Skip to content
Search resources Open menu

False Confessions

Introduction to False Confessions and Police Interrogation

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: What is a confession worth as evidence, how are suspects questioned in the United States today, and what does the research on interrogation and false confessions establish and leave unsettled?
  • What the research shows: Most confessions are presumed to be true, although the proportion that are false is unknown and no study measures it directly, and confessions are often corroborated. A minority of known wrongful convictions involve false confessions, and in laboratory studies with known ground truth, mostly with students, some accusatorial tactics raised false-confession rates more than true-confession rates.
  • What it does not show: No general false-confession rate is known. Exoneration shares, self-report surveys, and laboratory rates measure different things, and none can show whether a particular confession is true or false.
  • The law: A confession must be voluntary and, in custody, preceded by Miranda (or Article 31(b)) warnings; once admitted, its reliability is for the fact-finder, who may hear about the circumstances in which it was obtained (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986). Federal and military law require independent evidence tending to establish a confession’s trustworthiness; Arizona’s corpus delicti rule requires independent evidence that the charged crime occurred.
  • Issues for each side: For prosecutors, complete recordings and corroboration that the suspect supplied rather than received bear most directly on reliability; for defense counsel, so does a detailed record of the interrogation and of what was disclosed to the suspect. General research does not outweigh strong independent corroboration, and corroboration does not cure a contaminated record.

A confession is among the most persuasive kinds of evidence a fact-finder can hear. The Supreme Court has described a defendant’s own confession as “probably the most probative and damaging evidence” that can be admitted (Arizona v. Fulminante, 1991, at 296, quoting Bruton v. United States, 1968, White, J., dissenting). Most confessions are presumed to be true, although the proportion that are false is unknown and no study measures it directly, and many are corroborated by physical evidence, witnesses, or details that the suspect supplied and investigators later confirmed. Yet some confessions are false, and in cases later shown to be wrongful convictions, false confessions were frequently believed by investigators, prosecutors, judges, and juries.

Disputes about confessions reach court on motions to suppress, at trial, where the parties contest the weight a confession deserves, and in post-conviction proceedings. In each setting the parties draw on the same body of research in psychology and criminology, with the same limits.

This paper introduces the Interrogations and False Confessions resource: confessions as evidence, how interrogations are conducted, what the research has established and where it is disputed, and the governing federal, military, and Arizona law. Each topic is developed in the other papers in this resource.

Confessions as Evidence

Confessions solve crimes. Field studies in several countries have found that roughly 40% to 60% of interrogated suspects confess, with more recent estimates near 45% across crime types (Deslauriers-Varin, 2022). In a survey of 631 North American investigators, respondents estimated that they obtained self-incriminating statements from 68% of the suspects they questioned (Kassin et al., 2007). True confessions spare victims the ordeal of trial, encourage guilty pleas, and in cases without physical evidence may be the only path to accountability. Research on offenders’ own accounts indicates that the strength of the evidence and the interviewer’s approach both influence the decision to confess (Deslauriers-Varin, 2022).

A confession is also unlike most evidence in how it is evaluated. Jurors find it hard to believe that an innocent person would confess (Kassin et al., 2025). Mock-jury studies show that confessions strongly influence verdicts, and that jurors discount coerced confessions only partly (Mindthoff et al., 2024; see “How Jurors Respond to Confession Evidence”). That research is summarized in “How Jurors Respond to Confession Evidence” in this resource and in “Juror Beliefs About Memory, Eyewitnesses, and Confessions” in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource.

Because a confession is so persuasive, its accuracy matters to both sides. A true confession that is suppressed or disbelieved can free a guilty person; a false confession that is believed can convict an innocent one and leave the actual offender at large. The law addresses the first risk by admitting voluntary statements and letting the fact-finder weigh them, and the second through voluntariness, warning, and corroboration requirements.

How Interrogations Are Conducted in the United States

Most interrogations are brief. Observational studies in the United States and Britain have found that most sessions last between about 30 minutes and 2 hours, and police surveys in 2007 and 2024 reported an average of about 1.6 hours (Brimbal et al., 2024; Kassin et al., 2007; Kassin et al., 2025). Most suspects waive their rights: naturalistic studies estimate that 80% or more waive the rights to silence and counsel (Kassin et al., 2025). Waiver and comprehension are addressed in “Miranda Warnings, Waiver, and Comprehension.”

