Snap Shot
- The question: Why might a person reporting partner abuse stay, return, delay, self-blame, or recant, and what do those behaviors prove?
- What the research shows: In the studies reviewed, which mostly sampled women already identified as victims, self-blame was common and was associated with poorer adjustment. In the studies reviewed, staying was associated with commitment, practical barriers, attachment, and fear; in an 11-city case-control study of 220 femicides and 343 abused women, estrangement, especially from a controlling partner, was associated with higher odds of femicide, though leaving has not been shown to be generally more dangerous than staying. In one qualitative study of recorded jail calls by 25 couples, recantation followed the defendant’s appeals to sympathy and minimization of the abuse.
- What it does not show: No behavior described is diagnostic. These behaviors also occur when allegations were exaggerated, mistaken, or false, or when violence was mutual, at rates the research does not estimate. A recantation does not show that the original report was true, and some are accurate corrections.
- The law: Cold experts may explain counterintuitive behavior (Salazar-Mercado, Haskie) but may not offer profile evidence about the defendant (Ketchner) or opine on a witness’s truthfulness (Lindsey). Arizona’s Rule 801(d)(1)(A), unlike the federal and military rules as they now read, does not require an oath for a testifying witness’s prior inconsistent statement, which may be substantive evidence subject to Rule 403. Crawford and Davis govern a non-testifying complainant’s statements; Giles requires intent for forfeiture.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should avoid categorical claims and treat a recantation as evidence to be weighed, not as automatically false; defense counsel should stress that no behavior is diagnostic and seek a limiting instruction, while recognizing the testimony is generally admissible when confined.
Few questions in intimate partner violence (IPV) cases are asked more often, by jurors and by professionals, than why a person who reports abuse stayed in the relationship, returned to it, delayed reporting, blamed themselves, or later recanted. These behaviors can appear inconsistent with the allegation, and they are frequently central to credibility disputes at trial, in protective-order and custody hearings, and in military proceedings. Psychological research offers explanations for why such behaviors occur in abusive relationships, and courts have admitted expert testimony to explain them.
This paper reviews the research on self-blame, the decision to stay or leave, separation risk, traumatic bonding, delayed reporting, and recantation. It then states plainly what that research does not support, in particular that none of these behaviors is diagnostic of whether abuse occurred. The paper closes with the legal framework governing expert testimony on victim behavior, impeachment, and the admission of statements by a complainant who does not testify. The research discussed concerns victims of either sex, although most studies sampled women abused by male partners; limits on generalizing are noted where relevant.
Self-Blame
Characterological and behavioral self-blame
Self-blame is the attribution of responsibility for a harmful event to oneself. Janoff-Bulman (1979), studying depression and rape, distinguished two forms. Characterological self-blame attributes the event to a stable aspect of who one is (“this happened because I am weak” or “because I am unlovable”). Behavioral self-blame attributes it to something one did (“I shouldn’t have argued that night”). Janoff-Bulman proposed that behavioral self-blame might be adaptive, because it implies that changing one’s behavior can prevent recurrence, whereas characterological self-blame implies helplessness and is linked to depression.
Research with IPV victims has not confirmed that behavioral self-blame is protective. Among 160 women who had experienced physical violence by a partner, both characterological and behavioral self-blame were associated with more psychological symptoms; women still living with violent partners reported the highest levels of both forms and the lowest sense of control (O’Neill & Kerig, 2000). In 100 women who had been battered, self-blame as a coping strategy uniquely predicted dysphoria after controlling for abuse severity and self-esteem (Clements et al., 2004). Among 131 women seeking protection orders, self-blame coping, and being blamed by others, was associated with greater depressive and post-traumatic symptoms (Flicker et al., 2012). In 80 women survivors, self-blame was associated with lower self-esteem across physical, psychological, and sexual abuse and moderated the association between physical abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Reich et al., 2015). In a community sample of 229 women recruited after a police-reported IPV incident by a male partner, trauma-related appraisals including fear, alienation, and self-blame were the strongest independent predictors of PTSD symptom profile (Hebenstreit et al., 2015), and in 109 women seeking mental-health help after IPV, higher shame and guilt were associated with greater self-blame (Beck et al., 2015).
