Skip to content
Search resources Open menu

False Confessions

Mental Illness, ADHD, and Other Personal Vulnerabilities

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: Do mental illness, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and related personal characteristics make a suspect more likely to waive rights, comply with pressure, or confess falsely, and how does the law treat a confession given by a person with such a condition?
  • What the research shows: People with serious mental illness show lower average understanding of Miranda warnings, and in self-report surveys of offenders with mental disorders, a minority reported having made a false confession (9% to 28% by site) or a false guilty plea (27% to 41%); the reports were not verified. ADHD is common in custody and prison populations and is associated with higher compliance and more self-reported false confessions, though not consistently with suggestibility. Anxiety, life adversity, and antisocial traits are also associated with suggestibility, compliance, or reported false confession.
  • What it does not show: In the case collections reviewed, diagnosed mental illness was documented in a minority of proven false confessors (roughly 6% to 10%), although diagnoses may not have been assessed in many cases; that is a different question from how often people with mental illness confess falsely, which is unknown, and the proportion of confessions that are false is also unknown. The findings are largely self-report and group-level and cannot show that a particular confession is false.
  • The law: A mental condition alone does not make a confession involuntary; coercive police activity is required (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986). The condition remains relevant to the knowing and intelligent character of a waiver, to how police tactics affected the suspect, and to the weight of the statement (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can show that a diagnosis does not classify a confession, that diagnosed mental illness was documented in a minority of the proven false-confession cases in the collections reviewed (though diagnoses may not have been assessed in many), and that the law requires police coercion for suppression on due-process grounds; defense counsel can document the condition and show how specific features of the questioning interacted with it, while acknowledging the limits of self-report research.

Many suspects questioned by police have a mental health condition. Surveys of jails, prisons, and police custody find high rates of mood and psychotic disorders, substance use disorders, ADHD, and histories of trauma and adversity. These conditions raise practical questions in interrogation: whether the suspect understood the warnings, whether symptoms such as confusion, guilt, impulsivity, or anxiety made him more likely to go along with the questioner, and whether a statement reflects what happened or something else.

The questions reach court in suppression hearings, at trial, and in post-conviction review. This paper summarizes the research on mental illness, ADHD, and related personal vulnerabilities; explains what the case collections show and what they do not; and describes the federal, military, and Arizona law. It does not address autism in detail; police interviews of autistic suspects are covered in Police Interviews, Miranda, Compliance, and Suggestibility in Autism in the Autism Online Offense resource, and memory in ADHD and schizophrenia in ADHD and Memory and Schizophrenia and Memory in the Memory in the Courtroom resource. Intellectual disability, youth, and intoxication are treated in their own papers, and the overview of risk factors is in “Risk Factors for False Confessions: An Overview.”

Mental Illness and Confessions

Mental illness has been described as a risk factor for false confession because symptoms can affect the processes on which a reliable statement depends. Commentators point to impaired reality monitoring, confusion, guilt-proneness, heightened anxiety, poor concentration, and diminished executive functioning, and they note that people with serious mental illness may both volunteer false confessions and be more easily pressured into compliant ones (Leo, 2008, ch. 6; Redlich, 2004). Leo (2008, ch. 6) reports that voluntary false confessions, those made without police pressure, are often associated with psychiatric disorder or serious psychological disturbance. These are explanations drawn largely from case analyses rather than controlled comparisons.

Comprehension of rights is lower on average in this group. In a sample of 107 defendants with mental disorders, most lacked good comprehension of all but the simplest warnings, and those with the poorest understanding had deficits in intelligence, comprehension, and general adjustment; different clinical and background variables predicted whether defendants could generate reasons to exercise or waive their rights (Rogers et al., 2007).