Two broad approaches are distinguished in the research. Accusatorial methods, of which the Reid technique is the best known, begin with an assessment of whether the suspect is being truthful and, if the investigator concludes that the suspect is lying, proceed to an interrogation built around a confident assertion of guilt, the rejection of denials, the presentation of evidence, and themes that offer the suspect a face-saving way to admit the offense (Inbau et al., 2013). Information-gathering methods, of which the British PEACE model is the best known, aim to obtain the suspect’s full account, test it against the evidence, and treat a confession as one possible outcome rather than the goal (Kassin et al., 2025; Milne & Bull, 1999). Both are described in more detail in “Accusatorial Interrogation and the Reid Technique” and “Investigative Interviewing and the PEACE Model.”

Practice in the United States is changing. In 2017 Wicklander-Zulawski and Associates, a large training firm that had taught the Reid method under license, announced that it would teach non-confrontational methods instead (Wicklander-Zulawski & Associates, 2017). The High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, created in 2009–2010 as an interagency group administered by the FBI, funded research on science-based interviewing (Meissner et al., 2017), and a field evaluation found that federal, state, and local investigators trained for five days in those methods used them more often afterward (Russano et al., 2024). In a 2024 self-report survey of 526 officers, officers reported video recording more than half of their interrogations, compared with fewer than one in ten in 2007 (Brimbal et al., 2024). John E. Reid and Associates states that most confessions are accurate and that false confessions, with very few exceptions, result from improper conduct such as threats, promises of leniency, excessively long interrogation, disclosure of crime details, or failure to adjust for juveniles and people with mental limitations (John E. Reid and Associates, 2025). Because methods are often mixed and relabeled, the useful question in a case is which tactics were used, not what the method was called.

What the Research Has Established

Research on confessions uses several methods, each with different strengths: analyses of proven false confessions and exonerations, observational studies of recorded interrogations, self-report surveys of suspects, prisoners, and police, and controlled laboratory and field experiments (Kassin et al., 2025). These methods and their limits are the subject of “Confession Research Methods and Their Limits.”

Three findings are widely cited in the research literature. First, false confessions occur in different ways. A classic typology distinguishes voluntary false confessions, given without police pressure; compliant false confessions, given by suspects who know they are innocent but confess to end the interrogation or obtain a benefit; and internalized false confessions, in which the suspect comes to believe, at least for a time, that he or she may have committed the crime (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985; see “Types of False Confessions”). Second, false confessions leading to wrongful conviction are usually described as the product of three errors in sequence: misclassifying an innocent person as a guilty suspect, interrogating with tactics that move the suspect to confess, and contaminating the confession with nonpublic details the suspect learned from the investigation (Gudjonsson, 2021; Leo & Bazelon, 2026). Third, the risk is shaped by both situational and personal factors. Situational factors include prolonged custody and isolation, false evidence, and minimization themes that imply leniency; personal factors include youth, intellectual disability, mental illness, and suggestible or compliant personality traits (Kassin et al., 2025). In a 2018 survey, at least 80% of 87 confession researchers (experts who publish or testify in the field) agreed that findings of this kind were reliable enough to present in court (Kassin et al., 2018).

On interrogation methods, controlled experiments generally point in the same direction, with accusatorial methods associated with more false confessions than other methods, although effect sizes vary across studies and the meaning of the absolute rates is disputed (see “Where the Research Is Disputed” below). A Campbell systematic review of experiments in which the truth was known found that accusatorial methods produced more false confessions than direct questioning (odds ratio 3.03) or information-gathering methods (odds ratio 4.41), and that information-gathering produced more true confessions than direct questioning (odds ratio 2.43); most participants were U.S. college students (Catlin et al., 2024). In the laboratory study that introduced the cheating paradigm, minimization and an explicit offer of leniency each increased true and false confessions, and the two together reduced the ratio of true to false confessions by 74% (Russano et al., 2005). A self-report survey of 249 people held in two U.S. jails is consistent with this: those who described their interrogators as humane were more likely to have confessed, cooperated, and disclosed incriminating information (Bettens et al., 2024). Guilt could not be verified, so the survey shows that respectful interviewing was associated with admissions, not whether the admissions were true or false.

