Snap Shot
- The question: What conditions of questioning and what characteristics of the person questioned are associated with a higher risk of false confession, how do they combine, and what can a risk factor say, and not say, about whether a particular confession is reliable?
- What the research shows: Reviews identify situational risk factors (very long or isolated questioning, sleep deprivation, false evidence, minimization that implies leniency, and a presumption of guilt) and personal risk factors (youth, intellectual disability, some mental disorders, high suggestibility or compliance, and intoxication or withdrawal). In one mock-theft experiment with students, innocent participants were more likely than guilty ones to waive their rights (Kassin & Norwick, 2004); this has not been tested directly in field samples, and prior contact with the justice system may reduce the effect. Risk is thought to rise when several factors combine.
- What it does not show: It does not show how often any factor produces false confessions, that a confession given by a person with risk factors is false, or that one without them is true. Many factors are also common among people who give true confessions, and most of the evidence comes from laboratory studies, self-report surveys, and samples of known false confessions.
- The law: Risk factors enter the law through the totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness test, which requires coercive police activity (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986) and weighs the suspect’s characteristics against the conduct of the questioning. They also bear on the weight jurors give a confession (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986). Arizona jurors decide voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt under A.R.S. § 13-3988.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can show the absence of situational factors, the presence of accurate non-public details, and independent corroboration; defense counsel can document each factor present and how factors combined, while recognizing that risk factors raise or lower risk and do not classify a confession as true or false.
When a confession is disputed, the first question is usually what was present in the room: who the person was, how long the questioning lasted, what was said, and in what condition the person was. The research literature organizes these questions as risk factors, features of the interrogation or of the person that are associated with a higher likelihood that an innocent person will confess. The framework was set out in a 2010 scientific review sponsored by the American Psychology-Law Society and updated in 2025 (Kassin et al., 2010; Kassin et al., 2025), and in parallel classifications by British researchers (Gudjonsson, 2018).
Risk factors reach court through suppression motions, jury instructions on voluntariness, and expert testimony about interrogation research. They are also the part of the literature most easily misused, because a list of factors can look like a checklist that sorts confessions into true and false. It is not. This paper summarizes the main factors, how they are thought to interact, the evidence behind them and its limits, the counterarguments, and how the law uses them. Individual factors are treated in more depth in the papers listed at the end.
Situational Risk Factors
Situational factors are features of the interrogation. A frequently identified factor is very long questioning. Surveyed investigators estimate that a typical interrogation lasts about 1.6 hours, a figure unchanged between 2007 and 2024 (Kassin et al., 2007; Brimbal et al., 2024), while in a collection of 125 proven false confessions, the 44 cases in which the length could be determined averaged 16.3 hours, with a median of 12 hours (Drizin & Leo, 2004, pp. 946–947). Because the false-confession cases were selected for being false, and length was unknown in about two-thirds of them, the contrast shows over-representation of long sessions among known false confessions, not a rate. Related factors are isolation from family, friends, or counsel, and sleep deprivation, which in one experiment raised the odds that students would sign a false statement 4.5-fold (Frenda et al., 2016); see Sleep Deprivation, Fatigue, and Interrogation Length.
Two families of tactics follow. Presentations of false evidence increased false confessions in laboratory studies with student participants (Stewart et al., 2018, a meta-analysis of laboratory simulations), and in a laboratory cheating paradigm with students, minimization that implies leniency increased false confessions more than true ones (Russano et al., 2005); see False Evidence Ploys and Police Deception and Minimization, Maximization, and Implied Promises of Leniency. Finally, the investigator’s presumption of guilt, often formed in the pre-interrogation interview, has been associated in laboratory studies with more pressure on innocent suspects (Kassin et al., 2003; Narchet et al., 2011); see The Pre-Interrogation Interview.
Personal Risk Factors
Personal factors are characteristics of the person questioned. Two frequently documented factors are youth and intellectual disability. In an exoneration sample of 340 cases from 1989 through 2003, 14 of 33 exonerated juveniles (42%) and 18 of 26 exonerees with mental disabilities (69%) had falsely confessed (Gross et al., 2005); these are shares of exonerees in each group, not rates among all juveniles or all people with mental disabilities, and they answer a different question from what share of false confessors have a diagnosis (see the paper on mental illness, ADHD, and other personal vulnerabilities), and in an experiment with an accusation of crashing a computer, younger participants were more likely than young adults to sign a false confession (Redlich & Goodman, 2003). Some mental disorders, including conditions that impair reality testing, mood, or attention, are associated with self-reported false confessions and false guilty pleas; in a survey of 1,249 offenders with mental disorders, false admissions to murder or rape were rarely reported (Redlich et al., 2010).