The largest self-report study surveyed 1,249 offenders with mental disorders at six sites. Unverified self-reports of having ever made a false confession ranged from 9% to 28% by site, and reports of a false guilty plea from 27% to 41%; false admissions to murder or rape were rarely reported. Those who reported false admissions were more likely to be members of minority groups, to have longer criminal histories, and to be more symptomatic (Redlich et al., 2010). Calculated per interrogation rather than per person, the reported rate of false confession in this sample was about 4% (Redlich et al., 2010, as cited in Gudjonsson, 2018, ch. 5), which is consistent with the possibility that lifetime figures partly reflect how often a person has been questioned. The authors pointed to more frequent police contact, as well as the effects of illness, as possible explanations for the reports. The reports were not verified.

The case collections give a more cautious picture. Estimates of how often diagnosed mental illness appears among proven false confessors vary by sample: 3 of 40 DNA-exoneration false confessors (7.5%; Garrett, 2010), 12 of 125 in Drizin and Leo’s (2004) U.S. sample (about 10%), and 2 of 34 overturned English appeal cases (6%), as summarized in Gudjonsson (2018, ch. 5). Intellectual disability was documented more often (28 of the 125, or 22%, in Drizin & Leo, 2004). Separately, in an exoneration sample (Gross et al., 2005), 18 of 26 exonerees with mental disabilities (mental illness or intellectual disability) had falsely confessed (69%), a share of the exonerees in that group, not a rate among all people with mental disabilities. Diagnoses may not have been assessed in many of these cases. He concluded that in the English cases the main problem was usually difficulty coping with the pressures of interrogation and custody, not a mental disorder as such (Gudjonsson, 2018, Conclusions). Psychological vulnerabilities, in his view, are best understood as potential risk factors rather than definitive markers of unreliability (Gudjonsson, 2010). Mental illness may still matter in a particular case, especially through its effect on coping, anxiety, and judgment, but the evidence does not support treating a diagnosis as a marker of a false confession.

Case Example. In 1984, Eddie Joe Lloyd, who had been involuntarily hospitalized for treatment of mental illness in Detroit, wrote repeatedly to police with suggestions about unsolved murders, including that of a 16-year-old girl (National Registry of Exonerations, 2026). According to the Registry, detectives who visited and questioned him three times allowed him to believe that confessing would help them draw out the real killer, and supplied details he could not have known, including the location of the body and the victim’s clothing; he signed a written confession and gave a recorded statement. He was convicted of first-degree murder. In 2002, DNA testing excluded him, the charges were dismissed with the prosecutor’s agreement, and in 2020 another man pleaded guilty to the killing. The case illustrates how disclosed details can make a confession by a vulnerable person appear knowledgeable.

ADHD

ADHD is far more common in criminal justice populations than in the general population. A meta-analysis of 42 studies estimated, from diagnostic interviews, a prevalence of about 26% in adult prison populations and 30% in youth prison populations, about a fivefold to tenfold increase over general-population estimates (Young et al., 2015). Among 200 people detained at a London police station, 23.5% screened positive for current ADHD, and custody assessments did not reliably identify them (Young et al., 2013).

Several studies link ADHD symptoms to compliance and to self-reported false confession. Among 90 male Icelandic prisoners, those with current ADHD symptoms scored higher on a measure of compliance, but not on a measure of interrogative suggestibility, and were significantly more likely to report having made a false confession to police in the past (Gudjonsson et al., 2008). In a national survey of Icelandic adolescents, conduct problems, ADHD symptoms, and life adversity were each associated with reported false confession (Gudjonsson et al., 2012). In a study of adults diagnosed with ADHD and matched controls, the ADHD group was not more suggestible; participants with ADHD were more likely to answer “don’t know” than to accept a leading question (Gudjonsson et al., 2007, as summarized in Gudjonsson, 2013).

One interpretation of the pattern is that ADHD may raise risk mainly through impulsivity, restlessness, and a wish to end an uncomfortable situation quickly, rather than through acceptance of suggested information; this is an inference from a few Icelandic and British samples, not a tested mechanism. It also illustrates why ADHD findings must be read with care: ADHD overlaps heavily with conduct disorder, substance use, and frequent police contact, each of which is independently associated with reported false confession, and most of the evidence comes from Icelandic and British self-report samples. Untreated symptoms, or the loss of prescribed medication in custody, may matter in a particular interrogation; lack of access to prescribed medication appears on published lists of custodial risk factors (Gudjonsson, 2018, ch. 5).

