Snap Shot
- The question: Do protective orders work, how do courts and custody evaluators handle IPV allegations, and what does the research say about unproven allegations and parental-alienation claims?
- What the research shows: Effectiveness research is methodologically weak and mixed; many petitioners report reduced abuse, and stalking is a strong risk factor for violation. In observational state-level studies, laws that bar firearm possession by people under restraining orders and require relinquishment were associated with roughly 10% to 14% lower intimate partner homicide rates (for example, 9.7% lower total and 14.0% lower firearm rates in a 25-year state panel study), and findings by victim race were not uniform. In one survey, evaluators’ beliefs predicted recommendations that perpetrators receive custody or unsupervised visitation more strongly than their demographics or IPV knowledge.
- What it does not show: No study isolates an order’s effect from separation or arrest, and firearm studies are observational. A denied petition, uncharged report, or acquittal is an unproven allegation, not a false one, and there is no reliable estimate of how often IPV allegations are deliberately false. The conflicting alienation studies settle neither side’s claim.
- The law: A.R.S. § 13-3602 governs Orders of Protection. A.R.S. § 25-403.03, amended in 2026, rebuttably presumes against a parent found to have committed domestic violence, limits findings of mutual violence, and adds coercive control. Rahimi upheld § 922(g)(8) against a facial challenge; federal statutes govern MPOs and interstate enforcement.
- Issues for each side: Petitioners’ and government counsel should focus on stalking, prior violence, and firearm findings, without treating an order as proof; respondents’ and parents’ counsel should ask whether the pattern and direction of violence were assessed, without treating an unsubstantiated allegation as false.
Civil protective orders and child-custody determinations are where intimate partner violence (IPV) most often reaches a courtroom without a criminal charge. A protective order can remove a person from a shared home, bar contact, and prohibit firearm possession within days of a petition, frequently on a short hearing and a limited record. A custody determination can reshape a child’s relationship with each parent for years, and in Arizona a finding of domestic violence triggers statutory presumptions that can control the outcome. Both proceedings require judges, and often mental health evaluators, to decide what happened in a relationship, how dangerous it is, and what will protect the people in it.
This paper summarizes research on protective-order effectiveness, violation, and judicial decisions; firearm restrictions; differentiating types of IPV in family court; custody evaluators’ beliefs; unfounded, unprosecuted, and false allegations; and parental-alienation claims. It closes with Arizona, federal, and military law.
Key Terms
A civil protective order (in Arizona, an Order of Protection) is a court order restraining a person from committing acts of domestic violence and, often, from contacting or approaching the petitioner. Arizona also offers an Injunction Against Harassment for conduct outside the domestic-relationship definition. An ex parte order is issued on the petitioner’s showing alone, with the restrained party given a later opportunity to be heard. A Military Protective Order (MPO) is a command order issued by a military commander to a service member under his or her command; it is not a court order. Legal decision-making is Arizona’s term for what other states call legal custody, and parenting time is Arizona’s term for physical custody or visitation. Parental alienation refers to a child’s unjustified rejection of a parent, attributed to the other parent’s influence; the concept and its forensic use are disputed, as discussed below.
Do Protective Orders Work?
The research on protective-order effectiveness is large but methodologically weak, and reviews consistently describe the results as mixed. A review of 15 empirical sources found violation rates ranging from 7.1% to 81.3%, and noted an earlier meta-analysis of 32 studies with violation rates ranging from 3% to 79% and averaging 40%; the authors concluded that protective orders are not a cure-all but can be a useful part of threat management (Benitez et al., 2010). A systematic review and meta-analysis of 25 studies found that violation rates were higher when measured by victim report than by police records, that orders were violated less often when combined with arrest, when the respondent had no prior arrests for violence, when there was no stalking, and among medium- to higher-income couples, and that most studies were at high risk of bias (Cordier et al., 2021).