Contamination, the third error in that sequence, has been documented in exoneration cases. In a study of the first 250 DNA exonerations, 40 exonerees had falsely confessed and records were obtained for 38; in 36 of those 38 the confession reportedly contained key details about how the crime occurred, and in 27 cases officers testified at trial that they had not disclosed facts to the suspect. Those details were often described at trial as facts only the offender could know, and Garrett argued that they most likely reached the confessors through the investigation, directly or indirectly (Garrett, 2010). The same reasoning supports the prosecution’s legitimate reliance on accurate, nonpublic details: a detail that the suspect supplied before anyone disclosed it, and that was later independently verified, is strong evidence of guilty knowledge. The difference between the two situations usually can be established only with a complete recording and a record of what was disclosed. These issues are addressed in “Contamination: Non-Public Details and Post-Admission Narratives” and “Corroboration and Assessing the Reliability of a Confession.”

Where the Research Is Disputed

The largest dispute concerns how often false confessions occur. Exoneration data describe known wrongful convictions, not all confessions. The National Registry of Exonerations recorded 147 exonerations in 2024, 22 (15%) of which involved false confessions, and 3,646 exonerations from 1989 through 2024 (National Registry of Exonerations, 2025); about 13% of registry exonerees had themselves falsely confessed (Kassin et al., 2025; Leo & Bazelon, 2026), and the Innocence Project reports that about 29% of the 375 DNA exonerations it counted through 2020 involved false confessions (Innocence Project, n.d.); the figures come from different databases, definitions, and years. These are shares of known wrongful convictions. They are not rates of false confession among confessions or interrogations, and no such general rate is known; “How Often False Confessions Occur: Exoneration Data and the Base-Rate Problem” explains why.

A second dispute concerns laboratory research. Critics argue that the standard paradigms ask students to admit low-stakes, plausible mistakes, so that they measure compliance more than confession to a crime. A 2026 meta-analysis of 99 conditions from 41 studies reported a pooled laboratory false-confession rate of 41%, with tactics explaining less than 1% of the variation, and concluded that absolute laboratory rates cannot be generalized to the field (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b). An integrative review raised related concerns about student samples and staged tasks (Welner et al., 2025), and a separate analysis argued that the probability that an interrogation using a lawful tactic ends in a false-confession wrongful conviction depends heavily on base rates that are low and uncertain, and, under stated base-rate assumptions, estimated it at about 1% in simulations; the figure cannot be checked directly and does not describe a particular suspect (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026a). Researchers who use these paradigms have long acknowledged that absolute rates are likely to differ in the field, and argue that the experiments are designed to compare conditions and identify causal processes, not to estimate prevalence (Kassin et al., 2025; Russano et al., 2005). The debate is taken up in “Confession Research Methods and Their Limits.”

A third question is how inclusive exoneration databases are. One review notes critiques that the registry’s definition may include some guilty people and may also exclude some innocent ones (Leo & Bazelon, 2026), and earlier critics argued that some collections of “proven” false confessions included cases in which guilt remained plausible (Cassell, 1999). These critiques bear on how the case collections are used, not on whether false confessions occur.

Limits of the Evidence

The research has important limits. Exoneration data are drawn from the cases most likely to be reviewed, mostly homicides and sexual assaults with available DNA or other conclusive evidence, and they omit false confessions discovered before trial, cases resolved by guilty plea without later review, and true confessions entirely (Kassin et al., 2025). Self-report surveys depend on the honesty and memory of respondents. Laboratory experiments establish causation with known ground truth but use students accused of minor infractions, and their absolute rates are not field rates (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b; Russano et al., 2005). Field studies of real suspects, such as surveys of jail and prison populations, measure what suspects said they did, usually without independent confirmation of guilt or innocence (Bettens et al., 2024).

Sex and gender have been studied little. Most known false-confession exonerees are men, as are most people interrogated in serious cases (Drizin & Leo, 2004). In the original computer-crash experiment, with 79 students (40 men and 39 women; 75 analyzed), men and women confessed at comparable rates (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996); in a later variant, women were more likely than men to confess falsely when the alleged error was highly plausible (Klaver et al., 2008). Other key studies used mixed samples without analyzing sex, such as the cheating-paradigm study, whose participants were 70% women (Russano et al., 2005). These are group findings that say nothing about any individual.