Where self-blame comes from
Researchers describe several sources. Some self-blame reflects general human tendencies to search for controllable causes of distressing events. Some reflects the abusive partner’s messages that the victim provoked the violence or is responsible for the partner’s behavior. A 2024 narrative review concluded that coercive tactics tend to lower self-esteem and sense of agency and to increase dependence and self-blame, which in turn can reduce recognition that the relationship is abusive (Veldhuis, 2024). Self-blame also interacts with rumination: in 200 women with an IPV history, intrusive rumination was associated with greater self-blame (Bakaitytė et al., 2022).
What self-blame does and does not indicate
These studies show that self-blame is common among people who report IPV and is associated with poorer adjustment. They do not show that self-blame is unique to genuine victims. People in mutually violent relationships, people who used violence themselves, and people in distressed but non-violent relationships may also blame themselves, and the studies above sampled only women who had already been identified as victims, so they cannot estimate how often self-blame occurs in those other groups. A complainant’s statement that “it was my fault” is therefore consistent with victimization but is not evidence that victimization occurred; equally, it is not evidence that the complainant was the aggressor.
Why People Stay or Return
Investment and commitment
Social psychologists explain commitment to any relationship through the investment model, which holds that commitment depends on satisfaction with the relationship, the quality of alternatives, and the size of investments (time, shared children, finances, identity) that would be lost by leaving. Rusbult and Martz (1995), studying women at intake to a shelter, found that commitment was greater among women with poorer economic alternatives and greater investments (for example, being married), and less severe abuse; commitment in turn distinguished women who returned to their partners immediately after leaving the shelter from those who did not. The model’s point is that staying can be understood through the same dependence processes that keep people in non-abusive relationships, without assuming any pathology in the victim.
Practical, economic, and child-related barriers
Reviews of the leaving process identify material and psychological predictors: income and employment, housing, social support, concern for children, fear, and emotional attachment (Anderson & Saunders, 2003). Leaving is typically a process with multiple separations and returns rather than a single event, and some women who have just left show more psychological difficulty than those still in the relationship because separation brings new stressors (Anderson & Saunders, 2003). Economic dependence, shared children, immigration status, religious or family expectations, and lack of safe housing are commonly cited barriers. Men face many of the same barriers plus some distinctive ones, discussed in Intimate Partner Violence Against Men.
Fear and separation risk
Fear of escalation is one reason people give for staying. In an 11-city case-control study comparing the proxies of 220 women killed by intimate partners with 343 abused women who were not killed, several factors were associated in multivariate analyses with higher odds of femicide: the abuser’s access to a gun, a prior threat with a weapon, the presence of the abuser’s stepchild in the home, and estrangement, especially from a controlling partner; never having lived together and a prior domestic-violence arrest were associated with lower odds (Campbell et al., 2003). Because the comparison group was abused women, these odds ratios describe differences among women in abusive relationships; they are not probabilities and do not estimate the risk of leaving compared with staying. A meta-analysis of 17 studies of homicide of women by male partners found that the strongest risk factors were the perpetrator’s direct access to a gun, prior nonfatal strangulation, prior rape of the victim, prior threats with a weapon, controlling behaviors, and prior threats to harm the victim (Spencer & Stith, 2020). Homicide is rare, and these findings come from samples of male-perpetrated violence against women; they establish that separation can be a period of heightened risk, not that leaving is generally more dangerous than staying.
Traumatic bonding
Traumatic bonding theory holds that strong emotional attachment can develop in relationships marked by a power imbalance and intermittent alternation between abuse and warmth. In 75 women who had recently left abusive relationships, the intermittency of maltreatment and power differentials predicted attachment to the former partner, and attachment persisted after separation, with attachment, self-esteem, and trauma symptoms remaining associated at a six-month follow-up (Dutton & Painter, 1993). A 2022 study of 345 Nigerian women attending violence-response services found that empathy, the capacity to understand and share the partner’s feelings, was associated with stronger traumatic bonding (Effiong et al., 2022). The theory has empirical support, but the studies are few, correlational, based on self-report, and drawn from women in services. “Traumatic bonding” (sometimes popularly called “Stockholm syndrome,” a term without a formal diagnostic definition) is an explanatory framework, not a diagnosis, and its presence cannot be inferred simply from the fact that someone stayed.