Anxiety, Adversity, and Personality

Other personal characteristics are associated with suggestibility and compliance. In a study of 60 participants, the number of negative life events reported was significantly correlated with every suggestibility score, while self-esteem was not (Drake et al., 2008). Anxiety, poor coping, and low self-esteem have been associated in other studies with greater susceptibility to negative feedback (Gudjonsson, 2013). Antisocial personality traits and delinquent peers are associated with reported false confessions in youth and prisoner samples, in part because people with these traits are questioned more often and in part, the authors suggest, because some confess falsely to protect peers (Gudjonsson, 2018, ch. 5; Gudjonsson et al., 2012). These are correlations in survey and laboratory samples; they describe groups, not individuals.

Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical 40-year-old woman with long-standing depression who is questioned about the theft of medication from the clinic where she works. She waives her rights after the detective explains them in plain language and she restates them correctly. During a recorded interview of about an hour, she cries, says she deserves to be punished, and then describes taking the medication on two specific dates, hiding it in a locked cabinet at home, and selling some to a named acquaintance; the cabinet, the medication, and text messages with the acquaintance are later found. Her depression and expressions of guilt are relevant to how her statements are weighed, but the details she supplied first, which led to independent evidence, are the kind of corroboration the research identifies as most informative.

Limits of the Evidence

Most of the evidence on mental illness and ADHD is self-report. Respondents’ accounts of false confessions are not verified, often concern minor matters, and may be shaped by the same conditions under study. The ADHD studies come mostly from Iceland and Britain, use screening measures as well as diagnoses, and cannot separate ADHD from the conduct problems, substance use, and police contact that accompany it. Laboratory studies use volunteers and measures, such as suggestibility scales, that differ from a real interrogation. The case collections are selected sets of serious cases, and their low rates of diagnosed mental illness may partly reflect conditions that were never assessed.

The base rate matters here. As with confessions generally, the proportion of confessions by suspects with mental illness or ADHD that are false is unknown and no study measures it directly, and the per-interrogation rate of self-reported false confession in the largest survey of people with mental illness was about 4% (Redlich et al., 2010, as cited in Gudjonsson, 2018, ch. 5). A diagnosis raises questions about comprehension, coping, and the effect of particular tactics; it does not answer whether a confession is true.

Sex and gender findings are limited. The ADHD prisoner study sampled only men (Gudjonsson et al., 2008), and the ADHD prevalence meta-analysis found no significant difference by gender (Young et al., 2015). In a survey of 24,627 students in seven European countries, boys were interrogated more often than girls (16% vs. 7%) and, among those interrogated, somewhat more often reported a false confession (15.8% vs. 11.6%) (Gudjonsson et al., 2009, as reported in Gudjonsson, 2018, ch. 5). The mental illness surveys and comprehension studies summarized here did not report sex differences in the abstracts reviewed. Most proven false confessors are men, as are most people questioned about serious crimes. None of this permits an inference about an individual.

No diagnosis, test, or expert can determine whether a particular confession is true or false. The research identifies conditions that raise risk and questions to ask about a record; the answer depends on the evidence.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a diagnosis is offered as a reason to doubt a confession, ask when and how it was made, whether the condition was active at the time of the interrogation, and whether medication was available. Ask what the record shows about the suspect’s understanding of the warnings and about symptoms during questioning. When a self-report figure is cited, ask whether it is a lifetime or per-interrogation rate, what population it describes, and whether the reports were verified. For ADHD, ask whether the study measured compliance or suggestibility, since the findings differ, and whether conduct problems and substance use were accounted for. And in every case, ask whether the statement contained accurate, non-public details that the suspect supplied first, and whether any details were disclosed to him. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Mental Illness, ADHD, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

In Colorado v. Connelly (1986), a man approached a police officer in Denver and said he had committed a murder; he later reported that a voice had told him to confess, and a psychiatrist testified that he had been psychotic at the time. The Supreme Court held that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is involuntary under the Due Process Clause, that the same focus on official coercion governs the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, that the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the reliability of a statement not produced by police coercion is a matter for state evidence law. A mental condition therefore does not by itself make a confession involuntary.