Above all, the research identifies conditions associated with more or less reliable confessions. It cannot establish whether a particular confession is true or false. A risk factor raises or lowers risk; it does not classify a statement. Whether a confession is reliable depends on the circumstances of the interrogation, the characteristics of the person, and, most of all, whether independent evidence corroborates what was said.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When an exoneration percentage is cited, ask what was counted: a share of known wrongful convictions, from which database, through what date, and whether it is being used as if it were a rate among all confessions. When a laboratory rate is cited, ask who the participants were, what they were accused of, what confessing would cost them, and whether the study compared conditions or estimated prevalence. When field research on humane interviewing is cited to show that good interviews produce true confessions, ask whether the people studied were later shown to be guilty and whether any innocent suspects were included. When a published critique is cited to show that false confessions are rare, ask what base rate it assumed and how that rate was estimated. And when any of this research is offered about a particular confession, ask what independent evidence corroborates or contradicts the statement and what was disclosed to the suspect before it was made. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Confessions and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The Due Process Clause bars the use of involuntary confessions. The Supreme Court first reversed a conviction on that ground in a case resting on confessions obtained by whipping (Brown v. Mississippi, 1936), and later held that psychological pressure alone can render a confession involuntary (Spano v. New York, 1959). Voluntariness is judged under the totality of the circumstances, but coercive police activity is a necessary predicate, and the prosecution must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986; Lego v. Twomey, 1972). A defendant is entitled to a reliable hearing on voluntariness before the jury considers the confession (Jackson v. Denno, 1964), and an involuntary statement cannot be used even for impeachment (Mincey v. Arizona, 1978). Custodial interrogation must be preceded by warnings and a valid waiver (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966), a rule the Court has called constitutional (Dickerson v. United States, 2000). Deception does not by itself make a confession involuntary (Frazier v. Cupp, 1969).

Admission does not end the inquiry. The defendant may present evidence about the physical and psychological circumstances of the confession to show that it is unworthy of belief (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986), and the jury gives it the weight it deserves (18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)). Federal courts also require substantial independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of the statement (Opper v. United States, 1954; Smith v. United States, 1954). Expert testimony on interrogation research must satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999); see “Expert Testimony on Interrogations and False Confessions.”

Case Example. In Crane v. Kentucky (1986), a 16-year-old confessed to the 1981 shooting of a liquor-store clerk in Louisville, a crime with no identifying physical evidence. After finding the confession voluntary, the trial court barred testimony about the length and manner of the interrogation and allowed the defense to point only to inconsistencies within the confession. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that a voluntariness ruling does not prevent a defendant from showing the jury why a confession may be unworthy of belief, and left the State’s harmless-error argument to the state court. The case did not decide whether the confession was true. It illustrates the division of labor between the judge, who rules on admissibility, and the jury, which weighs reliability.

In courts-martial, Article 31(b), UCMJ, requires that a suspect be told the nature of the accusation, that he need not make a statement, and that any statement may be used against him before any person subject to the Code interrogates or requests a statement, whether or not the suspect is in custody; Article 31(d) and Military Rule of Evidence 304(a) exclude statements obtained in violation of the article or through coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. Rule 305 governs warnings and counsel rights in custodial interrogation, and Miranda has applied to military interrogations since United States v. Tempia (1967). Under Rule 304(c), as amended in 2016, a confession may be considered only if independent evidence has been admitted that would tend to establish its trustworthiness, and that evidence need raise only an inference of truth. Once a statement is admitted, the defense may present evidence on voluntariness and the members give it the weight it deserves (Mil. R. Evid. 304(g)). The Fifth Amendment and Article 31, not the Fourteenth Amendment, supply the governing protections. See “Confessions in Courts-Martial: Article 31(b), Mil. R. Evid. 304 and 305, and Expert Assistance.”

Arizona

Several of the leading Supreme Court confession cases arose in Arizona, including Miranda, Edwards v. Arizona (1981), Mincey, and Fulminante. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.2(b), the State must prove by a preponderance the lawfulness of its acquisition of evidence once the defendant has alleged specific circumstances establishing a prima facie case for suppression. A.R.S. § 13-3988 requires the trial judge to determine voluntariness outside the jury’s presence and, if the confession is admitted, permits the jury to hear the circumstances and give the confession the weight it deserves. The standard jury instruction tells jurors not to consider a defendant’s statements to law enforcement unless they find beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary, and treats a statement as involuntary if it resulted from violence, coercion, threats, “or by any direct or implied promise, however slight” (RAJI (Criminal) Standard 19, 2022).

Arizona applies a corpus delicti rule: before a confession may be used, the State must present evidence from which jurors could reasonably infer that the charged crime occurred, and circumstantial evidence suffices (State v. Gillies, 1983; State v. Carlson, 2015). Expert testimony is governed by Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, which adopted the federal Daubert formulation effective January 1, 2012, and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004); experts may not offer opinions on the credibility of a particular person (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475). Arizona law is treated in “Arizona Confession Law.”