Delayed Reporting
Some IPV is never reported to police, and some that is reported is reported after delay. The reasons overlap with those for staying: fear of retaliation, financial or housing dependence, concern for children, hope that the partner will change, shame and self-blame, distrust of police or courts, and uncertainty about whether the conduct “counts” as abuse. Recognition that a relationship is abusive often develops gradually, and controlling tactics can impede that recognition (Veldhuis, 2024). Delay is therefore a documented pattern among people who were abused. It is also common in other situations, for example when an allegation arises during a custody dispute or after a separation, and the research does not provide a way to tell, from the fact of delay alone, which situation applies.
Recantation
Recantation is a complainant’s withdrawal or reversal of an earlier allegation, or a refusal to continue participating in prosecution. A frequently cited study analyzed recorded jail telephone calls between 25 heterosexual couples in which the male partner was held on felony domestic-violence charges and the female partner later recanted (Bonomi et al., 2011). The authors described a sequence: the defendant appealed to the victim’s sympathy (describing his suffering in jail and life without her); the couple minimized the abuse and imagined their lives apart; and, once the victim decided to recant, the couple redefined the events, blamed the State for their separation, and planned what she would say. The authors emphasized sympathy appeals and minimization as the influences on recantation intentions in these calls.
The study’s design defines its limits. It examined only couples in which recantation occurred and in which the defendant was detained and calling from jail, so it describes how recantation unfolded in those cases; it cannot estimate how often recantation occurs, cannot compare recanting with non-recanting complainants, and cannot establish whether original allegations were accurate. The study is qualitative and from a single jurisdiction.
What the Research Does Not Support
Because these topics are so often argued at trial, the boundaries of the research deserve explicit statement. They apply to any expert, whichever side calls the expert.
First, no behavior described in this paper is diagnostic. Staying, returning, delaying a report, minimizing, blaming oneself, and recanting all occur among people who were abused, and the research explains why. But the same behaviors can also occur when allegations were exaggerated, mistaken, or false, and when violence was mutual. The research describes behavior within samples of identified victims; it does not establish how often these behaviors occur among people whose allegations were inaccurate, and so it cannot convert a behavior into evidence that abuse did or did not happen.
Second, a recantation does not by itself show that the original allegation was true. Research such as Bonomi et al. (2011) shows that recantation can follow pressure, sympathy appeals, and minimization; it does not show that every recantation is false, and some recantations are accurate corrections. Equally, the original report does not by itself show that the allegation is true, and the recantation does not by itself show that it was false. Each statement must be weighed in light of corroborating evidence and the circumstances in which it was made, and credibility is for the fact-finder.
Third, general testimony about victim behavior cannot validate a particular complainant. An expert can explain that a behavior is consistent with research findings on abuse victims; the research does not support an opinion that a particular person was abused or is telling the truth, and Arizona law forbids such opinions.
Fourth, most of this research sampled women victimized by male partners, often in shelters, courts, or clinics; every self-blame study cited above used women, so the research did not test whether self-blame, staying, or recantation differ by sex. Generalization to men, to same-sex relationships, to community samples, and to mutually violent relationships should be made cautiously.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When self-blame findings such as those in 160 women (O’Neill & Kerig, 2000) or 229 women recruited after a police-reported incident (Hebenstreit et al., 2015) are cited, ask who was sampled: all were women already identified as victims, so the studies cannot say how common self-blame is among people whose allegations were inaccurate or whose violence was mutual. When estrangement is cited as a danger marker, ask what the comparison was: Campbell et al. (2003) compared 220 femicides with 343 abused women, so the findings are odds ratios among women in abusive relationships, not the probability of harm after leaving, and homicide is rare. When the jail-call study of 25 couples (Bonomi et al., 2011) is cited to explain a recantation, ask whether it applies to this case, since every couple in it had a recantation and the study cannot estimate how often recantations reflect pressure or accurate correction. When a recantation, a delay, or a return to the partner is offered as proof that abuse did or did not occur, ask what corroborating evidence exists, since none of these behaviors is diagnostic. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Victim Behavior Evidence and the Law
Expert testimony on counterintuitive behavior
Expert testimony explaining why victims may stay, delay, blame themselves, or recant is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, and Military Rule of Evidence 702, into which the 2023 federal amendment took effect in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) govern the gatekeeping inquiry, and Kumho extends it to all expert testimony. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended in 2012 to follow Daubert and again effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004) to conform to the 2023 federal amendment; confirm current text. State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) held that Arizona’s amended Rule 702 does not bar “cold” expert testimony, meaning general education by an expert unfamiliar with the case, if it satisfies Rule 702 and survives Rule 403.