Personality traits measured by suggestibility and compliance scales, such as a tendency to yield to leading questions or to go along with requests to avoid conflict, are associated with reported false confessions in prisoner and student samples (Gudjonsson, 2018; Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 1996). Acute states matter as well: intoxication, drug or alcohol withdrawal, distress, and fatigue can lower the capacity to resist pressure even in a person without lasting vulnerabilities (Gudjonsson, 2018). In self-report surveys of young people in Iceland and other European countries, negative life events, including victimization, and other background and psychological variables distinguished those who reported false confessions from those who did not (Gudjonsson et al., 2006; Gudjonsson et al., 2009, as summarized in Gudjonsson, 2018). These conditions are discussed in “Juveniles and False Confessions,” “Intellectual Disability and False Confessions,” “Mental Illness, ADHD, and Other Personal Vulnerabilities,” “Intoxication, Withdrawal, and Confessions,” and “Interrogative Suggestibility and Compliance.”
Sex and gender have been examined mainly in self-report surveys. In a survey of more than 24,000 students in seven European countries, boys were more than twice as likely as girls to report having been interrogated by police (16% vs. 7%), and among those interrogated, 15.8% of boys and 11.6% of girls reported a false confession (Gudjonsson et al., 2009, as summarized in Gudjonsson, 2018). Most exonerated false confessors are men, which reflects in part who is questioned about serious crimes. In one laboratory study of 219 undergraduates, women were more likely than men to confess falsely when the alleged mistake was made more plausible (Klaver et al., 2008). These are group-level findings and do not make any man or woman more or less likely to have confessed falsely.
Innocence as a Risk Factor
A further factor is innocence itself. Kassin (2005) proposed that innocent suspects hold a “phenomenology of innocence,” a belief that their innocence is apparent and will prevail, which leads them to waive their rights, talk freely, and sometimes accept a confession as a temporary step they expect the evidence to undo. In a mock-theft experiment with 72 undergraduate suspects, innocent participants were significantly more likely than guilty ones to waive their rights (81% vs. 36%), and 72% of the innocent participants who waived said they did so because they were innocent and had nothing to hide or fear (Kassin & Norwick, 2004), and innocent participants told that evidence would be tested sometimes confessed because they expected the test to clear them (Perillo & Kassin, 2011). The hypothesis is supported by experiments with students and low stakes; it has not been tested directly in field samples.
How Risk Factors Combine
Researchers generally describe false confessions as usually arising from a combination of situational and personal factors rather than one cause, and as not acting in isolation; in general, the more relevant factors present, the greater the risk (Gudjonsson, 2018; Kassin et al., 2025). A healthy adult questioned for an hour with accurate evidence presents a different picture from a sleep-deprived adolescent questioned overnight and told that a test proved his guilt. The interaction model has a practical implication for both sides: a factor that matters little alone may matter more when combined with others, and a personal vulnerability may matter little where the questioning was brief, recorded, and free of the tactics most associated with false confessions.
Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical 19-year-old questioned for nine hours after a night without sleep, told that a witness had seen him, who eventually adopts the investigator’s account. His statement contains no detail that had not been suggested, and the timeline it describes conflicts with phone records. A second, equally young and tired suspect in a different hypothetical case gives a shorter account that includes where a weapon was discarded, a fact the police did not know, and the weapon is then found there. Both suspects present the same risk factors. What distinguishes the two statements is not the risk profile but the fit between each account and evidence that could not have come from the investigators.
What the Evidence Can Support, and the Counterarguments
Risk-factor research rests on four kinds of evidence: laboratory experiments, self-report surveys, studies of police practice, and collections of known false confessions. Each has limits, and critics have pressed them. Collections of “proven” false confessions have been challenged on the ground that some included cases in which guilt remained plausible (Cassell, 1999). A 2025 integrative review argued that laboratory paradigms lack ecological validity for serious crimes and that the literature gives too little weight to the reasons guilty people confess (Welner et al., 2025). A 2026 meta-analysis of 99 conditions from 41 laboratory studies found a pooled false-confession rate of 41% with very wide variation across studies, and concluded that design features other than the interrogation tactic accounted for most of that variation, so that the paradigms may measure something closer to compliance than to confession (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b). The same authors, using simulations that incorporate base rates, estimated the probability that an interrogation using a lawful tactic ends in a false-confession wrongful conviction at about 1%; the figure comes from a simulation under stated assumptions, cannot be checked directly, and does not describe a particular suspect, and whether a tactic is lawful is decided case by case (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026a). The authors of the 2025 review argue that convergence across methods, including the over-representation of the same factors in exonerations, supports the factors’ validity even though no single method is decisive (Kassin et al., 2025).