Longitudinal studies in Kentucky illustrate both sides of the evidence. Following 698 women for a year after a protective order was issued, Logan and Walker (2009) found that about two in five experienced no further violence while about three in five experienced some ongoing violence; only 9% dropped the order, and most women perceived the order as effective. In a separate sample of 210 women followed for six months, half experienced no violation, those who did experience violations reported significant reductions in abuse compared with the period before the order, fear declined, and stalking emerged as the strongest risk factor for violation, sustained fear, and lower perceived effectiveness (Logan & Walker, 2010). An order is associated with reduced abuse for many petitioners but is unlikely, alone, to stop a determined, stalking respondent.
The literature has two notable limits. First, nearly all effectiveness studies sample female petitioners and male respondents, so less is known about orders sought by men or by same-sex partners. Second, without random assignment, no study can isolate the order’s effect from the effects of separation, arrest, or the petitioner’s other safety steps.
Judicial Decisions on Protective Orders
Research on how judges grant orders is limited but raises questions about consistency. In a random sample of 157 temporary restraining-order petitions from a California family court, men were less likely than women to receive orders when the alleged violence was at a low level, while no gender difference appeared when the alleged violence was moderate to severe; only a small number of petitioners were men (Muller et al., 2009). In a Pennsylvania study of men who obtained protection-from-abuse orders against female partners, all received a basic order not to abuse, stalk, or threaten, but few obtained collateral relief such as temporary custody of shared children, eviction of the respondent, or firearm relinquishment; the study had no comparison group of female petitioners (Mele et al., 2011). An analysis of 607 Arizona protective-order filings from 2015 found that petitioners aged 50 and older were far more likely than younger petitioners to be men, and that the forms of violence alleged, the likelihood of issuance, and the provisions granted differed substantially by age and gender (Durfee & Goodmark, 2021). These studies come from single jurisdictions and do not establish that gender rather than case facts drove outcomes, but they indicate that the relief granted can vary in ways worth examining.
Firearms and Protective Orders
Firearm restrictions with relinquishment requirements have the most population-level evidence of any protective-order provision, though the studies are observational state-level analyses reporting relative changes of roughly 10% to 14%, and findings by victim race were not uniform. In a 25-year panel study, state laws that both prohibited firearm possession by persons subject to IPV-related restraining orders and required them to relinquish firearms were associated with 9.7% lower total intimate partner homicide rates and 14.0% lower firearm intimate partner homicide rates; laws without an explicit relinquishment requirement were associated with a smaller, non-significant reduction (Díez et al., 2017). A reanalysis by victim race found that state restraining-order firearm restrictions with relinquishment provisions were associated with reduced intimate partner homicide among White victims but not Black victims, while the federal restraining-order prohibition was associated with reductions among Black but not White victims (Wallin et al., 2022). Relinquishment laws have also been associated with substantial reductions in homicide of pregnant and postpartum women (Wallace et al., 2021). These are observational, state-level studies that cannot prove causation or account for differences in enforcement, and the reanalysis by victim race shows that the pattern was not the same for all victim groups.
Differentiating Types of IPV in Family Court
A central development in family-court practice is the recognition that IPV is not a single phenomenon. Kelly and Johnson (2008) described four patterns: coercive controlling violence, in which physical violence is embedded in a broader pattern of intimidation and control; violent resistance; situational couple violence, arising from escalating conflicts without a general pattern of control; and separation-instigated violence, which first appears at or after separation. They described coercive controlling violence as perpetrated primarily by men and situational couple violence as perpetrated by both sexes, argued that the gender-symmetry controversy largely reflects sampling differences, and urged that differentiation guide safeguards and parenting plans. The gendered part of that account is contested: researchers have documented coercive controlling violence against men by female partners (Hines & Douglas, 2010), and the proportion of each pattern by sex varies with the sample studied.
Two organizations central to family-court practice, the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC) and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ), convened a 2007 conference that produced a consensus report urging that courts screen all cases for IPV, assess the nature and context of any violence, and tailor interventions to the pattern identified rather than to the mere presence of a violent act (Ver Steegh & Dalton, 2008). Jaffe et al. (2008) proposed a differentiated approach to parenting plans organized around the potency of the violence, its pattern, and which parent is the primary perpetrator, with options ranging from co-parenting for low-risk situational conflict to supervised or suspended contact where coercive control or serious danger is present. These frameworks are widely cited, but the screening instruments they call for have limited validation in custody settings, and evaluators must still make difficult judgments about which pattern a given family fits.