State v. Haskie (2017) is the controlling Arizona decision on this subject in IPV cases. On the day of the incident the complainant gave police a written statement that the defendant had beaten and strangled her, and physical evidence corroborated it; after his arrest she wrote letters to the prosecutor recanting, and at trial she testified that she did not remember who had beaten her because she had been drinking. The State called a cold expert to explain why victims may stay, blame themselves, or recant. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the testimony was not impermissible profile evidence and was within the trial court’s discretion to admit, because the complainant’s behavior and inconsistent statements were squarely at issue. The court cautioned that trial courts must screen such testimony carefully under Rules 401 through 403 and 702, that it should not be admitted automatically, that experts must stay within their expertise and avoid broad categorical claims about what is “common” or “usual” without empirical support, and that a defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction under Rule 105. The court distinguished State v. Ketchner (2014), in which cold-expert testimony about separation violence and the characteristics of abusers was held inadmissible because the victim’s behavior was not at issue and the testimony invited the jury to compare the defendant with a domestic abuser; the court reversed the first-degree murder and burglary convictions, whose disputed element was the defendant’s intent, and found the error harmless as to the other counts. State v. Lindsey (1986) separately prohibits expert opinion on whether a particular witness is truthful and expert testimony quantifying the probability that witnesses of a type are truthful. Together these decisions permit general education about counterintuitive behavior and prohibit using that education to label the defendant an abuser or the complainant credible.
Impeachment and prior inconsistent statements
When a complainant recants at trial, the earlier statement is ordinarily admissible to impeach. Whether it may also be used as substantive evidence depends on the jurisdiction’s rule. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) as it reads until the amendment described below, and the corresponding Military Rule, a prior inconsistent statement of a testifying witness is not hearsay only if it was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, other proceeding, or deposition; an unsworn statement to police may be used to impeach but not for its truth unless another exception applies. The Supreme Court has ordered an amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), scheduled to take effect December 1, 2026, under which the statement need only be inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony; under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, federal amendments generally apply in courts-martial after a delay unless the President directs otherwise, so practitioners should confirm which text governs. Arizona’s Rule 801(d)(1)(A) already reads that the statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about it and it is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and Arizona decisions treat a properly admitted prior inconsistent statement as usable substantively, subject to Rule 403 (State v. Skinner, 1973). Excited utterances, statements for medical diagnosis or treatment, and statements in recorded 911 calls may be admissible under separate hearsay exceptions, subject to the confrontation limits below.
Confrontation and evidence-based prosecution
When a complainant declines to testify, prosecutors sometimes proceed with “evidence-based” (sometimes called “victimless”) prosecution, relying on 911 recordings, officer observations, photographs, medical records, the defendant’s statements, and other witnesses. The Sixth Amendment limits this approach. Crawford v. Washington (2004) held that testimonial hearsay from a witness who does not testify is inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Davis v. Washington and its companion case Hammon v. Indiana (2006) drew the line in domestic-violence cases: statements made to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency (the 911 call in Davis) are nontestimonial, while statements describing past events after the emergency has ended (the statements and affidavit in Hammon) are testimonial. Michigan v. Bryant (2011) applied the same “primary purpose” analysis to statements made to police by a mortally wounded victim. The confrontation analysis is therefore statement-by-statement and fact-specific.
Forfeiture by wrongdoing
A defendant who wrongfully causes a witness’s unavailability forfeits the confrontation and hearsay objections. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), mirrored in the Military Rules, admits a statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant’s unavailability, intending that result. In Giles v. California (2008), the Supreme Court held that the constitutional forfeiture exception applies only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying. The Court observed that in domestic-violence cases, earlier abuse or threats intended to dissuade a victim from seeking outside help, or from cooperating with a prosecution, would be highly relevant to that intent. The research on recantation is relevant to forfeiture litigation but does not resolve it: evidence that a defendant pressured a complainant (for example, through recorded jail calls) bears on intent, while the finding that recantations in one set of recorded calls followed sympathy appeals does not establish that any particular defendant acted with the purpose of preventing testimony.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
Prosecutors most often encounter this research when a complainant stays with, returns to, or reconciles with the defendant, delays reporting, or recants. The research legitimately explains to jurors why such behavior occurs among people who were abused, and Haskie permits general expert education on that point. The same research also defines the limits of that testimony: it cannot establish that the complainant was abused, and testimony framed in categorical terms (“victims usually recant”) or that implicitly matches the defendant to an abuser profile risks the error identified in Ketchner.