The condition remains relevant in other ways. Courts consider the suspect’s mental state as part of the totality of the circumstances in judging whether police tactics overbore his will, and whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent may depend on his ability to understand the warnings. Once a confession is admitted, the defendant may present evidence about the circumstances in which it was made, including evidence bearing on its reliability (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986). In courts-martial, Article 31(d), UCMJ, and Mil. R. Evid. 304(a) exclude statements obtained through coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement; Rule 304(a)(1)(A) defines an involuntary statement by reference to the Fifth Amendment privilege and Due Process Clause, Article 31, and coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply, but those terms describe the conduct of the persons obtaining the statement, the accused’s mental condition is part of the totality of the circumstances, and Rule 304(g) allows the defense to present evidence on voluntariness to the members for its weight. Questions about the accused’s mental responsibility or capacity are addressed separately through a sanity board under R.C.M. 706.

Arizona

Arizona follows Connelly on the federal question and applies its own constitutional privilege (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10). Under A.R.S. § 13-3988, the judge determines voluntariness considering all the circumstances, and if the statement is admitted, jurors may consider it only if they find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was voluntary; Arizona’s instruction defines an involuntary statement by reference to a law enforcement officer’s violence, coercion, threats, or promises (RAJI (Criminal) Standard 19, 2022). A defendant’s mental condition is relevant to how those tactics affected him and to the weight of the statement. Expert testimony is governed by Ariz. R. Evid. 702, as amended effective January 1, 2024, and State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits general testimony that educates the jury without opinions about a particular person’s truthfulness. Arizona law is treated further in “Arizona Confession Law.”

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The research described above is the same whichever party relies on it. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately make. Diagnosed mental illness was documented in a minority of the proven false-confession cases in the collections reviewed, though diagnoses may not have been assessed in many of them (Gudjonsson, 2018, ch. 5), and a diagnosis is a potential risk factor, not a marker of unreliability (Gudjonsson, 2010). ADHD is associated with compliance more than with suggestibility, and adults with ADHD were not more suggestible than controls in one study (Gudjonsson et al., 2007, as summarized in Gudjonsson, 2013). Self-report findings are unverified and confounded with police contact. A condition alone does not make a confession involuntary (Connelly), and a record showing that the suspect understood and restated the warnings, was oriented and responsive, and supplied verifiable details first is the kind of record that the corroboration analysis treats as informative about reliability; whether the statement is reliable is for the fact finder.

The research also counsels caution. Many defendants with mental disorders understand only the simplest warnings (Rogers et al., 2007), and investigators may not recognize ADHD or other conditions in custody (Young et al., 2013). Where a suspect was visibly confused, expressed guilt unrelated to the facts, or was told that confessing would serve some other purpose, and where key details were disclosed, the Lloyd case illustrates how a confession can appear knowledgeable when the details came from the questioners. Recording the full interview, documenting what was disclosed, and confirming the suspect’s understanding protect the investigation.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports documenting the condition and its effect on the interrogation. Records of treatment, medication, and hospitalization, and accounts from people who saw the client near the time, can show whether symptoms were active (Redlich, 2004; Rogers et al., 2007). The ADHD research supports attention to compliance, impulsive decisions to end questioning, and the loss of medication in custody (Gudjonsson et al., 2008; Gudjonsson, 2018, ch. 5). The circumstances of the confession, including the client’s condition, are admissible on weight even after a suppression motion fails (Crane), and the comprehension research bears on whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent.

The research also counsels caution. Under Connelly, the condition alone does not establish involuntariness without police coercion. Self-report studies cannot show that any client’s confession was false, and in the case collections reviewed diagnosed mental illness was documented in a minority of proven false confessions, though diagnoses may not have been assessed in many of them (Gudjonsson, 2018, ch. 5). A diagnosis says little by itself about whether a particular statement is accurate. The research is most informative when a documented condition is connected to specific features of the questioning and when the corroboration evidence, including any accurate details the client supplied first, is addressed directly.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Drake, K. E., Bull, R., & Boon, J. C. W. (2008). Interrogative suggestibility, self-esteem, and the influence of negative life-events. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 13(2), 299–307. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532507X209981

Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. A. (2004). The problem of false confessions in the post-DNA world. North Carolina Law Review, 82(3), 891–1007.