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The research described above is the same whichever party relies on it. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately use. Most confessions are presumed to be true, although the proportion that are false is unknown, many suspects who commit offenses confess, and humane, evidence-based interviewing is associated with admissions and cooperation by people who committed the offense (Bettens et al., 2024; Deslauriers-Varin, 2022). No general false-confession rate is known, exoneration shares are not rates among confessions, and absolute laboratory rates do not transfer to felony investigations (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b; Welner et al., 2025). A confession that contains accurate, nonpublic details the suspect supplied before they were disclosed, or that led investigators to evidence they did not already have, is strongly corroborated, and Opper, Rule 304(c), and Arizona’s corpus delicti rule all turn on that kind of independent evidence. A complete recording of the interview, with a record of what information was given to the suspect, is the clearest evidence of those points, and it protects investigators against later claims about what occurred.

The research also counsels caution. Exoneration studies show that false confessions can be detailed, consistent, and persuasive, and that details may have been supplied by the investigation rather than by the suspect (Garrett, 2010). Experiments in which the truth is known associate accusatorial tactics, false evidence, and minimization themes that imply leniency with lower diagnosticity (Catlin et al., 2024; Russano et al., 2005), and youth, intellectual disability, and mental illness are widely recognized risk factors (Kassin et al., 2018). Where a confession rests on few corroborated facts, followed a long or isolated interrogation, or was obtained from a vulnerable suspect, a careful evaluation of its reliability before trial is warranted, and in Arizona jurors must find voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt under an instruction that reaches implied promises, however slight.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports close attention to how a confession was obtained and what it contains. Controlled experiments show that accusatorial methods and minimization raise false-confession rates more than true-confession rates (Catlin et al., 2024; Russano et al., 2005); exoneration studies describe confessions containing nonpublic details that may have come from the investigation (Garrett, 2010); and recognized personal risk factors include youth, intellectual disability, mental illness, and suggestibility (Kassin et al., 2025). Defense counsel are often best positioned to develop the record: the length of custody, breaks and sleep, the tactics used, any false evidence or implied promises, the suspect’s age and functioning, whether the interview was recorded in full, and which facts investigators disclosed before the suspect repeated them. Those circumstances are admissible on weight even after a confession survives suppression (Crane; § 13-3988; Mil. R. Evid. 304(g)).

The research also counsels caution. The proportion of confessions that are false is unknown, and most confessions are presumed to be true; exoneration shares are not rates among confessions; and laboratory studies with students and minor stakes have been criticized as poor estimates of field rates (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b; Welner et al., 2025). Field studies associate respectful interviewing with admissions by people who committed offenses (Bettens et al., 2024), so a well-conducted interview may well have produced a true confession. Where independent evidence corroborates the confession, particularly through details the suspect supplied first, the research gives little support to a general claim that it is false; questions about specific uncorroborated elements, or about particular tactics documented in the record, are better supported. No research or expert can say that a particular confession is false.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bettens, T., Cleary, H. M. D., & Bull, R. (2024). Humane interrogation strategies are associated with confessions, cooperation, and disclosure: Evidence from a field study of incarcerated individuals in the United States. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 51(6), 949–969. https://doi.org/10.1177/00938548241232068

Brimbal, L., Roche, S. P., & Martaindale, M. H. (2024). Interviewing and interrogation practices and beliefs, 20 years later: A national self-report survey of American police. Law and Human Behavior, 48(4), 247–261. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000570

Cassell, P. G. (1999). The guilty and the “innocent”: An examination of alleged cases of wrongful conviction from false confessions. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 22(2), 523–603. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.161470

Catlin, M., Wilson, D. B., Redlich, A. D., Bettens, T., Meissner, C. A., Bhatt, S., & Brandon, S. E. (2024). Interview and interrogation methods and their effects on true and false confessions: A systematic review update and extension. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 20(4), Article e1441. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1441

Deslauriers-Varin, N. (2022). Confession during police interrogation: A decision tree analysis. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 37(3), 526–539. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-022-09507-9

Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. A. (2004). The problem of false confessions in the post-DNA world. North Carolina Law Review, 82(3), 891–1007.

Garrett, B. L. (2010). The substance of false confessions. Stanford Law Review, 62(4), 1051–1118.