The base-rate point is the one most often overlooked. Many risk factors are common among people who give true confessions. In a survey of 359 Icelandic prisoners, 92% had confessed, and intoxication at the time of the offense or the interview was commonly reported (Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 1994), and in a study of 160 suspects at two London police stations, those who reported illicit drug use in the previous 24 hours were more likely to confess, while measured psychological vulnerability did not predict confession; whether the confessions were true was not known (Pearse et al., 1998). If most interrogated suspects are guilty and many guilty suspects share a factor, the presence of that factor in a given case says little by itself about whether that confession is false. Risk factors identify where closer scrutiny of the record is warranted; the reliability question is then answered by corroboration and by whether the confession contains accurate details that could not have come from the investigators (see Corroboration and Assessing the Reliability of a Confession).
Limits of the Evidence
The factors are supported by convergent but indirect evidence. Laboratory studies used students and minor accusations and cannot set real-world rates; self-report surveys depend on what respondents say and on how they define a false confession; exoneration collections are selected for falsity and favor serious cases, mostly involving men; and field studies rarely know which confessions were true. Few studies estimate how much any factor raises the probability of a false confession in actual interrogations, and none can supply a probability for a particular case. Sex differences were seldom analyzed outside self-report surveys. Group research cannot say whether a particular confession is true or false.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a list of risk factors is offered, ask what evidence supports each factor, whether that evidence comes from laboratory studies, surveys, or known false confessions, and whether the factor is also common among true confessors. When Drizin and Leo (2004) is cited for interrogation length, ask how the cases were selected and how duration was measured. When Kassin and Norwick (2004) is cited for the risk posed by innocence, ask who the participants were and what was at stake. When the laboratory critique is cited, ask what assumptions its base-rate estimates rest on and whether it addresses the personal vulnerabilities present in the case. In every case, ask what independent evidence corroborates or contradicts the confession. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Risk Factors and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Courts weigh risk factors within the due-process voluntariness test, which considers the totality of the circumstances, including the suspect’s age, education, intelligence, and condition and the length and nature of the questioning (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1973). Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate; a personal vulnerability alone does not make a statement involuntary, though it can make police conduct more coercive in effect (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986). Courts have both suppressed and admitted confessions from suspects with significant vulnerabilities.
Case Example. Brendan Dassey was 16 when he confessed on videotape in March 2006 to taking part in a 2005 rape and murder in Wisconsin. The state courts found the confession voluntary. A federal district court granted habeas relief, and a divided three-judge panel affirmed. The full Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed by a 4–3 vote under the deferential federal habeas standard (Dassey v. Dittmann, 2017). The majority listed factors pointing each way: his youth, limited intellectual ability, suggestions by the interrogators, and broad assurances of leniency, against Miranda warnings he understood, his mother’s consent, a comfortable setting, a relatively brief session, and details he gave in response to open-ended questions. The dissent concluded that the questioning supplied much of the account. The case shows that recognized risk factors do not determine the legal outcome; courts weigh them with the conduct of the questioning under the applicable standard of review.
Once a confession is admitted, the defendant may present evidence of the circumstances of the questioning to challenge its reliability (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986). In courts-martial, Article 31(d), UCMJ, and Mil. R. Evid. 304 apply a similar totality analysis, and Mil. R. Evid. 304(c) requires independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of a confession. Expert testimony on risk factors is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 702 as amended Dec. 1, 2023, and, in courts-martial, by Mil. R. Evid. 702; the 2023 federal amendment to Rule 702 applies to the military rule from June 1, 2025, 18 months after its December 1, 2023 effective date, under Mil. R. Evid. 1102(a) unless the President acts otherwise (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). Kumho Tire extends gatekeeping to all expert testimony.
Arizona
Arizona courts presume a confession resulting from custodial interrogation to be involuntary and require the State to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it was freely and voluntarily made (State v. Jimenez, 1990); a confession is involuntary when coercive police conduct, rather than the suspect’s internal compulsion, induced it (State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 1990); and A.R.S. § 13-3988 and RAJI (Criminal) Standard 19 require jurors to find voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt before considering the statement. Arizona also requires independent evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the crime occurred (State v. Gillies, 1983). Experts may describe research on risk factors but may not offer opinions on whether a particular person is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475), and the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of an expert whose testimony would have relayed the defendant’s own claim that his confession was false (State v. Carlson, 2015). Expert testimony is governed by Ariz. R. Evid. 702, amended effective Jan. 1, 2024.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The research described above is the same whichever party relies on it. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several points. Most interrogations are short (Kassin et al., 2007; Brimbal et al., 2024), many risk factors are common among people who confess truthfully (Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 1994; Pearse et al., 1998), and the laboratory evidence is contested (Welner et al., 2025; Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b). A risk factor does not show that a confession is false, and the law requires coercive police conduct, not merely vulnerability (Connelly). The most informative evidence is case-specific: a recorded interview of moderate length, the absence of false evidence or implied promises, accurate details that were not disclosed to the suspect, and independent corroboration.