Custody Evaluators and IPV
The most extensive U.S. research on custody evaluators’ handling of IPV was a National Institute of Justice study by Saunders, Faller, and Tolman (2011), which surveyed custody evaluators and other family-court professionals about their beliefs regarding domestic-abuse allegations and how those beliefs related to their recommendations. In a published analysis of 465 evaluators, beliefs—such as that mothers often make false allegations of domestic violence—predicted recommendations that perpetrators receive custody or unsupervised visitation more strongly than evaluator demographics or knowledge about IPV; male gender, endorsement of patriarchal norms, and less IPV knowledge were also associated with such recommendations (Saunders et al., 2013). The authors drew implications for evaluator training and selection.
Evaluator bias can operate in more than one direction. In a national survey of psychologists, irrespective of the psychologists’ own demographics, identical psychologically aggressive behaviors were rated as more abusive and more severe when a husband directed them at a wife than when a wife directed them at a husband (Follingstad et al., 2004). Together these findings suggest that an evaluator’s prior beliefs—about the frequency of false allegations, or about which partner is likely to be dangerous—can shape conclusions more than the case data, and that structured, documented methods are a safeguard regardless of which belief is at issue.
Unfounded, Unprosecuted, and False Allegations
Beliefs about how often IPV allegations are false matter in practice, as the evaluator research shows, but the systems that handle these allegations rarely decide that question. A protective-order petition that is denied or dismissed, a police report that does not lead to charges, a case the prosecutor declines or dismisses, and an acquittal each mean that a particular standard of proof was not met. None is a finding that the allegation was false, and neither the civil nor the criminal process ordinarily sets out to make such a finding. The more informative figure is therefore the share of allegations that are not substantiated or not proven, which every system produces, rather than a false-allegation rate, which exists only where someone went further and documented that an allegation was untrue.
The attrition is substantial. A review of 135 reports from more than 170 jurisdictions in five countries estimated that approximately one-third of IPV offenses reported to the police result in a prosecution, that about three-fifths of arrests result in charges, and that about one-third of arrests and more than half of prosecutions result in a conviction, with rates varying widely among local systems (Garner & Maxwell, 2009). Most reported IPV incidents therefore end without a conviction. That pattern reflects evidentiary and procedural obstacles, including complainants who do not participate in prosecution, as well as cases in which the alleged violence did not occur or did not meet the legal definition, and the data do not divide the cases among those explanations. In family court, a study of 120 custody-disputing families found that allegations of child abuse, neglect, or family violence were raised in most cases and that about half of the alleged abuse was substantiated in some way (Johnston et al., 2005).
Direct evidence on deliberate fabrication of IPV allegations is thin. The national Canadian study often cited on false allegations in separating families found that more than one-third of child maltreatment investigations were unsubstantiated but only 4% were judged intentionally fabricated, rising to 12% where there was a custody or access dispute; those figures cover child maltreatment, and the study did not report a separate rate for allegations of partner violence (Trocmé & Bala, 2005). In that study, anonymous reporters and noncustodial parents, usually fathers, most often made the intentionally false reports, while custodial parents, usually mothers, were among the least likely to do so; because parental role and sex overlap, the finding describes reporter roles in one Canadian sample rather than the truthfulness of mothers or fathers generally. No study of comparable quality establishes how often IPV allegations are deliberately false, and proven versus unproven is not the same as true versus false; any party may ask what the cited data counted. What the research does show is that the unproven group is large and that its size says nothing, by itself, about how many allegations were true or false. An unproven allegation is not a false one, and an allegation not shown to be false is not thereby proven.
Parental Alienation and Abuse Allegations
Few topics in family law are more contested than the interaction between abuse allegations and counter-claims of parental alienation. Meier, Dickson, O’Sullivan, Rosen, and Hayes (2020) analyzed ten years of published U.S. custody decisions involving abuse and alienation claims (more than 2,000 court opinions, according to the abstract of the authors’ National Institute of Justice report). They reported that mothers’ abuse allegations—especially allegations of child physical or sexual abuse—were associated with an increased risk of losing custody, and that a father’s cross-claim of alienation roughly doubled that risk; fathers’ allegations of abuse by mothers were not similarly undermined when mothers alleged alienation. As reported by the study team, courts credited mothers’ abuse claims in about 36% of cases overall, and when fathers claimed alienation, the rate at which mothers who alleged abuse lost custody rose from 26% to 44%; Harman and Lorandos disputed these findings, as described below.