Gudjonsson, G. H. (2021). The science-based pathways to understanding false confessions and wrongful convictions. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, Article 633936. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.633936

Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. C. (2013). Criminal interrogation and confessions (5th ed.). Jones & Bartlett Learning.

Innocence Project. (n.d.). DNA exonerations in the United States (1989–2020) [Data through 2020]. https://innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/

John E. Reid and Associates. (2025, October 24). The fallacy of defense attorney claims that the Reid Technique causes false confessions. https://reid.com/resources/investigator-tips/the-fallacy-of-defense-attorney-claims-that-the-reid-technique-causes-false-confessions

Kassin, S. M., Cleary, H. M. D., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Redlich, A. D., & Scherr, K. C. (2025). Police-induced confessions, 2.0: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 49(1), 7–53. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000593

Kassin, S. M., & Kiechel, K. L. (1996). The social psychology of false confessions: Compliance, internalization, and confabulation. Psychological Science, 7(3), 125–128. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1996.tb00344.x

Kassin, S. M., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Richman, K. D., Colwell, L. H., Leach, A.-M., & La Fon, D. (2007). Police interviewing and interrogation: A self-report survey of police practices and beliefs. Law and Human Behavior, 31(4), 381–400. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9073-5

Kassin, S. M., Redlich, A. D., Alceste, F., & Luke, T. J. (2018). On the general acceptance of confessions research: Opinions of the scientific community. American Psychologist, 73(1), 63–80. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000141

Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1985). Confession evidence. In S. M. Kassin & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), The psychology of evidence and trial procedure (pp. 67–94). Sage.

Klaver, J. R., Lee, Z., & Rose, V. G. (2008). Effects of personality, interrogation techniques and plausibility in an experimental false confession paradigm. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 13(1), 71–88. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532507X193051

Leo, R. A., & Bazelon, L. (2026). Exonerations: Causes, consequences, and reforms. Annual Review of Criminology, 9, 317–342. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-032924-035031

Meissner, C. A., Surmon-Böhr, F., Oleszkiewicz, S., & Alison, L. J. (2017). Developing an evidence-based perspective on interrogation: A review of the U.S. government’s High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group research program. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 23(4), 438–457. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000136

Milne, R., & Bull, R. (1999). Investigative interviewing: Psychology and practice. Wiley.

Mindthoff, A., Ferreira, P. A., & Meissner, C. A. (2024). The effect of confession evidence on jurors’ verdict decisions: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 48(3), 163–181. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000563

Mourtgos, S. M., & Adams, I. T. (2026a). Recalibrating the risk of false confession wrongful convictions: Interrogation tactics and inverse probability. Journal of Criminal Justice, 103, Article 102600. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2026.102600

Mourtgos, S. M., & Adams, I. T. (2026b). What do laboratory false confession paradigms measure? A calibration meta-analysis. Journal of Quantitative Criminology. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-026-09687-1

National Registry of Exonerations. (2025). 2024 annual report. https://exonerationregistry.org/sites/exonerationregistry.org/files/documents/2024_Annual_Report.pdf

Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Atkinson, D. J., Brandon, S. E., Wells, S., Kleinman, S. M., Ray, D. G., & Jones, M. S. (2024). Evaluating the effectiveness of a 5-day training on science-based methods of interrogation with U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement investigators. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 30(2), 105–120. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000422

Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Narchet, F. M., & Kassin, S. M. (2005). Investigating true and false confessions within a novel experimental paradigm. Psychological Science, 16(6), 481–486. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01560.x

Welner, M., DeLisi, M., & Janusewski, T. (2025). False confessions: An integrative review of the phenomenon. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 43(2), 185–202. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2707

Wicklander-Zulawski & Associates. (2017, March 6). [Press release announcing that the firm will no longer offer training in the Reid Method]. PRWeb.

Legal Authorities

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).

Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954).

Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).

Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).

State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079 (2015).

State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967).

U.S. Const. amend. V.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831.

18 U.S.C. § 3501.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 304, 305 (2024 ed.).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 19 (State Bar of Arizona 2022).

Related topic papers: How Often False Confessions Occur: Exoneration Data and the Base-Rate Problem · Types of False Confessions · Confession Research Methods and Their Limits · Risk Factors for False Confessions: An Overview · Corroboration and Assessing the Reliability of a Confession · How Jurors Respond to Confession Evidence

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Jurors and Jury Decision-Making · Courts-Martial