Garrett, B. L. (2010). The substance of false confessions. Stanford Law Review, 62(4), 1051–1118.

Gross, S. R., Jacoby, K., Matheson, D. J., Montgomery, N., & Patil, S. (2005). Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through 2003. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 95(2), 523–560.

Gudjonsson, G. H. (2013). Interrogative suggestibility and compliance. In A. M. Ridley, F. Gabbert, & D. J. La Rooy (Eds.), Suggestibility in legal contexts: Psychological research and forensic implications (pp. 45–61). Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118432907.ch3

Gudjonsson, G. H. (2018). The psychology of false confessions: Forty years of science and practice. Wiley.

Gudjonsson, G. H. (2010). Psychological vulnerabilities during police interviews. Why are they important? Legal and Criminological Psychology, 15(2), 161–175. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532510X500064

Gudjonsson, G. H., Sigurdsson, J. F., Bragason, O. O., Newton, A. K., & Einarsson, E. (2008). Interrogative suggestibility, compliance and false confessions among prisoners and their relationship with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms. Psychological Medicine, 38(7), 1037–1044. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291708002882

Gudjonsson, G. H., Sigurdsson, J. F., & Sigfusdottir, I. D. (2009). Interrogation and false confessions among adolescents in seven European countries. What background and psychological variables best discriminate between false confessors and non-false confessors? Psychology, Crime & Law, 15(8), 711–728. https://doi.org/10.1080/10683160802516257

Gudjonsson, G. H., Sigurdsson, J. F., Sigfusdottir, I. D., & Young, S. (2012). False confessions to police and their relationship with conduct disorder, ADHD, and life adversity. Personality and Individual Differences, 52(6), 696–701. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.12.025

Gudjonsson, G. H., Young, S., & Bramham, J. (2007). Interrogative suggestibility in adults diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD): A potential vulnerability during police questioning. Personality and Individual Differences, 43(4), 737–745. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.01.014

Leo, R. A. (2008). Police interrogation and American justice. Harvard University Press.

National Registry of Exonerations. (2026). Eddie Joe Lloyd. Retrieved November 6, 2026, from https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/10617

Redlich, A. D. (2004). Mental illness, police interrogations, and the potential for false confession. Psychiatric Services, 55(1), 19–21. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.55.1.19

Redlich, A. D., Summers, A., & Hoover, S. (2010). Self-reported false confessions and false guilty pleas among offenders with mental illness. Law and Human Behavior, 34(1), 79–90. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-009-9194-8

Rogers, R., Harrison, K. S., Hazelwood, L. L., & Sewell, K. W. (2007). Knowing and intelligent: A study of Miranda warnings in mentally disordered defendants. Law and Human Behavior, 31(4), 401–418. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9070-8

Young, S., Goodwin, E. J., Sedgwick, O., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (2013). The effectiveness of police custody assessments in identifying suspects with intellectual disabilities and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. BMC Medicine, 11, Article 248. https://doi.org/10.1186/1741-7015-11-248

Young, S., Moss, D., Sedgwick, O., Fridman, M., & Hodgkins, P. (2015). A meta-analysis of the prevalence of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in incarcerated populations. Psychological Medicine, 45(2), 247–258. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291714000762

Legal Authorities

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 10.

Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 304; R.C.M. 706 (2024 ed.).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 19 (State Bar of Arizona 2022).

Related topic papers: Risk Factors for False Confessions: An Overview · Types of False Confessions · Interrogative Suggestibility and Compliance · Intellectual Disability and False Confessions · Intoxication, Withdrawal, and Confessions · Forensic Evaluation of a Disputed Confession or Miranda Waiver

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Autism Online Offense · Memory in the Courtroom