The research also counsels caution. Youth and intellectual disability are over-represented among known false confessors (Gross et al., 2005), factors are thought to combine (Gudjonsson, 2018; Kassin et al., 2025), and in one mock-theft experiment with students, innocent participants were more likely than guilty ones to waive their rights (Kassin & Norwick, 2004), a finding not tested directly in field samples. Where several factors coincide, corroboration matters more, and the research indicates that some innocent people do confess under prolonged or intense pressure, so the assumption that no innocent person would confess does not hold in every case; whether a particular confession is reliable depends on the record. Prosecutors are well placed to encourage complete recording and the preservation of what was disclosed to the suspect.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports a careful account of every factor present. Defense counsel are often best positioned to document the length and timing of the questioning, rest and food, what evidence was claimed and whether it existed, what was said about consequences, and the suspect’s age, cognitive functioning, mental health, and condition at the time, along with how those factors interacted. The scientific reviews (Kassin et al., 2010, 2025; Gudjonsson, 2018) and the exoneration data (Gross et al., 2005) give that account context, and the voluntariness test requires courts to consider the suspect’s characteristics along with police conduct.
The research also counsels caution. Risk factors raise or lower risk; they do not classify, and many guilty people share them. The laboratory paradigms used students and low stakes, and critics argue their relevance is limited (Welner et al., 2025; Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b). A confession that contains accurate non-public details the suspect supplied, or that led to new evidence, is not made unreliable by the presence of risk factors, and courts have admitted confessions from suspects with substantial vulnerabilities (Dassey). No research permits an expert to say that a particular confession is false.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Cassell, P. G. (1999). The guilty and the “innocent”: An examination of alleged cases of wrongful conviction from false confessions. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 22(2), 523–603. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.161470
Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. A. (2004). The problem of false confessions in the post-DNA world. North Carolina Law Review, 82(3), 891–1007.
Frenda, S. J., Berkowitz, S. R., Loftus, E. F., & Fenn, K. M. (2016). Sleep deprivation and false confessions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(8), 2047–2050. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1521518113
Gross, S. R., Jacoby, K., Matheson, D. J., Montgomery, N., & Patil, S. (2005). Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through 2003. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 95(2), 523–560.
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Gudjonsson, G. H., Sigurdsson, J. F., Asgeirsdottir, B. B., & Sigfusdottir, I. D. (2006). Custodial interrogation, false confession and individual differences: A national study among Icelandic youth. Personality and Individual Differences, 41(1), 49–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.12.012
Gudjonsson, G. H., Sigurdsson, J. F., & Sigfusdottir, I. D. (2009). Interrogation and false confessions among adolescents in seven European countries: What background and psychological variables best discriminate between false confessors and non-false confessors? Psychology, Crime & Law, 15(8), 711–728. https://doi.org/10.1080/10683160802516257
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Kassin, S. M., Cleary, H. M. D., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Redlich, A. D., & Scherr, K. C. (2025). Police-induced confessions, 2.0: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 49(1), 7–53. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000593
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Kassin, S. M., Goldstein, C. C., & Savitsky, K. (2003). Behavioral confirmation in the interrogation room: On the dangers of presuming guilt. Law and Human Behavior, 27(2), 187–203. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022599230598
Kassin, S. M., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Richman, K. D., Colwell, L. H., Leach, A.-M., & La Fon, D. (2007). Police interviewing and interrogation: A self-report survey of police practices and beliefs. Law and Human Behavior, 31(4), 381–400. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9073-5
Kassin, S. M., & Norwick, R. J. (2004). Why people waive their Miranda rights: The power of innocence. Law and Human Behavior, 28(2), 211–221. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:LAHU.0000022323.74584.f5
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Legal Authorities
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 800 P.2d 1260 (1990).
State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 799 P.2d 785 (1990).
State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079 (2015).
State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 304, 702, 1102 (2024 ed.).
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 19 (State Bar of Arizona 2022).
Related topic papers: Juveniles and False Confessions · Intellectual Disability and False Confessions · Mental Illness, ADHD, and Other Personal Vulnerabilities · Sleep Deprivation, Fatigue, and Interrogation Length · Intoxication, Withdrawal, and Confessions · Corroboration and Assessing the Reliability of a Confession
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Jurors and Jury Decision-Making