition that violent resistance is a recognized pattern, which may bear on self-defense and on A.R.S. § 13-415. The research does not support assuming that an incident was situational merely because it was isolated or because both parties used some force.
Coercive control can exist without frequent violence, and evidence of controlling conduct may be admissible or legally significant in its own right, particularly under the amended A.R.S. § 25-403.03. Counsel should also recognize that typology classifications applied to individual cases lack forensic validation, that a client’s claim of violent resistance cannot be shown by the category alone, and that the same reliability limits apply whichever side offers them.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Ketchner, 236 Ariz. 262, 339 P.3d 645 (2014).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-415.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-403.03 (as amended by 2026 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 263 (H.B. 2995)).
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (2023) (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Cal. Fam. Code § 6320.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-1.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906.
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.105.010.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 404(b), 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b), 702.
Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (Eng. & Wales).
Domestic Abuse Act 2021, c. 17, § 68 (Eng. & Wales).
Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 5).
Related topic papers: Introduction to Intimate Partner Violence · Bidirectional Violence and the Gender-Symmetry Debate · Predominant-Aggressor Determinations and Arrest · Protective Orders and Custody · IPV Risk Assessment Instruments