Harman and Lorandos (2021) challenged those conclusions. In a preregistered analysis of 967 appellate cases in which parental alienation was found or alleged, they reported that parents found to have alienated a child received less parenting time, that parents alleging alienation without a credible finding did not gain parenting time, that gender did not appear to drive outcomes, and that they found no evidence that children were placed with abusive parents. They also criticized the earlier study for initially appearing outside peer review and for limited transparency about its data. Meier, Dickson, O’Sullivan, and Rosen (2022) responded that Harman and Lorandos’s dataset differed fundamentally from theirs, that reanalysis did not support the reported findings of bias favoring fathers, and that the study contained coding and statistical errors.
What is and is not settled can be stated plainly. Both studies analyzed published or appellate decisions, which are a small and unrepresentative fraction of custody cases. Neither could determine whether the underlying abuse or alienation allegations were true, so neither can say whether courts reached correct outcomes. The two teams used different samples, coding rules, and definitions, and each has published detailed criticisms of the other. The research does support the narrower proposition that abuse allegations and alienation counter-claims frequently appear together and that how courts weigh them can significantly affect outcomes. It does not establish either that alienation claims are routinely used to defeat valid abuse allegations or that such misuse is rare.
Supervised Visitation
Supervised parenting time and supervised exchanges are common interim measures when IPV is alleged, and Arizona law expressly lists them as conditions a court may impose. The empirical literature on supervised visitation outcomes is thin: most published work is descriptive, focuses on program practices rather than measured outcomes, and comes from single centers, so claims about particular arrangements rest largely on professional consensus rather than controlled research.
Limits of the Evidence
Protective-order research relies heavily on female petitioners, self-report, short follow-up, and non-random designs. Firearm-law studies are ecological and cannot establish causation for individual cases. Custody research relies on surveys of professionals and on published decisions, which reveal what evaluators say they believe and what appellate courts wrote, but not what happened in the families involved. Data on case attrition describe what proportion of allegations were proven, not what proportion were true, and there is no reliable estimate of how often IPV allegations are deliberately false. Validated IPV screening tools designed specifically for custody evaluations remain limited.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the association of relinquishment laws with 9.7% lower intimate partner homicide rates (Díez et al., 2017) is offered to support a firearm provision, ask how large the effect is in absolute terms, since 9.7% is a relative change in a state-level rate, and whether an observational design can show what an order will do in one case. When the finding that 12% of child maltreatment investigations in custody or access disputes were judged intentionally fabricated (Trocmé & Bala, 2005) is cited to suggest that allegations raised in custody litigation are often false, ask what exactly was counted: the figure concerns child maltreatment, not partner violence, and the same study found only 4% fabricated overall. When either parental-alienation study (Meier et al., 2020; Harman & Lorandos, 2021) is offered, ask who was studied, since both used published or appellate decisions, and how the findings have held up in the published exchange between the teams (Meier et al., 2022). When violation rates are cited, ask whether they came from victim reports or police records (Cordier et al., 2021). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Protective Orders, Custody, and the Law
Arizona Orders of Protection and Injunctions Against Harassment
Under A.R.S. § 13-3602, a person may petition a magistrate, justice of the peace, or superior court judge for an Order of Protection against a person with whom a domestic relationship under § 13-3601 exists. The court shall issue the order if it finds reasonable cause to believe the defendant may commit an act of domestic violence or has committed an act of domestic violence within the past year, or a longer period for good cause. Relief may include an order not to commit domestic violence, exclusive use of the residence on a showing that physical harm may otherwise result, no-contact and stay-away provisions, and, if the court finds the defendant is a credible threat to the physical safety of the plaintiff or others, a prohibition on possessing or purchasing firearms with transfer of any firearms to law enforcement. Mutual orders are prohibited. The defendant may request one hearing, which ordinarily must be held within ten days, or within five days if exclusive use of the home was granted. An order expires if not served within one year and otherwise expires two years after service (§ 13-3602(N)). The Injunction Against Harassment under A.R.S. § 12-1809 addresses a series of acts directed at a specific person that would seriously alarm, annoy, or harass a reasonable person and serve no legitimate purpose, or one or more acts of sexual violence; it does not apply to protective orders against domestic violence and remains in effect for one year after service.