When a complainant recants, the research supports treating the recantation as one piece of evidence to be weighed, not as automatically false, and it does not support treating the original statement as accurate for that reason alone. Recorded communications showing pressure, if any exist, are case-specific evidence of a kind the general research cannot supply. Evidence-based prosecution requires a statement-by-statement confrontation analysis under Crawford, Davis, and Bryant, and forfeiture under Giles and Rule 804(b)(6) requires proof of purpose, not simply proof that the complainant became unwilling to testify.
Special Issues for Defense
Defense counsel most often encounter this research when the prosecution offers an expert to explain a complainant’s staying, delay, self-blame, or recantation. The research is genuine and the testimony is generally admissible when confined, but its limits are central: no behavior described in this literature is diagnostic, the studies reviewed sampled women already identified as victims, and the research does not estimate how often the same behaviors occur when allegations are inaccurate or when violence was mutual. Haskie entitles the defense to Rule 403 and Rule 702 screening and to a limiting instruction, and Lindsey bars opinion on the complainant’s truthfulness.
A recantation may reflect pressure, but it may also be an accurate correction, and the research does not allow an expert to say which, so a recantation does not by itself show that the original allegation was false. When the prosecution proceeds without the complainant’s testimony, the testimonial character of each statement under Davis and Bryant and the purpose requirement under Giles are matters the general research does not resolve. The prosecution may offer a defendant’s continued contact with the complainant as evidence of pressure; whether particular communications show intent to prevent testimony is a case-specific question, and the same limits on categorical claims apply to any expert the defense may call.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Bakaitytė, A., Puente-Martínez, A., Ubilos-Landa, S., & Žukauskienė, R. (2022). Path to posttraumatic growth: The role of centrality of event, deliberate and intrusive rumination, and self blame in women victims and survivors of intimate partner violence. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, Article 1018569. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1018569
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Bonomi, A. E., Gangamma, R., Locke, C. R., Katafiasz, H., & Martin, D. (2011). “Meet me at the hill where we used to park”: Interpersonal processes associated with victim recantation. Social Science & Medicine, 73(7), 1054–1061. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.07.005
Campbell, J. C., Webster, D., Koziol-McLain, J., Block, C., Campbell, D., Curry, M. A., Gary, F., Glass, N., McFarlane, J., Sachs, C., Sharps, P., Ulrich, Y., Wilt, S. A., Manganello, J., Xu, X., Schollenberger, J., Frye, V., & Laughon, K. (2003). Risk factors for femicide in abusive relationships: Results from a multisite case control study. American Journal of Public Health, 93(7), 1089–1097. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.93.7.1089
Clements, C. M., Sabourin, C. M., & Spiby, L. (2004). Dysphoria and hopelessness following battering: The role of perceived control, coping, and self-esteem. Journal of Family Violence, 19(1), 25–36. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOFV.0000011580.63593.96
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Flicker, S. M., Cerulli, C., Swogger, M. T., & Talbot, N. L. (2012). Depressive and posttraumatic symptoms among women seeking protection orders against intimate partners: Relations to coping strategies and perceived responses to abuse disclosure. Violence Against Women, 18(4), 420–436. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801212448897
Hebenstreit, C. L., Maguen, S., Koo, K. H., & DePrince, A. P. (2015). Latent profiles of PTSD symptoms in women exposed to intimate partner violence. Journal of Affective Disorders, 180, 122–128. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2015.03.047
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Legal Authorities
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (decided with Hammon v. Indiana).
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Ketchner, 236 Ariz. 262, 339 P.3d 645 (2014).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135 (1973).
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (2023) (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Fed. R. Evid. 702; Mil. R. Evid. 702; Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (amendment ordered by the Supreme Court, effective Dec. 1, 2026); Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); Mil. R. Evid. 1102; Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).
Related topic papers: Expert Testimony on Intimate Partner Violence · Introduction to Intimate Partner Violence · IPV Risk Assessment Instruments · Intimate Partner Violence Against Men · Sexual Assault and Intimate Partner Violence