Arizona Custody Law
A.R.S. § 25-403.03 governs domestic violence in legal decision-making and parenting time. The statute was substantially amended in 2026 by H.B. 2995, the “Alec and Lydia Act” (2026 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 263), an emergency measure approved by the Governor and filed on June 22, 2026 and operative immediately; the enacted act contains no separate applicability or transition section, so counsel handling matters pending at that time should confirm which version applies and should read the current text of the statute directly. As amended, the statute treats domestic violence, including child abuse, as contrary to the child’s best interests and directs courts to give highest priority to the safety and well-being of the child and the victim. Domestic violence must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and corroboration is not required. A finding that a parent committed domestic violence triggers a mandatory rebuttable presumption that awarding that parent legal decision-making or parenting time is contrary to the child’s best interests. The court may not require the victim to prove that the violence was severe or frequent enough to warrant restriction, and may not find the violence mutual, or apply the presumption to both parents, unless both parents acted without justification to a similar degree and caused similar injury; otherwise the presumption applies only to the parent whose conduct and motivation were more serious. In deciding whether the presumption is rebutted, the court weighs factors including the severity and frequency of the violence, aggravators such as strangulation, weapons, and multiple forms of coercive control, denial or minimization, the passage of time, and whether any treatment was relevant and proportionate (a certificate of completion alone is not proof of rehabilitation); the court must disregard the child’s absence from or unawareness of the violence and the child’s preference for contact with the parent who committed it. A parent subject to the presumption may obtain sole or joint legal decision-making, or unsupervised parenting time, only by clear and convincing evidence, and supervised parenting time by a preponderance. The court must adopt safety precautions for a parent who committed domestic violence, which may include protected exchanges, supervised parenting time (never supervised by the victim), prohibition of overnight parenting time, intervention programs, and substance testing, and it may not order a victim to participate jointly with the perpetrator in counseling or assessment. The definition of domestic violence for this section now includes coercive control, defined as a pattern of threatening, coercive, or emotionally abusive conduct without consent or justification. The statute’s limits on finding violence mutual make the distinctions discussed in this paper—who was the predominant aggressor and whether force was defensive—directly consequential.
Federal Firearms Law
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), a person subject to a court order issued after a hearing of which the person received actual notice and an opportunity to participate, which restrains the person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or child and either includes a finding that the person represents a credible threat to the partner’s or child’s physical safety or explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, may not possess firearms. In United States v. Rahimi (2024), the Supreme Court rejected a facial Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8), holding that an individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. The Court did not decide the constitutionality of the provision as applied to orders resting only on the explicit-prohibition prong. Because § 922(g)(8) requires a court order issued after notice and hearing, an ex parte Arizona order does not by itself trigger the federal prohibition, and a commander-issued MPO is not a court order.
Full Faith and Credit and Enforcement
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2265, a protection order issued by a state, tribal, or territorial court that had jurisdiction and gave the respondent reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard must be enforced by other jurisdictions as if it were their own; registration is not a prerequisite to enforcement. A mutual order is not entitled to full faith and credit as against the original petitioner unless the respondent filed a cross-petition and the court made specific findings that each party was entitled to an order. In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005), the Supreme Court held that the holder of a restraining order had no property interest, protected by the Due Process Clause, in police enforcement of the order, because the Colorado statute did not clearly eliminate police discretion or create a personal entitlement to enforcement. The decision does not affect criminal liability for violations.
Military Protective Orders and Installations
A commander may issue a Military Protective Order, documented on DD Form 2873, to a service member under his or her command. Under 10 U.S.C. § 1567, an MPO remains in effect until the commander terminates it or issues a replacement order. Under 10 U.S.C. § 1567a, the member’s unit commander must notify appropriate civilian authorities within seven days of issuing an MPO, and must also report changes, terminations, and transfers. Civilian authorities generally do not enforce military protective orders, which are enforced mainly through the military justice system, although MPOs are entered in the National Crime Information Center and some jurisdictions have their own provisions (verify local law); violations are addressed through the military justice system, including Article 128b, UCMJ, which reaches violation of a protection order committed with intent to threaten, intimidate, or commit a violent offense against a covered family member or partner. In the other direction, 10 U.S.C. § 1561a provides that a civilian order of protection has the same force and effect on a military installation as it has within the jurisdiction of the issuing court, and a 2019 statutory note directs the Secretary of Defense to establish registration policies while providing that failure to register an order is not grounds for refusing to enforce it. A protected person with ties to both systems may therefore hold a civilian order enforceable on and off the installation and an MPO enforced mainly through the command.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
In the protective-order and custody context, “prosecutors” includes petitioners’ counsel and government attorneys enforcing orders. The research supports attention to the factors most strongly associated with violation and lethality—stalking, prior arrests for violence, and access to firearms—because those factors bear directly on the relief requested and on enforcement priorities. Relinquishment requirements are the firearm provision with the most population-level evidence, although the studies are observational and the findings by victim race were not uniform, and federal and Arizona law each condition firearm prohibitions on specific findings and procedures, so the record of a credible-threat finding and of notice and hearing often determines whether a prohibition applies. The research also supports explaining that a prior petition that was denied, or a prior report that was not prosecuted, is an unproven allegation, not a false one.
The research also counsels care in how a protective order or prior allegation is later used. The existence of an order, particularly one issued ex parte or on a limited record, does not itself establish that the violence alleged occurred or that the respondent was the predominant aggressor. Custody research shows that evaluators’ prior beliefs can drive recommendations, and judicial-decision studies suggest relief may vary by petitioner characteristics. Presenting the underlying facts, rather than relying on the order or the allegation as proof, gives the court a more reliable record.
Special Issues for Defense
In this context, “defense” includes respondents’ counsel and counsel for a parent defending against an abuse allegation. The research supports attention to the distinction between types of violence, because Arizona’s amended custody statute applies its presumption only to the parent whose conduct was more serious unless both parents’ violence was similarly unjustified and similarly injurious. Kelly and Johnson’s differentiation framework, the AFCC and NCJFCJ consensus, and the evaluator-bias research all support asking whether an evaluator assessed the pattern, context, and direction of any violence rather than treating a single incident or an allegation as dispositive. Where an evaluator or witness relies on a belief about how often allegations are true or false, any party can ask what the cited data counted, including what proportion of allegations were proven at all; proven and unproven are not the same as true and false, and a false-allegation rate is not what those figures describe.
The research also counsels care in how alienation and bias arguments are framed. The parental-alienation studies analyzed published decisions, could not determine whether allegations were true, and reached conflicting conclusions; neither side’s research establishes how often alienation claims are valid. Protective-order research shows that many orders are followed by reduced violence and that stalking predicts violation, so the existence of an order may reflect genuine risk. An allegation that was not substantiated is not thereby shown to be false. Evaluations grounded in documented behavior and corroboration, rather than in general claims about either side’s motives, provide the most defensible basis for a court’s decision.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Wallin, M. A., Holliday, C. N., & Zeoli, A. M. (2022). The association of federal and state-level firearm restriction policies with intimate partner homicide: A re-analysis by race of the victim. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 37(17–18), NP16509–NP16533. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605211021988
Legal Authorities
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).
10 U.S.C. § 928b (Article 128b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 1561a.
10 U.S.C. § 1567.
10 U.S.C. § 1567a.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
18 U.S.C. § 2265.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1809.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3602.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-403.03 (as amended by 2026 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 263 (H.B. 2995)).
DD Form 2873, Military Protective Order.
Related topic papers: Co-Occurrence of IPV and Child Maltreatment · Typologies of Intimate Partner Violence · IPV Risk Assessment Instruments · Predominant-Aggressor Determinations and Arrest · Intimate Partner Violence Against Men